A Dose of Emptiness

An Annotated Translation of the
sTong thun chen mo
of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang

JOSÉ IGNACIO CABEZÓN

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*[Brackets] indicate that the title is not originally found in the text, being instead my insertion.

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Introduction

> **All men by nature desire to know.**
>
> Aristotle

With these words the great Greek philosopher, Aristotle, begins his *Metaphysics.*[1] Although history has been witness to a plethora of interpretations of these seven words, Ortega y Gasset's must be one of the most interesting. In his Postscript to an essay in *What Is Philosophy*[2] he states: "To know is to be not content with things as presented to us, but to seek beyond their appearance for their being. This 'being' of things is a strange condition: it is not made clear in things, but on the contrary, it throbs hidden within them, beneath them, beyond them." There is a sense in Buddhism also in which we might say that it is natural for man or woman to know. Knowledge, and specifically knowledge of the true nature of things, of the "being" that lies throbbing within things, as Ortega y Gasset puts it, is our destiny as human beings. It is natural for human beings both to know and to want to know. Hence, it is not truth in and of itself that will set us free, but our appropriation of it, our knowledge of it.

Ortega y Gasset also recognizes, however, that the being of things "is not clear," that it is "hidden." Buddhists also believe that reality is not evident to us, that, while always present, it evades our attempts at apprehending it. The reason for this has to do with the condition of our own mind, with the fact that we have accustomed ourselves to constantly misperceiving the world. This continual misapprehension of ourselves, of others and the world around us is called *ignorance,* and it is said to be the cause of all of the pain and anguish in the cycle of rebirth, this world known as *saṃsāra*. Hence, mKhas grub rje, the author of the text translated here, begins his polemical treatise on insight meditation called *The Lamp for Eliminating the Darkness of Evil Paths*[3] with these words:

> Apart from meditation on the correct view
> There is no path that can destroy the root of *saṃsāra*.

In Buddhism ignorance (skt. *avidyā;* tib. *ma rig pa*) is said to be the most basic cause of suffering. In this context ignorance does not refer to a passive

lack of factual knowledge but to an active misapprehension of the world. It is considered an innate, prelinguistic, psychological predisposition that, having found a niche in the minds of sentient beings, causes us to suffer. This ignorance, which is the active superimposition of a certain kind of ontological status onto entities that lack them, is believed to be at the very root of the trials and tribulations that affect not only human beings, but all sentient life forms that inhabit this universe of limited existence. Certainly, one of the most important of the Buddha's insights was the fact that neither suffering nor its most fundamental cause, ignorance, is an adventitious thing.[4] Instead, the tradition has consistently maintained that both suffering and its cause could be overcome through the application of an antidote.[5] That antidote is called *wisdom* (skt. *prajñā;* tib. *shes rab*), and it refers to the understanding of realty, the ultimate nature of all phenomena. Being the antidote to ignorance, it brings about the reversal of the normal misperception of the world to which living things are heir. The understanding of the true and final nature of our selves and of the world around us is said to be the force that brings an end to suffering, liberating the person to lead the life of an awakened one, a buddha. The object that wisdom perceives, the ultimate nature of phenomena, the reality that eludes sentient beings in their limited modes of thought, is (at least in Mahāyāna Buddhism[6]) called *emptiness* (skt. *śūnyatā;* tib. *stong pa nyid*).[7] It is little wonder, therefore, that emptiness has been characterized as "the central philosophy of Buddhism."[8]

What follows is an annotated translation of one of the most important works on emptiness in the history of the scholastic tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, the *sTong thun chen mo (TTC)* of the fourteenth century scholar-saint, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po. It is an encyclopedic work that aims at synthesizing into a coherent whole the most important strands of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy around one central theme, that of emptiness. The dGe lugs pa, or, as it was known in its early days, the dGa' ldan pa school of Tibetan Buddhism, of which mKhas grub rje is the third patriarch, is both historically and intellectually the culmination of a long tradition of scholasticism that began in the early centuries of the common era in India with such figures as Asaṅga and Nāgārjuna. Following in the steps of his master, the founder of the dGe lugs pa school, the great Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa (1357–1419), mKhas grub rje attempts a synthesis of the different schools of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought (the idealist school, known as the Yogācāra or Cittamātra, and the nominalist, the Madhyamaka—itself divided into two subschools, the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika). His approach is to create an interpretive scheme that at once validates these different schools as soteriologically useful while maintaining a gradation in philosophical accuracy (truth)[9] that allows him ultimately to declare the "bright rays of the logical methods of the glorious Candra,"[10] that is, the Prāsaṅgika school of the Madhyamaka as elucidated in the works of Candrakīrti (seventh century) and his successors, to be the ultimate and final expression of truth, the Buddha's ultimate purport

(*dgongs pa mthar thug pa*).[11] Based on a hermeneutical framework that seeks to interpret and reconcile the different (and oftentimes contradictory) scriptures upon which these schools were based, he sets forth the doctrine of emptiness in the Mahāyāna, contrasting it to the doctrines of the Buddhist "realists," and throughout relying very heavily on the methodology of the school of Buddhist "logicians," the Pramāṇikas. Indeed, the particular synthesis of Madhyamaka thought and Dharmakīrti's *pramāṇa* method is considered one of the striking (and most controversial) features of the dGe lugs pa approach to Māhāyana philosophy.[12] The later dGe lugs pa tradition goes to the extent of characterizing this synthesis of the Madhyamaka and Pramāṇika traditions as "two lions back to back" (*dbu tshad seng ge rgyab sprod*), implying that it is an invincible philosophical stance impervious to external attack.

Much of mKhas grub rje's work therefore can be seen as the synthesis and reconciliation of the different scholastic traditions of India. However, synthesis is only half of mKhas grub rje's task. This was to a great extent already accomplished in the works of his master, Tsong kha pa. Equally, if not more important to mKhas grub rje was the defense of the views of Tsong kha pa against the attacks, both real and imagined, of rival philosophical schools. Hence, the *TTC* is both a didactic text and *a polemical text,* something that is witnessed as much by the style as by the content of the work.

For those with a love of the scholastic mind set, alas an endangered species in this postmodern age, the scope and detail of the *TTC* will be found to be truly amazing. In a text of less than 500 folio sides mKhas grub rje manages to touch upon most of the major issues of Māhāyana Buddhist philosphy, from prophecy to hermeneutics to psychology and meditation. The table of contents of the work, an exquisite piece of scholastic precision in its own right, is a veritable curriculum for an advanced course in Buddhist metaphysics. However, the very ambitious nature of the enterprise oftentimes makes the work demanding on the part of readers. I have attempted to ease the reader's burden by supplying the context of arguments, or expanding on them, in brief explanatory notes. In view of the length of the work, and the additional task of annotating the copious citations from scriptural and commentarial sources on which mKhas grub rje relies, I have tried to keep these to a bare minimum. Be that as it may, I can assure the reader that perseverance in regard to these more difficult portions of the text will be well rewarded.

Contextualization of the TTC

Historically speaking, the *TTC* is a work of pivotal importance within the Madhyamaka exegetical tradition of the dGe lugs pa school of Tibetan Buddhism.[13] In many ways it is a transitional work, taking us historically and intellectually from the works of Tsong kha pa (founder of the dGe lugs pa school) to the later *yig cha* literature, the manuals-guidebooks for dialectical

disputation in the great monasteries of the order. In the *TTC* the influence of Tsong kha pa's writings is evident, especially as regards the framework and layout of the text. We also begin to find, however, more emphasis on the "opponent-reply" format so typical of the later *yig chas*. Indeed, to this day the *TTC* has been used as a supplement to the *yig cha* material within the monastic curriculum itself. In many ways it bridges the gap between the all-encompassing and erudite works of Tsong kha pa and the more specialized debate manuals. In an area where opinions abound and vagueness is rampant, the tradition considers the *TTC* to be one of the clearest expositions of Madhyamaka thought.

The works of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (the senior-most disciple of Tsong kha pa and his first successor) can be said to have set the standard for the study of the *prajñāpāramitā* (tib. *phar phyin*) and *pramāṇa* (tib. *tshad ma*) genres within the dGe lugs pa school. Although mKhas grub rje also composed commentaries to the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and to the *Pramāṇavārttikam*[14] (the chief textbooks for the study of *prajñāpāramitā* and *pramāṇa*, respectively), it is principally the *rNam bshad snying po rgyan* and the *Thar lam gsal byed* of rGyal tshab rje that have been relied upon as the standard first-order Tibetan commentaries in these two fields.[15]

When it comes to Madhyamaka studies, the works of Tsong kha pa are primarily relied upon. His commentaries to the *Madhyamakāvatāra* and to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, the *dGongs pa rab gsal* and *rTsa shes ṭik chen*, respectively,[16] are classics and the standard works for the study of Madhyamaka in the dGe lugs pa school to this very day.

Unlike these works, whose importance lies in being commentaries on specific Indian texts, the significance of the *TTC* as a piece of Madhyamaka exegesis lies in its being a synthetic work that brings together in a systematic way relevant strands of thought, approaching the subject thematically without being bound by adherance to a root text. mKhas grub rje's real genius, then, is as a composer of synthetic works. The *TTC*, the *sDe bdun yid kyi mun gsal*, his synthetic work on *pramāṇa*, and the *rGyud sde spyi rnam*,[17] on *tantra*, are all considered masterpieces of independent and systematic thought arranged thematically, owing no structural alliegance to any single Indian text. For this very reason, it seems to me, the work presented here is of the utmost relevance to the Western student of Buddhist thought whose interest is in gaining a broad yet detailed understanding of key areas of Māhāyana philosophy.

Structure of the TTC

The chief virtue of the *TTC*, the quality that sets it apart from other Madhyamaka works, is its synthetic character. But how is this synthesis accomplished? As we have said, it is synthetic in that it approaches the philosophy of the

Mahāyāna topically, dealing with specific issues and bringing the fundamental works of the Indian philosophical tradition to bear on these major themes. It is "synthetic" in another way, however. The *TTC*, in the way it is structured, is a synthesis of three of Tsong kha pa's major works:

1. The *Drang nges legs bshad snying po,*[18] itself a synthetic work on the doctrine of emptiness in the Yogācāra, Svātantrika, and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka schools and on the hermeneutical questions arising from such different interpretations of emptiness.
2. The "Insight" (skt. *vipaśyanā,* tib. *lhag mthong*) section of the *Lam rim chen mo,*[19] a systematic exposition of the path to enlightenment based on Atiśa's model of the individuals of small, intermediate, and great scope.[20]
3. The *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal,*[21] his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti.

Each of these three works contributes some element, structural, doctrinal, or both, to the *TTC*. The general layout of the *TTC* is based on that of the *Legs bshad snying po.* We find first in the *TTC* a brief section on Yogācāra hermeneutics and on the notion of emptiness derived from this interpretive scheme, a section very similar, both in structure and content, to that of the *Legs bshad snying po.* This is followed by a section on the Svātantrika Madhyamaka school, again resembling that of the latter work, but discussing at much greater length several pivotal topics such as "the reasoning from the one and the many," the uncommon Svātantrika tenet of accepting that things exist by virtue of their own characteristic and so forth.[22] Finally, as in *Legs bshad snying po,* the bulk of the work is dedicated to a detailed exposition of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka school, and here the *TCC*'s treatment differs from and is in some ways far more elaborate than that found in the work of Tsong kha pa, emphasizing and discussing at great length the uncommon tenets of the Prāsaṅgikas[23] such as their belief that *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha āryans* must have understood emptiness, their rejection of a foundation consciousness (skt. *ālayavijñāna*) and of autocognition (skt. *svasaṃvedanā*), their peculiar views concerning the nature of time, and so forth. It seems clear, therefore, that the general framework of the *TTC* is based on that of the *Legs bshad snying po.*

At the beginning of the Madhyamaka section, before discussing the specific tenets of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika subschools, we find a section (4.2.3) in the *TTC* that is clearly derived from the *vipaśyanā* section of the *Lam rim chen mo.* We find here a format that is almost identical to that of the latter work: a discussion of why it is necessary to identify the object to be negated, the rejection of two faulty interpretations, one that does not go far enough in its refutation and one that goes too far, and finally the proper iden-

tification of the object to be refuted and the methods for doing so. This is essentially the same framework Tsong kha pa uses in his *Lam rim chen mo.*

Finally, within the Prāsaṅgika section itself we find that much of the material is based on topics dealt with in the *Madhyamakāvatāra.* It is not surprising, therefore, that much of mKhas grub rje's exposition here is loosely structured on Tsong kha pa's great commentary to the latter work, the *dGongs pa rab gsal.*

Hence, the *TTC* is indeed mKhas grub rje's synthesis of three of Tsong kha pa's major works into a logical and systematic whole. It should be evident from this that the *TTC* is arguably the best available synoptic exposition of the dGe lugs pas' views on the Madhyamaka.[24] In my translation I have attempted to point out instances where sections in the *TTC* correspond to sections in the three works mentioned earlier, to cross reference the *TTC* to the relevant works of Tsong kha pa, making reference both to the Tibetan originals and available translations.

Madhyamaka Polemics

The *TTC* is, however, more than just an expository work on the Madhyamaka in general and the views of Tsong kha pa in particular. It cannot be overemphasized that it is in great measure a *polemical* work,[25] defending the views of Tsong kha pa against rival theories and in the process criticizing those theories themselves. In this sense the *TTC* can be seen as one of the earliest texts in what was to later become a large corpus of literature dedicated to Madhyamaka polemics.[26] Nor is it unfair to characterize mKhas grub rje himself as the first "defender" of the views of Tsong kha pa against the rival theories of his day.[27] To say that much of his language in the *TTC* is extremely harsh is an understatement. It is clear from his own words that he viewed himself as the defender of his master's views and considered the critiques of others something demanding response and rebuttal.

It is difficult to determine exactly to whose views mKhas grub rje is responding much of the time: very rarely does he mention a rival school of thought by name, much less that of an individual opponent.[28] Even though it is often impossible to identify individual opponents,[29] it *is* an easier task to identify some of the philosophical positions that mKhas grub rje finds anathema. We know, for example, that chief among these views was that known as the *gzhan stong,* "the emptiness of what is other," a theory first systematized textually by Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292–1361), in his *Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho* and later expanded on by his successors to the throne of the Jo mo nang monastery, the most famous of which was Jo nang Tāranātha (c. 1575–1634). Another major philosophical position criticized in the *TTC* is

called by mKhas grub rje "the view that things are neither existent nor nonexistent" (*yod min med min gyi lta ba*).[30] Although explicitly an ontological position, in actuality it seems to be a code word for a complex of beliefs (some dealing with language and conceptual thought, some with ontology, some with epistemology, some with soteriology and the theory of meditation) that were most likely never held by a single individual or school.[31]

To understand the kinds of issues that the *TTC* is addressing, it might be useful to make some more general observations concerning the philosophical positions that mKhas grub rje ascribes to his opponents. Generally speaking, we can say that mKhas grub rje sees himself responding to at least three major sets of beliefs that he considers to be doctrinally misguided intellectually. He regards all three as forms of skepticism or nihilism, and so do the later dGe lugs pa exegetes who follow him. In fact, as mentioned earlier, often the three are conflated and portrayed as the view of a single opponent, something that is clearly not the case historically.

The first is considered by mKhas grub rje to be a form of quietism,[32] which he considered a kind of soteriological nihilism in the sense of being a dead end in the path to salvation. It has been variously called "the view of Hva shang" or "the view that nothing is to be thought of" (*ci yang yid la mi byed pa'i lta ba*). As described by the *TTC* and other dGe lugs pa sources, it is the position that discursive and analytical forms of meditation are but expedients to lead the adept to the supreme form of meditation in which all thought is to be eliminated, the mind resting in the peacefulness of no thought.[33]

Another position repeatedly criticized by the dGe lugs pa authors is a form of epistemological skepticism, a view that challenges the validity of conceptual and linguistic knowledge.[34] From a cognitive perspective, this view is portrayed as criticizing the validity of logical inference, where the Prāsaṅgika critique of the *svatantra* form of reasoning is mistaken for a critique of syllogistic reasoning in general.[35] At its most extreme the position is seen as the repudiation of the possibility of valid knowledge (skt. *pramāṇa;* tib. *tshad ma*) in general. On the linguistic side it upholds the doctrine of radical ineffability, that nothing can be predicated of anything else, that any description of emptiness is useless, all being equally distant from the ultimate; as a corollary it maintains that the Prāsaṅgika therefore holds no philosophical position whatsoever.[36]

Finally, we find a form of radical ontological skepticism known as "the view that things are neither existent nor nonexistent" (*yod min med min kyi lta ba*). According to this view the Madhyamaka critique is to be carried out in regard to existence, causality, and so on *in general,* without the need to affix the qualifier *ultimately;* that is, without it being necessary to qualify what is being repudiated as "ultimate" existence, or "true" causality, and so forth. This view derives from a literal interpretation of certain passages in the Madhyamaka literature that on the surface repudiate the law of the excluded middle.

Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub rje, and the later tradition have all been consistent in claiming that these views are mutually related. If they had ever been confronted with the fact that there was probably no one historical figure that held all of these views they most likely would have answered that whether they are ever found to be historically exemplified within a single school or individual, the views are mutual corollaries of each other *in the logical sphere*. If nothing exists, they would say, nothing can be said to exist *as* anything else (a man cannot be said to exist as an impermanent thing, for example), and if this is the case, nothing can be said *to be* anything else (predication is impossible), reducing one to the view of radical ineffability. If nothing exists, then knowledge is also impossible, for knowledge is knowledge of what exists. What is more, if nothing exists and if there is nothing that can be said or known, what method of meditation would be more appropriate than the emptying of the mind? The connection between these three views, they would claim, is obvious.[37]

Even though we often can glean the general philosophical principles that mKhas grub rje found anathema, principles such as those outlined earlier, corollating these to the views of specific historical persons or texts, as we have said, is highly problematical. Although a few Tibetan scholars, such as Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, *are* mentioned by name when their views are rejected, this is by far the exception. Usually we find an opponent identified simply as "someone" (*ka cig*), nor is it clear that every time an opponent's opinion is cited it need represent the views of a well-established school or a well-known individual at all. It is more likely that on many such occasions mKhas grub rje is putting forth hypothetical arguments that he has either pondered over himself or else encountered on the debate courtyards of different monasteries.[38] Be that as it may, the opponent-reply format of much of the *TTC* is clear evidence that the work is to a great extent polemical and intended by mKhas grub rje as a defense of the views of his master.

Ideally, the translation of a work the likes of the *TTC* should make extensive reference to the views of mKhas grub rje's opponents. It is the ideal because, by identifying the intellectual currents that influenced the writing of such a work and by noting those currents to which the work itself gave rise, the text, now placed in the intellectual and historical context in which it arose, can truly be understood. Given that these opposing views are almost never identified with historical figures or texts, an enterprise of this sort has as a prerequisite the complete mastery of the vast corpus of Tibetan Madhyamaka literature.[39] Needless to say, this is something I lack. Nonetheless, I have not completely forsaken the vision of providing for the reader a text that, although food for thought for the philosophically minded, is not lacking in interest to the intellectual historian. To this end I have made reference to other pivotal Madhyamaka works of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries where their views either support or are in clear opposition to those of the *TTC*.[40]

Textual Considerations

The unabridged title of our text is *The Treatise That Perfectly Elucidates Reality, The Profound Doctrine of Emptiness, Called "Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate" (Zab mo stong pa nyid kyi de kho na nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed)*. It is, however, known colloquially as the *Great Digest* (*sTong thun chen mo*)[41] or as *The Digest That Opens the Eyes of the Fortunate* (*sTong thun skal bzang mig 'byed*).

In my translation, I have consulted three different editions of the text:

1. That found in the first volume of the Mādhyamika Text Series (*MTS*), edited by Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin bsTan pa rgyal mtshan (New Delhi: 1972);
2. That found in the *gSungs 'bum (Collected Works)*, vol. *ka,* of the 1897 Lhasa Zhol edition preserved in microfiche by the Microform Research Program of the State University of New York at Stonybrook (1976), and subsequently published in Dharmasala (1981); and
3. That found in the *gSungs 'bum,* vol. *ka,* of the bKra shis lhun po edition from the library of Lochen Rinpoche (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1983).

From the pattern of textual and scribal errors it seems clear that the *MTS* was most likely based on the Lhasa Zhol edition.

In my translation I have made reference to the page numbers of the *MTS* edition that, though not the most reliable, is nonetheless one of the most accessible. The *MTS* edition is labeled both with the traditional Tibetan page numbers (written out in words on the left-hand margin of the front of each folio) and with arabic numbers (each folio-side numbered sequentially).[42] The arabic page numbers of *MTS* are to found in the margin of the translation to facilitate access to the original. The text of the *TTC* is then 473 pages (235 folios)[43] in length. In addition, in the same volume we find the text followed by three appendices, separate from, but nonetheless related to, the *TTC* itself. Instead of being the actual writings of mKhas grub rje, these three smaller works are notes on lectures given by him and taken down by one of his chief disciples, Zhang zhung pa Phyogs las rnam rgyal Chos dbang grags pa'i dpal (1404–1469). The first of these (*MTS,* pp. 473–506) is an explanation of the refutation of "arising via the four extremes" as it is explained in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*. The second (*MTS,* pp. 506–512) is a brief commentary on Tsong kha pa's *rTen 'brel snying po.*[44] The final one (*MTS,* pp. 512–523) is a work on the difficult points relating to the cultivation of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. Although these three smaller texts are related to each other and to the *TTC* in that they deal with topics in Madhyamaka philosophy, that they are distinct works from the *TTC* is evidenced by the fact that the concluding

verses and colophon to the *TTC* separate it from these three appendices, despite the fact that they are not listed separately in the table of contents of the *Collected Works* (dkar chag).[45]

The editions consulted are riddled with textual or scribal errors (on an average of two per folio). Most of these errors are evident and minor. No mention was made of most of them in the notes to the translation. To have done so would have been both tedious and pointless. Only major errors whose correction could change the meaning of the text in a drastic way were referred to in the notes, but such instances are relatively rare. It is my hope to see published a list of textual emendations to the *TTC* at a later date.

The Translation

The translation was completed under the tutelage of several eminent native scholars of the tradition (see Acknowledgments). One of my mentors once said that the key to good annotations is knowing not what to include, but what to omit. I have taken his words to heart and have tried to be laconic in the notes to the translation. My annotations are in general of four kinds: historical, explanatory, bibliographical, and philological. Historical notes attempt to show the intellectual connections, antagonisms or allegiances between mKhas grub rje's views and those of other Tibetan scholars throughout history.

Explanatory notes are meant to elucidate obscure points in the arguments or to set forth some of the presuppositions assumed by mKhas grub rje in the course of his exposition, presuppositions that might be evident to a Tibetan scholar with many years of background in Madhyamaka studies, but that, more often than not, escape the Western reader. I have assumed the reader to have a substantial knowledge of Buddhist philosophy. Given the already advanced nature of the text, not to have done so would have meant a proliferation of explanatory notes that could easily have matched the text itself in length.

The bibliographical notes are usually to be found at the beginning of a major section. In these I have attempted to give the references to the latest or best works, usually in the secondary literature, that treat the topic in question. Where the literature on a certain subject is vast, I have referred the reader to the bibliographies contained in one or two recent works.

Philological notes point out major textual or scribal errors or inconsistencies in the body of the *TTC* and give references to the works cited by the author. Although I have attempted to locate all of the passages from the Indian and Tibetan texts that mKhas grub rje cites, I cannot say that I have completely succeeded. There are over 1,000 such citations and, as is the custom among Tibetan scholars, mKhas grub rje will often quote a work without giving any information as to the title (this is especially true when citing a *sūtra*). With few exceptions, however, I have located almost every work cited. Most

of the passages cited have been traced to the Tibetan canon (see the list of abbreviations for the different editions of the canon used) except in instances where separate critical editions of a superior quality exist (*MA*, for example). When the Sanskrit is available I have generally attempted to give the reference to the passage in the Sanskrit text as well. Finally, I have discussed variations between the *TTC* citation and the original (either Tibetan or Sanskrit) only when the original varies significantly from the cited passage. Therefore, I have given the Sanskrit-Tibetan original for a cited passage only in exceptional cases, when it differs sufficiently from the *TTC* citation to warrant discussion.

For the transliteration of Tibetan words I have used a modified Wylie system,[46] identical to that used in the Descriptive Catalogue of the Naritasan Institute Collection of Tibetan Works (Narita, Japan: Naritasan Shinshoji, 1989), Monograph Series, Occasional Papers, vol. 1. The first letter of pronounced letter-clusters of proper nouns has been capitalized.

The *TTC* is a philosophical work written in very terse philosophical Tibetan that is at once extremely accurate and extremely difficult to understand. The problems of rendering such a work into readable English should be evident. I make no apologies for the fact that my translation is at times terse and awkward. The original itself is this in many cases. I have not, however, forsaken the hope of making the translation readable; and yet, when it has come down to a choice of a flowing style or accuracy, I have opted for the latter. Nonetheless, whether "easy English" or not, I hope that what I have written is English. An accurate and grammatical translation that is at times difficult and unwieldy is as much as I had ever hoped to accomplish. Still, the very difficult portions of the work (the linguistic version of the Yogācāra theory of emptiness, the critique of the *svatantra* form of reasoning, and so forth) are few and far between, and I would once again encourage the reader to persevere even with these more difficult sections. mKhas grub rje, of course, likens the work, in its unabridged title, to the proverbial curative for the blind that acts "to open the eyes of the fortunate." One might hope that for those of us in whom the text does not elicit the advent of gnostic insight, its study may nonetheless provide us with a glimpse, albeit ever so small, of the very profound Buddhist theory of emptiness.

A Short Biography of mKhas grub dGe Legs dpal bzang

Note: This biography is based on several bio-hagiographical works (*rnam thar*) concerning mKhas grub rje. The basis for the present account has been Tshe mchog gling Yongs 'dzin Ye shes rgyal mtshan's (1713–1793) biography in the *Byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i bla ma brgyud pa'i rnam thar* (*LRLN*) (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1970, vol. 1, pp. 877–922), a concise work that discusses most of the major points in mKhas grub rje's life. This has then been supplemented by consulting other works such as the *gSang ba'i nram thar* (*SNT*) of rJe btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, to be found in mKhas grub rje's *Collected Works*, vol. *a*, pp. 421–493.[1] I have also consulted, in the composition of the present biography, the *rNam thar mkhas pa'i yid 'phrog* (*KYP*), *Collected Works*, vol. *ka*, pp. 1–22, written by gNas rnying 'Jam dbyangs kun dga' dge legs rin chen rgyal mtshan (1446–1496), the basis for a great deal of later *rnam thar* material on the life of mKhas grub rje. I have also used as a source the incomplete *rNam thar* (*NT*) by dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po (1728–1791) found in his *Collected Works*, vol. 5, Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series, vol. 25 (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1971), pp. 699–723; and also sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho's history of the dGe lugs pa sect, the *Baidur ser po* (BS) (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1976), pp. 121–123. Many of the dates, both in this biography and throughout the text, have been determined in dependence upon, and others cross referenced against, the *bsTan rtsis kun las btus pa* of Tshe tan zhabs drung (*TTKT*) (Tsho sngon: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, n.d.) My goal has been to give the reader a feeling for the contents and style of traditional Tibetan hagiographical literature without the loss of a critical historical perspective. Discussions of the variations in the different biographies, differences in dates, and supplementary materials derived from oral traditions, for the most part, is relegated to the notes. Very little secondary literature is devoted to mKhas grub rje. Of what is available, the most interesting and accurate is L. W. J. van der Kuijjp's two articles, "Studies in the Life and Thought of Mkhas grub rje I: mKhas grub rje's Epistemological Oeuvre and His Philological Remarks on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I" (*SK-I*) and "Studies in the Life and Thought of Mkhas-Grub-Rje IV Mkhas-Grub-Rje on Regionalisms and Dialects" (*SK-IV*), both in *Berliner Indologische Studien* (*BIS*), Band 1 (1985): 75–105 and Band 2 (1986): 23–49, respectively.

I live in the gorge of a snow mountain, the *Tathāgata's* teachings,
My mane heavy with the weight of a thousand scriptural traditions,
Possessing the power of the inexhaustible claws of reasoning,
I alone am the supreme sage, the king of beasts.[2]

mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang[3] (1385–1438) was one of the two chief disciples of Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa (1357–1419), one of the greatest figures in the history of Tibetan Buddhism and the founder of the dGe lugs pa school. Though the younger contemporary of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen[4] (1364–1432), who was Tsong kha pa's first successor to the throne of dGa' ldan, mKhas grub rje is often characterized as the "chief spiritual son" (*sras kyi thu bo*),[5] implying a closer personal relationship to Tsong kha pa. Indeed, so close were his spiritual ties to his master that, after the death of Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub rje is said to have received visions of him in many different forms. He is also, as we have seen, the first major upholder and defender of the tradition after the death of his teacher, guarding the doctrine set forth by his master against the onslaught of rival theories.

The eleven volumes of his *Collected Works* are witness to his expertise in both the fields of *sūtra* and *tantra*. As regards the latter, he is especially renowned for his work on the *Kālacakra*.[6] With regard to the *sūtra* tradition, his commentaries on Madhyamaka,[7] Pramāṇa, and the Prajñāpāramitā[8] are all extremely respected and popular with scholars in the dGe lugs pa tradition, being in part the foundation for the later *yig cha* literature, that corpus of work that formed the basis for the curriculum of the great dGe lugs pa monastic institutions of Tibet.

He was born[9] in a section of sTod byang[10] in gTsang called lDog gzhung,[11] not far from where a famous monastery was later to be founded. His father, bKra shis dpal bzang,[12] was a nobleman in government service; his mother's name was Bu[13] 'dren rgyal mo.[14] He was the eldest of three brothers. The intermediate one, Ba so Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1402–1473), also became renowned as a great scholar-saint and like his elder brother eventually came to occupy the throne of dGa' ldan.

mKhas grub rje is said to have had a very uneventful, obstacle-free youth, and from an early age is said to have been admonished by "the Buddhas and their Sons and by all of the holy protectors of the doctrine to firmly grasp onto the teachings of the Master, the Protector Mañjuśrī (Tsong kha pa)."[15] He took novice (*śramaṇera*) vows at the permissible age of seven under mKhas grub Seng ge rgyal mtshan dpal bzang po.[16] At this point he received the ordination name of dGe legs dpal bzang. He was then put under the tutelage of the great Sa skya scholar Red mda' ba gZhon nu blo gros (1349–1412)[17] from whom he is said to have very quickly learned all the important philosophical texts studied at the time, including "the seven logical treatises, the higher and lower *Abhidharmas*, the *Five Works of Maitreya*, and (Nāgārjuna's) *Sixfold*

Compendium of Reasoning, as well as the *Vinaya*." At that time he is also said to have received from Ye shes dpal the initiation into Hevajra and the full transmission of the *Lam 'bras* teachings, the principal tantric practice of the Sa skya school to which he belonged.[18] His earlier years were spent at places like Ngam ring and Sa skya, studying *sūtra* and *tantra* from a variety of Sa skya scholars the likes of bSod nams rgyal mtshan and the great Na bza' ba.[19]

During his years of study, as was the custom of the time, he traveled to many of the great monasteries of gTsang (Western Tibet) to debate with other students and to sharpen his own mental faculties through dialectical disputation. At one point, while he was visiting the monastery of Ngam ring chos sde,[20] the great scholar Bo dong Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1375–1450)[21] arrived to challenge the monks and their understanding of scripture. He announced a date and time and dared anyone to speak out against his systematic critique of the Sa skya Paṇḍita's controversial work on logic, the *Tshad ma rig gter*,[22] a work that Bo dong characterized as "a teeming mass of internal contradiction." Several of the more prominent scholars attempted to confront Bo dong but were reduced to accepting contradictions "in a matter of two or three arguments."[23] The monks in the assembly, witnessing the displeasure of their benefactor, who at one point is even said to have scolded them,[24] are said to have urged mKhas grub rje to stand up to the great scholar as the defender of the Sa skya tradition even though he was but a mere sixteen years of age at the time.[25] Not only was he said to have properly defended the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita, but, as the story goes, he mercilessly attacked Bo dong's own views, reducing him to accepting the absurd conclusion that "there was such a thing as an entity (*dngos po*) that did not arise from a cause."[26] In general, the debate is said to have been a classic in the field of logic, an air of openmindedness prevailing, with neither party insistently holding onto his own views dogmatically. Many of the philosophical positions advocated by Bo dong are said to be cited in mKhas grub rje's classic work on logic, the *sDe bdun yid kyi mun sal*, and later, Bo dong is said to have himself praised the young mKhas grub rje.[27]

When he reached the appropriate age of twenty he took full monastic ordination with Red mda' ba as the abbot.[28] Then, two years later in 1407,[29] it is said that Red mda' ba, realizing the tremendous boon for the doctrine if mKhas grub rje met the great Tsong kha pa, sent his student to Se ra chos sding,[30] where Tsong kha pa was residing at the time. On the way, at Nye thang, mKhas grub rje had a vision of an orange colored Mañjuśrī, considered very significant as Tsong kha pa is believed to be a manifestation of Mañjuśrī.[31] Arriving at Se ra chos sding, he inquired as to the whereabouts of Tsong kha pa from a monk. This simple ascetic so impressed mKhas grub rje with his life-style, conduct, and respect for his own master that, when he heard that the ascetic was a disciple of Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub rje's faith and wish to meet his future master increased.

When the meeting took place there is said to have been an instant rapport between the two.[32] The master asked his new disciple what dreams he had had on the path, and upon relating to Tsong kha pa his vision of Mañjuśrī, the latter is said to have replied that mKhas grub rje was an extremely bright disciple of the highest quality who held great promise in being of benefit to others in the future. He also convinced the young mKhas grub rje to take as his new tutelary deity (*yi dam*) Vajrabhairava, which he did from then on, having obtained the initiation and complete instructions from his new master. It is said that Tsong kha pa, overjoyed by mKhas grub rje's earnestness and zeal, prophecied his future success in this practice.

Next, he is said to have received from Tsong kha pa the instructions on *Lam rim* (the *Graded Stages of the Path*) and that he obtained "indestructibly firm faith" in him.[33] At dGa' ldan, after mKhas grub rje had made a series of extensive offerings to Tsong kha pa, the latter consented to give him ten months of consecutive teaching. During this time the master would explain the four classes of *tantra* and the great treatises (*gzhung chen mo*) during the day. At night he would give instructions concerning the generation and completion stages of the *tantra;* and again, at the same time, after more extensive offerings, Tsong kha pa is said to have related to mKhas grub rje his "secret autobiography"[34] and many other hidden instructions concerning the *tantra*. He is also said to have received many essential instructions (*man ngag*) from his master's other disciples, especially from rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen and from 'Dul 'dzin grags pa rgyal mtshan.[35]

It is not clear how long mKhas grub rje spent in Tsong kha pa's presence. We know, however, that he eventually left for gTsang, where he founded several monasteries, taught, and dedicated himself especially to tantric practice. During his time in gTsang he founded the Nyang stod lCang ra monastery,[36] and he initially became known in the area under the title *lCang ra bKa' bcu pa*, the lCang ra Master of Ten Treatises.[37] On the death of Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub rje is said to have retired to mDangs can Mountain, another of the monasteries he founded in gTsang, where he continued to practice all aspects of the doctrine in accordance with the precepts of his master. At this time he wrote several verses and made ten solemn promises[38] such as to engage only in religious activity and never in politics, war, and so on; never to speak of the faults of others no matter how slight; never to speak harshly to others; not to think about things that incite attachment, desire for wealth and fame, and so forth; but to focus solely on those religious principles that deserve to be contemplated.

Then, in 1424, five years after the death of Tsong kha pa, when mKhas grub rje was thirty-nine years old, he founded the great monastery of dPal 'khor sde chen[39] under the sponsorship of the local ruler, Rab brtan kun bzang. There he remained for four years, teaching extensively the doctrinal system of his master and gathering an extensive following of disciples. Although we do not know the exact date of the composition of the *TTC*, as we

know from its colophon that it was composed at dPal 'khor sde chen, we know that it must have been written in this four year period between 1424 and 1428.[40]

It is both interesting and significant that several of his biographies make little mention of mKhas grub rje's association with dPal 'khor sde chen. Both the *mKhas pa'i yid 'phrog (KYP)*[41] and the *gSang ba'i rnam thar (SNT)*,[42] however, give lengthy accounts of the events that led up to mKhas grub rje's eventual departure from this monastery. According to *KYP* and to an oral tradition of this monastery itself,[43] a disagreement arose between mKhas grub rje and the monastery's sponsor, the local monarch Rab brtan kun bzang, over a debate that the latter wished to organize, one that would pit mKhas grub rje against one of the other great scholars of the day, Rong ston pa Śākya rgyal mtshan (1367–1449).[44] According to *KYP*, mKhas grub rje agreed to participate in the debate.[45] Scholars were invited to serve as judges, and the event was scheduled to take place on a specific date. Then, without explaining why, the text simply states that "bdag po Rab btran and Rong ston Śākya rgyal mtshan had a change of heart and made preparations to leave."[46] Mkhas grub rje, in response to the imminent exodus of his opponent, wrote several inflammatory verses that he pasted on the door of the main temple at dPal 'khor chos sde in a final attempt to incite his opponent to debate him.[47] These verses have been preserved for us in the *KYP*.[48] Not only because of their importance as a historical source but also because they reflect so clearly mKhas grub rje's inclinations toward and expertise in the art of polemics, I have included them as Appendix I.

The *SNT* account is much more detailed but, being a more partisan work, is prone to exaggeration as well. It begins by painting a picture of Rong ston pa as a frustrated and scheming scholar.[49] The text states that Rong ston declared Tsong kha pa's enterprise to be one of refuting the Sa skya tradition and that this created an atmosphere of tremendous hostility toward Tsong kha pa and his disciples, to the point where certain Sa skya pas even resorted to black magic (*gtor ma 'phen pa*) against them. The *SNT* account also differs from that of *KYP* on several points. For one thing, *SNT* implies that the machinations of mKhas grub rje himself (and not those of the local ruler) led to cornering Rong ston pa. Despite its excesses, the *SNT* account is a lively one, often depicting the human side of the actors in this most fascinating of scenarios. For example, once Rong ston pa had been put in the position of having to debate mKhas grub rje, it portrays him as being "extremely nervous, unable to stand still, pacing back and forth, having to go to the bathroom repeatedly."[50] He adds, immediately after that, almost as if anticipating that the reader may doubt his characterization of the great Rong ston pa, "this is not my imagination, for it was common knowledge among all of the disciples of the day." *SNT* also states that Rong ston pa, realizing that he had no way out of the situation, wrote to mKhas grub rje telling him that he would not

debate him because he had already defeated his teacher, rGyal tshab, in debate.[51] We also find in this text the mention of Rong ston pa's last ditch attempt to rescue his reputation, a plan that involves sending a disciple to the prayer hall with a prepared argument for mKhas grub rje. The plan backfired, for the poor student, who brought the prayers to a halt with his entrance and now had all the monks' eyes on him, forgot his coaching and stated the argument incorrectly. mKhas grub rje, in characteristic form, asked him, "What is it you want to say, fool?" This was the last straw, and the poor disciple ran out of the hall ashamed and in disgrace. It is worth reiterating that despite its sectarian bias, *SNT* presents us with what is clearly a very human side of these great scholars, something that too often is missing in the more stylized accounts.

Both *KYP* and *SNT* make it very clear that mKhas grub rje's attempts to incite Rong ston pa to debate were in vain and according to most written historical records the event never took place.[52] Again, from dPal 'khor chos sde he went back to his monastery-retreat on mDangs can Mountain, where he continued to teach, engaging in tantric practice in his spare time.

Not only was mKhas grub rje a master of the tenets of the *sūtrayāna* schools, he was also a very accomplished adept of the *tantras*, having obtained, within his lifetime, visions of many deities. Many of the particulars of his spiritual life can be gleaned from *SNT*.[53] Even after the death of Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub rje is said to have had many visions of his master, both in dreams and in waking life. For instance, on one occasion when mKhas grub rje was at a loss regarding the doctrine of emptiness, Tsong kha pa is said to have appeared to him in a dream and given him the complete instructions on the "Kāśyapa Chapter" of the *Ratnakūṭa Sūtra*. He is said to have had five major visions of Tsong kha pa, each with his master in a different aspect, ranging from that of an ordinary monk riding on the back of a white elephant to that of a wrathful tantric practitioner riding on a tiger.[54]

In the iron pig year (1431) he is said to have met rGyal tshab rje in gNas rnying. The latter requested mKha sgrub rje to accompany him back to Central Tibet, to dGa' ldan, to assume the throne of Tsong kha pa as his second successor. They stopped for a short time at the newly founded 'Bras spungs Monastery where both were treated with great respect by 'Jam dbyangs chos rje and his followers. They also lectured there. Finally, arriving at dGa' ldan, they were served with great devotion by the Elder Rin chen rgyal mtshan and the congregation of monks. Once at dGa' ldan, the seat of Tsong kha pa, rGyal tsab rje stepped aside to allow his younger contemporary and student to assume the throne and the responsibilities of the newly formed order.[55] mKhas grub rje then began teaching extensively at dGa' ldan, covering Tsong kha pa's systematic exposition of the stages of the path, the *Lam rim chen mo*, in great detail once a year, and giving the monks many initiations (*dbang*), oral transmissions (*lung*), and teachings (khrid).[56] He gathered together some of

the best scholars of his day, men the likes of the great Śākya śri sNon pa dpal ldan and bLa ma yar 'brog pa, in this way consolidating the program of studies at the monastery, and in the process attracting many new monks as students.

He passed away at age fifty-three[57] at dGa' ldan, where his body was cremated. The golden urn containing his relics remained beside that of his master as an object of devotion for more than five centuries, until the destruction of the monastery at the hands of the Chinese in 1959.

Translation: The Great Digest

The Treatise Which Perfectly Elucidates Reality, The Profound Doctrine of Emptiness, Called "Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate"

[PREAMBLE]

[Hommage]

I bow with great respect to the feet of the chief of all the conquerors' sons, the holy and glorious Master who is none other than the Lord Mañjughoṣa[1] and who possesses the great objectless compassion (*dmigs pa med pa'i thugs rje chen po*).[2]

I bow down to you, peerless teacher, who are the wavering clouds of compassion, an expert at making it rain the waters which clear away the torment of the heat of egotistic views (*bdag tu lta ba*) by ceaselessly roaring, from the portals of space, the doctrine of dependent arising (*rten cing 'brel 'byung*), the melody of summer clouds, the drum roll of profound emptiness (*stong pa nyid*).

You spoke of the profound in the midst of numberless bodhisattvas, the great doctrinal convocations of all the conquerors. You, who are peerless in proclaiming the lion's roar, protect me with the treasury of Mañjughoṣa's knowledge.

With all my heart I bow down to the supreme Ārya Nāgārjunapāda and to his sons. You were prophecied by the Conqueror and are yourself a second conqueror in your [ability] to unerringly explain emptiness, the essence of the Conqueror's teachings.

You, oh supreme one among the flocks of preachers, in a vision were perfectly instructed by Mañjughoṣa in all of the Conqueror's doctrinal methods. I bow down to you, my incomparable Master, who are the eye of beings in the three worlds.

[Reason for the Composition of the Text]

Though there are some who are very learned [in scholarly matters], others who apply themselves to *samādhi* (*ting nge 'dzin*), and yet others who exert themselves in the verbal repetition of profundities (*zab mo'i bzlas brjod*),[3] still none seem to understand the root of the *saṃsāra* that binds them. Because the [3]
tree of their ego grasping (*bdag tu 'dzin pa*) expands and once again spreads, I

see (their various religious efforts) as purposeless hardships. Out of compassion for them, and due to the kindness of my master, I will here explain the profound path.

[The Buddha's Doctrine as the Ultimate Source of Salvation]

When the wise begin to analyze what the state of greatest fulfillment for themselves and others is, they will not be satisfied with methods that eliminate suffering and bring about a form of happiness that lasts only the length of this life. The gateway for those who especially seek higher states from the next life on is but one: the teachings, a banner wavering over the three worlds, of the one renowned as the Lord Buddha, the great impartial friend of the world. As it says in the *Miśrakastotra:*

> We live inside an ocean, *saṃsāra,* without breadth or depth, our body eaten by the sea serpents of our everpresent attachment. At such a time to whom should we go for refuge? Anyone with half a mind would go for refuge to one who in every way possesses all good qualities, and who is devoid of absolutely every single fault. It is fitting to shower such a one with praise and to abide by his teachings.[4]

[The Prophecies of Nāgārjuna's[5] Coming][6]

What is more, in the scriptures of our Teacher, the Conqueror himself has [4] again and again prophesied a man who could be considered trustworthy in commenting on the profound [doctrine of emptiness], that being the protector, the Ārya Nāgārjuna himself. As it says in the *Laṅkāvatāra:*

> In the South, in the land of Vaidalya, a monk renowned as The Glorious One, called by the name of Nāga, will eliminate both the side of existence and that of nonexistence. Having explained to the world that my *yāna* is the supreme Mahāyāna, he will accomplish the stage of joy,[7] and then proceed to Sukhavatī.[8]

And in the *Mahāmegha Sūtra* it says:

> This youngster will be born as a monk called Nāga when four hundred years have elapsed since my Parinirvāṇa. He will spread my teachings and eventually [he will be born] in the earthly kingdom called Radiance of Faith (*Dad pa'i 'od*) where he will become the conqueror known as the Tathāgata "Radiance of the Gnostic Source" (*Ye shes 'byung gnas 'od*).[9]

The *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* has also explained that his name and time of birth would be like this and that he would live for 600 years.[10] The *Mahābheri Sūtra* also states:

> This young Litsavi, Sarvalokapriyadarśana, will, after the passing away of the Teacher, during the time of the degeneration of the doctrine, when [lifespans] are 80 years in age, become a monk with all of the marks of a teacher. He will spread the teachings, and having passed on after 100 years of age, he will be born in Sukhavatī.[11]

These then are the prophecies concerning the Acārya [Nāgārjuna] accepted by the Great Lord [Atīśa] and by the Elder Bodhibhadra. [That they are prophecies concerning Nāgārjuna] depends on the *Suvarṇaprābhāsa*'s gloss of the "young Litsavi" spoken of [in the *Mahābheri Sūtra,* for example] as being of the same continuity as Nāgārjuna.[12] The *Mahābheri Sūtra* explains this Acārya [5] to be of the seventh stage, and there are many other works such as the *Later Tantra* of the glorious *Kālacakra* that prophesy him, commenting in a definitive way (*nges don du 'grel par*). The *Pradīpodyotana* says:

> The Acārya [Nāgārjuna], by means of the tantric path, actualized the [state of] the great Vajradhāra in that very lifetime for, as it is said: "The great Acārya, the glorious Nāgārjuna, came face to face with his goal, and having taught personal self-knowledge to the world (*so so'i rang rig pa*), this being the *samādhi* of the great Vajradhāra, he went beyond the happiness of gods and men. He went beyond the bliss of the meditational equipoise of the heterodox (*mu steg),* *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas.* But he knew not satisfaction with simply seeing the body that possesses the best of all qualities, the body of a Tathāgata, devoid of arising and cessation, and so, having ornamented himself with all of the qualities of a buddha, such as the ten powers and fearlessnesses, he went to Sukhavatī and remained there, possessing the eight mights as his qualities."[13]

Now, his having actualized the state of Vajradhāra refers to the *sāmbhogakāya* [he obtained], and his proceeding to Sukhavatī and his becoming enlightened as the Conqueror called *Radiance of the Gnostic Source,* refers to the *nirmāṇakāya* that he will create. For example, the fact that our teacher, Śākyamuni, is said to have attained buddhahood many eons ago in no way contradicts his having demonstrated the act of becoming enlightened in India during this time period when [the lifespan of beings] was 100 years in length. [6]
And now, following that very Acārya [Nāgārjuna], I will here explain the profound doctrine of emptiness.

[INTRODUCTION]

1. The Reason Why It Is Correct to Seek Out Reality (de kho na nyid)

Beings who strive to liberate themselves from *saṃsāra* should first properly determine what reality, that is, selflessness (*bdag med pa*), is like, and then above all things, exert themselves in meditation on the wisdom that realizes selflessness. Should [that wisdom] be lacking, it reduces one to being like the heterodox, who possess in great quantities extremely stable, clear and nonconceptual *samādhis* that are devoid of agitation and mental dullness, together with all of the magical powers and the forms of extrasensory perception based on those [*samādhis*]. Therefore, these accomplishments alone cannot make the least impact on the root of *saṃsāra*. For this reason, the Lord of Sages, Kamalaśīla, says in his first *Bhāvanākrama:*

> Thus, having put the mind firmly on the object, analyze it with wisdom. Because when the light of wisdom is born in this way, the seeds of the afflictions (*nyon mongs*) will be eliminated. Otherwise, mere *samādhi,* like that of the heterodox, will not eliminate these afflictions, for as it says in the *sūtras*, "Even though worldly beings open the door to *samādhi,* they do not destroy the perception of the self; and because of their afflictions, they remain in utter turmoil. Such was the case, for example, with Udraka's *samādhi.*"[14]

Well then, what method *does* free one from *saṃsāra,* you might ask. The [7]
passage that follows in the *sūtra* quoted in the *Bhāvanākrama,* says: "If one understands the lack of self in phenomena, if one analyzes it and does meditation on it, this will be the cause of the result, the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. No cause other than that will pacify [the afflictions]."[15] By accustoming oneself to the wisdom that is the understanding of selflessness, one will become liberated from *saṃsāra,* because the root that binds one to *saṃsāra* is the misapprehension of the self (*bdag 'dzin*).

Therefore, because every last bit of the Conqueror's scriptures are only directed at reality (*de bzhin nyid*), and only point to reality, one should not be satisfied merely with *samādhi,* but, having searched for the wisdom that is the

understanding of reality, one should exert oneself in single-pointed meditation [on it]. That is why in the second *Bhāvanākrama* it also says:

> All of the Buddha's words are well spoken, and because they are derived from his direct experience (*mngon sum*), they clarify reality [for us], they immerse us in reality. If one understands reality, one will become free of the net of all views (*lta ba*), just as darkness is dispelled when light arises. One cannot attain pure wisdom simply by means of *śamatha*, nor can it eliminate the darkness of the obscurations (*sgrib pa*). When wisdom (*shes rab*) correctly meditates on reality, it transforms into perfectly pure gnosis (*ye shes*), it will realize reality. It is by means of wisdom that one eliminates the obscurations.
> Therefore, think to yourself, "I will abide in *śamatha* and will strive [8]
> by means of wisdom toward reality. I will not be satisfied only with *śamatha*." And what, you may ask, is reality? It is emptiness, that is, that ultimately all things, both persons and phenomena, [are devoid] of self.[16]

Not only is it [the cause of obtaining *nirvāṇa*], but the principle path for attaining omniscience itself is this very wisdom that understands reality, for the other [perfections], giving and so on, are as if blind when not steeped in wisdom, and [hence wisdom] is said to be like a guide to the blind. The *Vajracchedikā* says:

> When a man who has eyes enters the darkness, he does not see a thing. Likewise should one consider a bodhisattva who engages in giving, having fallen into eternalism. It is like this, Subhūti, at daybreak, when the sun rises, men who have eyes see the various aspects of physical things. Likewise should one consider any bodhisattva who engages in giving without falling into eternalism.[17]

Also, as the *Āryasaṃcayagāthā* says: "The trillions of blind men cannot, without a guide, even find the road, much less enter the city. Devoid of the guide of wisdom, the [other] five perfections, without eyes, cannot reach enlightenment."[18] This has been a very brief treatment [of this subject].

[The Emptiness Taught in the Tantras][19]

Not only is this so within the vehicle of the perfections of the Mahāyāna, but even in the Vajrayāna, the reality on which beings are to meditate conjoined with the endless specialties of methods [particular to the *tantras*] is none other than the emptiness set forth in the Madhyamaka logical compendia (*dBu ma rigs pa'i tshogs*).[20] There is no special [kind of emptiness in the *tantras*] apart [9]
from this [one taught in the Madhyamaka]. Hence, the reality that is to be

meditated on by everyone in all three vehicles—both [the two divisions of the] greater and the lesser—is only of one [kind]. Though there are many scriptural passages from such *tantras* as the glorious *Guhyasamāja* and from the Mahāsiddhas's [works] that substantiate this, as it would lengthen [my work] and as this is not the appropriate place for [such a discussion], I will not expand on it.

[Opponent:] But is not the intention of the *Kālacakra Tantra*[21] different, for in the "Brief Topic" (*mdor bstan*) "Explanation of What We Ourselves Believe"[22] it says: "The emptiness which analyzes the aggregates (*phung po*), like a plantain, has no core."[23] Does this not suggest that emptiness arrived at through logical analysis is without a core, [that is, is pointless]?[24]

[Reply:] The meaning of this scripture is as follows. It is not referring to the object that is arrived at through analysis. It is instead refuting a nihilistic kind of emptiness (*chad stong*) which is a blank mindedness that results through the [incorrect] analysis of the aggregates, without [as is correct] setting forth the aggregates as truthless (*bden med*) through the negation [of truth and not of existence in general]. That is why the great commentary, the *Vimalaprabhā* says. "The emptiness which is the end product of analyzing the aggregates is a far cry from a nihilistic [kind of] emptiness."[25]

[This position that the emptiness as taught in the *Kālacakra Tantra* is different from that taught in the Madhyamaka sources] is also in contradiction to the seventh "Brief Topic" of the second chapter [of the *Vimalaprabhā*], where it states that a Mādhyamika should understand reality by determining the consciousness aggregate to be devoid of an essence (*rang bzhin*) by means of the reasoning that proves it to be neither one nor many, and by means of such examples as the sky flower. Moreover, in the "Brief Topic" concerning "The Insuperable"[26] in the section dedicated to the refutation [of the claim] that nothing whatsoever coming to mind is meditation on reality, it says that the gnosis of the Tathāgata is the realization that all phenomena lack inherent ex- [10]
istence; that it is not a mind which has fallen into a deep sleep, the characteristic [of the mind that thinks of] nothing. Thus, it explains the reality of all phenomena to be the lack of inherent existence.

In the second chapter it says: "The multitude of beings who are confused by illusion are seized by one suffering after another."[27] And in the *Commentary,* it says: "They are seized by one suffering after another, such as those of the hell beings, *pretas,* and animals, and this [is because] they are confused by the illusions of *saṃsāra*. They are confused in the sense of their grasping to 'I' and 'mine'."[28] Because it explains that the grasping of "I" and "mine" is the root of the suffering of *saṃsāra,* [it implies] its acceptance that the antidote that cuts the root of *saṃsāra* is the wisdom which realizes selflessness. Thus, one should understand that [the philosophy of the *tantras*] is not in the least inconsistent with the Madhyamaka of the perfections. That is why the second chapter of the *Great Commentary* [the *Vimalaprabhā*] says: "Thus the effect

does not arise from itself, from something else, from both, nor is it causeless."[29] Such passages as these teach the reasoning that refutes the four extremes. It goes on to say that this can be understood more extensively by studying the vast scriptures, such as those of the Madhyamaka.[30]

[Opponent:] But doesn't this *tantra* [the *Kālacakra*] explain that emptiness possesses an object *(dmigs bcas)*?[31]

[Reply:] Even though it does explain this, in that context it is the emptiness of an object of refutation *(dgag bya)* that is physical matter [the body] qua aggregation of subtle atoms that is termed *emptiness.*[32] This omni-aspected matter *(rnam pa thams cad pa'i gzugs)* is conventional, it is not the reality set forth via the refutation of the object of refutation, namely true existence. The [11] gnosis of great bliss that arises from such matter perceives reality, and it is because of *this* that it is on more than one occasion called *objectless bliss.* Although a great deal is to be said in regard to these [points], because it is not something found in common [to discussions of *sūtra* and *tantra,* as it is a strictly tantric matter], and because this is not the appropriate occasion [to deal with it], I will say nothing further. Nonetheless, seeing that all of us, both members of our own school and others, being committed to the incorrect path of such [interpretations], are then hindered from belief in the profound [doctrine of] emptiness, and accumulate great quantities [of nonvirtue], I have introduced the subject.

2. *The Benefits of Trusting the Profound [Doctrine of] Emptiness*

To explain [to others] and to pursue [one's own] study based on the scriptures that teach the profound [doctrine of] emptiness and their commentaries creates a source of merit so great that it is difficult to fathom. The *Sūtrasamuccaya* says: "By having faith in the profound doctrine, all merit is accrued, and until one obtains buddhahood, one will acquire all wealth, both worldly and supramundane."[33] Also, in the *Khye'u rin po che byin pa'i mdo*[34] it says:

> Mañjuśrī, bodhisattvas who lack skill in means must practice the six perfections for a hundred thousand eons. Now if the study of this exposition, even when they are doubt ridden, makes their merits greatly increase, then what need is there to mention [the benefits] of study for those who lack doubt. If just by writing one letter [of it] one can impart instruction, then what need is there to mention [the benefits] of teaching others [this doctrine] in an extensive fashion.[35]

The *Vajracchedikā* says:

> The Blessed One spoke. "What do you think, Subhūti, all those particles that there may be in the river Ganges, are they many, those particles that are in the river Ganges?" [12]

Subhūti replied. "The sand particles that there are in the river Ganges, oh Lord, are indeed many. How is it possible to know even the number of those sand particles?"

The Blessed One spoke. "You understand, Subhūti, you have fathomed it. Now if a man or a woman were to fill universes equal in the number to the sand particles of the river Ganges with the seven kinds of precious substances, and were then to offer it to the Tathāgata, would that man or woman generate great merit from such an action?"

Subhūti replied. "Yes, oh Lord, a great amount! A great amount, oh Tathāgata!"

The Blessed One spoke. "Whoever memorizes even one four-line stanza from this doctrinal exposition and teaches it to others would thereby generate even more merit."[36]

The *bDe bzhin gshegs pa'i mdzod kyi mdo* says: "Should those who possess even the greatest of the ten nonvirtues come to understand the selflessness of phenomena and have faith and trust in the fact that all dharmas are primordially pure, they will not go to the lower rebirths."[37] And the *bDud 'dul ba'i le'u* says:

> If a monk simply by understanding that all phenomena are utterly subdued and by understanding that even the origin of faults is naturally solitary, can thereby subdue even an *anantarīya* sin[38] without the [13]
> [need to rely on the] firm and clear contrition that arises from such a fault, then what need is there to mention the fact [that such knowledge can purify] such triflings as following incorrect moral discipline or ritual.[39]

The *Ajātuśatru Sūtra* also says: "Because those who commit an *anantarīya* sin can come to understand the holy Dharma and have faith in it after hearing it, I did not call that [sin] a karmic defilement."[40] These passages [all show] that in the purification of sin, there is no purifying force of greater strength than faith in emptiness.

To obtain the benefits of explaining the profound doctrine as they have been spoken of above, two prerequisites are necessary: (1) one must have a pure motivation that does not seek material wealth or fame, and (2) one must, without misapprehending the meaning of the doctrine to be explained, expound upon it in a nonerroneous way. If one possesses either one or both of these faults, one will not accrue new merit, and indeed, the previous merit one *has* accrued will degenerate. That is why the Acārya Vasubandhu has said: "Thus, whoever incorrectly explains the doctrine, or explains it with a negative attitude, such as the desire for profit, honor or fame, will degenerate enormous amounts of personal merit."

3. The Vessel, That Is, the Listener, to Whom This Doctrine Should Be Explained[41]

[A Misconception Concerning Emptiness and Its Consequences]

This profound subject should be taught to those who in the past have repeatedly established within their minds the propensity for understanding emptiness, and not to others. This is because, although those [others] may have managed to study the scriptures that teach emptiness, with their mistaken preconceptions about emptiness, teaching it to them will be utterly useless. It is [14]
utterly useless because some of them, those who have no expertise, refute emptiness and go to unfortunate realms. Others, thinking that the meaning of emptiness is that phenomena do not exist, first generate the mistaken view that is nihilistic in regard to cause and effect. Then, without turning from this false view, it grows larger and larger until, as a result of this, they are reborn into the Avīci Hell.

Now here, although the expressions *nihilistic view (med par lta ba)* and the *view that things do not exist (yod par ma yin par·lta ba)* are nominally different, in terms of the way they are apprehended by the mind, that is, in terms of the way their generic images (*don spyi*) arise, there is not the slightest difference, because in both cases they [the images] arise as mere negations of existence.[42] As regards this point, in commenting on the following lines:

> When they have a faulty view of emptiness
> Those of poor intellect will degenerate.[43]

the *Prasannapadā* says:

> If one conceives of the emptiness of everything in terms of the nonexistence of everything, then this is a mistaken view. For as it is said, "If this doctrine is mistakenly understood, those who are not experts disparage it, in this way sinking into the mire of nihilism." When, however, they avoid this nihilistic attitude in regard to everything, they introspect as follows. "How is it that things that have been perceived can be empty? Hence, essencelessness cannot be the meaning of emptiness." And in no uncertain terms they refute the doctrine of emptiness. To repudiate it in this way is to create the karma of "disparaging the doctrine" (*chos kyi phongs pa*), which leads to definite rebirth in an unfortunate realm. As the *Ratnāvalī* explains:[44] "And [15]
> moreover, if this is misapprehended, the fools, possessing the pride of sages, refute it. Thus these unworthy *mahātmās* end up falling head first into the Avīci [hell]."[45]

One goes to Avīci not only by having a nihilistic attitude in regard to emptiness, but also by having a nihilistic attitude in regard to cause and effect. A

multitude of reputable *sūtras* and *śāstras* all agree that to view causality as nonexistent is the cause of losing the roots of all of one's merit, and is also the cause of the degeneration of one's vows.

Still, some insist that they are claiming that [things] "do not exist" and not that "things are nonexistent." However, this scriptural citation from the *Prasannapadā* quoted earlier clearly explains that such a distinction in phrasing is both unnecessary and unjustified. That is why the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā*, [commenting on the lines from the root text] that go: "The one [who repudiates emptiness] will be reborn into an unfortunate realm, but the extraordinary one [who comes to correctly understand it] will find peace,"[46] says: "When the unholy ones hear the doctrine of emptiness, they end up refuting and misunderstanding it, and so they can only be reborn into an unfortunate realm."[47] Therefore, to refute emptiness or to conceive of the meaning of emptiness in terms of [things] not existing are both misconceptions that bring rebirth in an unfortunate realm.

[The Characteristics of the Proper Disciple]

[Question:] How can one know the difference between a disciple to whom the doctrine of emptiness is to be taught and one to whom it is not to be taught?

[Reply:] In the *Madhyamakāvatāra* it says:

> Even though still at the stage of ordinary beings, when [some people] study emptiness, they experience great rapture and wonderment internally. Arising from this great rapture, their eyes well with tears, and [16] the hairs of their body stand on end. Those beings have the seed of the perfect Buddha's mind. They are the vessels to whom reality (*de nyid*) is to be taught. It is to them that the ultimate truth (*dam pa'i don gyi bden pa*) should be taught.[48]

Thus, when someone hears an unmistaken explanation of emptiness and understands its meaning, and should there, based on that understanding, well up tears that come from such wonderment, such are the unmistaken signs. However, an outburst of tears on the part of a fool who has misguided faith in a mistaken doctrine [does not indicate] firmness of mind (*yid brtan*).

[Question:] If one teaches such a suitable vessel, what kind of benefits arise from his or her having understood the doctrine of emptiness?

[Reply:] Again, the *Madhyamakāvatāra* says:

> For those who follow this [doctrine] good qualities will arise, for having taken up the practice of moral discipline, they abide by it; they engage in charity and they practice compassion; they meditate on patience; and the virtue [arising from] all of these practices they com-

> pletely dedicate toward [the attainment] of enlightenment in order to liberate beings. And of course, they come to have faith in the perfect Bodhisattvas.[49]

To whatever extent they have understood emptiness, to that extent will their faith in the doctrine and the quantities of the merit ensuing from charity and moral discipline [increase]. The *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* also says: "Having understood the emptiness of all phenomena, one comes to trust karma and its effects. This is more marvelous than the most marvelous thing, more astonishing than the most astonishing."[50] This [fact] is mentioned in extremely praiseworthy sources.

[Opponent:] That, after meditating in order to generate certainty in the doctrine of emptiness, one [still engages] in moral discipline and so on [is a [17]
teaching] meant for those who have not understood the definitive meaning (*nges don*). How could someone who has understood the definitive meaning engage in such mental proliferations (*spros pa*), [which distinguish between good and evil, and so forth]?

[Another Opponent:] Training in karma and its effects was urged provisionally for the sake of others.

[Reply:] [The adherents to] both of these [views] are identical in accepting that these [doctrines like karma and moral discipline] do not apply to themselves. Hence, they are sources of great negative karma for all, themselves as well as others, and they open the door to the unfortunate realms. One should realize this to be a case of reasoning from the effect [to the cause] (*'bras rtags yang dag*) that has led to an incorrect understanding of emptiness.

If one explains the profound doctrine of emptiness to one who is not a suitable vessel, should the one explaining emptiness possess the bodhisattva vows, the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* states that "speaking of emptiness to sentient beings who do not engage in mental training"[51] is a downfall (*pham pa*), if all of the negative emotional factors are present (*kun dkris*).

Even when [the disciple] has generated a pure understanding biased in favor of neither of the two extremes, when he or she hears an unmistaken explanation of emptiness, there may be no other [external signs] arising from amazement, [signs] such as the standing on end of hairs or the welling up of tears. If these signs are lacking, although it is not definite whether or not [the disciple] is a fit vessel for this profound doctrine, as long as they do not transgress the instructions of the holy master, [teaching it] may make them suitable vessels by newly implanting many seeds for understanding emptiness [in the future]. The *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* says:

> If one has faith in the teachings of emptiness, one should do whatever increases one's devotion for emptiness by means of establishing conditions that are conducive to it. One's compassion should increase
> and one should become more grateful to the Lord, the Tathāgata. [18]

> Those who desire to rid themselves of the great peril, the reason behind the impediments [one has] toward the holy doctrine, should rely on the subtle (*yang ba*), give though giving is difficult, and collect disciples with the four means for accumulating them (*sdu ba'i dngos po bzhi*). One should, with every effort, teach this holy doctrine to the one who is a receptacle for this doctrine of holy men.[52]

It is saying that those who have the ability to teach without erring must explain [the doctrine] with great fervor. But some, who pride themselves on having done just a little study of one or two other scriptures, and faulty study at that, without any training in the scriptural system of the Madhyamaka, where the profound abode [emptiness], so difficult to fathom, is taught, exert themselves at advising others. Without having studied the abode of stainless reasoning [the Madhyamaka scriptures] they teach or impart some trifling instruction (*man ngag*).[53] They, who have the audacity to claim that they are explaining the meaning of the profound, who do not know their own limitations, tire themselves explaining the meaning of the profound. [For them] these become, without a doubt, the dual causes [for rebirth] in an unfortunate realm, and so one should never earnestly compete with those whose audacity is so great, who are preoccupied with mere material gain and fame.

4. The Actual Doctrine to Be Explained[54]

*4.1 Identifying Which Scriptures Are of Definitive Meaning (*nges don*) and Which of Provisional Meaning (*drang don*)*[55]

Those who wish to understand reality (*de kho na nyid*) must rely on the scriptures of the Sage. Yet various kinds of scriptures are taught, depending upon [19] the various intellectual levels of the disciples. On which of these [scriptures] should one base one's examination of this profound topic [emptiness]? Know that one should examine the scriptures of definitive meaning.

Well then, what is of definitive meaning and what is of provisional meaning? In this regard, some *śrāvakas* believe that all of the scriptures of the Sage are strictly of definitive meaning, whereas others believe that there are [scriptures] of both definitive and provisional meaning.[56] [But regardless of which side they take], all [*śrāvakas*] believe that what distinguishes definitive from provisional [scriptures] is whether or not they can be taken literally. They also believe that the Mahāyāna canon is not the word of the Buddha.[57]

The Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and so forth, who came after the split into the eighteen subschools[58] accept only the *śrāvaka* canon as valid (*tshad ma*). Hence, those who are termed *śrāvaka* (lit. "hearer") do not accept the Mahāyāna as the word [of the Buddha]. It is because they strive for *śrāvaka*

enlightenment (*byang chub*) that [those who challenge the authenticity of the Mahāyāna *sūtras*] are called *śrāvakas*. But how could the *Śrāvakayāna* that is the referent (*'jug gzhi*) of the word *hearer*, [that is, those actually on the *śrāvaka* path as opposed to those who are *śrāvakas* by virtue of their philosophical outlook, like Vaibhāṣikas, and so on,] be skeptical to the point of saying "I do not [believe] that the Mahāyāna is the [Buddha's] word." Even were *they* to be skeptical in this way, it would follow, absurdly, that though [such *śrāvaka*] *arhants* have eliminated all afflictions (*nyon mongs*), they accumulate the karma of disparaging the doctrine (*chos spong gi las*) with the ignorance of one ridden with afflictions. It seems that for this reason Tibetans [20] have made many mistakes in their failure to distinguish between those on the *śrāvaka* path (*nyan thos theg pa ba*), [who do not slander the Mahāyāna,] and *śrāvaka* philosophers (*grub mtha' smra ba*), [who *do* do so].

In distinguishing the definitive from the provisional we have the two chariots of the Mahāyāna. They are as follows: (1) the interpretation of Ārya Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu] who follow the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, and (2) the method of interpretation of Ārya Nāgārjuna, the father, and his son [Āryadeva] who follow the *Ārya Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra*.

The Doctrines of the Yogācāra School[59]

[YOGĀCĀRA METAPHYSICS AND HERMENEUTICS]

[The Three Natures][60]

The *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* says in the chapter requested by Pāramārthasamudgata:

> At first, the Lord, in the Vārānasī region at the Deer Park in the Ṛṣivadana, taught, for the followers of the Śrāvakayāna, the four noble truths, a wheel of the doctrine that was astonishing and marvelous, a doctrine the likes of which had never previously been expounded in the world by anyone, either god or man. But that turning of the wheel of the doctrine by the Lord was surpassed, it became outdated, it was of provisional meaning and it became the object of dispute. And so the Lord set about teaching that all phenomena have no nature (*ngo bo*), that they do not arise nor do they cease, that they are naturally peaceful and by nature *nirvāṇa* itself. By so doing he taught emptiness to those who follow the Mahāyāna, thereby turning the second wheel of the doctrine which was even more marvelous and astonishing. But that turning of the wheel by the Lord was also surpassed. It became outdated, was of provisional meaning, and it became the object of disputation. And so the Lord set out [teaching] that all phenomena have no nature, that they are naturally peaceful and by nature *nirvāṇa* itself. This was the perfect elucidation [arbitering the doctrines of the first two wheels] for the followers of all *yānas*. It was the third tu' ıing of the wheel of the doctrine, astounding and marvelous. This turning of the wheel by the Lord was unsurpassed, it did not become outdated, it was of definitive meaning, and it did not become the object of disputation.[61] [21]

Thus, the first two wheels are said to be of provisional meaning and the last one of definitive meaning. Asaṅga [fourth century C.E.] and his brother [Vasubandhu] make it quite clear in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, in the *Vyākhyāyukti*, in the *Viṃśatikā*, *Triṃśikā*, and their commentaries that their method of [scriptural] interpreta-

tion is the same as that of the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, that is, that they take the first and middle wheels to be of provisional meaning and the final wheel to be of definitive meaning.

In particular, the *Nirṇayasaṃgrahāni* quotes the vast majority of the contents of all of the chapters of the *Saṃdhinirmocana* except for the Chapter of Introduction (*gling gzhi'i le'u*) and extensively explains these passages. In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, moreover, in the chapter on "Reality,"[62] the method of setting forth selflessness in accordance with [the *Saṃdhinirmocana*] is taught. [22]
The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*,[63] having taught the theory of the foundation consciousness (*kun gzhi*)[64] and having refuted [the notion of] external objects (*phyi don*), goes into particular detail concerning the exposition of the three natures (*ngo bo nyid gsum*) of which the dependent (*gzhan dbang*) and the real (*yongs grub*) [are said to] truly exist. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* sets forth in condensed form the main points of all such extensive explanations [mentioned earlier].[65] What is more, the scriptures of Vasubandhu mentioned earlier also follow these [works of Asaṅga]. The scriptures of both brothers, who are the trailblazers of such a method of expounding on the meaning of the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, have as their basis the [Yogācāra-oriented] scriptures of the Lord Maitreya, namely the *Sūtrālaṃkāra* and the two *Vibhaṅgas*.[66]

The meaning of *definitive* and *provisional* in the system that delineates things in this way is as follows. A *sūtra* that must depend upon another *sūtra* for the elucidation of its purport, that is, whose [meaning] cannot be understood in accordance with its own direct teachings without depending on [another work], is a *sūtra* of provisional meaning.[67] Vice versa, if it can [be taken as self-interpreting], then it is a *sūtra* of definitive meaning. For example, in the first wheel the aggregates and so on are all equally said to exist by virtue of their own characteristics (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis yod*). In the middle one, all phenomena are equally said to be essenceless (*rang bzhin med*). Because [the *sūtras* of these two wheels] do not actually teach [the nature of phenomena] through the elucidation of whether or not they have essences, they are of provisional meaning. The final [wheel] teaches that the imputed (*kun brtags*) is essenceless, and that the dependent and the real inherently exist (*rang bzhin gyis yod*). Therefore, because [the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, as exemplary of the final wheel,] explains this distinction in a clear way, it is explained to be of definitive meaning.

The Saṃdhinirmocana explains the intent of the middle wheel *sūtras* as
follows. When *sūtras* of the middle wheel, such as the *Prajñāpāramitā*, state [23]
that all phenomena are natureless (*ngo bo nyid med*), they do so with the intention [of expressing that] the imputed is characteristically natureless (*mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa*), that the dependent is causally natureless (*skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa*), and that the real is ultimately natureless (*don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa*). It explains this as [the Lord's] reply to the bodhisattva Pārmāthasamudgata when he asks the Lord the intention behind his having

taught things to be natureless; that is, why in some *sūtras* the Lord taught that the aggregates and so on exist inherently, whereas in others he taught the doctrine of essencelessness. The *Saṃdhinirmocana* says: "Pāramārthasamudgata, my teaching all phenomena to be natureless is threefold, i.e. characteristic naturelessness, causal naturelessness, and ultimate naturelessness. With this intention did I teach all phenomena to be natureless."[68] The *Nirṇayasaṃgrahāni* also says: "With what intention did the Lord teach that all phenomena are natureless? It is said that he taught it to certain disciples intending the three kinds of naturelessness."[69] The *Triṃśikā* also states: "Intending the three kinds of natures to have the three kinds of naturelessness did I teach all phenomena to be natureless."[70] In view of this, those who claim that when the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* teach all phenomena to be natureless, they are referring only to all *conventional* phenomena, fall outside of both the scriptural system [24] of the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* and outside of that of Asaṅga and his brother as well.[71]

The *Prajñāparamitā Sūtras* state that [every phenomenon] from matter up to and including the reality of matter, from omniscience up to and including the reality of omniscience[72] is natureless, and that applies to all other phenomena in the list of permutations (*'dres khang*) as well. They say that even *nirvāṇa,* and were there something superior to that then even *that,* would be essenceless. So when someone claims that [the *Prajñāpāramitā*] teaches the essenceless of only the conventional and does not include the ultimate among those [essenceless phenomena], then that is when to shout out that "to whatever extent you take your own words seriously, to that extent should you know that you are insane!"[73]

Well then, what is the meaning of these three [kinds of naturelessness], characteristic naturelessness, and so forth? Because they are only posited by name (*ming*) and sign (*rda*) and do not exist by virtue of their own characteristic, the imputed are said to be characteristically natureless. Because they must arise in dependence on other causes and conditions and arise neither from their own natures nor from their own selves, the dependent are said to be causally natureless. Because it is the ultimate and also because it lacks the nature of the two kinds of self, [that is, the self of persons and that of phenomena,] the real is said to be ultimately natureless. That is why the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* says:

> So then what is the characteristic naturelessness of phenomena? It is the characteristic of the imputed. And why is that? It is like this. Because it has the characteristic of being established by name and sign and because it does not exist by virtue of its *own* characteristic, that is why it is called *characteristically natureless.*[74]

It goes on : [25]

> What is the causal naturelessness of phenomena? It is the characteristic of the dependency of phenomena. And why is that? It is like this. It is because they arise under the influence of other conditions and not by themselves. It is for this reason that these [dependent phenomena] are called *causally natureless.*[75]

And also:

> Moreover, what is the characteristic of the real? It is said to be ultimate naturelessness. And why is that? Oh Pāramārthasamudgata, the selflessness of phenomena (*chos kyi bdag med*) is said to be their naturelessness. That is the ultimate, and because the ultimate is identified with the naturelessness of all phenomena, that is why [the real] is said to be ultimately natureless.[76]

One other secondary explanation of ultimate naturelessness was also taught, for the dependent was also said to be ultimately natureless. That object (*dmigs pa*) which, when meditated upon by the *āryan* gnosis that directly realizes the selflessness of phenomena, purifies the obscurations (*sgrib pa*) [is called *ultimate*]. Because [the dependent] lacks the nature of being such an object, it is said to be ultimately natureless.[77] Again the *Saṃdhinirmocana* states:

> What is the ultimate naturelessness of phenomena? Those phenomena that arise interdependently, that are causally natureless, are also natureless in the sense that they are ultimately natureless. And why is
> that? Oh Pāramārthasamudgata, that object among all phenomena that [26]
> is pure has been taught to be ultimate. It is because the characteristic of the dependent is such that it is not a pure object, that it is said to be ultimately natureless.[78]

To say that the imputed does not exist by virtue of its own characteristic means that it is not truly existent (*bden par med*). Were that not so, it would mean that [the characteristic naturelessness of the imputed] was tantamount to its utter nonexistence; and if that were the case, because the imputed could not possibly exist, it would follow, absurdly, that whatever exists (*gzhi grub*) would have to be substantially existent (*rdzas yod*). Therefore, although the dependent is taught as existing by virtue of its own characteristic, what this means is that it is truly existing. Otherwise, it would not be correct to claim that a difference [existed] between the imputed, which does not exist by virtue of its own characteristic, and the dependent, which does exist by virture of its own characteristic, because then both would have to be nominally existent (*tha snyad du yod pa*) and not truly existent.[79]

To claim that whether something exists by virtue of its own characteristic is determined by whether it is efficacious (*don byed nus pa*) is also incorrect.

Because the real is also explained as existing by virtue of its own characteristic, it would follow, absurdly, that it too was an [efficacious] entity (*dngos po*) [when in fact it is not].

[The Reality of the Dependent and the Real, and the Yogācāra Critique of the Madhyamaka][80]

How does one explain the fact that the dependent and the real exist by virtue of their own characteristic? To view the dependent as not existing by virtue of its own characteristic is tantamount to being a nihilist in regard to the dependent,[81] and nihilism in regard to *it* is nihilism in regard to the imputed and the real as well, and that is why this is said to be a nihilistic view. The dependent entities are the linguistic referents (*gdags gzhi*) of the imputed, and as they are also what possess the quality (*chos can*) of the real [in that they are empty], to be nihilistic in regard to [the dependent] is also to be nihilistic in [27]
regard to the other two. The *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* says in this regard:

> Oh Pāramārthasamudgata, likewise, if the characteristic of the dependent and the characteristic of the real exist, then so too should the characteristic of the imputed be known to exist. This is because whoever perceives the characteristic of the dependent and the characteristic of the real as nonexistent is also being nihilistic in regard to the characteristic of the imputed. Hence, such a [person] should be known to be nihilistic in regard to all three characteristics.[82]

The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* also says:

> The referents (*gzhi*) of the labeled word sign (*btags pa'i tshig gi mtshan ma*) is the basis (*rten*) of the labeled word sign. But to say that because it is ineffable in nature (*brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid*) that the ultimately existing, the correct entity (*yang dag pa'i dngos po*), never and in no way exists is not only nihilism, but the destruction [of the doctrine]. These two [faults] should be understood to be the utter degeneration of this doctrinal teaching.[83]

And again, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* says:

> Thus, if someone should hear teachings as to the intended meaning of the *sūtras* which are very difficult to understand, which [teach] the Mayāyāna, which [teach] the profound doctrine of emptiness, and having heard them, if they do not correctly understand the meaning which was explained, exactly as it is, but instead conceive of it in an

> incorrect manner, then due to the conception born from such a mistaken [understanding, they believe] everything to be only labels (*btags pa tsam*), and that this is reality. Who would view and who would say [28] that such a viewpoint was the correct viewpoint? Were that so, because there would be no entities to act as the referents of labels (*'dogs pa*), the labels themselves could never and in no way exist. If that were so, how could the reality that is [said to be] a mere label be said to exist? Therefore, the [claims] in those treatises are forms of nihilism in regard both to reality and labels, and one should know that to do away with reality and labels is the worst of nihilistic views.[84]

This [passage] is ascribing to the Mādhyamika the fault of nihilism when he or she claims that all phenomena are mere labels (*btags pa tsam*). The words "the ultimately existing, the correct entity" in the first *Bohisattvabhūmi* citation clearly indicate that [in the Yogācāra system] entities (*dngos po*) truly exist. If dependent things were not truly existent, [according to the Yogācāra] there could be no such thing as a substance that has the ability to give rise to an effect. Hence, they would have to be utterly nonexistent. Likewise, the imputed and the real would also have to be nonexistent. This is the meaning [of this passage]. The claim that things which do not truly exist must be utterly nonexistent is a general tenet of the realists (*dngos smra ba*).

The *Nirṇayasaṃgrahāni* says:

> Some Mahayanists, under their own false misapprehensions, say that conventionally (*kun rdzob tu*) everything exists but that ultimately (*don dam par*) they do not exist. To this one must reply: "Oh Venerable One, what does it mean to say that something ultimately exists or that it is conventional?" If one asks them this they reply that whatever is the essencelessness of phenomena, that is the ultimate, while the objects of the perceptions of those natureless phenomena as [hav- [29] ing intrinsic] nature, are the conventional . . .[85]

from this passage up to the line: "if they answer in this way"[86] they cite the Madhyamaka position as anathema, namely the position that truthlessness (*bden med*) is the ultimate and that phenomena as they seem to be (*ji snyed pa*), appearing as true things, are the conventional.

Although according to the previous citations from the *Saṃdhinirmocana* and the *Nirṇayasaṃgrahāni*, the meaning of the dependent being causally natureless is explained to be that it does not arise from its own self, still, that does not mean they [the Yogācāras] accept arising to be truthless, for were they to accept that arising is truthless it would be pointless [for the Yogācāras] to interpret [the claims of] naturelessness as they do.

[The Rationale Behind the Prajñāpāramitā's Claims That Things "Do Not Arise" According to the Sūtrālaṃkāra, a Yogācāra Text]

The *Sūtrālaṃkāra* says: "The [claim of] nonarising was said to hold up when [it is interpreted] in terms of

1. beginning,
2. sameness,
3. otherness,
4. its own characteristic,
5. itself,
6. becoming another,
7. the afflictions, and
8. the distinctiveness."[87]

The explanation of the intention behind saying that all phenomena can withstand [the claim made of them in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*, namely that] "they do not arise" is as follows. *Beginning* refers to the fact that there is no beginning to *saṃsāra* [so that the beginning has "never arisen"]. *Sameness* refers to the fact that once that itself has arisen in the past it does "not arise" once again by virtue of its own nature. *Otherness* refers to the fact that effects not concordant with their causes do "not arise." *Own characteristic* refers to the fact that the imputed "does not arise" by virtue of its own characteristic. *Itself* refers to the fact that the dependent "does not arise" from itself. *Becoming another* refers to the fact that the real "does not arise" to become something else, [as it is permanent]. *The afflictions* refers to the fact that in the mental continuum of one who knows the exhaustion [of the afflictions, that is, of one who has attained *nirvāṇa*], these afflictions "do not arise" [ever again]. *Distinctiveness* refers to the fact that there is "no arising" within the *dharmakāya (chos sku)* that possesses the two purities. The commentary ex- [30]
plains that such is the intention behind explaining the fact that phenomena "withstand the claim of nonarising." Therefore, we can see from this explanation that this [Yogācāra] system cannot accept the possiblity of the nonexistence of true arising [and must instead interpret those passages in which it occurs to mean something different].

[The Elucidation of Some Scriptural Passages Highlighting Unique Features of the Yogācāra]

The *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* states: "That which is misconceived, [that is, the dependent,] does exist, but its duality does not. Emptiness exists within it, and as regards that [emptiness], it too exists."[88] The first line expresses the fact that

the basis, the thing that is empty, [that is, the dependent,] exists inherently. The second line expresses the fact that that [basis] is empty of duality, [where duality refers to] a difference in substance between what perceives, [the subject,] and that which is perceived, [the object]. The third line indicates that the real, emptiness, the fact that the dependent is empty of the imputed,[89] also exists inherently [just as the dependent itself does]. The commentary explains that to understand emptiness in an unmistaken way one must understand it as follows. Whenever something is missing in something else, that absence is said to be its emptiness. And the residue that exists is what gives it its real existence. Therefore, the existence of the residue is indicated in the line "that which is misconceived does exist." Hence, [this line] does not mean that there exist dependent entities that are the residues after they have been emptied of the imputed. That such [a remaining dependent entity] can be taken as merely existing [is a position that the Prāsaṅgikas but no Yogācāra will accept]. Were that so, [that is, were the Yogācāras to accept that the dependent was merely existent without needing to make the additional claim as to its *true* or *inherent* existence,] then, as even [some] imputed [entities like space and so on] are considered [by them] to be "merely existing [phenomena]," there would be nothing to distinguish [these imputed things from dependent things]. Therefore, one must not take this [claim that the dependent "exists"] to mean that it *merely* exists, but] to mean that it *truly* exists, here [in the commentary] called *real existence (yang dag par yod pa)*.

The *Madhyāntavibhaṅgaṭīkā* [of Sthiramati] also explains this passage clearly: "Some think that all phenomena are utterly nonexistent like the horns of rabbit. In order to refute this all-encompassing nihilism, the verse 'that which is misconceived does exist . . .' was taught. The word *inherently* is to [31]
be supplied."[90] Likewise, the *Triṃśikāvṛtti* also states:

> Some think of all phenomena as substances, just as consciousness itself is. Others think that consciousness exists conventionally and not ultimately, just as phenomena do. This treatise was composed in order to refute those who propound these two one-sided extremes.[91]

This clearly explains that external objects do not exist and that consciousness ultimately exists.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* states: "There is a perception of something being empty of something else, but it is [the realization] that there is a residue left there that still exists that is the correct understanding of reality."[92] The meaning is as explained earlier. The imputed is truthless, and the dependent, which is the remainder that is empty of that [imputed duality,] must be explained as truly existing. This method [of interpretation] is quite clearly [in sympathy with that found] in [Asaṅga's] *Bhūmis*. Nor is that all, for in the *Samuccaya*, when it briefly explains the four searches (*tshol ba bzhi*) and the four knowledges (*yongs su shes pa bzhi*),[93] and in the "extensive explanation"

section of the "reality" chapter of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*,[94] it states that to know that things, that is, to know that dependent entities, which are established by virtue of their own characteristic, *are* so established is the knowledge associated with the search for the thing (*dgnos po tshol ba*); and to know the tautologous and qualifying predicates (*ngo bo dang khyad par kun brtags*) to be mere labels (*btags pa tsam*) is the knowledge associated with the search for essential and specific predication (*ngo bo nyid du 'dogs pa dang khyad par du 'dogs pa tshol ba*).[95]

The *Samuccaya* section that begins: "What is the intention behind the [32]
Vaipulya [*Sūtras'*] claiming that all phenomena are natureless?" and that ends: "the nature of the imputed is characteristic naturelessness, that of the dependent is causal naturelessness, and that of the real is ultimate naturelessness"[96] states that the teaching in the *Vaipulyapiṭaka* that all phenomena are natureless, as found in such texts as the *Extensive Mother* [*Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*] and so forth, have an ulterior purport (*dgongs pa can*) and, as was explained earlier, it says, just as the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* does, that the ultimate intention (*dgongs gzhi*)[97] is the threefold form of naturelessness. Hence, the claims of one individual with no training that [the philosophical position expounded in] the *Samuccaya* is similar to that of the Madhyamaka logical compendia (*dbu ma rigs pa'i tshogs*) is nothing but nonsensical blithering. How can the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, the *Nirṇayasaṃgrahāni*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, and the *Samuccayas* be taken as [expounding] the system of the Mādhyamikas,* who advocate naturelessness [unqualifiedly, seeing no need to interpret these claims,] when they all teach that the *sūtra* passage: "All phenomena neither arise nor do they cease; they are primordially peaceful and *nirvāṇa* by nature" is of ulterior purport and flexible (*ldem pa*)?

*[The Yogācāra Belief in Three Final Vehicles and the Foundation Consciousness (*kun gzhi*) as Another of Their Distinctive Features]*

Moreover, the *Saṃdhinirmocana*[98] teaches that it is impossible for those who one-sidedly set themselves on the pacification of the *śrāvakas*[99] to achieve the essence of enlightenment even if they were to possess all of the combined exertion of all the Buddhas. The *Nirṇayasaṃgrahāni* also explains that:

> The *śrāvaka* who is set on pacification from the very beginning is part of the lineage that is very impoverished in compassion and is not on the side which [works] solely for the benefit of sentient beings, [33]

*A Mādhyamika is someone who follows the Madhyamaka school. The first term refers to a person, the latter to a philosophical position or school of thought.

> being terrified by suffering. Thus his mind turns only to thoughts of abiding in *nirvāṇa*. He is one of the unfortunate ones who cannot attain great enlightenment.[100]

So it is indisputable that in their system, [that is, in the Yogācāra of Asaṅga,] three final vehicles are accepted, [pointing to yet another difference between the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka schools]. Again, the *Saṃdhinirmocana* states: "Mañjuśrī, in terms of the body which is liberated, there is a similarity, an equality, between the *tathāgatas* and the *śrāvakas*."[101] Having condensed the meaning in this way, the *Sūtrālaṃkāra* then goes on to say:

> One final vehicle [was taught] because of similarity between the liberated one who has [realized the emptiness] of phenomena and [the one who has realized only] selflessness, because of the one of different lineages [who can be converted from one vehicle to another], because of the one who achieves two thoughts, [who, having first been a Mahāyānist, degenerates,] because of emanations [of *arhants* who do not themselves die], and because of the finality [of a Buddha's enlightenment].[102]

Hence, it indicates the ultimate intention behind the teachings that there is one final vehicle.[103] Therefore, those who accept that these [texts] belong to the Great Madhyamaka and who accept them as being of a kind of definitive meaning that is to be taken literally[104] and yet who [simultaneously] claim that there is one final vehicle could not possibly be in their right minds.

Again, the *Saṃdhinirmocana* states it extensively as follows: "Oh Mativiśāla, the group of six consciousnesses is based on that receptacle consciousness (*len pa'i rnam par shes pa*) and they are the eye consciousness, ear, nose, tongue, body and mental consciousnesses."[105] Stating it briefly it says: "The receptacle consciousness is profound and subtle."[106] It thus clearly states that the foundation consciousness, the totality of mental seeds (*sa bon*), [34]
is the cause and condition [giving rise to] all afflicted phenomena, [a position rejected by the Mādhyamikas].[107] Quoting this very [scripture] as proof, the *Samuccaya* and the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* extensively explain [the existence of the foundation consciousness] in the same way.

[Arguments Against the Advocates of "the Emptiness of What Is Other" (gzhan stong)*]*[108]

[Opponent:] We claim that a permanent, stable (*rtag brtan*) *tathāgatagarbha* (*bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po*) is the foundation consciousness taught in those scriptures and we also claim that [this doctrine] is of a literal definitive meaning.

[Reply:] This is equivalent to you claiming "we are just blithering without ever having seen even one letter of those [texts]."

As it was explained earlier, the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the scriptures of Asaṅga and his brother, the *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, and the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* clearly explain again and again that the "emptiness of what is other" refers to the fact that the bases of emptiness (*stong gzhi*), that is, the dependent qua truly existent entities, are empty of the imputed qua nonentity (*kun brtags dngos med*). But some think that the *tathāgatagarbha* qua nonentity is the basis of emptiness and conceive that in those scriptures of the "emptiness of what is other" that [basis] is claimed to be empty of the collection of composite (*'du byed*) dependent entities. Then they establish those [scriptures] as being of definitive meaning. These mad "sages" are misapprehending their enemy to be their father.

Therefore, that these works which follow the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* take the dependent to be ultimately established entities, to be entities existing in their own right, is a point that has been made more than once. The reasons proving this point and the fact that taking the dependent to be truthless amounts to nihilism [in this Cittamātra system] have also been explained more than once. Consider the belief that every entity exists only nominally as the object of an erroneous (*'khrul pa'i*) mind, and that because it is "empty of self" (*rang stong*), that is, because it itself is empty of itself, it can in no way be a functional phenomenon (*go chod kyi chos*). The claim that this [belief] is the literal intention of the *Saṃdhinirmocana* and of the scriptures of Asaṅga [35] and his brother, to claim that it is of definitive meaning and then to persist in this [line of reasoning,] can be, alas, nothing but a cause of [intellectual] poverty.

If "empty of self" means that something is itself empty of itself, then it would imply that every instance of causality would be empty of every instance of causality.[109] Hence, because causality would be like the horns of a rabbit, [that is, nonexistent,] what more disastrous consequence could there ensue than this? Therefore, to believe that *empty of self* means this, whether one accepts, as some do, that *all* phenomena are empty of themselves or whether one claims that only the conventional are empty of themselves, is something that is not taught by any school of either the Mahāyāna or Hināyāna; it is not the meaning of either *sūtras* of provisional meaning nor of *sūtras* of definitive meaning; and there has never arisen in the Noble Land [of India] such a belief among any of the Buddhist philosophical schools.

[The Distinctively Yogācāra Use of the Example of the Illusion and the Status of the Dependent][110]

[Opponent:] Well then, what about when the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* states that the dependent is like an illusion? Because that which truly exists cannot be like an illusion, why do you advocate that that *sūtra* takes the dependent to be truly existent?

[Reply:] It depends upon the way in which one takes the analogy of the illusion. [In the *Saṃdhinirmocana*] it is not taken as an example the way a Mādhyamika would, that is, as an example of the fact that the dependent is not true, though it appears to be true.

[Opponent:] Why is that?

[Reply:] The way in which this system takes the dependent as being exemplified by an illusion is clearly explained in such works as the *[Sūtra]Alaṃkāra*, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, and the *Samuccaya*. As it says in the *Sūtrālaṃkara:*

> That which is conceptually cogitated, which is [perceived] incorrectly, is accepted as being like an illusion. And in what way does it have the aspect of an illusion? It is said to be like [an illusion] because it is misperceived as being dual, [when in fact it is not].[111]

As for the meaning [of this passage], the commentary explains that the basis [36] of the misperception [within the magical trick], the stones and wood and so on, that is, the basis on which an illusion-spell is cast, is similar to the dependent, which is [perceived] incorrectly, which is conceptually cogitated, and which has been affected by the latent potentialities (*bag chags*) of the error of dualistic appearance. The appearance of rocks and so forth as the horse or elephant [within the trick] is similar to the appearance of the dependent as dual, that is, as if there existed a separation between apprehended object and apprehending subject (*gzung 'dzin rgyangs chad*).

In the *Mother Sūtras* the dependent is taught by means of such examples as the illusion. Now when the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* explains this analogy, it explains that to destroy the belief that without external objects nothing could be perceived as objects [of the mind], the example of the illusion [is taught, for in an illusion an object is perceived despite the fact that it does not exist]. To destroy the belief that if there were no objects, thoughts (*sems*) and secondary mental events (*sems byung*) could not arise, the mirage [is taught, for sight of water and the decision to reach it can arise without there being any water present]. Finally, to destroy the belief that if there were no objects, things could not be characterized as either pleasant or unpleasant, the example of the dream is taught [because in a dream unreal objects can cause pleasant or unpleasant sensations]. When [the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*] explains [things in this way, we can see] how great a difference there is between it and the Madhyamaka [interpretation of the analogy of the illusion].[112]

[Opponent:] Well then, if in their system, [that is, in the Yogācāra,] dependent entities *are* truly existent, then why do the *Saṃdhinirmocana* and the *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, in explaining the ultimate that possesses five characteristics, explain it to be birthless and destructionless? What is more, the *Saṃgrahāni* says: "Should the misconceived (*rnam par rtog pa*) be said to exist conventionally or should it be said to be ultimate? It is stated that it should be said to

exist conventionally.'' So how do you avoid contradicting these explanations [which seem to indicate that the dependent does not truly or ultimately exist]?

[Reply:] There is no contradiction. It is as follows. Whether or not something truly exists has nothing to do with whether it is a conventional truth or an ultimate truth.

[Opponent:] Why is that?

[Reply:] A mental object (*dmigs pa*) that, when perceived, purifies the obstacles to omniscience (*shes bya'i sgrib pa*) is called an *ultimate truth*. A [37] mental object that, when perceived, creates afflictions (*kun nas nyon mongs*) is called a *conventional truth*. Although the dependent is [in the Cittamātra system] truly existent because it is not a purifying mental object, it is said to be a conventional truth. The true existence of the dependent refers to the fact that it exists by virtue of its own characteristic as opposed to simply being posited by names and signs (*ming dang rda'i bzhags pa tsam*). Therefore, there is a very great difference between being an ultimate truth and simply existing. It is a tenet of this system that although something is a conventional truth it need not be a strictly false thing (*rdzun pa tsam*). That is why the *Jñānasārasamuccaya* says: ''The consciousness which has been liberated from the apprehended object / apprehending subject [duality] ultimately exists. [This is a tenet] well known in the Yogācāra scriptures which take the mind to the opposite side of the ocean [of *saṃsāra*].''[113] In this way the followers of the Cittamātra have with great effort set forth proofs of the fact that it is not correct to take as literally true the teachings of the *sūtras* of the middle wheel, which teach that all phenomena are essenceless, taking instead as literal the way in which the *Saṃdhinirmocana* distinguishes the three natures in terms of whether they exist by virtue of their own characteristic. Now the chief context of all of these expositions is as follows. There is the identification of the extremes of reification (*sgro 'dogs*) and nihilism (*skur 'debs*) in dependence upon [that object] which when negated (*khegs pa*) establishes the selflessness of this system. Then there is the understanding of how the two kinds of selflessness are set forth by means of the method of refuting those [two extremes]; and finally, by meditating on these two kinds of selflessness, what obscurations are abandoned and what enlightenment, the effect, is actualized. [38]

Nihilism is only posited by tenet, [that is, philosphically or intellectually, as opposed to being an innate thing,] and that it exists in the Buddhist (*rang sde*) system of the Advocates of Naturelessness, [that is, in the Madhyamaka,] has been explained. A glimpse of the way in which the refutation of the stance of nihilism is taught [in the Cittamātra] can be gleaned from my previous brief explanation.[114]

Reification is of two kinds: intellectual (*kun brtags*) and innate (*lhan skyes*). The intellectual is of two varieties, both of which advocate [the existence] of objects (*don smra ba*): one is a Buddhist form and the other belongs to other religions. The innate is also twofold: one reifies a self of the person

(*gang zag gi bdag*) and the other a self of phenomena (*chos kyi bdag*). Because the way in which this first [kind of innate reification] and the nonexistence of the self of the person, which is the negation of that [innately reified self], are set forth in this system is not vastly dissimilar to [the way in which] the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas do so, [I will not go into it here], and it should instead be understood from the brief explanation I give of it later.

The way in which this system elucidates the reification of the self of phenomena, and the nature of the selflessness of phenomena which is the complete negation of that [innately reified self of phenomena] is the ultimate reality (*mthar thug pa'i gnas*), which is extremely difficult to understand. That being so, among these snowy mountain ranges, only our Lord, the Omniscient Tsong kha pa, made [these points] clear. Others, even those that had reputations as scholars, did nothing more than refute the fact that sensory consciousness (*dbang shes*) is a different substance (*rdzas*) from blue, the object that appears to it (*rang gi snang yul*). Apart from that they do not mention a word about such imputed entities as essential and specific predication (*ngo bo dang khyad par du kun brtags pa'i kun brtags*), nor about how it is that the selflessness of phenomena is posited as the negation of [such imputed entities] existing by virtue of their own characteristic,[115] so that in the ocean of the tenets of the Vijñaptimātra, the sailor of intelligence, when grasping the oars of analy- [39]
sis, begins to steer afoul, which makes it useless for one to climb into the ship of the great scriptural exegesis of this system.

[Tsong kha pa's Unique Exposition of the Yogācāra Theory of Emptiness][116]

Be that as it may, our Lord, the Omniscient One, has demonstrated his kindness by his complete and utter elucidation of this system of the Mahāyāna in his treatise *Essence of Eloquence: An Exposition of [the Doctrines of] Provisional and Definitive Meaning (Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa legs par bshad pa'i snying po)*.[117] Nowadays, men are extremely weak in intellectual prowess, and so, like befuddled children, thinking only of the present moment, they are incapable of elucidating even the slightest passage from such adamantine words [as those found in *Essence of Eloquence*]. Realizing that they cannot but become confused (*gtol med pa*), I, with very few words, will reveal to the reader, as clearly as the lines on the palms of their own hands, this very meaning which is like a buried treasure. So lend your ear!

The *Pramāṇavārttikam* explains the misapprehension of the self of phenomena in terms of only the dualistic sense consciousness' misapprehension of object and subject as different substances. It does not clearly explain the misapprehension of the self of phenomena to be the misapprehension of the fact that essential and specific predicates[118] exist by virtue of their own character-

istic, nor does it then go on to explain the way in which to negate the fact that things exist as they are grasped by that [form of misapprehension]. But some take notice of this single fact and use this as their reason for claiming that the selflessness of phenomena qua negation of the fact that essential and specific predicates do not exist by virtue of their own characteristic is [exclusively] Asaṅga's system [of interpretation], whereas the selflessness of phenomena [40] qua negation of the fact that, with respect to sensory consciousness, subject and object are different substances is Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's system [of interpretation].[119] But this position is too limited in scope, for the Acārya, the *Ārya* Asaṅga, says in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha:* "In this regard, what is the characteristic of the imputed? It is that although [external] objects do not exist, mere *vijñapti*[120] (*rnam par rig pa tsam*) appears as those very objects."[121] From such passages as these we can see that [Asaṅga] accepts that external objects do not exist the way they appear to sensory consciousness; that is, as objects [that are of a different substance from the mind]. Then, to prove this fact, he relies on scriptural sources such as the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* and the *Saṃdhinirmocana* as well as a battery of logical reasoning such as that in the following verse: "*Pretas,* animals, men, and gods will perceive a single thing differently according to the family [of beings] to which they belong. It is because of this that we do not accept the existence of [external] objects."[122] Though [they claim that] there do not exist any external objects, to establish that the consciousness, that is, the subject, truly exists, they set forth many examples like the dream, the eye consciousness affected by cataracts (*rab rib can gyi mig shes*), the consciousness to which a mirage appears, the consciousness to which illusory horses and elephants appear, and what appears during the *samādhi* of meditation on impurity. By means of having cited many such [examples] and then extensively substantiating them, [Asaṅga's system demonstrates], based on both scripture and reasoning, even more extensively than does the *Pramāṇavārttikam,* the refutation of external objects and of a difference in substance between subject and object in regard to sensory perception. Also, Dignāga, in his *Aṣṭasāhasrikāpiṇḍārtha,* clearly explains this in the same way as the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha,* namely that the meaning of the *Prajñāpāramitā (sūtras)* lies in the explanation of the selflessness of phenomena qua negation of essential and specific predicates existing by virtue of their own characteristic.

Therefore, if one does not know how a dependent entity is taken as the abode (*gnas*) of predication (*'dogs*) and the way in which essential and specific [properties] are predicated (*btags*) of it; if one does not know the method of [41] negating that those predications exist by virtue of their own characteristic, nor the method of positing the selflessness of phenomena which *is* that negation, one cannot know completely the way in which this system [the Yogācāra] posits the selflessness of phenomena, nor can one in the least understand the full impact of [the doctrine of] "the four understandings" (*yongs su shes pa bzhi*),

of "the four searches" (*tshol ba bzhi*),[123] of the way in which one comes to understand the Vijñaptimātra based on these, or of the way in which the *Prajñāpāramitā* teaches [this] as the antidote (*gnyen po*) to the ten unstable misconceptions (*rnam gyeng gi rnam rtog bcu*).[124]

The *Saṃdhinirmocana* explains that the dependent is not of the nature of either essential or specific predicates by virtue of its own characteristic, and hence characteristic naturelessness is explained to be the selflessness of phenomena. This in turn implies that to apprehend what is essentially and specifically predicated of the dependent as existing by virtue of its own characteristic is to apprehend the self of phenomena.

The *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the *Nirṇayasaṃgrahāni*, and the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* also go to great extent to prove that emptiness, which is that [an entity] is empty of existing the way it is apprehended, is the ultimate meaning of the Madhyamaka and also to prove that the selflessness of phenomena is the real. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the other [texts] also explain that the dependent's emptiness of existing by virtue of its own characteristic as it is essentially and specifically predicated is the real, is the reality (*chos nyid*) which is the negation of the self of phenomena, and is that mental object (*dmigs pa*) which, when perceived and meditated upon, purifies the obstacles to knowledge (*shes sgrib*). For this reason [they claim] that the two *śrāvaka* systems do not set forth the theory that essentially and specifically predicated imaginary entities are empty of existing by virtue of their own characteristic and that in both systems those [imaginary entities] must, of necessity, be apprehended as exist- [42]
ing by virtue of their own characteristic.

Such imaginary entities are of the nature of verbal (*ming*) and symbolic (*rdar*) predications (*btags pa*) [that predicate] of, for example, the aggregates, such essential qualities as "this is form," or such specific [qualities] as "this is the arising of form." Now because one cannot deny that the aggregates *are* of just such a nature, [that is, that they are the abodes or objects of such predications,] what they are refuting is that they exist in this way *by virtue of their own characteristic*. That the self which is the object of negation (*dgag bya*), that is, that the object of negation which when negated establishes selflessness, cannot exist even nominally is a belief that all of the Buddhist philosophical schools that accept selflessness have in common.

[The Cittamātra] (1) refutation of the fact that mere verbal and symbolic predications, whether essential ones like "form" and so on or specific ones like "arising" and so on, exist by virtue of their own characteristic and (2) their refutation that one fact of "form's being (*yin pa*) the cognitive basis (*zhen gzhi*) of the conceptual consciousness (*rtog pa*) which predicates (*'dogs pa*) its essential and specific (qualities)" exists by virtue of its own characteristic are in no way different from the Sautrāntikas' repudiation of the fact that form is, by virtue of its own characteristic, (1) the subject matter (*brjod bya*) of speech (*spra*) and (2) the object cognized (*zhen yul*) by the conceptual con-

sciousness [experiencing] form, [these being in the Sautrāntika system corollaries to their] accepting that [these latter entities] are universals (*spyi mtshan*).[125]

Having correctly elucidated this fact [that in this regard there is no difference between Cittamātrins and Sautrāntikas], it is necessary to properly identify, not just theoretically, but through a multitude of examples, how it is that [things] are either essentially or specifically [predicated] either verbally or cognitively, how it is that that [connection between object and predicate] appears to exist by virtue of its own characteristic, and what the object that is the cognitive basis of conceptual thought is like.

In this regard, form's being the basis (*gzhi*) or abode (*gnas*) of the essen- [43] tial and specific terms (*tha snyad*) [predicated of it] is something that exists only by virtue of name (*ming*) and symbol (*rda*);[126] and although form is established by valid cognition (*tshad ma*) to be the basis of essential and specific terms,[127] still, form is not established *by virtue of its own characteristic* as being the basis of these essential and specific terms, even nominally. Therefore, though form appears to exist in that [latter] way, that it exists as it appears is something that must be repudiated even nominally; just as the fact that it exists even nominally in the way it is cognized (*zhen tshul ltar*) by the cognition that conceives of it as existing in that way must be repudiated.

Form appears to conceptual consciousness as being the basis of essential and specific terms by virtue of its own characteristic and this mere appearance already has been taken as a reification of something that does not exist by virtue of its own characteristic even by the Sautrāntikas. The [Sautrāntikas] have also taken that conceptual consciousness to be a consciousness that is in error (*'Khrul shes*) with regard to those appearances. Hence the realization (*rtogs pa*) that that appearance to conceptual consciousness is empty of existing as it appears, that is, empty of existing by virtue of its own characteristic, cannot possibly be what [the Cittamātrins] mean by "the realization of the selflessness of phenomena."

But here [in the Cittamātra], it is the fact that form appears *to sensory perception (dbang shes)* as being, by virtue of its own characteristic, the basis of essential and specific terms that is negated as existing the way it appears, even nominally; [and here, sensory perception is considered as being something] that arises in dependence upon latent potentialities (*bag chags*) and that the Sautrāntikas believe *not* to be in error with regard to its appearing object (*snang yul*). That [negation] is the real (*yongs grub*), the negation of the self [44] of phenomena, and the *realization* of that [fact] is posited [by the Cittamātrins] to be the realization of the selflessness of phenomena.

Having negated that form exists as it is cognized by a conceptual consciousness, that is, as being by virtue of its own characteristic the basis of essentially and specifically predicated terms, they then repudiate the self of phenomena. But it is more difficult to understand what is to be refuted (*dgag bya*) in regard to the way in which [things] appear to sensory perception than

it is in regard to the way things are conceptually cognized. Therefore, if one first identifies the way in which [what is to be negated] appears [to perception], it will make a great deal of difference [pedagogically] in one's coming to understand the method of refuting its existing as it is *conceptually* cognized, when it is [conceptually] cognized as existing in this way. [The verse that goes]: "Because there is no thought previous to the name"[128] is what principally refutes [the fact that things exist] the way in which they appear to sensory perception.

[Opponent:] How is it that an appearance, which is only a conceptual imputation (*rtog pas btags pa tsam*), can appear to nonconceptual sensory perception?

[Reply:] Were there a contradiction in its appearing [to sense consciousness simply by virtue of its being a conceptual imputation], it would follow, absurdly, that [in the magician's trick] the appearance of illusory horses and elephants could not possibly appear to sensory perception, as illusory horses and elephants are only conceptual imputations.[129]

[Opponent:] Well then it is incumbent upon you to explain (1) why form and so on appear to sensory perception as if they were the basis of essential and specific terms, (2) also why they appear to be that basis by virtue of their [45] own characteristic, (3) in what way [form's being the basis of such predicates] is established [only] verbally and symbolically, and (4) the ways in which it is posited to be the cognitive basis of a conceptual consciousness.

[Reply:] I will indeed explain. It is as it says in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha:* "In this regard, what is the characteristic of the dependent? It is that which is possessed as seeds (*sa bon*) within the foundation consciousness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*). It is that *vijñapti* gathered [there] by an incorrect misconception of existence."[130] Thus it explains that the incorrect object [arises] due to the latent potentialities in the foundation consciousness. It teaches that the principal dependent entity is the *vijñapti* that is incorrectly misconceived and that has a mistaken mode of appearance (*phyin ci log gi snang tshul yod pa'i*). Then, when it explains the divisions of such a *vijñapti,* it says that there is (1) a *vijñapti* that is the appearance of an object by virtue of linguistic latent potentialities (*mngon par brjod pa'i bag chags*), (2) a *vijñapti* that appears by virtue of latent potentialities which perceive the self (*bdag tu lta ba'i bag chags*), and (3) *a vijñapti* that appears by virtue of the latent potentialities of the kinds of existence (*srid pa'i yan lag gi bag chags*).

What are these? The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says:

> What are these? They are the *vijñaptis* of the body, of the embodied and of the experiencer, the *vijñapti* of what is undertaken by such [an experiencer], the *vijñapti* of the actual mode of undertaking it, the *vijñapti* of time, the *vijñapti* of numbers, the *vijñapti* of place, the *vijñapti* of terms, the *vijñapti* of the distinction between the self and others, the *vijñaptis* of good rebirth, bad rebirth, and death.

> In this regard, the *vijñaptis* of the body, embodied and the experiencer, the *vijñapti* of what is undertaken by that [experiencer,] the *vijñapti* of the actual mode of undertaking it, and the *vijñaptis* of time, place, numbers, and terms all arise from the seeds of lingusitic latent potentialities.[131] [46]

Again, that same work says:

> The *vijñapti* of what is undertaken by that [experiencer] should be known to be the six external spheres (*khams*) such as form and so forth, and the *vijñapti* of the actual mode of undertaking it should be known to be the six [internal] spheres such as the eye consciousness (*mig gi rnam par shes pa*) and so on.[132]

Hence, [we can see] that the appearance of form to the eye consciousness is a form of appearance that occurs by virtue of linguistic latent potentialities.[133] It is necessary to understand this mode of appearance in this way.

Now in the Sautrāntikas' system, blue is form by virtue of its own characteristic,[134] and although "blue's *being* form" is the cognitive object of the conceptual consciousness that thinks "blue is form," still, its being the cognitive object of such a conceptual consciousness is not something that exists by virtue of its own characteristic, but is instead a reification (*sgro btags*). And that is not all . . . even though the cognitive object of the conceptual consciousness which cognizes that "blue is form" is not established by virtue of its own characteristic, the blue that is the cognitive object of the conceptual consciousness that apprehends the fact that "this blue is form" *does* exist by virtue of its own characteristic. Thus in the Sautrāntika system there is this kind of distinction, namely, that although the cognitive object of a conceptual consciousness qua category (*rang ldog*) is a reification, the individual members (*gzhi ldog*) [of those categories] are not.

Now as regards the Vijñaptimātra theory, when persons well versed in [47]
linguistic symbols focus their minds during the perception of blue, then at the time that blue appears to the eye consciousness, the blue appears *as* blue and *as* an external object also. But that is not all. There also exists a mode of appearance in which that very blue appears to be the blue which is the basis or abode of such expressions as "this is blue," "this blue is of the nature of form," and "this is the arising of blue."

How do we know that [mode of appearance] to be present? It is because when one makes that very appearance, that is, the way in which blue appears to the eye consciousness, the object of one's recollection, it is cognized, and the conceptual consciousness that creates the expression "this is blue" is elicited under the influence of the eye consciousness;[135] also when someone asks "what is the nature of the meaning of the word *blue*?" cognizing that very appearance that is the way in which the blue appears to the eye consciousness,

one answers "its nature is that it is form," where the motivating conceptual thought [for such an answer] is elicited under the influence of the eye consciousness. For that reason, when the blue that is the basis of the term *blue* appears to the eye consciousness there also occurs an appearance in which blue appears to be the basis of the term *blue* from the side of its own reality (*gnas lugs*) qua entity. This is what it means for the blue that is the basis of the term *blue* to appear to exist by virtue of its own characteristic. Likewise, there is an analogous situation as regards the meaning of the fact that form appears, by virtue of its own characteristic, to be the basis of the expressions such as "this blue is of the nature of form" and "this is its arising." Such an appearance [48] within the eye consciousness is not an appearance that occurs under the influence of the reality (*gnas tshod*) of blue, nor, as is the case with the blue that appears to the eye consciousness, does it arise taking as its cause the seeds of concordant latent potentialities (*rigs mthun pa'i bag chags kyi sa bon*). Instead, from beginningless time we have become accustomed to repeatedly engaging in the conceptualizations of essential and specific expressions of the sort "this is blue," "this is form," and "this is the arising of form." This [above mentioned appearance], then, is an appearance that arises only by virtue of latent potentialities that have been planted [by our having accustomed ourselves in this way]. Because it is a mere appearance that arises under the influence of latent potentialities planted by the conceptual consciousness' being conditioned to the predication (*sbyar ba*) of terms, it is said to be an appearance that is established only by name and symbol, an appearance that is established [only] by the power of conceptual consciousness.

Form and so on appear to sensory perception to be the basis of essential and specific terms, and nominally (*tha snyad du*) form *does* exist as the basis of essential and specific terms. As for why it is established [in this way] merely nominally and conceptually [and not by virtue of its own characteristic], that has been explained earlier. Both (1) the *appearance* of form to sensory perception as being the basis of essential and specific terms by virtue of its own characteristic and (2) form's being, as it appears to be, established as the basis of the terms by virtue of its own characteristic, are mere imputations (*btags pa*) by name and conceptual thought. How this is so is as [explained] earlier, but they do not exist even nominally as they are imputed. Hence, form's being the basis of essential and specific terms is an *existent* imaginary entity, whereas form's being the basis of essential and specific terms *by virtue of its own characteristic* is a *nonexistent* imaginary entity. When form appears [49] to sensory perception, it appears as if (*lta bur*) it were the abode onto which expressions like "this is form" are predicated. That it exists in accordance with this mode of appearance by virtue of its own characteristic is something the Sautrāntikas accept. But neither the Sautrāntikas nor the Cittamātrins accept that when form appears to sensory perception it appears to be the basis of

those expressions in such a way that it is the individual members [of the category] of the expressions [relating to] form that appear. Nonetheless, when form appears to sensory perception, there does exist a way in which the basis, onto which such expressions as "this is form" is predicated, appears. Therefore, the appearance of form to sensory perception is cognized[136] in the [conceptual consciousness], and then the conceptual consciousness makes such predications as "this is form." This is a point on which both [Sautrāntikas and Cittamātrins] agree. They do not agree however as to whether it exists the way it appears *by virtue of its own characteristic*.

Therefore [first] form appears to sensory perception as being, by virtue of its own reality qua entity, the basis onto which expressions like "this is form" are predicated. The subsequent conceptual thought then cognizes the appearance of form [in this way], after which predications such as "this is form" are made. The linguistic latent potentialities that existed previously in the mental continuum are again and again nurtured (*gso par byed*) by means of the process in which conceptual consciousness cognizes[137] [form] to exist in the same way as it appears to sensory perception. Therefore, the form which appears in that way to sensory perception is called the *cognitive basis of conceptual consciousness*. This is what we are referring to when we say over and over again "the cognitive basis of the conceptual consciousness of form." To say, however, [that this is the cognitive basis of the conceptual consciousness of form] [50]
is different from simply saying that this is the cognitve *object* of the conceptual consciousness of form. The [Yogācāra's assertion] that form is not the cognitive *basis* of conceptual consciousness by virtue of its own characteristic is different from the Sautrāntika's claim that form is not the cognitive *object* of conceptual consciousness by virtue of its own characteristic.

Let me give the reason for this in an easily understandable and brief way. These two *are* dissimilar. This is because when we say that form is not the cognitive basis of conceptual consciousness by virtue of its own characteristic we are not referring only to the cognitive bases of conceptual consciousness qua [universal] category (*rang ldog*), but instead to the individual elements of that [set], accepting that this applies to a mode of appearance in which form appears to the sensory perception that arises in dependence on latent potentialities as the basis onto which expressions like *this is form* are predicated, whereas in the Sautrāntika system those sensory perceptions are unmistaken in regard to their appearing objects (*snang yul*), so that the objects of those sensory perceptions exist as they appear, that is, by virtue of their own characteristic. Thus, the Sautrāntikas accept that the conceptual consciousness which apprehends [form] to exist by virtue of its own characteristic as it appears to those sensory perceptions has a mode of apprehension (*'dzin stangs*) in accordance with its object (*don mthun*). Because [the Yogācāras] believe that apprehending [things] to exist by virtue of their own characteristic, as they appear

to sensory perception, is grasping at the self of phenomena, however, there is a tremendous difference [between the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika positions in this regard].

Therefore, the appearance of form to sensory perception as being in reality the basis onto which essential and specific terms are predicated is an incorrect mode of appearance that arises due to the latent potentialities of ignorance. Still, that sensory perception is not claimed to be either an obstacle to omniscience (*shes sgrib*) nor the grasping at the self of phenomena. It is the [51]
conceptual consciousness which apprehends [things] to exist as they appear to sensory perception that is a reification, and that is both the grasping at the self of phenomena and the manifest (*mngon gyur*) obstacle to omniscience, whereas on the other side there is the repudiation that even nominally [things] do not exist in the way they are conceived by, [that is, appear to,] conceptual consciousness as well as the repudiation that even nominally they do not exist in the same way as they appear to sensory perception, that is, as the basis of the terms *form* and so forth.

That is why the text known as *The Essence of Eloquence: An Exposition of [the Doctrines of] Provisional and Definitive Meaning* says:

> Therefore, when terms such as *form* are predicated and one looks at how it is that blue appears to be the basis onto which the term *form* is predicated, [we find] that it appears not to be established by virtue of just name and symbol, but that it instead appears to be established by virtue of its own reality. Misapprehending the blue as existing the way it appears is the reification that misapprehends the word *form* to be labeled onto [the entity] blue by virtue of its own characteristic. That this [reification] is something that the infantile possess has been established by previous explanations. The two schools that advocate the [existence] of objects, [that is, the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntikas,] accept such a mode of apprehension to be accurate (*'thad ldan*). Hence, although they [are similar to the Cittamātrins in claiming] that the referents of words (*sgra'i brjod bya*) qua universal categories are conceptual imputations (*rtog btags*), how can they possibly be like [the Cittamātrins] in whose system there are *svalakṣanas* as the elements of those [categories]?[138]

The meaning of this passage should be explained as follows. Therefore, form appears to sensory perception to be the basis onto which essential and specific terms are predicated. It is cognized [by conceptual thought] in accordance with this mode of appearance, and then there occurs a conceptual thought that creates such expressions as "this is form" and so forth. This [52]
[conceptual thought] is not a mistaken consciousness (*log shes*). The object as it is cognized by that [conceptual thought, that is, the appearing object,] is an imaginary entity that only nominally exists. Now just as form appears to sen-

sory perception to be the basis of essential and specific terms by virtue of its own characteristic, a conceptual consciousness cognizes [form conceptually] in just the same way as it appears [to sense perception nonconceptually]. [This conceptual thought] *is* a mistaken consciousness whose object does not exist as it is cognized even nominally. Hence, all conceptual thoughts are not taken as being the same.[139]

Although blue is not the basis of the term *blue* by virtue of its own nature, [in the Cittamātra system] blue is blue by virtue of its own nature. Likewise, although blue, contrary to the way in which it appears to sensory perception, does not exist as the basis of the predicated term *blue* by virtue of its own characteristic, still, blue does, as it appears, exist as blue by virtue of its own characteristic. It also exists by virtue of its own characteristic as it is cognized by a conceptual thought [and not just by a sense perception] that apprehends it in accordance with this latter way of appearing, [that is, of blue as blue].

[On Latent Potentialities]

Blue appears to the eye consciousness as the basis onto which the term *blue* is posited because of the imprints (*lag rjes*) of linguistic latent potentialities. Therefore, because the object of such an appearance is an object that is a mere imputation by name and conceptual thought, it is not a real entity (*dngos po*). However, blue's appearing as blue to the eye consciousness is not due to the imprints of linguistic latent potentialities but instead is caused by concordant latent potentialities (*rigs mthun pa'i bag chags*). Because the object of such an appearance is an impermanent entity that is destroyed at each instant, it exists substantially (*rdzas su grub pa*) and is a dependent entity (*gzhan dbang*), and hence it is not an imaginary entity. For this reason it should be understood that each way in which [an object] appears to a single eye consciousness [results from] its own individual latent potentialities, just as one single sense consciousness has its own individual set of threefold conditioning imprints (*rkyen gsum gyi lag rjes*).[140] It is also with this idea in mind that the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* says:

> If what appears as an object that is mere *vijñapti* is a dependent entity, [someone may ask] how that is so; that is, why it *is* a dependent entity and why is it called a dependent entity. It is called *dependent* because it arises from its own latent seeds. After it has arisen, because it cannot of its very nature abide for more than an instant, it is called *dependent*.[141] [53]

[The expression] *its own latent seeds* refers to concordant latent potentialities.

[Question:] What are these so-called concordant latent potentialities?

[Answer:] A previous consciousness has the ability to give rise to a similar later consciousness. Now when [the former] ceases, that which is left deposited upon the foundation consciousness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*) [that can give rise to another similar consciousness at a later time is called the *concordant latent potentiality*]. Therefore, the appearance of blue to a later eye consciousness is [the result of] a latent imprint placed [in the foundation consciousness] by a previous eye consciousness to which blue has appeared. It is not the result of a latent imprint placed [in the foundation consciousness] by a *conceptual* consciousness.

[Question:] Because blue appears to the eye consciousness to be the basis of essential and specific terms in dependence on linguistic latent potentialities, it must be the result of those latent potentialities, and if that is so, does that not make it a real entity (*dngos po*), [that is, the result of causes, when in actuality it is an unreal and imputed fact]?

[Answer:] Well then, [following the same logic,] taking the appearance of a pot even to conceptual consciousness, it follows, absurdly, that it is the result of linguistic latent potentialities because it is an appearance that arises in conceptual consciousness in dependence on those [linguistic latent imprints]. Hence, [one can see from this that] there is a difference between "arising in dependence upon latent influences" and "being born from latent seeds." As regards the concordant latent potentialities, Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu] explain them to be the "causal condition" (*rgyu rkyen*) from among the four types of condition.[142]

In this way [we see that] even in regard to a single sense consciousness that arises in dependence upon potentialities there is (1) an object that exists just as it appears, and this is a dependent entity (*gzhan dbang*) that exists by virtue of its own characteristic. (2) Then there is an object that can be posited to exist only nominally as it appears by name and symbol, and this is an imaginary entity (*kun brtags*). (3) Finally, there is a mere conceptual imputation that cannot be posited to exist as it appears by name and symbol *even nominally*. [Because the kinds of things that appear to sense perception] are divisible into these three kinds [of objects], the method in which the conceptual consciousness conceives of the object that appears to that [sense perception] is also threefold. But [in the case of conceptual thought] we are dealing with distinct conceptual thoughts, [as opposed to dealing with the different objects of a single mind as is the case in sense perception]. It is not simply that the way in which things are conceived of within a single conceptual thought can be divided into three. [54]

Although all this could have been gathered from the previous explanations [in this text,] I have once again set it forth in this condensed fashion for those whose mental faculties are extremely dull.

Take the case of the sense consciousness of someone who is not conversant with a certain term or symbol (*rda*). The way in which [the direct object]

appears to [such a sense consciousness] in no way differs from the way it appears to someone who *is* conversant with the term or symbol. Nevertheless, although the generic image (*don spyi*) corresponding to such an appearance arises in the conceptual consciousness following [both sense consciousnesses], because the generic linguistic image (*sgra spyi*) corresponding to that symbol or term does not arise [for the person not conversant with the term], there will be a difference in so far as [the latter person] will simply not know how to use such a term.

[The Proof of the Linguistic Interpretation of Emptiness][143]

Form [first] appears to sense consciousness to be the basis of essential and specific terms by virtue of its own characteristic, and then a conceptual consciousness conceives of it as existing the way it appears [to that sense consciousness]. The reasoning which refutes that [form] exists as it is apprehended [by that conceptual consciousness] is explained in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha:*

> Because there is no mind before the name,
> Because of multiplicity and because it is indefinite,
> And because of the contradictions between
> Its very self, its many selves
> And its mixture of selves, thus can it be proven.[144]

The first reason is this. When positing "the bulbous one"[145] as the basis of the term *pot,* it follows, absurdly, [from your[146] premises] that it is done utterly independently of the term because that the bulbous one exists by virtue of its own characteristic, from the side of its own reality, as the [basis of that term]. Now if you accept [that the bulbous one is the basis of the term *pot* [55]
independently of the term,] then it follows, absurdly, that the thought (*blo*) which thinks "pot" of the bulbous one arises independently of the term, and if you agree to *that,* then it follows that the mere sight of the bulbous one should evoke the thought "this is a pot" even prior to the bulbous one's having been given the name *pot.* Based on these reductios it is proven that such a thought does not arise prior to the name and thus that [the bulbous one] does not exist as the basis of that [word *pot*] by virtue of its own characteristic.

The second reason is this. When one being is called by several names, like Indra, Śakra, and Grāmaghātaka,[147] it follows, absurdly, that that being is the referential basis (*'jug pa'i gzhi*) of those names by virtue of his own real nature (*dngos po'i dbang gis*). Now if you accept this, it will follow, absurdly, that one single being would be as many objects as it had different names. This is yet another proof in favor of the original premise, [that a thing is not, by virtue of its own characteristic, the referential basis of the term that names it].

The third reason is this. When two beings are called by one and the same name, it follows that they are called that name by virtue of their own real nature because [according to you] those two beings are the referential bases of that single name by virtue of their own reality (*dngos po'i gnas tshod kyis*). If you agree to *this* then it follows, absurdly, that those two beings must be only one referential object just as the name by which they are called is one, and thus it would follow, absurdly, that those two beings would have their mental continua mixed up [into one].

According to Sautrāntikas, if what is actually expressed (*dngos kyi brjod bya*) by the word *pot* exists by virtue of its being a *svalakṣaṇa (rang mtshan)*[148] there would occur a problem in so far as there could arise a thought of that name [*pot*] independently of its relationship to the term. Nevertheless they claim that there is no fault in maintaining that the bulbous one exists as the referential basis of the name *pot,* just as it appears to sense consciousness, by virtue of its own characteristic. The Vijñānavādins, however, force through, [56]
with those [preceding reasons], the proof that such a distinction is not tenable.

Although consciousness truly exists [in this Yogācāra system], it does not truly exist as the basis onto which the term *consciousness* is posited; its being the basis or the abode of such a term is an imaginary entity. Nonetheless, when blue appears to sense consciousness, it appears as if that very blue were, by virtue of its own characteristic, the basis of essential and specific expressions such as *this is blue*. Now when such a consciousness appears to the autocognition (*rang rig*)[149] which experiences that consciousness, that very consciousness does not appear to be the basis of essential and specific expressions. This is because, although the appearance of blue to sense consciousness is an appearance accompanied by the appearance of duality (*gnyis snang*),[150] the autocognition that experiences consciousness experiences it without dual appearance.

The two *śrāvaka* schools maintain that unless the object that appears (*snang yul*) to sense consciousness, which they accept as being perceived without error (*ma 'khrul ba*), exists by virtue of its own characteristic, it can not be posited as existing [at all]. The Vijñānavādins, on the other hand, maintain that there is an object that appears to sense consciousness in dependence on latent potentialities but that does not exist by virtue of its own characteristic, being only posited by name and symbol; but [though they accept that it does exist in this way], because it is merely posited by name and symbol, it can not be posited as [being involved in] a causal [process]. Therefore, they do not accept that it is a real entity (*dngos po*). Because the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas accept that what is posited merely by name can also be posited as causal, this is the best [position]. That is why *The Elucidation of the Provisional and Definitive (Drang nges rnam 'byed-LSN)* says:

> However, if something is merely posited by name and symbol, the [Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas] accept that it cannot be causal. These

> two advocates of [external] objects believe that if you repudiate that form and so on is, by virtue of its own characteristic, the basis of the conceptions that conceive of it and the abode of the term that names it, then it could not exist. This does not refer to the *svalakṣaṇas* that are spoken of by the logicians (*tshad ma pa*).[151] [57]

One should familiarize oneself with this point as it is expounded herein.

Even though [*LSN*] states that it does not refer to the *svalakṣaṇas* that are spoken of by the logicians, it does not mean that the two advocates of [external] objects do not accept that the object that appears as the basis of such terms as *form* and so on to a nonerroneous sense consciousness *is* a *svalakṣaṇa* of the kind spoken of in such passages as "because there are two kinds of existent entities (gzhal bya), there are two kinds of valid cognitions (*tshad ma*)."[152] This is because in that passage it explains that everything potentially efficacious (*don byed nus pa*) is also a *svalakṣaṇa* and because the Mahātma (Dharmakīrti) explains that it is impossible for a Sautrāntika to accept that something is both the object which actually appears to a nonerroneous sense consciousness and at the same time not be potentially efficacious.

Neither does it mean that the Cittamātrins accept that the object which appears in a similar fashion, [that is, as the basis of such terms as *form*,] to sense consciousness is a *svalakṣaṇa* of the kind spoken of in the passage of the logicians, [for in fact the Cittamātrins do not accept this]. The reason is this: were that so, one would have to maintain that the Vijñānavādins accept that that object is both merely posited by name and symbol and potentially efficacious; and, as has been explained, the Vijñānavādins cannot envision that something merely posited by name and thought can [at the same time] be causal. So do not entertain either of these two doubts in regard to the meaning of [Tsong kha pa's] passage.

Well then, [if those are not the meanings of the cited passage,] what *is*? [When he says] that if the Sautrāntika's and so forth were to negate that [things] are the abodes of the terms that name them by virtue of being *svalakṣaṇas*, then they would not exist, it is not referring to the *svalakṣaṇas* that are spoken of by the Sautrāntikas themselves in such passages as "because there are two kinds of existent entities." Because the Sautrāntikas do not [58] accept that "space's being the basis onto which the name space is posited" is a real entity (*dngos po*), they do not believe that it is a *svalakṣaṇa* of the kind spoken of in such passages as "because there are two kinds of existent entities." Still, they do claim that it exists, and they nonetheless believe that space is the basis onto which the name space is posited by virtue of space's own reality (*rang gi gnas tshod*), and that if it did not exist in such a way, space could not exist.

A Sautrāntika accepts that space and *nirvāṇa* are the abodes onto which the names *space* and the *exhaustion of defilements* are posited by virtue of

their own reality. Now although the Sautrāntikas themselves do not mention the word *svalakṣaṇa,* [that is, they do not explicitly say "by virtue of its being a *svalakṣaṇa,*"] according to the Cittamātrins, the Sautrāntikas are reduced to accepting that in that [expression "by virtue of its own reality," the words] mean ["by viture of its being] a *svalakṣaṇa.*" To understand this is extremely important.

[Nonduality as a Corollary of the Linguistic Interpretation of Emptiness]

How is it that one comes to understand the Vijñaptimātratā (mind-only theory) by means of this method of refuting the extreme of reification (*sgro 'dogs pa'i mtha'*) as it has been explained here? When one negates the fact that all phenomena, from form up to omniscience, are ultimately the bases of conceptual cognitions (*rnam rtog gi zhen pa'i gzhi*) and the abode on which linguistic terms are predicated (*ming gi tha snyad 'dogs pa'i gzhi*), then one realizes that the object of a certain conceptual thought does not exist as it appears to [exist]. [And what is that thought?] First it appears [to sense perception] as if, based on the name, which is what expresses, the meaning, which is what is expressed, and the relationship between name and meaning, any meaning expressed, whether [predicated] essentially or specifically, exists from its own reality (*rang gi gnas tshod*). Then there is a mental conception which conceives that this is so. [This is the conceptual thought whose object one comes to realize does not exist as it appears to exist.] By [negating this fact] one comes to consider that the mode of perception that perceives [things] in that way is not without error, and then one enters into an understanding of the Vijñaptimātra, which is the nonexistence of the duality of subject and object. This is how it is explained in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha.* By the very negation of [this extreme of] reification, one will [be able to] effortlessly negate the fact that subject and object qua external entity are different substances. When, [59]
through reasoning, one negates the fact that form exists as it is conceived when it is conceived to be, by virtue of its own characteristic, the abode or basis onto which essential and specific terms are posited, as one is also in the process negating that it exists as it appears to the *sense consciousness* to which it appears in such a way, one will also realize that the object that appears to those sense consciousnesses are erroneously [perceived]. When one understands *that,* as one is repudiating [that such consciousness] arises under the power of a perceived object (*dmigs yul*) which exists externally, one is also repudiating that blue and so on exist as different substances from the sense conciousnesses to which they appear.

If one does not understand this method of refuting such an extreme of reification, then when the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* explains that the *Mother Sūtras'* claims of "nonexistence" are intended [to apply to] imaginary entities, the Vijñānavādins' own system would be reduced to many [unnecessary] absurdities,[153] for there would of necessity arise a multitude of explanations such as this; that is, that what [these *sūtras*] actually mean when they say that space is nonexistent is that space does not exist as an external object, which is nothing but the refutation of a mistaken conception (*log rtog*) that could not possibly occur to anyone.

When one has understood this, one will have gained expertise in the proper method of interpretation, namely, that what is meant [by the nonexistence claims of the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras—PPS*] such as "see no space, neither see space's name" is that space is not, by virtue of its own characteristic, the abode of names such as *space*.

To hold that space is, by virtue of its own reality, the abode of terms like *space* is a [misconception] that exists innately (*lhan skyes du*) in ordinary beings, and it is also what this system [the Yogācāra] takes to be the misapprehension of the self of phenomena (*chos kyi bdag 'dzin*). It is impos- [60]
sible [however] to have an innate thought that holds space to be an external material form.

Likewise, when one has understood this, one will have gained expertise concerning the way in which the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāpiṇḍārtha* explain the meaning of the *Mother Sūtras* when they say "a bodhisattva should not be perceived, neither should a bodhisattva's name be perceived." Otherwise [if this linguistic interpretation has not been grasped] one cannot say that one has grasped even the smallest portion of the meaning of the Mahāyāna scriptures.

[The Explanation of the Three Natures]

Dependent entities are the bases on which imaginary entities are predicated or imputed. They are also the subjects that possess the quality (*chos can*) of reality. Any real entity (*dngos po*) is an example [of a dependent entity]. They are defined as those things that arise in dependence on other causes and conditions. They are divided into (1) pure dependent entities (*dag pa gzhan dbang*) like the worldly gnoses (*'jig rten pa'i ye shes*) of the pure attainments subsequent [to the equipoise] (*rjes thob dag pa*) of Mahāyāna *āryans*, and (2) impure dependent entities (*ma dag gzhan dbang*) such as the incorrect misconceptions (*yang dag ma yin kun rtog*) of ordinary individuals.

Imaginary entities are the mere labels of the conceptual thoughts that chiefly take dependent entities as the bases of the labeling (*gdags gzhi*). Any

generic image (*don spyi*) is an example. As it says in the *Elucidation of the Provisional and Definitive:* "There are quite a few of those which cannot be posited by name and symbol and are not established by virtue of their own characteristic because they are merely labeled by conceptual thought."[154] What this is saying is that, for example, sound's being empty of permanence does not arise as an object in the mind, [that is, does not come to be understood,] simply on account of latent potentialities [due to] one's accustoming oneself to saying expressions such as "sound has no permanence." Although sound's being empty of permanence is not posited by the mere expression of terms like "sound has no permanence," [as it requires the elimination of reification through reasoning,] still, because it is a universal that is labeled mentally, one must consider it to be an example of an imaginary entity. The definition [of an imaginary entity] is "that which is merely labeled by conceptual thought and is also the object of an erroneous mind." It has two divisions: (1) those [61]
that can be counted as imaginary entities (*rnam grangs pa'i kun brtags*) [but that nonetheless exist] like the fact that form is the basis of essential and specific terms, and (2) utterly nonexistent imaginary entities (*yongs su chad pa'i kun brtags*) such as the two selves, [that is, that of persons and of phenomena].

The real is reality [lit. thusness], that is, the fact that dependent entities are empty of existing as they are imagined by the two forms of self-grasping. This is also its definition. It has two divisions: (1) the nonerroneous real (*phyin ci ma log pa'i yongs grub*) such as the *ārya*'s equipoised gnosis that perceives the selflessness of phenomena, and (2) the unchanging real (*'gyur med yongs grub*), that is, reality (*chos nyid*). The former is *called* the *real*, but is [in actuality] a dependent entity in nature.[155] In the Vijñaptimātra it is explained that dependent entities cannot appear to the equiposed gnosis in which an *āryan* who has directly perceived the selflessness of phenomena trains. This is set forth and extensively explained in the tenets of the Vijñaptimātra, but fearing too lengthy an account, I will not write [about it] here.

No one has yet [to understand]
The teachings of the scriptures,
So I have opened the jewel treasure,
The intended meaning of the profound [emptiness].
Behold it and rejoice!

I have refuted those mistaken explanations of the intended meaning
And established them as the abodes of doubt.
Perfecting their [understanding] of the intended meaning of reality,
The wise abandon mistaken wishes.

These are some stanzas of intermission.[156]

[Similarity in Terminology Between the Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika Is Not a Reflection of an Underlying Similarity in Meaning]

In [the Cittamātrins'] own system, it is accepted that imaginary entities do not exist by virtue of their own characteristic. The Cittamātrins believe that the [62] object of refutation of the Prāsaṅgikas, an object that exists by virtue of its own characteristic, is an imaginary entity. Hence, there is a merely nominal similarity [in that both Prāsaṅgikas and Cittamātrins refute the fact that the expression] "existence by virtue of own characteristic" applies to certain entities, but there is a great difference in the meaning [of what each system considers to be "existence by virtue of own characteristic" and to what it applies]. Likewise, even though other texts [of the Yogācāra] explain that the object appearing to conceptual thought (*rtog pa'i snang yul*) and universals (*spyi mtshan*) do not exist by virtue of their own characteristic, they nonetheless have a full-blown theory [in which other things] exist by virtue of being *svalakṣaṇas,* a fact refuted by the Prāsaṅgikas. Likewise, because the Prāsaṅgikas, Svātantrika Mādhyamikas, and Cittamātrins differ greatly as to their degree of subtlety in their determination of what it means for something to be truly existent, one should not go astray in thinking that the mere nominal [similarity of the expressions they use,] "existing by virtue of own characteristic" and "truly existent," [reflect similarities in tenets or meaning].

[Cittamātra Hermeneutics][157]

The *Saṃdhinirmocana* states that the teachings of the three stages [or turnings] of the wheel [of the doctrine] cannot be distinguished either by virtue of [there having been different] series (*thebs*) of entourages [of disciples], nor from the viewpoint of the [different] periods in the Teacher's, [that is, the Buddha's,] life, but instead from the viewpoint of subject matter (*brjod bya*). [The distinction between the three wheels] is based on the way in which the meaning of selflessness is presented. [The first wheel] does not, for the most part, refute true existence. [The middle wheel] explains that no phenomenon truly exists; and [the last wheel] perfectly elucidates which of the three natures truly exist and which do not. So it is based on the three wheels' respectively teaching such doctrines [that they are distinguished from one another].

Other *sūtras* do not teach such a method, [that is, do not teach a method for understanding the doctrine of emptiness,] such as those that teach that the monk's lower garment should be worn wrapped around [the body] (*zlum por*). These works cannot be taken as bases on which to distinguish the definitive from the provisional because they do not distinguish the definitive from the viewpoint of the three different methods of setting forth selflessness. This is

because teachings such as the statement that the monk's lower robe should be worn wrapped around [the body] are not any of the three methods of teaching selflessness. Therefore, just because a text is a scripture does not imply that it [63]
is a *sūtra* of one of the three wheels. Hence, the division into three [wheels] is a division based on points of chief [importance, and not on secondary matters, such as how to wear the robe].

[Opponent:] The *Dharaṇīśvararājaparipṛccha Sūtra* says:

> Oh son of good family, it is like this, for example, an expert jeweler who is well versed in the method of cleaning jewels will first pick out a very pure precious stone from among a variety of precious stones. Then he cleans it by soaking it in strong salt water and cleaning it with a hair brush. But he does not stop his efforts at merely that. Afterwards he cleans it by soaking it in a strong organic solution and cleaning it with a woolen cloth. Yet he does not stop his efforts at merely that. Afterwards he cleans it by soaking it in a chemical solution and cleaning it with a fine cotton cloth. [What results] is utterly clean and free from impurities and is said to belong to the great family of lapizes (*vaiḍhūrya*).
>
> Oh son of good family, likewise does the Tathāgata make sorrow arise in sentient beings who enjoy *saṃsāra*. For having understood the various dispositions of beings, he teaches impermanence, suffering, selflessness, and the arising of the thought of the impurity [of the body and so on]. He thus introduces the noble Dharma to disciplines. But the Tathāgata does not stop his efforts at merely that. Afterwards he makes them understand the way of the *tathāgatas* by means of such teachings as emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness. Yet still the Tathāgata does not stop his efforts at merely that. Afterwards he makes all those sentient beings who possess different natural [64]
> potentials enter into the country (*yul*) of the *tathāgatas* by means of the utterly pure instructions of the three cycles,[158] by means of the teachings of the irreversible wheel. [Those beings] abide in [that object] and when they perceive the reality (*dharmatā*) of the Tathāgata, that is called the state of unsurpassable qualities.[159]

This passage teaches that the three stages of the wheel [as taught in the *Saṃdhinirmocana*] respectively cleanse the gross, subtle, and extremely subtle obscuring stains [that adhere] to the *tathāgatagarbha*, and that because of this, [that is, because the last wheel purifies the subtlemost stains,] the last wheel alone is of definitive meaning.

[Reply:] This [view arises] from improper examination of the scriptures and is, moreover, contradictory [to what such an opponent] believes. How is that so? [It arises from an improper examination of scripture] because if one joins example to meaning [by means of] a common quality, one must accept

that just as only *one* gem is being cleansed in stages by three cleansing agents, so the stains of three degrees of subtlety are being cleansed in the mind of only *a single* disciple by the three wheels, which are the agents of the [spiritual] purification. It is thus contradictory to explain that the disciples [within this quote] are beings of different lineages (*rigs*) [corresponding to] the three wheels [as they are taught in the *Saṃdhinirmocana*]. [It is contradictory] (1) because it is contradictory to [the proponent's] own views that the disciples *are* of different lineages and (2) because the absurdity would follow that if one was a disciple for whom the Buddha's turning of the wheel of the doctrine was meant, then one would have to enter into the three vehicles in order, [starting with the Śravakayāna first, whereas in actuality some beings can proceed to the Mahāyāna directly].

The expression "the teachings of the irreversible wheel" [in the preceding passage] is said to teach [the doctrine of] one final vehicle, and because, as has already been explained, the final wheel teaches three final vehicles, there is no relation [between the three cycles or wheels spoken of in this *sūtra* and the three wheels spoken of in the *Saṃdhinirmocana*].

Thus, this *sūtra* says that in order to cleanse the *dhātu*, [that is, the *tathāgatagarbha*,] a ripening path consisting of impermanence, suffering, and **[65]** so forth is taught, and that then the liberating paths of the rough and subtle selflessness of phenomena is taught, in that order, these being the only teachings that cleanse stains.

[Opponent:] Because the *Saṃdhinirmocana says* that the final wheel is of definitive meaning, the final wheel *is* of definitive meaning, and what is more, the *Brief, Intermediate, and Extensive Perfection of Wisdom [Sūtras]* and so forth, are all *sūtras* of the final wheel.

[Reply:] This is quite mistaken because the following appears in the *Extensive Mother* (*PPS*): "At that time limitless hundreds of thousands of sons of the gods threw flowers into the air and said this in unison: 'Alas, I and the rest [of you] have today seen the second turning of the wheel of the doctrine in the world.' "[160]

It follows [from your position] that the *Saṃdhinirmocana* is of definitive meaning because it explains itself to be of definitive meaning. This is the kind of inference that you yourself are accepting. But if you accept this, it contradicts your explanation that the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* are of definitive meaning; and it would follow, absurdly, that there is a valid cognition which [perceives] no error in a contradiction, for [it perceives no error in claiming that] the teaching that all phenomena do not truly exist, [which the *PPS* contain,] and the teaching that dependent entities truly exist, [which the *Saṃdhinirmocana* contains,] are both from *sūtras* of definitive meaning.

[Opponent:] A *sūtra* whose meaning exists as it is taught word for word in that *sūtra*, is of definitive meaning, and the opposite is accepted as being the provisional meaning. Thus, *sūtras* of the last wheel, such as the

Saṃdhinirmocana, are of definitive meaning [because they can be taken literally], and those of the middle wheel, such as the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* are of provisional meaning [because they cannot]. Also, *sūtras*[161] such as the *Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra,*[162] the *Jñānālokālaṃkāra Sūtra,*[163] the *Mahābheri Sūtra,*[164] the *Aṅgulimālika Sūtra,*[165] the *Ārya Dharaṇīśvararājaparipṛccha Sūtra,*[166] the *Cayapacayaśasana Sūtra*, and the *Mahānirvāṇa Sūtra*[167] are all *sūtras* of the final wheel and of definitive meaning. [66]

[Reply:] This [view is a result] of improperly investigating [scripture], because the way in which those latter *sūtras* teach [the doctrine] and the way the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* teaches it disagree on every point. How do they disagree? It is because the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra,* as cited earlier, explains that there are three final vehicles whereas those latter *sūtras* explain that there is only one final vehicle.

The *Ārya Śrīmālā Sūtra*[168] explains that a *śrāvaka arhant* [after he dies] takes up a body that is of the nature of mind because of the latent potentialities of ignorance (*ma rig bag chags*)[169] and undefiled karma (*zag pa med pa'i las*).[170] Moreover, one cannot take this to be referring [merely to the *arhant's* body] while he still possesses a remainder, [that is, before death,] because the body of an *arhant* who possesses a remainder is a suffering aggregate that he has been cast into due to the karma and afflictions of his previous births. Therefore, one must take this to be referring to the *arhant* who has actually attained *nirvāṇa* without remainder, [that is, who has attained *nirvāṇa* and then passed away]. Now [the doctrine] that an *arhant* who has obtained [nirvāṇa] without remainder takes up a body is in utter contradiction [to the doctrine] of three final vehicles, [for if the *arhant's* vehicle was truly final he would not need to take up a body].

When the *Saṃgrahāni* comments on the meaning of the *Saṃdhinirmocana* it clearly explains, as mentioned earlier, that there are three final vehicles. The Lord [Maitreya] also makes the same point in the *Sūtrālaṃkāra.* When it comments on the purport of the *Garbha Sūtra* and the like, the *Uttaratantra,* root text *and* commentary, both explain that they teach one final vehicle.[171] [67]

If one is following the explanations of the *Saṃdhinirmocana* one must accept the exposition of definitive and provisional meaning as it was explained, [that is, the former being doctrines that can be accepted literally and the latter those that cannot]. One cannot [in the Yogācāra system] take teachings of the conventional as being of provisional meaning and teachings of the ultimate as being of definitive meaning [as the Mādhyamikas do] because, if that were so, then it would follow that the *Brief, Intermediate and Extensive Mother (PPS),* that is, the *sūtras* of the middle wheel, would be of definitive meaning. This is because [when those sūtras] explain that the teaching of the lack of characteristic [existence] means that all [things] are imaginary in nature, they [teach] that the emptiness of the imaginary nature is the real,

[hence, teaching emptiness or the ultimate from the Yogācāra viewpoint and, hence, following from the opponent's premise, they would have to be of definitive meaning.]

The *Jñānālokālaṃkāra Sūtra* explains that the teachings of the ultimate are of definitive meaning, and it is therefore in accordance with the *Ārya Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra,* for it says: "Whatever is of definitive meaning is ultimate."[172]

This has been a brief explanation of the way in which the Ārya Asaṅga and his brother [Vasubandhu], following the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra,* set forth the [doctrines of] the definitive and the provisional.

The Doctrines of the Madhyamaka School

[THE SOURCES OF THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL]

4.1.2. How the Father, the Ārya Nāgārjuna, and His Son [Āryadeva], Following Such Sūtras *as the* Akṣayamatinirdeśa, *Set Forth the Doctrine of the Definitive and the Provisional*[173]

The *Prasannapadā*, the *Commentary on the Prajñāpradīpa*, and the *Madhyamakāloka* all quote the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra* as a source,[174] and having done so, they elucidate [the distinction] between definitive and provisional meaning according to it. This *sūtra* says: "What are the *sūtras* of definitive meaning and what are the *sūtras* of provisional meaning? The *sūtras* that teach the conventional are said to be of provisional meaning and those that teach the ultimate are said to be of definitive meaning."[175] Another *sūtra* [68] that is in accordance with this same [stance], the *Samādhirāja*, also says:

> The *Tathāgata's* teachings on emptiness
> Should be known as examples of *sūtras* of definitive meaning.
> Whichever ones teach about beings, personality, or man
> Should all be known as the doctrines of provisional meaning.[176]

Thus, when expounding [the doctrines of the] definitive and provisional in accordance with the explanations of those [two *sūtras*], we see that those *sūtras* which directly (*dngos su*) teach, as their chief subject matter, only various kinds of conventional entities should be known to be the *sūtras* of provisional meaning. [They are called *provisional*] because it is necessary to search for another reality (*gnas lugs*) by interpreting the chief teaching expounded by those *sūtras* away from that nondefinitive reality, [which is their literal teaching].[177] Those that directly teach emptiness, the mere elimination of proliferation (*spros pa*), nonarising, and so forth, as their chief subject matter are the *sūtras* of definitive meaning. [They are called *definitive*] because of the reason that is the reverse of the previous one, [that is, because it is not necessary to search for another reality apart from the one taught as the principal subject matter of such a *sūtra*, as the emptiness that it teaches *is* the ultimate reality].

There are two reasons why the meaning of *sūtras* must be reinterpreted. With regard to reality, *sūtras* whose direct teachings cannot be taken to be

reality, for example, those that teach such things as the fact that wealth arises from charity, [though expressing a conventional truth,] must still be reinterpreted. This is the "reason having to do with reality." With regard to the conventional, sometimes things cannot be taken [even conventionally] as they are directly taught by certain *sūtras* and thus must be reinterpreted, as is the case with the passage that goes "the father and the mother should be killed."[178] It is because of this that the *Madhyamakāloka* says:

> What exactly is the definitive meaning? It refers to whatever explanation is made based upon a valid cognition and is made with regard to the ultimate, because a [*sūtra* that fulfills these two conditions] cannot be interpreted by someone else in anyway different from that [literal meaning expressing the ultimate].[179] [69]

Such a method of explaining the definitive and the provisional is common to all Mādhyamikas who follow the Ārya Nāgārjuna.[180]

4.2. How, Step by Step, the Texts of Nāgārjuna and the Commentaries on Their Purport (dgongs pa) *Arose*[181]

4.2.1. The Explanation of the Way in Which the Scriptures of the Ārya Were Written[182]

The Ārya [Nāgārjuna], in accordance with a prophecy of the Victorious One, composed many [works] of both the Tantric and Prajñāpāramitā [classes], texts that clarify the essence of the teachings of *sūtra* and *tantra*. He composed many texts on medicine (*gso spyad*), such as the *Yogaśataka*,[183] and also many treatises [on topics common to both Buddhists and non-Buddhists], such as the *Prajñāśataka*, [a work on grammar].[184] His specialty, however, was the elucidation of the profound path of the Madhyamaka. He taught reality (*de kho na nyid*), collecting [passages of] *sūtras* of definitive meaning in his *Sūtrasamuccaya*.[185] The scriptures [called] the *logical compendia* (rigs tshogs kyi gzhung) constitute his logical exposition [of emptiness].[186] He composed

1. The *Prajñāmūla* (*madhyamaka kārikās*)[187]
2. The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*[188]
3. The *Śūnyatāsaptati*[189]
4. The *Vigrahavyāvartanī*[190]
5. The *Vaidalya*[191]
6. The *Ratnāvalī*[192]

The *Prajñāmūla* extensively teaches the reasons that refute the fact that things truly exist. The *Vaidalya* was composed to refute the sixteen categories

of the Naiyāyikas (*rtog ge tshig don bcu drug*),[193] which this non-Buddhist [school] mistakenly believes to be that which proves the fact that things truly exist. The *Vigrahavyāvartanī* is an excursus on the lines of the first chapter of the *Prajñāmūla* that go:

> The essences of things
> Do not exist in their causes.[194]

[to which the opponent in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* replies:]

> If the essences of all entities
> Do not exist, [70]
> Your words too would be essenceless
> And they could not repudiate essences.[195]

They [the realists] say that if all entities do not have essences, then your, [that is, the Mādhyamika's,] words would not have an essence. They [claim], therefore, that they could work neither to refute nor to prove [the Madhyamaka thesis]. They would not refute the position held by others that essences exist, nor would they prove the [Mādhyamika's] own position that essences do not exist. It is to the elimination (*vyāvartanī*) of such an argument (*vigraha*), that is, to showing in an extensive fashion how essenceless words can refute the opponents' position and establish our own position, that the remainder of this text, the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, is dedicated.

The *Śūnyatāsaptati* is also an excursus on [a portion of] the *Prajñāmūla*, this time on the lines from the seventh chapter that go:

> Like a dream, like an illusion,
> Just like a city of fairies,
> So is arising, so is abiding,
> And so is destruction taught to be.[196]

This text [the *Śūnyatāsaptati*] was composed as an answer to a refutation of this [verse]. [The opponent claims] that if arising, abiding, and cessation are essenceless, then it would contradict many of the teachings of the scriptures. This text was composed to make such an opponent understand that because [the *sūtras*] are referring not to arising, abiding, and cessation that exist inherently, but [to arising and so on] that are merely nominal things (*tha snyad tsam*), [the *Prajñāmūla*] does not contradict the teachings of the scriptures, [as it repudiates the former kind of arising but not the latter]. That is to say, it was composed to extensively [make this point] in a manifest way by demonstrating exactly how all functionality (*bya byed*), like arising and cessation, are mere names (*ming tsam*).

The remaining two texts [the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* and the *Ratnāvalī*] teach chiefly that it is impossible to even free oneself from *saṃsāra*, much less to attain omniscience, on paths which adhere to the extremist views of existence and

non-existence, and hence that, if one desires to free oneself from *saṃsāra*, it is [71]
necessary to understand reality exactly as it is, this being the counteractive measure to the grasping at [these two] extremes. The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* says:

> Because [we grasp at the extreme of] existence we are not liberated,
> And by [grasping at the extreme of nonexistence] there would be no liberation from the existential state (*srid pa*).[197]

thereby teaching that by grasping at the extremes of existence and nonexistence one cannot be liberated from the existential state [of *saṃsāra*]. [It goes on to say:]

> Because of his or her knowledge of the entity (*dngos*) and the nonentity (*dngos med*)
> The *mahātma* becomes liberated.[198]

This shows that those who know the reality of both *saṃsāra*, which is an entity, and *nirvāṇa*, which is a nonentity, are mahātmas; that is, *āryans*, who liberate themselves from *saṃsāra*. The actualization of the cessation [of suffering and its causes] at the time of the effect, [that is, on the attainment of liberation,] by a gnosis (*ye shes*) which understands that the existential state, *saṃsāra*, does not arise inherently, is called "the attainment of *nirvāṇa*." It refutes the opposite view, the position that would claim [that someone had attained *nirvāṇa*] because his or her afflictions (*nyon mongs*) qua things that exist by virtue of their own characteristic have been exhausted, and because the subsequent [continuity] of his or her aggregates did not arise. It therefore claims that it is impossible for this to be what is meant either by the actualization of cessation or the exhaustion of the aggregates and the afflictions. Because this very interpretation is explained to be the one offered by the texts that teach the Hināyāna form of *nirvāṇa*, the remainder of this work [the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*] is then devoted to proving [that such an interpretation is incorrect].[199]

The *Ratnāvalī* extensively explains that the cause of higher rebirth (*mngon mtho*) is faith (*dad pa*); that is, belief in karma and its effects (*las 'bras*). It says that with such [faith] as a prerequisite one becomes a suitable vessel for meditating on the path of the definitive good (*nges legs*).[200] Moreover, [it states that] based on the wisdom (*shes rab*) that perceives emptiness, which is the [fact that] "I" and "mine" do not ultimately exist, one accustoms oneself to the understanding that the aggregates are truthless (*bden med*), and in this way one exhausts one's grasping to the "I"; [it states that] until one stops
grasping at the truth of the aggregates, *saṃsāra* cannot be overturned. To be [72]
liberated from *saṃsāra*, [it goes on,] it is also necessary to understand the "perfect object" (*yang dag pa'i don* = emptiness), an [understanding] that does not view things in terms of the extremes of either existence or nonexis-

tence. By understanding such an object one will be liberated from *saṃsāra*. [Finally,] it explains in great detail the exact stages of the path for attaining the achievement of omniscience.

Therefore, these texts of the Ārya [Nāgārjuna] teach, by means of extensive scriptural citation (*lung*) and reasoning (*rigs pa*), that all functionalities (*bya byed*), such as the refutations and proofs [in which they engage], are conventionalities (*kun rdzob*), merely nominally labeled [entities] (*ming du btags pa tsam*), as it is unsuitable to consider them as existing by virtue of their own characteristic. They extensively set forth the ultimate truth (*don dam pa'i bden pa nyid*), which is reality, the fact that no phenomenon whatsoever has the slightest essence. [They explain] that if there is no need to say that understanding things in this way is necessary for the attainment of buddahood, how much more so that it be a sine qua non for liberation from *saṃsāra*. Hence, this is the refounding of the system of the chariot in which this Mahātma [Nāgārjuna] taught to the fortunate, exactly as the Conqueror intended it, the path to emancipation and omniscience.

4.2.2. The Explanation of How the Individual Commentaries on the Purport [of Nāgārjuna's Treatises] Arose[201]

Although many texts of both the *sūtra* and *tantra* [classes] comment on the purport of the Ārya, here we will offer only a brief account of how there arose commentaries on their purport, which set forth the right view [of emptiness] (*yang dag pa'i lta ba*).

The *Acārya Āryadeva*[202] (second century C.E.) set forth the profound emptiness in accordance with the purport of the Ārya in his *Yogācārya Catuḥśataka.*[203] All the others who came after this Acārya accept that he is a trustworthy source and that there is no difference between himself and the Ārya. That is why former Tibetan masters (*bla ma*) call this father and spiri- [73]
tual son pair the *Mādhyamikas of the Great Scriptures.* Although Āryadeva is a Prāsaṅgika (*thal 'gyur pa*) in his intention, he does not explicitly make a distinction between Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas (*rang rgyud pa*),[204] nor does he set forth anything like a refutation of the Svātantrikas.

After him, the Acārya Buddhapālita[205] (c. 500 C.E.) composed his *Vṛtti*[206] on the *Prajñāmūla*, where he comments on the purport of the father and spiritual son as a Prāsaṅgika. After him, the Acārya Bhāvaviveka[207] (c. 500–570 C.E.) composed his commentary on the *Prajñāmūla*[208] and offered an extensive refutation of Buddhapālita's Prāsaṅgika commentary. He was the first to open up the system of the Svātantrikas. Thus, those who follow either of these two came to be called *partisan Mādhyamikas* by the Tibetans of old. Bhāvaviveka's fundamental text, which he composed in an independent and synthetic manner

(*rang dgar brtsams*),[209] is the *Madhyamakahṛdaya*.[210] It also has an autocommentary, the *Tarkajvālā*,[211] which extensively explains the views of the Svātantrikas and different aspects of bodhisattva practices (*thabs*).

After him, the Acārya Jñānagarbha[212] (c. 700–750 C.E.) composed the Svātantrika text *Madhyamakasatyadvaya*.[213] Both he and Bhāvaviveka accept that nominally there are outer objects and autocognition (*rang rig*). The Acārya Śāntarakṣita[214] (c. 680–740 C.E.) was the first to open up the system of the Mādhyamikas who accept that (1) even nominally there are no external objects, (2) nominally autocognition exists, and (3) consciousness does not truly exist. He composed the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*.[215] Kamalaśīla[216] (740–795 C.E.), [the former's disciple,] wrote the *Madhyamakāloka*[217] and the three *Bhāvanākramas*.[218] The texts of Haribhadra[219] (c. 770–810 C.E.), Buddhajñānapāda[220] (late eighth century) and Abhayākara[221] (c. 1100 C.E.) all follow Śāntarakṣita's [74]
way of setting forth the view [of emptiness].[222]

The glorious Candrakīrti[223] (c. 600–650 C.E.) thoroughly refuted all of the faults of which Bhāvaviveka accused Buddhapālita.[224] His extensive and insistent refutation of the Svātantrikas' position made his texts be classified as being on the side of the Prāsaṅgikas. He composed the *Prasannapadā*,[225] which is a commentary on the *Prajñāmūla*, the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikavṛtti*[226] and the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā*.[227] He also composed independent and synthetic works such as the root text of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* and its *Bhāṣya*.[228]

The Ārya Śāntideva[229] (eighth century) also composed such treatises as the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*,[230] commenting on the purport of the Ārya [Nāgārjuna] as a Prāsaṅgika.

In India there were known to be eight commentaries on the Prajñāmūla:[231]

1. the *Akutobhayā*[232]
2. the commentaries of Devaśarma[233]
3. of Guṇamati
4. of Guṇaśrī
5. of Sthiramati[234]
6. of Buddhapālita
7. of Bhāvaviveka and
8. of Candrakīrti

Avalokitavrata explains that the [*Prajñāmūla*] commentary composed by Bhāvaviveka, the *Prajñāpradīpa*, is based on Devaśarma's commentary, called **Śuklavyudayana (dKar po rnam par 'char ba)*.[235]

That the *Akutobhayā*[236] is the Ārya's own autocommentary is a position that many Tibetans hold, but it is a [result of] the improper examination [of this text].[237] Why? When the *Akutobhayā* comments on the twenty-seventh chapter [of the *Prajñāmūla*], it cites the text of the *Catuḥśataka* to elucidate a point. It says:

The Venerable Āryadeva also explains this:

> A listener, that which is heard
> And a speaker [of the doctrine] arise so rarely.
> So, to put it briefly, *saṃsāra*
> Has no end nor does it lack an end.[238]

[So the *Akutobhayā* could not have been written by Nāgārjuna because it [75]
quotes his disciple, Āryadeva.]

[Opponent:] This is not correct, for Avalokitavrata considers [the *Akutobhayā*] to be an autocommentary.

[Reply:] Anyone who thinks that the omniscient Lord [Tsong kha pa] did not study that commentary [in his rejection of the authenticity of the text] is making himself known as a real fool. Even though that [commentary of Avalokitavrata] explains it in that way, if it were in fact an autocommentary, not only would it suffer from the just-mentioned fault concerning the citation [from Āryadeva], but it would be incumbent upon the commentaries of all three sages, Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka, to explain as incorrect the inconsistencies [between their own texts] and those of the Acārya [who wrote the *Akutobhayā*] that occur at many points in the *Prajñāmūla*.

For example, in that commentary [in the *Akutobhayā*] it states in the section of homage (*mchod brjod*) that there is no cessation *because* there is no arising. Then, to prove the reason, [that is, that there is no arising,] it cites [the first verse of the *Prajñāmūla*]:

> No entity whatsoever
> Arises ever or in any way
> From self or other
> From both or causelessly.[239]

And to prove *this* reason it explains that the passage:

> The essence of entities do not exist
> In their causal conditions . . .[240]

proves that arising from self is not possible; that the passage:

> If an essence [lit. self-existence] does not exist
> How can its opposite [lit. other existence]?[241]

proves that arising from another is not possible; and that from both of these [proofs] it follows that there is no arising from both [self and other]. Then it, [the *Akutobhayā*, states that the *Prajñāmūla*] presents arguments so as to refute [an opponent's rebuttal] presented in the four lines of the verse: "Causal conditions are fourfold: (1) cause . . ."[242] and that as the reply to that, the first two lines of the verse that goes: "Action does not possess causal conditions . . ."[243] refute the fact that an action which gives rise to an entity

by means of those four causal conditions neither possesses nor is it devoid of causal conditions. [It continues that] the latter two lines refute the fact that [76]
causal conditions do not possess an action, nor do they lack one, nor both, nor neither.

The way this text [the *Akutobhayā*] explains the layout of the scripture [the *Prajñāmūla*,] that is, the relationship between previous and later passages, does not in the least resemble the way in which the other three commentaries do so, [this being yet another reason to challenge the authenticity of the *Akutobhayā*]. If one minutely analyzes [the *Akutobhayā*] in this way, [these anomalies] will multiply greatly, and many instances will appear in which the difficult-to-understand points of subtle reasoning of this text [the *Prajñāmūla*, which expresses them in] verse, are merely put into prose without being properly explained.

Were this [*Akutobhayā*] an autocommentary [then why does Candrakīrti not quote it]? Candra does, to the extent that the proper explanations of Bhāvaviveka are acceptable, cite *him*. He also extensively quotes all of the scriptures of the Ārya such as his autocommentary to the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. Therefore, because he does not deem fit [to cite] even the smallest passage of this [purported] autocommentary [the *Akutobhayā*], it is quite clear that he does not accept that it *is* an autocommentary.

Also, in the field of *tantra*, quite a few scriptures and commentaries are attributed to the Ārya;[244] and, as in the case [of the *Akutobhayā*], there are also Indian commentaries accepted as having been composed by the Ārya but which are just as apocryphal as this one [the *Akutobhayā*]. That is to say, there are those who, without examining either words or meaning, trust the explanation of any commentary whatsoever on just a slight perusal of the words. How can such [people] be considered as anything but the dumbest of the dumb?

[Question:] Well then, was Candrakīrti a direct disciple of the Ārya Nāgārjuna or not?

[Reply:] Some teaching lineages renowned among certain former Tibetan Mādhyamikas hold that he was not his direct disciple. Even though those who follow [these previous masters] accept this, it is quite correct for the masters of the Samāja [lineage] (*'dus pa'i bla ma*),[245] namely, the precious Lord
[Tsong kha pa], [the translator] 'Gos and so forth, to accept him [Candrakīrti] [77]
as a direct disciple of the Ārya. The Great Lord, the Glorious Atīśa, says:

Candrakīrti is Nāgārjuna's disciple
And as regards the instructions that descend from him
There is Buddha[246] and none else.[247]

The *Pradīpoddyotana* also says: "I have found out from Nāgārjuna the seal for abiding in the two stages [of generation and completion] of all the Buddhas. It

is having paid homage to the all-pervasive Lord, the glorious Vajrasattva, that I, Candrakīrti, systematically explain this."[248] The Pandit Bhavyakīrti (*sKal ldan grags pa*) has also said: "He has found this out from the glorious Nāgārjuna." This demonstrates that [Candrakīrti] in fact was the actual, face-to-face disciple of the glorious Nāgārjuna and not a mere lineage descendent.

The Brahmin called Rāhulabhadra (*sGra gcan 'dzin bzang po*), that is, Sarahapa,[249] explained it to Nāgārjuna, and he [in turn] explained it to Candrakīrti. How this occurred is mentioned in the *Pradīpoddyotana:*

In the city of Kongka
On top of Śrīparvata
He first made his home
In a place free of men.

A lord of men and gods,
The highest doctrine he preached,
And [having heard it] in Rāhula's presence
He spread it throughout the earth.

Then having found that, he studied reality
By means of the yoga of the Mahāyāna.
Obtaining the *bhūmi,* he exerted himself in the welfare of others.
May the glorious Nāgārjuna prosper!

Obtaining these precious teachings from him,
He made them known in the three worlds.
He has crossed the ocean of Samāja.
May the elucidator Candrakīrti prosper![250]

The Pandit Kumāra, a disciple of the sage Bikṣoṃkara, also explains that: "Because they [Candrakīrti and so on] are the face-to-face disciples of Nāgārjuna, they are taught to be actual holders of his quintessential instructions (*man ngag*)."[251] Therefore, the siddha Kṛṣṇācārya (*Nag po spyod pa*),[252] [78] Nāropa[253] (c. 1016–1100 C.E.), the Prabhu Maitripa (tenth–eleventh century),[254] Abhayākara[255] (twelfth century), Karuṇāśrīpāda (*Thugs rje dpal zhabs*), the Kaśmīrī Lakṣmı (*Kha che lag smi*), Muniśrībhadra (*Thub pa dpal bzang po*), Bhavyakīrti,[256] Kumāra,[257] Kuladhāra, Tathāgatarakṣita[258] (late tenth century?) and Līlavajra[259] (eleventh century) and so forth all believe in Candrapāda, [that is, in Candrakīrti,] and hold him [to have views] similar to the Ārya Nāgārjuna's. Even though Abhayākara is not accepted as being Prāsaṅgika in his viewpoint, he does not attempt a refutation of Candrapāda, holding the view that he is in opposition to him. Moreover, when he sets forth his viewpoint, there are several instances in which he actually quotes the [*Madhyamaka*] *Avatāra* as a source.

Maitripa, both in his root text and in the commentary on the *Daśatattva*[260] explains that in no other system, except for that of Nāgārjuna and Candra, is reality understood.

Therefore, those who hold some of the followers of Candra as objects of faith and as *siddhas* that cannot in the least [be refuted] by opponents, and yet claim that the Candrakīrti of whom they were followers has been refuted [by other Indian scholars], are fools who have destroyed [their chances for a good] afterlife. They, without having bothered to even *read* the vast scriptural exegesis of *sūtras* and *tantras*, and impelled by the demon of jealousy, blither away these incoherent formulations. They have lost all self-control, their minds having been transformed by the demonic gods of the dark side, who grasp [at every chance] to oppose the essence of the teachings. Anyone who is intelligent and who desires only the best for himself or herself will cover their ears to these doctrines.

Another idiot who claims that "it is not so astonishing that we should refute Candrakīrti as some former Tibetan sages did in fact do just that," might as well be claiming that "because in former times patricide and matri- [79]
cide were rampant, it should not be so astonishing when such bad karma occurs today." Go right ahead then and take up this advice of the "holy" in its entirety, [that is, go out and commit patricide and matricide just because some fool did before you, just as you refute Candrakīrti simply because a former Tibetan did]. There have been several cases of this in the past, where, though the quintessential instructions and scriptures of someone who is indisputably considered a *siddha* in Tibet are held in high esteem, they have actually refuted the Ārya Nāgārjuna.

[In a similar case], bCom ldan ral gris[261] in his *Ṭīkā* to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, being himself unable to explain the harmony that exists between [the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*] and the *Pramāṇavārttikam*, explains that whatever points he [cannot harmonize in this way] are cases in which Dharmakīrti erred in his interpretation of the *Samuccaya*, in this way refuting [Dharmakīrti].[262] There also seem to be instances in the history of the exegesis of the *Prajñāpāramitā* where some former Tibetans, renowned as sages, write, though not in so many words, about the faults of the Lord Maitreyanātha [whom they imply] is not in accordance with the [*Prajñāpāramita*] *Sūtras*. How can anyone, taking as their reason the indubitable blitherings spoken by these "great celebrities," seek to become an ally of rumor mongers? Stop praising the logic of fools!

Someone else claims that whether or not Candrakīrti is a pandit is disputable, but that Nāropa is [without a doubt] a perfected pandit. Nāropa states:

> Following the *Pradīpoddyotana* have I explained
> The quintessential instructions of Nāgārjuna.[263]

and also:

Relying upon the stages of the quintessential instructions
Of the Acāryas Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva,
Nāgabodhi and Śakyamitra,
Candrakīrti and so forth
Have I composed [this work].

So [the person who distinguishes in this way between Nāropa and Candrakīrti] is just blithering nonsense without realizing that Nāropa himself accepts that he is a follower of Candrakīrti.

Moreover, to say that Candrakīrti did not understand the definitive meaning before he entered the tantric [path] but understood it after he entered it are [80] words to bring shame upon the scholars [who say them], for they are sheer nonsense.[264] This is because the *Pradīpoddyotana* commentary on the *Guhyasamāja* states:

> [Question:] Is there anything that is a different entity from the mind?
>
> [Reply:] It is said that there is no such phenomenon; that is, entities are without nature (*ngo bo nyid med pa*).
>
> [Question:] Is there any such thing as reality (*chos nyid*)?
>
> [Reply:] There is no reality. Here it is saying that all phenomena from [the list] "aggregates (*phung po*), elements (*khams*), sense objects (*skyed mched*), sense organs (*dbang po*) and so forth" are like a dream. They are neither true nor false.[265]

This teaches us in an extensive way that everything, both the subject (*chos can*) [lit. what possesses the attribute] and reality (*chos nyid*), [which is the attribute,] being like dreams, have no true essence. Likewise, in the section on the Madhyamaka it extensively explains [many Madhyamaka doctrines,] such as the fact that essencelessness does not contradict functionality. Such explanations it makes over and over again, but without looking over even the mere letters of all of these expositions, [these individuals,] in a state of total unawareness and themselves filled with ignorance, unabashedly spout off what it is that these Mahāyānists accept.

The sages of the Noble Land [India] are extremely skilled in discerning which [doctrines] are to be refuted and which are not to be refuted. They analyze them in an extremely impartial way with all of their intellectual acumen; and, because they take into account both their own and others' mental capacities, they are never in a hurry to actually refute the greats simply because [their views] do not coincide with their own. For example, although Śāntipa's own system is the Cittamātra, he does not refute the Ārya Nāgārjuna simply because he is a Mādhyamika. Instead, he consistently explains the Cittamātra by showing that both Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga are similarly Cittamātrin in their viewpoint. Great men, such as the Elder Dharmapāla of [81]

old, also take the purport of the Ārya Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva as being Cittamātrin, so that Candrapāda, in his *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* states that he [Dharmapāla] comments on the *Catuḥśataka* as a Cittamātrin would.[266]

Nonetheless, Śāntipa *does* criticize Ārya [Vimuktasena] and Haribhadra, actually mentioning *them* by name. Abhayakara and others, although they criticize Haribhadra, mentioning *him* by name, do not find the Ārya Vimuktasena the least bit objectionable. And yet, [although they criticize other scholars like the Ārya and Haribhadra,] come time to set forth their own philosophical viewpoint, they all seem to take the scriptures of Candrakīrti as a source they quote.

Although I could go on more extensively, [let me just say] that there are no Indians who criticize either Candrakīrti or Āryadeva, actually mentioning them by name.[267] Within no scripture of an Indian sage has he been refuted in this way. Nevertheless, when he is made the object of refutation by some foolish Tibetans, it does not nowadays diminish either [these Tibetans'] finances and reputation nor the [size of] the entourage that gathers [around them]. So now it seems that unless they get "refuted" with sticks to the body, they might even get up the gall to criticize the Buddha himself, mentioning even *him* by name; but when they see that they are going to get "refuted," it seems that they are unashamed to take up the life-style of laymen.[268] Those who want only the best for themselves should know that it is fitting to exert themselves at banishing these nonvirtuous friends to far away places.

[A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE MADHYAMAKA]

[On the Classification of Mādhyamikas][269]

Another former Tibetan master claims that there are two kinds of Mādhyamikas who are given [different] names depending upon how they accept the ultimate. (One is called) an *utterly nonabiding Mādhyamika,* [the other,] a *Mādhyamika who establishes the logic of illusion.*[270] The first [category] is [82]
said to be comprised of Candrakīrti and so forth who believe that the nonaffirming negation (*med dgag*), which is the refutation of there being any truth to appearances, is the ultimate truth. The second [category] is said to consist of Śāntarakṣita, Ārya [Vimuktasena], and Haribhadra who, [it is claimed] believe that the illusorylike conjunction (*tshogs*) of appearance (*snang*) and emptiness (*stong*) is the ultimate truth.[271] In regard to this, the translator rNgog (bLo ldan shes rab, c. 1059–1109 C.E.)[272] repeatedly explained in *An Epistle Called a Drop of Nectar* that: "To divide them in this way is to posit [something] that will astonish even the foolish."[273] Because the illusorylike conjunction of appearance and emptiness in fact is a conventional truth, there is no single Great Mādhyamika who accepts it as the ultimate truth. Were it an ultimate truth, it would follow, absurdly, that everything that exists (*gzhi grub*) would be an ultimate truth, for it is impossible that a phenomenon *not* be empty of truth.[274] It seems that those who posit this believe that the direct object (*dngos kyi gzhal bya*) of an inferential cognition [of emptiness] (*rigs shes rjes dpag*)[275] is itself the ultimate truth. The direct object of an inferential cognition, that is, the illusorylike conjunction of the subject [of the syllogism] (*chos can*) such as a sprout, and the predicate (*bsgrub bya'i chos*), truthlessness (*bden med*), is concordant (*mthun pa*) with the ultimate in so far as they, [the ultimate and this conjunction,] are both negations of [the same] object of refutation, namely true existence.[276] For this reason both the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and the *Madhyamakāloka* explain that it is [merely] *labeled ultimate* [without actually being so], and so not even Śāntarakṣita and his followers accept that such [an entity] is the ultimate truth.

A later Tibetan said that Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha, and so forth are Sautrāntika Mādhyamikas because they are Mādhyamikas who nominally

accept outer objects and who believe that the mind possesses aspects (*rnam bcas*). He says that Śāntarakṣita, the father, and his son [Kamalaśīla] are Yogācāra Mādhyamikas because, as they accept that external objects do not exist even nominally and that autocognition substantially exists (*rdzas su grub pa*), they accord with the Cittamātra in the use of terminology.[277] He says that Candrakīrti and so forth are Mādhyamikas who use [language in accordance [83] with] worldly conventions (*'jig rten grags sde spyod pa*) because they do not accord with any philosophical schools in their use of terminology, instead positing things in accordance with the world.[278]

This too is incorrect. It would follow that Candrakīrti and [his followers] are Mādhyamikas who use a system of terminology similar to the Vaibhāṣikas because they are Mādhyamikas who accept external objects nominally and who do not believe in autocognition. You have accepted the three cycles.[279]

Neither Bhāvaviveka nor Jñānagarbha agree with what the Sautrāntikas accept nominally because there are many major disagreements [between them and the Sautrāntikas], that [the former] do not believe even nominally in autocognition being just one. Now if you claim that they are in accord simply because they agree on one point,[280] then it would follow, absurdly, that every philosophical school would be in accord with every other, [as most schools agree on at least one point].

[The Meaning of the Claim That Prāsaṅgikas Accord with the World][281]

What kind of a worldly being is it that the Prāsaṅgikas accept when they expound their accordance with worldly beings (*'jig rten pa dang bstun pa*)? Does *worldly being* refer to ordinary beings (*so skye*), "beings who have gone beyond the world," thereby referring to *āryans*, or does *worldly being* refer to the common person (*skye bo rang dga' ba*) who is untrained in philosophy?[282] As for the first case, there is no way [that a Prāsaṅgika could accept] being in accordance with the way that things appear and are conceived of by such ordinary beings because [the Prāsaṅgikas] believe that it is impossible for the consciousness of that being to lack the appearance of true existence.[283]

[Opponent:] Just as ordinary beings use terms like *phenomena* and *personality* without logically searching for the referent objects (*btags don*) onto which the terms are labeled, likewise, the Prāsaṅgikas also posit [things] without analyzing or examining terms, and this is why they are said to be in accordance with ordinary beings.

[Reply:] Now although this much is something that we ourselves could accept, [we must add] that not only [the usage] of ordinary beings [must be taken into account when explaining "according with worldly usage"], one

must also consider, [as instances of "according with the world,"] all of the [84]
instances in which the innate language-using mind of an *āryan* still in training uses terminology.

As for those who claim that [the Prāsaṅgikas believe in being in accordance with] those who are untrained in philosophy, they are quite mistaken. This is because no one untrained in philosophy could accept the majority of the special ways Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas use terminology, such as when they posit functionality (*bya byed*) via a repudiation of the even nominal existence of *svalakṣaṇas* (*rang mtshan*), and when they hold that there is no such thing as autocognition, even nominally.

Tibetan Opponent: The Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas use their system of terminology in a way that accords with the Vaibhāṣikas.

[Reply:] This is quite incorrect because what the Vaibhāṣikas accept within their system of terminology the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas accept to be nonexistent *even nominally*; and this is because the realists' entire exposition of the two truths (*bden gnyis*), for example, is an exposition based upon [the presupposition that everything] exists by virtue of its own characteristic (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*), whereas the Prāsaṅgikas do not believe that even nominally there is such a thing as an entity that exists by virtue of its own characteristic. [Moreover, the Prāsaṅgikas cannot be said to accord with the Vaibhāṣikas in the conventional sphere] because, though they agree with the Vaibhāṣikas in that they accept outer objects, the Prāsaṅgikas believe that outer objects do not exist as substances (*rdzas su ma grub pa*), [a fundamental Vaibhāṣika tenet]. [The Prāsaṅgikas] also do not accept spatially partless particles even nominally; and although both are similar in their merely vocalizing "we do not accept autocognition," the *reason* why the Prāsaṅgikas do not accept autocognition has ultimately to do with their not accepting *svalakṣaṇas* even nominally. Moreover, although the Prāsaṅgikas believe that thought has aspects (*blo rnam bcas*), the Vaibhāṣikas believe that the objects of thought
have no aspects. Therefore, a certain Tibetan's claim that what the lower [85]
philosophical schools accept as ultimate the higher schools accept as conventional is the doctrine of one who has no training in the system of the glorious Candrakīrti, for his *Avatārabhāṣya* says:

> Therefore those who say that what the Sautrāntika system claims is ultimate is the conventional of the Mādhyamikas are speaking without any understanding of reality as it is [taught] in the Madhyamaka treatises. Thus should it be known. Those who think that what the Vaibhāṣikas say is ultimate is the conventional of the Mādhyamikas are simply ignorant of the reality which is the meaning of the treatises, for it is not right to say that a supramundane doctrine is similar to a mundane doctrine. This is how the wise should understand what

is meant by the saying, "this system holds nothing in common with others."[284]

4.2.3. *Setting Forth Emptiness by Following Those [Madhyamaka Scriptures]*[285]

4.2.3.1. *Identifying What Is to Be Refuted by the Reasoning Which Analyzes the Ultimate* (don dam dpyod pa'i rtags)

4.2.3.1.1. *Why It Is Necessary to Identify What Is to Be Refuted*[286] [86]

It is first necessary to ascertain what the object to be refuted is like. This object to be refuted is that [entity] whose negation (*rnam par bcad pa*) is what the ascertainment of reality must be based on, the reason being that without the appearance of the universal (*spyi*), [that is, the mental image,] of what is to be refuted, the universal of the refutation of that [object, namely, emptiness or reality,] will not appear.[287] As it is explained in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*:

> Without a feeling for the labeled entity
> One cannot apprehend that it is entityless.[288]

Moreover, unless one exactly grasps the extent of what is being refuted, either one refutes what should not be refuted, in which case one will fall into the extreme of nihilism, or else one does not refute some of the most subtle [aspects] that should be refuted, and hence, without seeing a fault in grasping at some kind of true existence, some portion [of the misapprehension of reality] remains, and one will fall into the extreme of reification.

4.2.3.1.2. *Refuting the Scriptural Exegesis of Those Who [Proceed in the] Refutation without Identifying [the Object to Be Refuted]*[289]

4.2.3.1.2.1. *Refuting the One Who Overextends* (khyab ches ba) *Himself or Herself in the Identification of What Is to Be Refuted*

4.2.3.1.2.1.1. *Stating What They Believe*[290]

Most of those who consider themselves Mādhyamikas today claim that the logic which establishes the emptiness of the Mādhyamikas refutes every phenomenon, from form up to omniscience, as follows.[291]

[1] They ask whether there exists a phenomenon that, when logically examined, is able to bear the analysis (*rigs pas brtags na dpyad bzod pa*). If it does exist, it follows, absurdly, that it must truly exist. If there is no such phenomenon, then it has been logically repudiated.[292]

[2] Moreover, [quoting this scriptural passage]:

> Neither existence nor nonexistence
> Nor both, nor is it not of the nature of both.
> It is freedom from these four extremes (*mtha' bzhi*)
> That the Mādhyamika understands.[293]

they claim that it is because the majority of the scriptures of definitive meaning refute all four of these possibilities (*mu bzhi*)—existence, nonexistence, both, and neither—and because there is nothing that is not included in these four, that all phenomena are the objects of the logical refutation.[294] That is, [they claim] why [the *Yuktiṣaṣṭika*] says: [87]

> Because [we grasp at the extreme of] existence we are not liberated.
> And by [grasping at the extreme of nonexistence] there would also be no liberation from the existential state (*srid pa*).[295]

And also:

> The advocates of existence go to heaven;
> The advocates of nonexistence go to hell;
> And they who rely on neither will be free.[296]

And also:

> To claim "existence" is to grasp at eternalism.
> To claim "nonexistence" is to grasp at nihilism.
> That is why the sage must abide
> In neither existence nor nonexistence.[297]

The *Ārya Ratnakūṭa Sūtra* also says:

> Oh Kāśyapa, the end of all the extensive teachings
> Is expressed by these two lines:
> That existence is one extreme
> And nonexistence the other.[298]

After which it is stated:

> Existence and nonexistence are one extreme;
> Purity and impurity are also extremes.
> And so, eliminating both of these extremes,
> The sage should stop abiding, even in the Middle [Way].[299]

[They hold to this position] because of such teachings as these, which expound that it is improper to in any way apprehend existence, nonexistence, or even the Middle [Way], which is the elimination of both, and also because the *Prajñāmūla* says:

> If the nonempty existed in the least,
> Then emptiness too could have some slight existence,
> But when there is no such thing as the nonempty,
> How could emptiness exist?[300]

which is to say that, as even emptiness is said not to exist,[301] because whatever is to be apprehended is to be refuted, [these opponents claim that] no phenomenon whatsoever exists.

[3] Moreover, they ask whether, if one accepts arising and so forth as existing, one does so without [its existence] being established by a valid cognition or whether it is only after having been established by a valid cognition that it can be said to exist. In the first case one has gone beyond the methodology of logic-epistemology.[302] In the second case, it would have to be either that it, [arising and so on,] was established [as existing] by the gnosis of an *āryan*, or else that it was established by a nominal valid cognition (*tha snyad* [88]
pa'i tshad ma)[303] such as the eye consciousness and so forth. It cannot be the first because the gnosis of an *āryan* perceives arising and so forth to be nonexistent;[304] but neither is the second [possibility] correct, because the eye consciousness and so forth are not valid cognitions, for as it says in the *Samādhirāja*:

> The eye, the ear and the nose too are not valid cognitions.
> The tongue, the body, and even the mind are not valid cognitions.
> If those organs were valid cognitions
> Who would need to rely on the *āryan* path?[305]

[4] Again they ask: is the way that entities arise describable (*kha tshon chod pa*) as [one among] the four ways of arising, from self, from other, from both, or causelessly, or do these not exhaust [all of the possibilities]? If the latter, then it contradicts the fact that when [Nāgārjuna] refutes the realists he refutes them assuming that these four [options] exhaust [all possible modes of arising].[306] In the former case, [that is, if it was the case that arising's existence implied that it must be describable in terms of one of the four possibilities,] then as none of these four is correct even nominally there would be no arising, for [Candrakīrti] has said: "There is no arising from another even from the world's [point of view]."[307] And also because the *Avatara* has said:

> When on the subject of reality, by whatever reasons [it is demonstrated]
> That arising from self and other are incorrect,
> By those same reasons [is it shown] that they are incorrect even
> nominally;

And if this is so, how can your [concept of] arising be [possible]?[308]

which [this opponent] explains as meaning that just as the logic which refutes arising via any of the four extremes repudiates real arising (*de kho na skye ba*), in the same way it repudiates arising even nominally. Hence, [they claim that] there is no arising, for the *Anavataptanāgarājaparipṛcchā Sūtra* states:

Whatever arises from conditions does not arise.
In it there is no arising essence.
Whatever depends upon conditions is explained to be empty.
It is the understanding of emptiness that is true piety.[309]

[5] Again, [this one who overextends himself or herself in what is to be negated claims that according to our own position] it would follow, absurdly, [89]
that [the fact that a thing] does not ultimately exist does not imply its nonexistence, and that its nominal existence implies its existence,[310] because [according to us] although no phenomenon ultimately exists, it is not correct to accept that any phenomenon is nonexistent; on the contrary, it is correct to accept them as existing. If the [original premise] is accepted, [as indeed we do,] then [they claim] that the Lord should have actually taught the opposite of the four reliances (*brton pa bzhi*) when, in these lines from the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra*, he says:

Do not rely on the person, rely on the doctrine.
Do not rely on the words, rely on the meaning.
Do not rely on the provisional meaning, rely on the definitive meaning.
Do not rely on consciousness, rely on gnosis.[311]

because the provisional meaning's existing conventionally implies its existence, whereas the definitive meaning's not existing ultimately does not imply its nonexistence,[312] so that it would follow, absurdly, that it would be fitting not to rely on the definitive meaning but on the provisional meaning. Likewise, the existence [of something] within the purview of erroneous consciousness (*rnam shes 'khrul pa'i ngor*) implies its existence, whereas the nonexistence [of something] within the purview of nonerroneous gnosis (*ye shes ma 'khrul pa'i ngor*) does not imply its nonexistence,[313] so that it would follow, absurdly, that it would be fitting not to rely on gnosis but on consciousness. [These criticisms] they put forward in great detail.

Now in this regard, some also claim that no phenomenon exists even nominally, whereas others claim that they do nominally exist. If one asks these [latter ones] whether nominal existence implies or does not imply existence, they reply that nominal existence implies nominal existence and does not imply ultimate existence; and if you ask then about a kind of existence that is not qualified by either "nominal" or "ultimate," they reply that it is impossible for there to exist a third kind of existence that is not contained within the two truths, [thereby skirting the question].

4.2.3.1.2.1.2. Refuting Them

4.2.3.1.2.1.2.1. Demonstrating That They Have Refuted the Principal and Special Quality of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas [90]

4.2.3.1.2.1.2.1.1. Identifying That Chief Quality[314]

The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* says:

> By the virtue [of this act] may all beings
> Complete the accumulations of merit and gnosis.
> May they obtain the two holy [bodies]
> That arise from merit and gnosis.[315]

The ultimate goal toward which every Mahāyānist strives is the unity of the *dharmakāya* (*chos sku*) and the physical body (*gzugs sku*). To obtain them, one must rely on the inseparability of methods that accumulate the two masses of merit and gnosis into a combined whole. Accumulating those two masses into a combined whole in this way depends on finding certainty as to the non-erroneous way in which the two truths are brought together into a combined whole within the exposition of the basic view (*gzhi'i lta ba*).[316] Moreover, unless one has truly found certainty in regards to the workings of dependent arising (*rten 'brel*), whereby individual causes give rise in an orderly way to their individual effects, the accumulation of one's mass of merit will not be accomplished faithfully and from the heart, as profound certainty that the mass of merit will give rise to the desired effect will not have arisen.[317]

If one has not found certainty as to the fact that no phenomenon whatsoever has even the smallest atom of inherent existence even nominally, one will not be able to accumulate the true (*mtshan nyid tshang ba*) mass of gnosis, though one may desire to do so. This is because there is no way to accumulate the true mass of gnosis without unmistakenly ascertaining emptiness. Therefore, if one does not find certainty in harmonizing (1) the fact that it is proper to accept the validity of all causality and functionality (*bya byed*) with (2) the [91] fact that inherent existence is to be repudiated even nominally, there is no way that one will be able to assimilate the two masses into a combined whole. Such also is the fate as regards the accumulation of the [two] masses [in that they will not be able to be accomplished] for those who proclaim that "in our own system we accept no causality whatsoever, it being a temporary expedient for the sake of others." So finding this certainty, which is the deep belief in the ways of causality, is what the *sūtras* call the *mundane correct view* (*'jig rten pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba*); and the unmistaken ascertainment of emptiness is called the *supramundane correct view* (*'jig rten las 'das pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba*). The word *mundane* within this context has been described as follows: "The mundane is the conventional truth." So because it refers to a correct view based on conventional truth, it is called by that name, [that is, *mundane correct view*].

In this regard, no realist can reconcile in a harmonious way these two [claims, that is, that things function and that they are empty]. They think that "if entities do not have the slightest own nature (*rang gi ngo bo*) how can there be anything left over after that [negation of own nature]?" So they claim that (1) if entities do not inherently exist they could not exist at all, implying the annihilation of every instance of causality; (2) that if an effect arises from its own cause it would have to exist from the object's own side, implying that it could be nothing but existent by virtue of its own characteristic; and therefore (3) that entities inherently exist. Hence, because it is a degradation of both truths [conventional and ultimate], without doing away with this view [of the realists], there is no way of obtaining emancipation, let alone omniscience. [92]
That is why it is said:

> There is no way to find peace
> Outside of the Ārya Nāgārjuna's path.
> Those who fall outside of the truths, the conventional and reality,
> Having fallen outside of the two truths, are not liberated.[318]

Even though the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas do not believe that there is true existence even nominally, still, they cannot reconcile [the fact that things] are empty of existing *by virtue of their own characteristic* even nominally and the possibility of their functioning. Hence, they accept that nominally [things] exist by virtue of their own characteristic. Without doing away with that view there is no way of generating within one's continuum the *āryan* path of either of the three vehicles.

Be that as it may, those who possess the intricate analysis, both subtle and extensive, who are designated by the term *Prāsaṅgika,* do away with the objects (*dmigs gtan*) of the apprehension of true [existence] even nominally, in this way setting forth the fact that there is not the slightest bit of inherent existence. In their exegesis not only do they lead one to certainty that [emptiness] is not contradictory to the position that things function, but indeed that it is *by virture of* the fact that things function that they are essenceless (*rang bzhin med pa*); and [they lead one to certainty] that it is by virtue of the fact that they lack inherent existence that it is possible for things to function. It is the never-failing way in which cause and effect are related that other opponents take as the reason for why emptiness is incorrect, while [ironically] for the Prāsaṅgikas this [interdependence of cause and effect] is the chief doctrine used to explain emptiness and validate it. Hence, not only do they not consider the two truths to be contradictory, but harmonizing (*grogs su song ba*) the two truths in such a way that they mutually validate each other, they board the ship that lacks not the two masses [of merit and gnosis] and that is impelled by the force of the wind of unsurpassable certainty and easily travel to the island of [93]
the three precious bodies. By this means their minds enter into incredible rapture, and marveling at the good qualities of our own Teacher qualities that surpass those of any other, they sing his praises as the best among all preachers,

in so far as he taught emptiness and dependent arising in a harmonious way. As it has been said:

> Homage to the imcomparable Buddha
> Who taught the supreme doctrine
> That on the middle path, emptiness
> And dependent arising are synonyms.[319]

In this way understand that this method [of harmonizing emptiness and dependent arising] is the principal and special quality of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas.

4.2.3.1.2 1 2.1.2. How They Have Refuted That [Special Quality] by Their System [of Interpretation][320]

You have managed to refute this principal quality [of the Prāsaṅgikas] as follows. As mentioned earlier, by virtue [of the fact that things] do not inherently exist it is possible to posit functionality, such as causality and so forth, and this is the principal quality [of the Prāsaṅgika system]; but you claim that, because things are empty of inherent existence, causality and so forth *do not* exist. Therefore, according to you it is necessary to claim the reverse [of this scriptural passage]:

> It is this reason, dependent arising,
> That cuts through the extensive net of wrong views.[321]

for you claim that to cut through the extensive net of wrong views one must refute dependent arising. When proving that the sprout does not truly exist using as a reason that it arises dependently, [according to you] there would be a contradictory pervasion (*khyab pa*),[322] for you claim that whatever arises dependently cannot be empty and that whatever is empty cannot arise dependently.

The realists think that emptiness prohibits functionality. They urge absurdities on the Mādhyamikas such as this: [94]

> If all things are empty
> They could not arise nor cease.
> And it would follow that for you
> There would be no four noble truths.[323]

but according to you, it would be correct to simply agree with [the realist's accusation]. The Ārya Nāgārjuna, however, [instead of agreeing with him] reverses the opponent's argument and urges [the same absurdity on him]:

> If everything was not empty
> Nothing could arise or cease,

And it would follow that for you
There would be no four noble truths.[324]

thereby accusing [the opponent] of a contradictory pervasion.[325] Both sides, [that is, both realists and Mādhyamikas,] believe that no matter what philosophical point [is being discussed], to preclude the existence of any soteriologically valid doctrine (*kun byang gi chos*),[326] such as the four noble truths, is an unbearably huge mistake. For this reason they mutually urge the same [fault] on each other. So why not wait at least until others actually accuse you of this fault before you spout off that there is no such thing as functionality?[327]

It is because of this that the Ārya [Nāgārjuna] has said:

Where emptiness is possible
There everything is possible.[328]

He is saying that in whatever philosophical system emptiness is possible, all phenomena are possible, and in whatever philosophical system emptiness is not possible, no phenomenon is possible. It follows according to *you*, however, that the opposite view should be set forth; that is, that "where emptiness is possible, there nothing is possible."

To say "everything is possible" means that everything exists. [The verse] is saying that in the Madhyamaka system, which advocates that [things] are empty of inherent existence, everything, like the four truths and so on, exist.

The *Prasannapadā*'s commentary on the verse that goes "where empti- [95]
ness is possible" says:

Wherever the fact that "all things are empty of inherent existence" is possible, there it has been said that all becomes possible. How so? It is because we call dependent arising "emptiness." Therefore, wherever this emptiness is possible, there dependent origination is possible, and wherever dependent origination is possible, there it logically follows that the four noble truths [must exist]. How so? It is because it is dependent origination itself that brings about pain; without arising dependently, [pain] could not [come about]. Because that [suffering] is essenceless, it is taken to be empty. If suffering exists, then the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path which leads to the cessation of suffering are possible. Hence, the understanding of suffering, the abandonment of the cause, the realization of cessation and meditation on the path also become possible; and if the understanding of the truth of suffering etc. exist, then [their] fruits become possible. If the fruits exist, then those who abide in the fruits are possible, and if those who abide in the fruits exist, those who enter them become possible. Where there exist those who enter and abide in the fruits, there the *saṅgha* is possible. If the noble truths exist, then the holy Dharma also becomes possible. When the holy

> Dharma and the holy *saṅgha* exist, then the Buddha is also possible. All of the distinct understandings of all things, both mundane and supramundane, are also possible. Dharma, nondharma, and their results, as well as all worldly terminology (*'jig rten pa'i tha snyad*) become possible. Where emptiness is not possible, since there dependent arising would not be possible, nothing would be possible.[329] [96]

Again the *Prasannapadā* says: "Not only do we not suffer from the fault of disallowing such things as arising and destruction etc., we also allow for the four truths etc."[330] And the *Avatāra* also says:

> Empty things, such as a reflection etc.,
> Are known to depend on the collection [of their parts].
> Just as there can arise an image from an empty reflection,
> Likewise, while all phenomena are empty,
> They arise from empty [causes].[331]

So when you hold a position in contradiction to so many scriptural passages, do not be so ready to claim, "we are Mādhyamikas who do not even advocate the Madhyamaka."

4.2.3.1.2.1.2.2. Demonstrating Those Reasons to Be Faulty[332]

4.2.3.1.2.1.2.2.1. Demonstrating That Their Examination of What It Means for Something to "Withstand or Not Withstand Logical Analysis" Is Faulty.[333]

Just because a phenomenon cannot withstand logical analysis [of the kind] that analyzes the ultimate (*don dam dpyod byed kyi rigs pas dpyad pa*) does not mean that it is negated (*khegs pa*) by the logical reasoning (*rigs pa*) that analyzes the ultimate.[334] This is because when a phenomenon is not found by a valid cognition which analyzes the ultimate that does not mean that [such a valid cognition finds] the nonexistence of that phenomenon This follows because a phenomenon's not being verified by a certain valid cognition does not imply that that valid cognition perceives that phenomenon to be nonexistent.

[Opponent:] I do not accept [the latter claim].

[Reply:] It follows then, absurdly, that sound must be perceived by a visual valid cognition to be nonexistent, as that visual valid cognition does not perceive [sound].[335] If you accept this, it follows, absurdly, that sound does not exist, because it is perceived to be nonexistent by a valid cognition; and if you accept *that*, then it follows, absurdly, that the direct perception [of the senses] must be repudiated. It also contradicts your accepting the claim that no phenomenon whatever is to be apprehended as either existent or nonexistent. [97]

Therefore, there is a very great difference between logical reasoning not finding something and it finding it to be nonexistent.

What does it mean, then, to engage in a logical analysis that analyzes the ultimate, and what does it mean to find or not find [what one is analyzing]? Suppose one is dissatisfied (*ma tshim par*) with considering the variety of phenomenal (*chos*) and personal (*gang zag*) conventionalities (*tha snyad*) such as the pot, the cloth, and so on, and Devadatta, Yajña, and so on as only the labels of nominal conventionalities (*ming gi tha snyad btags pa tsam*); and one then engages in a search for how it is that the referent objects onto which those names are labeled exist [by analyzing] whether [the referents] are the same substance as or different substances from their parts. This is called *engaging in thinking about the essence* (*rang bzhin sems pa la zhugs pa*) or *engaging in an ultimate analysis* (*don dam dpyod pa la zhugs pa*). If, when one performs such an analysis, something should be found within the purview of the mind that analyzes the possibilities concerning the nature (*sdod lugs*) of the object, that is, whether it is of the same nature as or different from its parts, for example, then this analytical logic will have gone afoul; and the mind which relies on that logic must be considered a mistaken consciousness (*log shes*). If the object existed from its own side (*don stengs na grub*) as it had been found by that [faulty] logical reasoning within the purview of that mind, then it would truly exist, whether or not one calls it *truly existent*.

When one engages in correct reasoning such as [the logic that establishes things as being] devoid of being the same as or different [from its parts], or such as the search for the chariot in terms of the seven aspects,[336] if one finds that the object does not exist in any of these [ways], that is, it is not the same [98]
or different [from its parts] and so forth, this is what we mean by "not finding [the object] such as the pot and so on when one searches for it by means of reasoning that analyzes the ultimate." It does not mean that the pot and so on has been found to be *nonexistent* by a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate. Not finding the pot, for example, when one searches for it by means of valid cognitions that analyze the ultimate indicates that the pot does not exist *ultimately*. How could it possibly be indicative of the fact that the pot does not [in general] exist?

When one searches for [the pot] in this manner, to find that it does not exist in terms of any [of the possibilities] is said to be "finding the reality (*gnas lugs*) of the pot" or "finding its essence (*rang bzhin*)" or "finding the ultimate (*don dam*)." One should also know that the fact that the referent object labeled by the term *pot* does not exist in any [of these different ways] when it is searched for by means of the logical reasoning which analyzes the ultimate is finding that the pot does not ultimately exist, and the pot's not existing ultimately is said to be "the ultimate (*don dam pa*) [nature] of the pot," "the essence of the pot," and "the reality of the pot."

4.2.3.1.2.1.2.2.2. Demonstrating That Their Analysis into the Four Possibilities, Existence, Nonexistence, and So Forth, Is Faulty: [The Law of Excluded Middle and the Question of Whether the Madhyamaka Has a Viewpoint][337]

By advocating that the sprout and so on does not exist, one is advocating that it is nonexistent; and by advocating that it is not nonexistent, one is advocating that it exists. This is in direct contradiction to what you believe.[338] Likewise, having stated that it is not both existent and nonexistent, to advocate that it is neither existent nor nonexistent is to directly contradict your claim that it is not both.

[Opponent:] These two are not in direct contradiction, for although the Svātantrikas and all lower schools understand reality (*rnal ma go ba*) in terms of the law of excluded middle (*dgag pa gnyis*),[339] in the Prāsaṅgika system reality is not understood in terms of the law of excluded middle. Hence, there is no fault.

[Reply:] Then it would follow, absurdly, that [two things] could never be in direct contradiction, that they could never mutually exclude each other (*phan tshun spangs pa'i dngos 'gal*), for [according to you] one is unable to [99]
understand something to be nonexistent by negating (*rnam par bcad pas*) its existence.

[Opponent:] [Your reason] is not established.

[Reply:] Desist [then in your claim] that reality is not understood in terms of the law of excluded middle, [because our reason, that negating the existence of something brings an understanding of its nonexistence, is based on this very premise].

[Opponent:] [Very well,] I accept [the original premise that direct contradiction qua mutual exclusion is impossible].

[Reply:] Then desist [in claiming] that the Prāsaṅgika refutes the realist by relying on internal contradiction (*nang 'gal*).[340]

It follows, absurdly, [from your views] that there is no difference whatsoever between right tenets and wrong ones, whether they be the tenets of the Prāsaṅgikas, realists, or whomever. This is because [for you] the point [expressed by] a tenet can neither be disproven by a valid cognition nor established by one.

[Opponent:] The former of the two reasons is unfounded, [that is, tenets can be disproven by a valid cognition].

[Reply:] Then desist [in claiming] that contradiction is impossible.

[Opponent:] The latter is unfounded, [that is, tenets can be proven].

[Reply:] Then desist [in your claim] that it is incorrect for any point whatsoever to be proven by a valid cognition.

According to you it would follow, absurdly, that existence and nonexistence are not contradictory because all phenomena belong in a third category

(*phung gsum pa*) that is neither existence nor nonexistence. Again, it follows, absurdly, [from your views] that it is not correct to say of any phenomenon that it either positively (*mtha' gcig tu*) is *x* or is not *x*, for [according to you] it is not right to say of any phenomenon that it definitely either exists or does not exist.

When we put forth such arguments, what reply can there be? If you accept [this consequence of your position, that it is not correct to predicate anything of anything else,] then it follows that it is not correct to advocate that (1) "all phenomena *are* free of mental proliferation (*spros bral*)" or that (2) "they *are not* any of the four [alternatives] such as existent, nonexistent, and so forth."

If all phenomena belong to a third alternative that is neither existence nor nonexistence, then they similarly would belong to a third alternative that was neither sprout nor nonsprout, to one that was neither arising nor nonarising, neither entity nor nonentity, and so forth ad infinitum. Because of this it follows that there is no certainty to be had [about anything], where by [*certainty* we mean that] something comes to be positively determined to be something else. In essence what you are holding is a radical and all-pervasive skepticism (*gang la'ang the tshom za ba 'ba' zhig*).

Following a line of reasoning similar to this, if to apprehend [something] [100]
as existing is an eternalistic view, then to apprehend something to be an entity (*dngos po*), or to apprehend it to be a sprout and so on would likewise be an extreme of reification, [which is absurd]. Also, what is taught and what is repudiated by the scriptures (*lung*) would have to be the same, for just as it says that existence and also nonexistence are one extreme, it also says: "Purity and also impurity are an extreme."[341]

When one analyzes anything to determine whether it has an essence, it is necessary to accept that one of the two [results] is determinable, [that is, either it does or does not have one]. But let us suppose that a third alternative did exist, which is neither of those two; if it were still correct to examine [the object] in this way, [that is, in terms of these two categories that do not exhaust all of the possible options concerning the object,] then it would follow, absurdly, that it would not be the slightest bit unreasonable to conduct this kind of examination: "If a sprout is an entity then is it a pot or a pillar?"[342] Therefore, it would follow, absurdly, that there would be no basis on which the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas could rest hypotheses such as the fact that all phenomena are ascertained to be one of the two truths, for the notion of two contradictory categories that exclude the possibility of a third is impossible [according to you].

It also follows, absurdly, that the wisdom (*shes rab*) which understands truthlessness (*bden med*) is a nihilistic view, because to apprehend something as truthless is a nihilistic view [according to you].

[Opponent:] We accept [that that wisdom is a nihilistic view].

[Reply:] Then tell me, you Mādhyamika the likes of which has never been

seen before, who advocates the logical refutation of truthlessness and the fact that *āryan* gnosis (*'phags pa'i ye shes*) is nihilism . . . tell me what kind of logic it is that refutes truthlessness?

The Ārya Nāgārjuna has clearly taught that reality is understood in terms of the law of excluded middle and that when one refutes essencelessness one [implicitly accepts] the existence of essences. In the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* he says:

When one opposes essencelessness
One will be establishing essentialism (*rang bzhin nyid*).[343]

The *Autocommentary* on this passage says: "If essenceless words refute the essencelessness of things, then because they would have refuted essencelessness, things would come to possess essences, and because they would possess essences, they could not be empty."[344] Hence, when Śāriputra asks Avalokiteśvara how one should practice the profound perfection of wisdom, the latter replies: "One should thoroughly perceive even the five aggregates to be empty of essence."[345] And the *Saṃcaya* also says: [101]

The thorough understanding of phenomena as essenceless
Is the supreme activity of the perfection of wisdom.[346]

The *Avatāra* also says:

Thus, by perceiving the emptiness of "I" and "mine,"
The yogi becomes liberated.[347]

We thus can see that [the scriptures] teach in an extensive way [that the law of excluded middle is operative even within the Madhyamaka and that the understanding of the emptiness of inherent existence can be affirmed as the ultimate liberative force without reservation]. So you had better not claim, in opposition [to all of these scriptures], that even *essencelessness* is not a proper view.

[Question:] Then how do you interpret this passage:

When there is no such thing as the nonempty
How could emptiness exist?[348]

and also this passage from the *Ratnāvalī*:

Thus, the Great Victor opposed
Both the view of self and that of selflessness.[349]

as well as the *Catuḥśataka* passage that goes:

When there is nothing that is not empty
How could emptiness be said to exist?[350]

[Reply:] You are taking as the refuge of all your desires only the mere *words* of the scriptures. That such a doubt should arise in you, who have no

understanding whatsoever of the logical analysis of the *meaning* of the scriptures, should be no surprise to anyone. To explain [the meaning of these passages] in this way, namely, to claim that [they are advocating that] because there is no true existence, there is no emptiness of true existence, is truly [102] laughable. It is like saying "rabbit horns do not exist because the horns of rabbits do not exist," [that is, it is no explanation of the meaning of scripture at all].[351] Therefore, when there is no true existence (*bden grub med*), there must exist truthlessness (*bden med yod*), and hence your pervasion [that the lack of true existence implies the nonexistence of the emptiness of true existence] is just the opposite of what it should be

Now the meaning [of these scriptures] is as follows. To counteract that emptiness, that is, that things are empty of true existence, be apprehended as truly existent, [the *Catuḥśataka*] is saying that emptiness is not truly existent because there is not the slightest phenomenon that *is* truly existent. Therefore, by means of the reason, which is the pervading category (*khyab byed*), that is, the repudiation of true existence in general, the pervaded category (*khyab bya*), the true existence of emptiness [in particular], is refuted. How could [this passage] possibly be teaching that by means of the reason, which is the repudiation of true existence, the object to be refuted (*dgag bya*), truthlessness, which is the very negation of that [object], does not exist? The *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* says:

> If what we call "emptiness" had any sort of existence by virtue of its own nature (*rang gi ngo bos*), then things would also possess essences. This [verse] has been explained for the purpose of demonstrating that it has no such existence:
>
> When there is nothing that is not empty
> How could emptiness be said to exist?
> In the absence of something
> How can its opposite exist?[352]

Immediately after the line "how could emptiness exist," the *Prajñāmūla* continues:

> The Conquerors have taught emptiness
> To be the eradication of all views,
> For they have taught that those who perceive emptiness
> Have nothing to prove.[353]

Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* has this to say:

> It is to those that conceive that "things exist by virtue of their own nature" that we teach "emptiness."[354] This is dependent arising and it is predicated of entities by virtue of the fact that [they arise in dependence on] causes and conditions. To say that things do not exist [103]

> by virtue of their [own] nature is to demonstrate that the nature of things is emptiness.[355] When [this is taught] it has the ability to counteract that misconception. Nothing else, however, has the ability to counteract the misconception in the case of those who conceive that emptiness itself is real (*dngos po nyid du*). For example, it is just like the following case: how can anyone be said to have understood the meaning of "nonexistence" when, after someone has said "I have nothing at all," he replies "give me some of that nothing at all."[356]

According to you, this example is not appropriate, for the following reason. When someone says to someone else "get the money," and the other person answers "there is no money whatsoever," there is no fault if there arises [in that first person] the thought that apprehends that there is no money whatsoever. If, however, this person apprehends the nonexistence to be [a kind of] money, there is no way for that person to come to an understanding that there is no money. Likewise, the apprehension of true existence is counteracted by the teaching of emptiness. However, it is taught that if one apprehends emptiness itself to truly exist, then the apprehension of the true existence of that [emptiness] is very difficult to reverse. According to you, however, the analogy must be explained by saying that there is a fault both in apprehending a lack of money to be money and in apprehending it to be truthless.[357]

[Opponent:] Then how do you, who have argued against us in so many meaningless ways, interpret the meaning of the definitive scriptures that refute the four extremes of existence, nonexistence, both, and neither?

[Reply:] Fearing the fault of advocating direct contradiction, as explained earlier, one individual claims that [the refutation of the four extremes must each be qualified by the word *ultimately*,] that is, that things are not ultimately existent, not ultimately nonexistent, not ultimately both existent and nonexistent, and not ultimately neither existent nor nonexistent, but this does not free [104]
him from the fault of direct contradiction, for after advocating that things are not ultimately both, by claiming that they are not ultimately neither, one is [essentially] advocating that they *are* ultimately both.

Hence the meaning is this, that existence does not truly exist, nonexistence does not truly exist, a third alternative which is both does not truly exist, and a third alternative which is neither does not truly exist.[358] This causes us no problems, and in fact, it is going to take us straight to heaven!

Because errors [in interpretation] such as the [one mentioned earlier] occur due to misunderstanding such scriptural passages as: "existence is an eternalistic view,"[359] I will explain [how the passage is to be interpreted].

"Existence" is a far cry from the "extreme of existence," and "nonexistence" a far cry from the "extreme of nonexistence." Without understanding this, to apprehend *any* existence as the extreme of existence is to go very far astray indeed.[360]

[Opponent:] Well then, what difference is there between these two?

[Reply:] In general, an "extreme" [or "edge"] is explained in the world as any boundary that, when overstepped, causes one to fall and hurt oneself. To [the border of] such a precipice, we apply the term *extreme*. Likewise, in this case we apply the term *extreme* to anything that, when apprehended, causes one to fall into the pit of false views and to degenerate.

Extremes are of two kinds: the extreme of existence and the extreme of nonexistence. The former [is as follows]. For example, non-Buddhists take the self to be permanent, they apprehend *pradhāna* and Īśvara [God] to be permanent entities (*rtag dngos*).[361] The Vaibhāṣikas' belief that space is a permanent substance (*rtag rdzas*)[362] is also a view that makes them fall into the extreme of eternalism. Nonetheless, realists [like the Vaibhāṣikas] never explicitly state [105]
that their view that things inherently exist is tantamount [to the view] that things are permanent; and as regards the way in which their minds apprehend [this eternalism], [it is true that] it involves no apprehension of things to be permanent. However, they have fallen into the extreme of eternalism because if a pot inherently existed then it must *be* permanent.

[Opponent:] Why must it?

[Reply:] It follows, absurdly, that the existence of the pot is its existence in terms of its own nature (*khyod kyi rang bzhin du grub*) because it inherently exists (*khyod rang bzhin gyis yod*).[363]

[Opponent:] I accept [the premise that the existence of the pot is tantamount to its existence qua essence].

[Reply:] Then it follows, absurdly, that it is impossible for it to ever not exist, because of what you have accepted. This follows because it is impossible for any phenomenon to suppress its own nature. If you accept that it is impossible for it to ever not exist, then it follows, absurdly, that it must always exist; and if you accept *that*, then it follows, absurdly, that it is permanent. That is why the *Prajñāmūla* says:

> Because whatever inherently exists
> Is never nonexistent, it is permanent.[364]

As for the latter, the extreme of nihilism (*med pa'i mtha'*), [it is as follows]. According to [some] non-Buddhists there is no emancipation or omniscience.[365] There are also views such as [the one advocating] that things have no cause. In our own system, [that is, among Buddhist schools,] the view expressed by some that the intermediate state (*bar srid*) does not exist is a nihilistic view.[366] Nor is that all. The view expressed by the realists that the inherent existence of things are annihilated (*rgyun chad*) in their second moment is also a nihilistic view (*chad lta*).[367] This is because if a pot inherently exists, that existence must be the pot's reality (*gnas lugs*), and when it is cut off at the second instant, it becomes tantamount to annihilating its reality. [This is also a nihilistic view] because, as explained earlier, if something

inherently exists, it must be permanent, and if one advocates that it is destroyed in the second moment, one would have to be advocating the annihilation of something permanent. That is why the *Prajñāmūla* says:

> To say that what previously arose does not presently exist
> Reduces one to the absurdity of nihilism.[368] [106]

These are all examples of the ways in which one may fall into the extremes of eternalism and nihilism.

One does not come to have an eternalistic view simply by apprehending [something] to exist. Likewise, one does not come to have a nihilistic view simply by apprehending [something] to be nonexistent. If apprehending that a pot exists, that a rabbit's horn does not exist, that space is permanent, and that a thing is destroyed in the second moment[369] are cases of falling into the extremes of eternalism and nihilism, then the extremely absurd conclusion would follow that apprehending that the Buddha has no faults and that the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka view does not fall into the extremes of eternalism and nihilism are [both] nihilistic views [because they both advocate the nonexistence of something].

The *Prasannapadā*, commenting on the lines:

> Because whatever inherently exists
> Can never be nonexistent, it is permanent.[370]

says:

> When something inherently exists, as its essence cannot be overturned (*ldog pa*), it can never not exist. Thus, it follows that to accept the existence of essences in this way is an eternalistic view; and to accept an essence during the time that it existed previously, and then to accept that now, at a later time, because it has been destroyed, it no longer exists entails the absurdity of a nihilistic view.[371]

Now because the *Prasannapadā* explains that the *sloka*, "Because whatever inherently exists," is to be applied in the case of passages that explain reasons such as "[To apprehend] 'existence' is to apprehend eternalism," it is quite clear that passages such as "[To apprehend] 'existence' is to apprehend eternalism" do not refer merely to existence and nonexistence, but are referring instead to inherent existence and to the apprehension of that very [inherent existence] as being annihilated; that is, as coming to an end.

Therefore, if things existed inherently, their existence would have to be their reality because the existence of things would be independent of causes [107] and conditions. The *Prajñāmūla* says:

> If one holds the view that things exist
> Due to their essences,

Then all things that exist in this way
Would have to be seen by you as devoid of causes and conditions.[372]

This is said in reference to a multitude of things. Therefore, by reason of the fact that things are empty of essence,[373] the possibility of their functioning is perfectly established. There are many instances in which the Acārya [Candrakīrti] has clearly stated that there is a difference between existence and inherent existence and between nonexistence and the nonexistence of self-nature (*rang gi ngo bos med pa*). In the *Prasannapadā* he says:

> [Opponent:] If one posits, as you do, that things have no essences, then this method [of yours] would do away with all that the Lord [Buddha] has taught, [contradicting, for example] his teaching that "one must oneself experience the ripening of the karma which one has oneself created." Because you would be annihilating karma and its effects, you would be the worst of nihilists (*med pa pa*).
>
> [Reply:] One should reply [as follows]. We are not nihilists. We refute the position that [things] can be dichotomized into existent and nonexistent, and having done so, we elucidate the way to the city of emancipation, the path of nonduality. We do not, however, advocate that there is no karma, or producer [of karma] or result [of karma]. Why is that so? We advocate that those [entities] have no essence.
>
> [Opponent:] I wonder whether this leads to a fault, for when [things] have no essence, they cannot possibly function.
>
> [Reply:] Even this [fault] does not occur, for it is only when things have essences that action is not seen [to take place], and it is [108]
> only when [things] are essenceless that action is seen [to occur].[374]

The *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* also says:

> The self is not advocated to be unreal (*dngos po med pa*) because it is advocated as arising dependently.
>
> [Opponent:] Are you then advocating that it is real (*dngos po*)?
>
> [Reply:] No, because of the fact that we advocate that it arises dependently.
>
> [Opponent:] What then do you advocate that it is?
>
> [Reply:] We advocate it to arise dependently. And again, what is the meaning of dependent arising? It refers to essencelessness. It refers to the fact that [things] do not arise inherently. It refers to the arising of an effect whose characteristic is that it resembles an illusion, a mirage, a reflection, a fairy city, an emanation, or a dream. It refers to emptiness and selflessness.[375]

Again, the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* states:

> [Opponent:] Does memory that has as its object something past not exist?

[Reply:] Who says that it does not exist? We do not repudiate dependent arising. Then how does it exist? As follows:

> Therefore, what we call memory is mistaken (*log pa*),
> Since it arises only with respect to false objects.[376]

This the Acārya has himself posited.[377] Therefore, the mental object (*dmigs pa*) of a memory is a past object. If it existed by virtue of its own nature, because the memory of that object would have to be perceiving an existing object, [the memory] too would exist by virtue of its own nature. When the past entity is essenceless, however, the memory that perceives it is also essenceless, and for this reason it is called *mistaken*. [In this case] to say that it is mistaken is no different from saying that it is essenceless or that it arises dependently. By *mistaken* we do not [here] mean that the [perceived] entity does not exist.[378]

It is not that the past entity is utterly nonexistent, for it is something to be [109]
remembered, and its effects are perceived; nor does it exist by virtue of its own nature, for it would follow, absurdly, that it was permanent and that it could be directly apprehended (*dngos su 'dzin pa*).[379] In this way it distinguishes in a very detailed way between utter nonexistence and nonexistence by virtue of own nature. Again, the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* states:

> The view of the realists is as follows. To the extent that something is its existence, to that extent is it its own nature. When they are devoid of their own nature, because those entities would be utterly nonexistent, they would resemble the horns of a rabbit. Hence, because they have not transcended dualistic views, it is difficult for the totality of their beliefs to harmonize.[380]

In this way it teaches that the realists go astray by asserting that if an entity does not exist by virtue of its own nature, it must of necessity be nonexistent.

Nowadays it seems that quite a few Mādhyamikas also accept, as do the realists, that if something is essenceless, it must be nonexistent. However, the realists, being experts, accept that things exist inherently without being nihilists in regard to karma and its effects. The Mādhyamikas of today, however, advocate that karma and its effects do not exist, and yet these idiots consider theirs the higher view! [The realists and present-day Mādhyamikas] resemble each other in that neither of them can reconcile dependent arising and emptiness. There exists only one difference [between them], that the latter are nihilists in regard to karma and its effects whereas the former are not.

In opposition to the realists' view that the Mādhyamikas resemble nihilists, the glorious Candra does not say, "because the nihilists have a view they are at fault, and because I have none I am not at fault," nor does he say, [110]
'nihilists espouse nonexistence, but because we advocate that things do not

exist (*yod pa ma yin pa*) and not that things are nonexistent (*med pa*), we are not at fault.''[381] Instead, [in his rebuttal] he says that a Mādhyamika advocates that because past and future births arise dependently, they are essenceless, but that he does not advocate that they are nonexistent. Nihilists, he says, do not advocate this, instead claiming that coming from a previous birth to this one or going to a future one from this one is something that is not witnessed, and hence nonexistent. Hence, [Mādhyamikas and realists] do not resemble each other. The *Prasannapadā* says:

> Here, an opponent may criticize us as follows: there is no difference between a Mādhyamika and a nihilist as [the former] advocates that virtuous and nonvirtuous karma, its doer, its effects, and all the worlds are empty of essence. Nihilists also say that these do not exist. Hence, claim these opponents, there is no difference between a Mādhyamika and a nihilist. But this is not so. Mādhyamikas advocate dependent arising. They claim that because things arise dependently, everything, both this world and the one beyond, are essenceless. Nihilists have not realized the unreality (*dngos po med pa*) of the world beyond from the vantage point of [the fact] that, as it arises dependently, it is empty of essence. How so? They perceive the aspect of the reality of this world in terms of an essence, and then, when they do not witness [the process] of coming from the world beyond to this world, and of going from this world to the one beyond, they become skeptical in regard to other [worlds] whose reality should be similar to the reality that is perceived in this world.[382]

[Question:] Do not the nihilist and the Mādhyamikas resemble one another [111]
in so far as [they both advocate] the essencelessness of entities?

[Reply:] No, they do not resemble each other, and as his reason [Candrakīrti] says that the Lokāyatikas [the Materialists] take essencelessness to mean utter nonexistence, whereas the Mādhyamikas believe that, although [things] are essenceless, they conventionally exist. The *Prasannapadā* says:

> [Opponent:] Though that may be so, they resemble each other from this point of view: when one perceives the nonexistence of a thing's own nature, one perceives it as [a kind of] nonexistence.
>
> [Reply:] No, they do not resemble each other because the Mādhyamikas accept that [things, that is, past and future lives and so on,] exist conventionally, while those [nihilists] do not accept this.[383]

In this way he clearly explains that there is no difference between the Mādhyamikas who believe that no phenomenon exists even nominally, those who believe that even though they do exist nominally that this does not imply existence, and the Lokāyatikas. That is why the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* says:

> Having realized that all phenomena are empty,
> We still rely on [the doctrine of] karma and its effects.
> Among all amazing things, this is the most amazing.
> Among all astonishing things, this is the most astonishing.[384]

The ability to posit the compatibility of [on the one hand] karma with its effects and [on the other] emptiness is a wonderful thing. It is said that because this is so difficult to understand the Conqueror himself, after demonstrating the act of [attaining] buddhahood, [seeing that] reality was so difficult to understand, found it extremely difficult to agree to turn the wheel of the doctrine.[385] The *Ratnāvalī* says:

> Because the doctrine was so profound, he realized
> That it was difficult for men to understand.
> Thus the Conqueror, upon [attaining] buddhahood,
> At first turned away from teaching the doctrine.[386]

[A Critique of Quietism][387]

In contradistinction to this, suppose that we search for what consciousness is [112]
by means of some sort of faulty reasoning such as the kind that analyzes whether it is color or shape.[388] When one does not find that it can be pinpointed in terms of any of these categories, turning to the mind that is doing the analysis, one does not find that even *it* can be identified at all. Hence, [the mind enters] into a state in which no identification takes place; that is, neither asserting nor denying anything about anything else. Because placing the mind so that it apprehends nothing is so simple, however, how could the Buddha have said of such a practice that it was the most difficult thing to understand?

It seems that because this interpretation is extremely easy to understand, a multitude [of scholars] from this Land of Snows have understood this to be the significance [of meditation on emptiness].[389] How can I possibly mention each of these individually? There are those "very learned" in the *sūtras* and *tantras*, those proud of their mastery of logical methodology, those who believe they possess some kind of special instructions (*man ngag*) concerning profound subjects . . . but when one analyzes them, all of their [views are filled with] exceedingly many inconsistent tenets. All of these great dialecticians who argue on a variety [of topics], such as the emptiness of self (*rang stong*) and the emptiness of other (*gzhan stong*),[390] and on whether reality truly exists, do not differ in the least when it comes to practicing the meaning of the profound [emptiness]. Whether they believe that they are practicing the idiot's meditation of not training in anything whatsoever, the practice of the Great Master of the Tripiṭaka, or that they are practicing the profound completion stage (*rdzog rim*) of the *anuttarayoga tantra*, they all concur on this one point: they posit that no [mental] object should be established, that the mind should

apprehend nothing. This will be seen to be a great den of iniquity when looked upon by those of sharp faculties.

Among the many things renowned as "Tibetan teachings" are a variety of concocted practices such as "preliminary visualizations" (*sngon 'gro'i dmigs pa*), and "bodily postures and exercises" (*lus 'gnas dang 'khrul 'khor*); granted that they can be distinguished as the teachings of various lineages, [113] still, it does not seem that there is any difference between them as regards the way in which they meditate on the definitive meaning. Although one can make some slight distinctions between the variety of tenets of these so-called sages, come time to set forth their views [concerning emptiness] they do not meditate in accordance with the distinctions that have been made. Instead they all, without distinction, meditate on creating nothing within their minds. Hence, there are strong indications that all of these [views] are on the periphery of the system of the Chinese Hwa shang.

Therefore, they hold [to the doctrine] that to create nothing within the mind is to meditate on reality, and thus they err in so far as they end up not being able to meditate on selflessness. They repudiate the practice of the path that is the counteractive measure against the way in which [we] grasp at a self (*bdag 'dzin*), the root of cyclic existence. They exert themselves in a kind of practice that does not the slightest harm to the way we grasp at the self. Hence, one should be aware of the fact that although many of our own Tibetan practitioners pride themselves on having meditated assiduously on reality for the whole of their lives, that they have not managed to put even the slightest dent in their grasping at a self is a valid effectual reason (*'bras rtags yang dag*) proving that their practice is faulty.[391] Although they may have attained some level of expertise concerning the proofs and refutations involved in setting forth the view [of emptiness] at the time of study, when it comes to *practicing* the profound meaning (*zab don*), they teach a kind of idiot's meditation saying, "create nothing at all in your mind. . . . See for yourself, is there anything to be identified?" As soon as they find some belief of the sort, "this alone is the reality of the mind," they immediately abandon analysis in the logical sphere. This too should be understood to be a valid reason for proving [the cause from] the effect; that is, for proving that no matter how much training they may have had in the study and elucidation of tenets, their method of setting forth reality is in error.

Because they believe that when it comes down to meditating on reality [114] one ought not to create anything in the mind, they must of necessity believe that when they set forth reality they ought not to set it forth even in terms of selflessness. In the same way, they must accept that one ought not to put forth even a theory of reality. Although this is an infinite source of faults, fearing that it will lengthen [this work excessively.] I discuss it no further here.

By holding to such a view there arises a nihilistic attitude in regard to all of the aspects of method (*thabs*). For example, [there arises] the view that

because charity and moral conduct, prostration and offerings, all require conceptualization (*rtog pas bya dgos pas*), they are things to be abandoned; and also the view that in the case of *tantra* the generation stage (*bskyed rim*) is not the cause of buddhahood, [as it too involves mental images]. Hence, no position is worse than this view, namely, the view that nothing at all should be apprehended.

Therefore, there are three possibilities as regards the mind: (1) there is the apprehension that the self exists, (2) the apprehension that the self does not exist, and (3) that which apprehends that neither of the two [is true]. The first of these is the root of cyclic existence and as its antidote it is necessary to generate within one's mental continuum the second mind and then meditate. To generate that [understanding of selflessness] in one's mental continuum it is necessary to lead one's mind to certainty (*nges pa 'dren pa*) by being aware of the logical faults that ensue when (one holds) that the object [of self-grasping, that is, the self,] exists as it is apprehended by a mode in which self-grasping is operative. That is why [the *Madhyamakāvatāra*] says:

> Insight should lead one to an awareness of the fact that all afflictions and faults
> Arise from a [mistaken] view in regard to the collection of perishable [aggregates] (*'jig tshogs la lta ba*).
> So realizing that the self is the object of this mind,
> The yogi repudiates the self.[392]

If this is not [done] one will wander in cyclic existence due to the grasping at a self. To merely prohibit the mind from engaging in [mental] activity in regard to both the existence and nonexistence of a self, [the third of the three minds described earlier,] will not harm [self-grasping] in the least. For example, a man is traveling along a road and is fearful of thieves. If based on his [115]
belief in the reason that there are no thieves he comes to generate an ascertaining consciousness (*nges pa'i shes pa*) that there are no thieves, then he can eliminate the mind that fears the thieves. He will not be able to eliminate this fear-ridden mind, however, by simply avoiding thoughts of either the existence or the nonexistence of the thieves.

It is not necessary to have as a prerequisite the establishment of the view [of emptiness] before generating in one's mental continuum this third kind of mind.[393] [We can see this to be the case] because nowadays there are idiots who understand nothing at all of the view of emptiness and yet who understand the perfect method of meditation in terms of the teaching that one should remain lucid and clear without creating anything in the mind.[394]

Such [meditative practices which] claim that one should not apprehend either the existence or the nonexistence of a self and that one should abandon whatever is apprehended are in no way different from the meditation of the *asaṃjñā* (*samāpatti*).[395] There is no being whatsoever who has not generated

[this trance state] in his or her mental continuum at some past time.[396] So please distinguish carefully between not meditating on a self and meditating on selflessness!

[Opponent:] To apprehend that there is no self, it is not necessary to set forth the view [of emptiness] by means of logical reasoning. We know from our own experience that even without establishing the view by means of logical reasoning we can still come to apprehend selflessness.

[Reply:] We believe that it is necessary to generate the ascertaining consciousness[397] (*nges shes*) which determines that there is no self by relying on logical reasoning, but we do not believe that the mere apprehension of selflessness must be generated from reasoning. Reification, that is, grasping at a self, must be undermined (*gcod*) by means of an ascertaining consciousness. Reification cannot be cleared away by mere belief (*mos pa*) without generating an ascertaining consciousness. As it says [in the *Pramāṇavārttikam*]:

> Since the ascertaining and reifying minds
> Are of such a nature that they mutually oppose each other,
> One should realize that this [ascertaining mind]
> Engages in the elimination of reification.[398]

[Opponent:] Well then, what about a kind of meditation in which one [116]
thinks, without nagging doubts, that all phenomena are selfless, but which, being based on belief in the words of one's holy spiritual master, [arises] from hearsay [and not from logical analysis]?

[Reply:] Although it is true that in this case there need not precede the establishment of the view by means of reasoning, this [kind of apprehension] is only a belief aroused by faith; it is not a full-blown ascertaining consciousness. Were it an ascertaining consciousness, one would have to claim that it arises from either of the two kinds of valid cognition, [and it does not]. If this were an instance of an ascertaining consciousness arising from [hearing] the words of the spiritual master, then there would be an instance of words validly verifying a fact that [could be proven by] direct means (*dngos stob kyi yul*),[399] [whereas this is impossible].

Therefore, if this [belief based on words] were an ascertaining consciousness that was induced by a valid verifying cognition, then, until one forgets the object (*dmigs*) and aspect (*rnam*) [of, for example, the fact that a pot, the object, is selfless, the aspect,] then one will not come to believe in the opposite fact (*bzlog phyogs*) [that the pot has a self] that contradicts (*'gal ba*) the way in which [the ascertaining consciousness] apprehended [the fact]. [We know that those who generate faith based on mere hearsay,] when they generate faith in another spiritual master's tenets which do not accord with the first, again, under the power of the words alone, abandon that previous false certainty, [thereby proving that it was not irrevocable knowledge, and hence not ascertainment to begin with]. Therefore, if one accustoms oneself correctly to that

mind which thinks that all phenomena are devoid of self and which is induced by faith in the mere words of the spiritual master, it *is* possible to slightly reduce attachment and so forth, but one will not in the least bring harm to the seeds of self-grasping.

Therefore, those who desire the best for themselves should induce [within themselves,] by means of logical reasoning, a certainty of the fact that selflessness is the real nature of all phenomena. They should avoid becoming sophists who exert themselves in discourse without any personal experience. Instead, by properly meditating, [following] the prescribed divisions of the meditation, they should exert themselves at destroying the afflictions that [infect] their own mental continua. Hence, if one does not understand the difference between refuting the existence of all phenomena and refuting, by means of logical reasoning, that any phenomenon whatsoever has the characteristic of being established by virtue of its own nature, then one will without a doubt fall
into the abyss of wrong views (*lta ba ngan pa*). Therefore, it is necessary to [117]
distinguish [these two views] in accordance with what the noble father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva] have clearly taught. As it says in the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā:*

> If one examines [the object] by means of logical reasoning in this way, because the sense organs, their objects, and the consciousness [that perceive them] have no existing natures, they are said to not exist by virture of their own natures. If these things did exist by virtue of their own nature, then, when correctly analyzed, one should be able to perceive quite clearly that they exist by virtue of their own nature, that this is how they exist. But this is in fact not perceived, and so they are said to be empty of essence (*rang bzhin gyis stong pa*).[400]

And again, the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* states:

> [Question:] If the eye and so forth are not possible, then how can the eye and so on qua sense organs be posited to be of the nature of the ripened karma?
>
> [Answer:] Do we refute that they are of the nature of the ripened [karmic causes]? [Of course not!]
>
> [Question:] As you establish your refutation in regard to the eye and so forth, how can you avoid not refuting [that the eye organ and so forth are the result of karmic causality]?
>
> [Answer:] It is because our analysis is preoccupied with (*lhur byed pa*) the search for essences. Here we are refuting that things exist by virtue of their own nature. We are not refuting the functioning (*byas*) of the eye and so on, or the [fact that they are the] ripening of karma; that is, that they dependently arise. Therefore, because they exist, they must be found to be the ripening of some [cause]. The eye and so forth do indeed exist.[401]

In addition, the Acārya Buddhapālita states in the commentary to the twentieth chapter of the *Prajñāmūla:*

> [An opponent] has said: If even time does not exist, and cause, effect, and the whole do not exist, then what else is there that does exist? You are therefore actually advocating nihilism!
>
> Let me explain. This is not so. Why? There is no validity whatsoever to your conception that time and so on exist because of their nature. Because they are dependent, they exist as labels (*btags pa*).[402] [118]

It would be pointless to continue to press those who incorrectly maintain that to advocate that [something] does not exist is not to advocate that it is nonexistent. We have already explained it with reference to such scriptures as the *Prasannapadā,* as well as through reasoning.

4.2.3.1.2.1.2.2.3. Demonstrating That Their Analysis of [What It Means for Something] to Be Established or Not Established by a Valid Cognition, and Their Subsequent Refutation, Is Faulty[403]

When we accept that arising exists, we accept that it exists as something established by a valid cognition.[404] Hence, we accept that arising exists because it is established by a nominal valid cognition (*tha snyad pa'i tshad ma*) such as the eye consciousness and so on. We believe that the ultimate truth [emptiness] exists as something established by a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate (*don dam dpyod pa'i tshad ma*).[405]

[Opponent:] Well then, how do you interpret such [scriptural passages] as "the eye, the ear and the nose too are not valid cognition"[406] [if, as you claim, the notion of valid cognitions acting as sources for the verification of the existence of entities is a valid one]?

[Reply:] If one were to explain the meaning of these [scriptures] as you do, [namely, as a general repudiation of valid cognition and of their role as verifying agents,] then an utterly contradictory pervasion would follow. You would end up explaining that "if the eye and the ear consciousnesses and so on are valid cognitions in regard to form and sound and so forth, then the *āryan* path would be purposeless."[407] If this were the case, then you would have to say that if valid cognitions which analyze the nominal are valid cognitions in regard to the conventional, then the valid cognitions which analyze the ultimate are pointless when it comes to perceiving the ultimate. So please do not make a contradictory pervasion the explanation of the purport of *sūtras.*

The meaning of that *sūtra* passage is this. If the eye consciousness and so forth were valid cognitions in regard to reality, it would follow, absurdly, that all sentient beings from beginningless time would have directly perceived

reality. Were that the case, then the *āryan* path would be pointless when it comes to the perception of reality.

The line [from the *Madhyamakāvatāra*] that goes: "Because the world is not valid in all respects"[408] is also similar to that [preceding *sūtra* citation]. Just after that passage, the [*Madhyamakāvatāra*] continues: "the world cannot [119]
oppose one when it comes to reality."[409] The *Avatārabhāṣya*[410] says:

> In this way only *āryans* are valid in regard to thoughts of reality; non-*āryans* are not. If those who believe that we advocate opposition to the world accept that when one analyzes reality, even worldly perceptions are valid cognitions, then we say:
>
> > If the world were valid, [that is, if the world's perceptions were valid cognitions]. . .[411]

And the commentary after [the verse] states:

> Because the mere eye consciousness and so on would ascertain reality, because it would understand the *āryan* path, the pursuits of moral discipline (*tshul khrims*), study (*thos pa*), contemplation (*bsam pa*), and meditation (*sgom pa*) etc. would be fruitless. But this cannot be so, and therefore:
>
> > Because the world is not valid in all respects
> > The world cannot oppose one when it comes to reality.[412]

That is why the *Prasannapadā* says: "therefore they posit that it is by means of the four valid cognitions that the world comes to an understanding of objects."[413] In this way it explains that by means of the four valid cognitions, that is, direct perception (*mngon sum*), inference (*rjes dpag*), scripture (*lung*), and comparison (*nyer 'jal*), one posits the conventional, [proving that the Mādhyamikas do not in general repudiate the notion of a valid cognition].

[Opponent:] Well then, how do you interpret this passage from the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā:*

> It is utterly nonsensical for anyone to reify the sense consciousnesses into forms of direct perception and then to conceive of them as valid cognitions in regard to phenomena. If in the world a nonmistaken consciousness was viewed as a valid cognition, then this contradicts what the Lord said about consciousness, namely, that "because it is compounded, it is a false and mistaken subject (*chos can*) and like an illusion." Whatever is a false and mistaken subject and like an illusion [120]
> is not unmistaken, for, while existing in one way, in actual fact it appears in another. So it is not right to call what exists in this way a

valid cognition, for then it would follow that all consciousnesses are valid cognitions.[414]

[Reply:] This passage is more difficult to understand than the previous one. Its meaning is taught in the [portion of the] *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* in which the opponent's position is presented:

> Because the logician (*rtog ge pa*) is utterly inexperienced in worldly meaning (*rjig rten pa'i don*), he must practice it from the very beginning like a young child. But when it comes to demonstrating this, your notion of what it means for something to be a direct perception is contradictory and must be examined. You claim that there is consciousness which is direct perception. What kind of consciousness? The kind that is devoid of conceptualization. Then what is conceptualization? It is a rough kind of recognition (*'du shes gyer po*) that engages in reifying an object in terms of name (*ming*) and classification (*rigs*). Because they are devoid of this [reification], that is, because the five sense consciousnesses come to understand the own characteristic of their object in a strictly ineffable way, they are given the name *direct perception*.[415]

This is refuting the exposition of valid cognitions as it appears in works such as the *Seven Logical Treatises* [of the logicians]; it is not refuting that valid cognitions are possible [in general]. If I explain each word [of these citations], it will lengthen this work excessively and so for the moment I will only mention their meaning in brief.[416]

The realists believe that if something is a valid cognition it cannot be a consciousness that is in error (*'khrul pa*) as to the object in regard to which it is considered a valid cognition. Now because what is apprehended in an ordinary person's valid cognition appears to be an object that exists from its own side, the realists accept the pervasion that if something is a valid cognition, then it must be a valid cognition even in regard to that object's existing by virtue of its own characteristic.

To refute this, take the eye consciousness, for example. It follows [according to you, the realist,] that it is not mistaken (*mi slu ba*) as to the nature (*rang* [121]
bzhin) of form because it is a valid cognition in regard to it. You accept the reason [that the eye consciousness is a valid cognition, in regard to form] and the pervasion [that if it is a valid cognition, then it must be unmistaken as to the ultimate nature of form,] because you claim that a valid cognition has as its characteristic that it is unmistaken. If you accept that [the eye consciousness is unmistaken in regard to the nature of form, then I refute you by saying that] the eye consciousness *is* mistaken in regard to the nature of form because form appears to it as if it existed by virtue of its own characteristic, [whereas in actuality] the nature of form is such that it is empty of existing by virtue of its own characteristic. This [is the meaning of the earlier quote].

Now in our own system, there would have to be a nonerroneous (*ma 'khrul pa*) valid cognition in regard to truly existing phenomena [if such phenomena existed]. The fact [that no such valid cognition exists], however, does not contradict the fact that a false phenomenon can be posited by an erroneous valid cognition. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that if something is a valid cognition in regard to *x*, then it is a nonerroneous consciousness in regard to *x*.[417] Also, the valid cognitions and phenomena of our own system do not exist by virtue of their own nature because we believe that they have only a labeled existence (*btags yod tsam*), that they exist one in dependence on another. The *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* says:

> Even these two exist in mutual dependence. If the two [kinds of] valid cognition exist, then so would the two [kinds of] perceived objects; and if the two [kinds of] perceived objects exist, then so would the two [kinds of] valid cognition. Neither valid cognitions nor phenomena exist by virtue of their own nature.[418]

The extensive explanation of the refutation of the realists' [conception of] valid cognitions in the *Prasannapadā* is difficult to understand, has many technical commentarial words, and is exceedingly long. To explain it here would take too many words and so I will not discuss it. Those who might wish to compose a commentary that explains in a detailed way the words of the digest, that is, the *Prasannapadā*, should refer to that treatment. The remainder of our [122]
own system's exposition of valid cognitions I will explain later.

4.2.3.1.2.1.2.2.4. Demonstrating That [Their] Examination of Whether Arising Can Be Determined to Exist in Any One of the Four Ways, Such as Arising from Self, Is Faulty[419]

The realists and the Prāsaṅgikas resemble one another in that they both accept arising. They differ, however, in that [the Prāsaṅgikas believe] that one can refute [inherent arising] by analyzing it into the four [possibilities], such as arising from self, whereas [the realists maintain that] one cannot. It is as follows. It is not correct to accept that realists, when they accept arising, analyze it into the four possibilities such as arising from self because realists accept that (1) arising is true arising (*bden skye*), and that (2) all true arising must be one of the four possibilities when the way in which [things] arise is logically analyzed.[420] This second reason is true because a form of arising that can withstand logical analysis implies the existence or the nonexistence of a cause, and it implies either that the cause is a different object from the effect or that it is not.

The arising that the Prāsaṅgikas accept is not refuted by the analysis into the four possibilities because the Prāsaṅgikas accept a merely nominal arising

[that is found to exist only] so long as it is not analyzed or investigated; and because that unanalyzed, uninvestigated arising, when logically analyzed, need not fall into any of the four possibilities; and, finally, because unanalyzed existence does not imply analyzed existence.[421]

From another viewpoint [we can say that] the Prāsaṅgikas use dependent arising to refute arising via [any of] the four possibilities. The *Avatāra* says:

> Because things arise interdependently,
> Concepts cannot be analyzed.
> And so, by the logical reason of dependent arising,
> The infinite net of wrong views is cut.[422]

And also:

> Because things are neither uncaused nor caused
> By God or by the two [possibilities]
> Of (1) a cause identical [with its effect] or (2) a cause different from it,
> They therefore arise interdependently.[423]

This shows that because things do not arise by means of [any one of] the four [123]
extremes, they arise interdependently. So do not, claiming the opposite of what Candrakīrti has explained [to be true], then claim that a form of arising devoid of the four extremes, [which is what we and Candrakīrti accept as conventional arising,] is a form of arising that is one of the four extremes.

The [*Madhyamakāvatāra*] verse that goes: "The reasoning at the time of [analyzing] reality"[424] does not teach that nominal arising does not exist but that even nominally there is no arising by virtue of [a thing's] own characteristic because, at the time of analyzing reality, the reasoning that refutes arising via the four extremes refutes arising from the four extremes *even nominally*. That is why the *Bhāṣya* on that very verse says: "Thus, the claim that 'arising by virtue of own characteristic cannot be considered to be true on either of the two levels' is something that you [the opponent] must accept though you may not wish to do so"[425] and it is why the *Avatāra* says:

> Just as the son of a barren woman
> Does not arise by virtue of its own nature (*bdag nyid*) even in worldly [convention],
> Likewise there is no entity that arises
> By virtue of its own nature (*ngo bo nyid*).[426]

Inherent (*rang bzhin gyis*) arising cannot be considered to be true on either of the two levels of truth [conventional or ultimate], but one must understand that there *does exist* arising that is dependent and that exists as long as one does not analyze or examine it. The glorious Candra has said that to not distinguish mere arising from inherent arising is lunacy in the extreme. The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* says:

Arising in dependence [on other things] is nonarising.
This has been taught by the Supreme Sage [the Buddha].[427]

In [Candrakīrti's] *Vṛtti* it says:

> [Opponent:] Is it not the case that what arises in dependence [on other things] is just [another kind of] arising? If so, then how can you call it *nonarising*? But if you [insist] on calling it *nonarising* then do not call it *arising in dependence*. As these two are mutually contra- [124]
> dictory, it is not right [to consider something to be both].
>
> [Reply:] Oh my goodness (*kye ma kyi hud*)! Even though you have neither lent your ear nor given thought [to what we have said, you think] that your opposition confronts us with a difficulty. But how can there be an opportunity for you to oppose us when we claim that what arises in dependence [on other things] does not arise inherently, like a reflection.[428]

Because [these opponents] have neither heard the word *inherently* nor understood its significance, [a qualifier] that has been stated on many occasions previously in such phrases as *not arising inherently,* he says that they have neither ears nor minds. This is also the point made by the *Ārya Anavataptanāgarājaparipṛcchā Sūtrā* when it says: "Whatever arises from conditions does not arise."[429] Then it explains why it does not arise: "It has no arising essence (*rang bzhin*)," thereby explaining that the meaning of *not arising* is "not arising inherently (*rang bzhin gyis*)."

The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* is also quoted in the *Prasannapadā:* "Mahamati, I have said that no phenomenon arises, intending [by these words to mean that] they do not arise inherently."[430] Hence, it is with no understanding whatsoever of such a distinction that [the opponent thinks] that it is mere [unqualified] arising that [*Prajñāpāramitā* claims concerning] *nonarising* [is referring to], that it is mere dependence that *nondependence* [is referring to], and that it is mere seeing that *nonseeing* is referring to [instead of their referring to *noninherent arising* and so on]. So do not think you are espousing such a high view when [all you actually have] is a big mouthful of mutually contradictory assertions.

4.2.3.1.2.1.2.2.5. Demonstrating That It Is Incorrect to Urge on Us the Absurdity That What We Advocate Goes Against the Four Reliances[431]

[Opponent:] Which is it that takes precedence (*dbang btsan*) [in determining the ontological status of form]? Is it (1) the fact that form and so on is per-

ceived by a conventional valid cognition as existing or (2) the fact that the gnosis of an *āryan* perceives it as nonexistent?[432]

[Reply:] This is not something that should be asked of us. Although *āryans* do not perceive conventional phenomena with the gnosis that perceives things as they are, they do not perceive them as *nonexistent*. Even though they [125] are not perceived, it is not because they do not exist that they are not perceived. Even though they do exist, because they are not the objects (*yul*) of that gnosis, they are not perceived [by it]. There is also a reason for why they are not the objects [of *āryan* gnosis]. It is because form and so on are conventional entities and the *āryan* gnosis that perceives things as they are is a valid cognition that examines the ultimate [that the former is not perceived by the latter]. Thus, when analyzing the ultimate, *āryan* gnosis takes precedence, and when analyzing the nominal, worldly consciousness takes precedence. An *āryan's* vision does not oppose [the existence of] an object that is established by a valid cognition which analyzes the nominal; and a nominal consciousness does not oppose the object which is established by *āryan* gnosis, [namely, emptiness]. Otherwise, the ultimate would refute the conventional, and reality qua attribute (*chos nyid*) would refute phenomena qua possessor of the attribute (*chos can*); and so it would follow, absurdly, that the two truths could not be made to harmonize.

According to you, it is not correct to make distinctions such as "rely not on the provisional meaning but on the definitive meaning" because both the provisional and the definitive are objects that reasoning refutes. [If you claim that] it does not follow, [that is, that the fact that both the provisional and definitive are repudiated through reasoning does not vitiate against whether one should be relied upon over the other,] then you are reduced to the absurdity that such distinctions as "rely not on the self of persons but on the self of phenomena," [in which both entities are repudiated through reasoning,] are valid.

It follows, absurdly, [from your position] that the fact, "no phenomenon exists," itself exists because it is perceived by a valid cognition. If you reject the reason, [that is, if you claim that it is *not* perceived by a valid cognition,] then desist from claiming that [the fact that all phenomena do not exist] is something that is perceived by the nonconceptual gnosis of an *āryan*. If you accept [that it is perceived by a valid cognition and therefore exists,] then it contradicts your claim that nothing whatsoever exists. Moreover, it would follow, absurdly, that what is nonexistent would exist, and that what is not a phenomenon (*gzhi ma grub pa*) is a phenomenon (*gzhi grub pa*).

It also follows, absurdly, that the distinction, "rely not on consciousness but on gnosis," is not a valid one because [all minds], whether consciousness or gnosis, exist in contradistinction to valid cognitions. If you reject [the reason, that is, that consciousnesses and valid cognitions are mutually contradictory things], then you must admit to the possibility of valid cognitions,

[something you repudiated earlier]. If valid cognitions are possible, then [by definition] so is existence. But once you admit to "existence," then you are [126]
caught in the horns of a dilemma. Because we predicate the term *existent* of anything that is perceived by a valid cognition, to accept that something is established by a valid cognition and yet deny that it exists is to quibble about definitions. If you do not accept [the notion of things being] established by a valid cognition, then in a way anathema [to your own views you must accept] that even *āryan* gnosis is not a valid cognition.

In conclusion, except for Tibetan scholars such as yourself, there is no one else who advocates [this position]. Although the Buddhist philosophers of the Noble Land of India may claim that their presentation of the two truths contradicts that of another school, none of them, accepting that the presentation of the two truths which they themselves expound is internally contradictory, then go on to claim that the conventional is refuted by valid cognitions which analyze the ultimate.

In our own system the presentation of the four reliances is extremely well-founded. Not to rely on the provisional, but to rely on the definitive and not to rely on the conventional, but to rely on the ultimate means that we should not accept that what appears as the variety of conventional entities is their reality and to accept instead that their reality is that ultimate entity which is that they are empty of existing as they appear; that is, [empty of] existing truly.

To accept that the way [things] appear to an ordinary person's consciousness is not reality, but that the way [things] are perceived by the non-conceptual gnosis (*mi rtog pa'i ye shes*) of an *āryan is* reality, is what is meant by not relying on consciousness but relying on gnosis. This is how it should be explained.

*4.2.3.1.2.2. How We Refute the One Who Does Not Go Far Enough (*khyab cung ba*) in the Identification of the Object of Refutation*[433]

Opponent: The object of refutation that is to be negated in the ascertainment of the ultimate view of the Madhyamaka is [a type of] essence[434] that possesses three characteristics: (1) its nature is such that it is not produced by means of causes and conditions, (2) it does not change into something else, [127]
and (3) it does not depend on something else for its existence. That is why the *Mūla* says:

> It is not possible for an essence
> To arise from causes and conditions.
> An essence that arises from causes and conditions
> Must be endowed with [the quality of being] produced (*byas pa can*);

But how can one possibly say
That an essence is endowed [with the quality of] production?
An essence is not created,
Nor does it depend on other [entities].[435]

[Reply:] Well then, it follows, absurdly, [from your stance] that the Cittamātrins ascertain that all entities are truthless because the Cittamātrins ascertain that all entities are empty of this kind of essence that possesses the three qualities. This follows because they ascertain that all entities arise from causes and conditions and that on different occasions they change into something different.

Again, you cannot posit that the mere ascertainment that phenomena are empty of an essence possessing these three qualities is the ultimate view of the Madhyamaka because the ascertainment [that things are] empty of an essence which possesses the three qualities is not the actual antithesis of the way that the innate (*lhan skyes*) grasping at truth grasps [things].[436] This is so because it is not possible that this way of apprehending the object, that is, apprehending it in terms of an essence that possesses these three qualities, exists in the mental continua [of creatures incapable of this kind of conceptual thought], like ants.[437]

[Opponent]: It follows that if one ascertains the emptiness of an essence that possesses the three qualities, one necessarily ascertains complete and full-blown truthlessness. This is because if something truly exists, it must exist in terms of an essence that possesses the three qualities.

[Reply]: Well then, it follows, absurdly, that if one ascertains the emptiness of a permanent entity (*rtag dngos*), one must ascertain complete and full-blown truthlessness. This is because if something truly exists, it must be a [128]
permanent entity. Therefore, even though truly existent things must necessarily be partless, the Prāsaṅgikas do not believe that partlessness is their chief object of refutation. Because this [position] is a special tenet of the philosopher, it cannot be the most basic [cause] that binds beings to *saṃsāra*.

[Opponent]: Well then, what is the meaning of the previously cited passage from the *Prajñāmūla*?

[Reply]: That [passage] is not identifying an essence as the object of refutation. Instead, it is teaching that in our own system we explain that which must definitely be accepted, that is, the reality of all phenomena, to be their "essence."

The *Prajñāmūla* [itself] posits reality to be the essence [of phenomena]:

An essence is not created,
Nor does it depend on other [entities].[438]

This speaks of reality as having two qualities: (1) *Noncreation* [means] that it is an essence that without fail, always exists within a phenomenon, unlike the

heat of water;[439] that it is not newly created by causes and conditions. (2) The second quality does not refer to independence from causes and conditions, for [if it did,] it would be redundant [with the first quality]. It also does not refer to the mere fact that it is not necessary to posit [a phenomenon] based on another phenomenon, [that is, "independence" in this case does not mean independence from having to rely on other phenomena,] for [were that so,] it would follow, absurdly, that reality is not interdependent.[440]

Let us consider how we determine something to be "long" or "short." When we consider a rope the length of a lower arm span to be long, we must do so in dependence on [a shorter length, say that of] a finger span. We do not ascertain it to be long one-sidedly without depending upon such [a standard,] because in dependence upon a rope a full arm span in length, our notion of "long" vanishes and we would instead determine [that original rope] to be short. The case of "over there" and "over here" is analogous.[441]

Even though *the heat* of fire, relative to the heat of water, is recognized, and in fact determined, to be the essence of fire, when one finds truthlessness [129]
to be the essence of fire by means of a valid cognition, one abandons holding the fact that heat is the essence of fire. When we determine that truthlessness is the essence of fire, we do not do so relative to another quality of fire; it can be posited to be the essence of fire one-sidedly. Because it is not merely posited relative to this or that standard (*ltos sa*) but is one-sidedly the [real] substratum (*gzhis*) of fire, it is the essence of fire. This is what is meant [by the passage that characterizes the essence of phenomena, that is, reality, to be independent]. The reference to "its not being like a possession which has been borrowed from someone"[442] means that one cannot make reference to it one-sidedly, saying "such and such a possession" without depending on the fact that it was lent by someone else. In contradistinction to that, here we are dealing with an object that must be able to be determined as the essence one-sidedly. In this vein, the *Avatārabhāṣya* says:

> In particular, is an essence of such a kind something that the Acārya [Nāgārjuna] accepts or not? It depends on one's point of view. The Lord has extensively taught that no matter whether or not there arise *tathāgatas,* the reality of phenomena still remains, that is, this reality, will exist. What is this reality? It is the essence of such [phenomena] as the eye and so on. And what is the essence of these [phenomena]? It is their noncreation; it is their nondependence. It is their own nature that is to be understood by the consciousness which is free of the eye disease (*rab rib*) of ignorance. This, then, do I reply to those who ask whether or not that [reality qua essence of phenomena] exists: if it does not exist, then for what purpose do the bodhisatıvas meditate on the path of the perfections. It is for the purpose of understanding reality that bodhisattvas undertake a multitude of difficulties.[443] [130]

So even though reality is the essence of phenomena, reality is posited by means of a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate; it is not posited by means of a conventional valid cognition. The "*existence* of reality" or "something's *being* the essence of phenomena" [are conventional phenomena and hence] are posited by means of a nominal valid cognition and not by means of a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate, for even though reality is an ultimate [truth], the *existence* of reality should be understood to be conventional. The fact that "reality" and "all phenomena" are [in the relationship of] quality to qualified is [a fact] not perceived by the gnosis that understands reality. It instead is perceived by a nominal valid cognition.

In this same vein, the *Prasannapadā* says:

> That uncreated [or nonadventitious] primordial nature that without fail exists within fire during the three times, that is not such that it does not arise earlier but does arise later, that does not possess a dependence upon causes and conditions, as is the case with the heat of water, here and there, and long and short, is said to be the essence [of fire]. Does such an own nature of fire exist? It neither exists nor is it nonexistent by virtue of its own nature. Though this be so, to eliminate fear within the listeners, reifying, we say "it does exist conventionally."[444]

If you are thinking that because it says "reifying it, we say 'it exists,' " [existence can be considered only as a form of reification and hence that] in our own school we do not accept existence, you are mistaken, for [it would mean that you] do not know how to determine that all phenomena have only a labeled existence, that they are only mere names. The method of determining this I will explain later.

The *Avatārabhāṣya* also says: "Thus I call it noncreated and not dependent upon others by comparison to conventional truths."[445]

4.2.3.1.3. The Explanation of What Our Own System [Considers] to Be the Extent of What Is to Be Refuted[446]

4.2.3.1.3.1. Explaining in a General Way the Layout of What Is to Be Refuted [131]

In general there are two [kinds of] objects to be refuted, the "soteriological object of refutation" (*lam gyi dgag bya*) and the "logical object of the refutation" (*rigs pa'i dgag bya*). The former is of two kinds, the obscurations that are afflictions (*nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa*) and the obscurations [that prohibit knowledge of all] phenomena (*shes bya'i sgrib pa*). To say that there is a way of ending (*'gog*) [these obscurations] by the path does not mean that we

repudiate (*'gog*) their existence in fact, [as in general they do exist within the minds of beings until they are uprooted]. [Here] to "end" them means to make their further arising in one's mental continuum an impossibility. In this case, [that is, in the case of the obscurations,] the object that is to be refuted is something that in general must be possible. In fact, were it not possible, then it would not be necessary to meditate on the path.

The logical object of refutation [or the object to be refuted by reasoning] is not an object to be refuted by the analytical reasoning engaged in nominal analysis. It is identified instead as the object to be refuted by the reasoning that analyzes the ultimate. In this regard both (1) the mistaken conception (*log rtog*) that mistakenly reifies the nature of phenomena [into something it is not] and (2) the way in which that mistaken conception [takes things] to exist, [that is, true existence,] are objects to be refuted. As it says in the *Vigrahavyāvartanīvṛtti:*

> Some men may mistakenly grasp an illusory woman that is essentially empty and think, "this woman exists ultimately," so that attachment arises due to this mistaken apprehension. The Tathāgata or one of his *śrāvakas* will do away with this man's mistaken apprehension by evoking an illusory body. Likewise, by means of my empty words, which are like an illusory manifestation, one can do away with any apprehension of the existence of essence, [so that one comes to see] all things to be empty and without essence, as is the illusory woman.[447]

Nonetheless, from among these two, [that is, from among the subjective aspect eliminated by means of the path and the objective one refuted by means of reasoning,] the chief thing to be refuted is the object (*yul*), [that is, the incorrect mode of existence,] and not the subject, [the mind grasping at this incorrect mode of existence,] for unless one undermines this mode of existence as it is grasped by mistaken conceptualization no other method brings an end [132]
to this mistaken conceptualization. Having witnessed the undermining of that [mode of existence], one ascertains that in fact [things] do not exist as they are apprehended by the mistaken conception; and by the force of constantly meditating on this, one is able to destroy from the root the very *seeds* of mistaken conceptions.

[Innate and Philosophical Misconceptions][448]

There are two kinds of mistaken conceptions: the philosophical (*kun brtags*) and the innate (*lhan skyes*). The philosophical [kind] refers to the philosopher's belief (*dam bcha' ba*) regarding the variety of ways in which things could inherently exist, arrived at through the invention (*sgro brtags*) of a host of reasons that [they claim] prove that things inherently exist. The innate kind is

something that has been part and parcel of every sentient being without distinction since beginningless time. It is that on account of which any phenomenon, when it becomes the object of our mind, is apprehended to be an object existing from its own side by a mind that arises from its own sphere, without our having to reflect on it.

Even though the apprehended object of those two minds [innate and philosophical] are both to be refuted, the chief one is the fact that [things] exist as they are apprehended by the *innate* mind. The refutation that [things] exist as they are apprehended by the philosophical [mind] is a stepping stone (*yan lag*) to the refutation [of the innate object], but to strive to refute only the philosophical [aspect] without making the least effort at refuting [the fact that things] exist as they are apprehended by the innate [mind] is an enterprise that cannot possibly liberate one from cyclic existence. The reason is as follows. When one studies and thinks [about emptiness] and sets forth the view [of emptiness] through reasoning, one is refuting only existence as it is apprehended by a philosophical mind. Come time to meditate, one must meditate only on the refutation of existence as it has been apprehended by the philosophical [mind, for this is all one has learned]. But even though one might very well meditate in this way to the point of directly realizing the refutation of existence as it is apprehended by the philosophical [mind], one will not be able to make the innate [form of misconception], still actually present, subside in the least. This being the case, what need is there to mention that one will not be able to rid oneself of the latent potentialities which are the foundation that give rise to such innate misconceptions? Were it otherwise, it would fol- [133]
low, absurdly, that by merely accustoming oneself to the direct understanding of the fact that elementary point particles (*rdul phren phyogs kyi cha med*) are impossible, [a philosophical misconception,] one should be able to rid oneself of the innate latent potentialities [that give rise to] the apprehension of physical matter as something true.[449]

It is for this reason that the Acārya [Candrakīrti] has said in the *Avatāra* that in setting forth the selflessness of the person,[450] it is not correct to refute *only* [the existence of] a person who is permanent (*rtag pa*), unitary (gcig), and independent (*rang dbang can*). As for the reason why it is not correct, [that is, not sufficient to refute the existence of a person with these three qualities and consider it to be the selflessness of the person, it is as follows]. It would follow, absurdly, that a *śrāvaka arhant* has not fully rid himself of the view [which apprehends] a self of persons because (1) [according to you] what it means for that *arhant* to have perfected his understanding of the selflessness of the person is his merely having perfected his understanding of the fact that there is no permanent, unitary, and independent person; and (2) this understanding alone cannot fully rid him of the innate view that the self of the person [exists]. The latter of the two reasons follows because none of those who have without interruption taken rebirth as animals for many eons possess a mode of apprehending (*'dzin stangs*) a permanent, unitary, and independent

person,[451] although they do possess the innate mode that apprehends [the existence] of a self of the person.

[Opponent:] Even though [psychologically] the innate mode of apprehending a self of the person does not contain an apprehension of the person as permanent, unitary, and independent, still, if [the person] were to exist as he or she is apprehended by that innate [mind], [simply as a logical corollary,] he or she would have to *be* permanent, unitary, and independent. For this reason, by merely accustoming oneself to the understanding that there is no permanent, unitary, and independent person, one rids oneself fully of the innate apprehension of a self of the person.

[Reply:] Well then, it follows, absurdly, that it is possible to fully rid oneself of the innate apprehension of [things as] truly existent (*bden 'dzin*) simply by understanding that entities are impermanent and meditating on *that,* for if entities existed as they are apprehended by the innate [mind] that apprehends [things as] true, they would have to be permanent.[452] Part (1) of the original reason is accepted by the realists. They believe that the refutation of a [134] permanent, unitary, and independent person is the *only* meaning of the selflessness of the person. Hence, not only *must* they [according to us] believe that accustoming oneself to this very understanding, [that is, to the understanding that there is no permanent, unitary, and independent person,] fully rids one of the innate apprehension of the self of the person, but, in fact, they accept this *themselves.* That is why we find passages such as this in the *Avatāra:*

> At the time of realizing selflessness, the notion of a permanent self is eliminated;
> But in this regard we do not in the least regard [the apprehension of the self to be permanent] as the apprehension of an ego (*ngar 'dzin*).
> Hence, it is quite surprising that you should claim that understanding such [a naive kind of] selflessness
> Can subsequently destroy the view of a self.
>
> It is just like the case of seeing a snake along the far wall of one's house
> [And then claiming] that [to think to oneself] that there is no elephant there
> Clears away doubt and even rids one of the fear of the snake.
> Alas! This will be sure to bring about the laughter of others.[453]

This passage from the *Avatāra* and also:

> Those who spend many eons as animals
> Do not perceive [the self] to be unborn and permanent.[454]

all point to the fact that there are some Buddhists who accept that the apprehension of a permanent, unitary, and independent person *is* the innate view

(*lta ba*) of the self of the person, whereas others accept that though this [itself] is a philosophical [view], one can rid oneself of even the innate view of a self of the person simply by perfecting one's understanding [of the fact that the person] does not exist as it is apprehended by that [philosophical mind]. [To counteract these two misconceptions he teaches], respectively, that (1) the innate mode of apprehension has no such [philosophical aspect], and that (2) there is a fault [in as much as their position] resembles the view that [perceiving] the absence of an elephant eliminates the fear of the snake. [Let me make it clear,] however, that neither the root text nor the commentary to the *Avatāra* at all imply that refuting the philosophical self does not *aid* in the refutation of the innate self. So it is not right [to claim] that Candrakīrti believes this, [that is, that the repudiation of the philosophical object is totally unrelated to the elimination of innate ignorance].

This being the case, the claim that those scriptures suffer from the fault that their refutation of arising via the four extremes does not refute true arising[455] is expounded without [these opponents] in the least understanding [135]
what it is that the Mahāyāna accepts. By urging this absurdity that is unrelated to what is accepted, this fool is making his own nature [as an incompetent] clearly known. Those who imitate these [fools do so] simply because they have come under the influence of these sinful friends devoid of intelligence.

This fault that you mention, namely, that [the refutation of a permanent, unitary, and independent person] is similar to the refutation via the four extremes, [so that if the former is but a mere refutation of a philosophical attitude, then so is the latter,] falls squarely upon yourself, not on us. Because you believe in refuting the scriptures of Candra, not only *must* you, but in fact you *do* [willingly], accept that the mere understanding of the nonexistence of a permanent, unitary, and independent person is the complete understanding of the selflessness of the person. This is because in your writings you yourself have expressed the view that if one refutes the three [qualities] of permanence, unitarity and independence as they are apprehended by the philosophical [mind], one refutes the more general notion (*spyi ldog nas*) of the self that is reified (*btags*) by the innate [mind] by means of refuting the characteristics (*mtshan nyid*) of the self reified by the innate [mind]. You also claim that if one repudiates permanence, unitarity, and independence, one refutes the general characteristics of the self, and that, whether one is proving or refuting the existence or nonexistence of a self, one can do so only before a philosopher and not with reference to someone who has no experience (*blo kha ma phyogs pa*) in philosophy, for those who accept a permanent, unitary, and independent self accept that the three qualities of permanence, unitarity, and independence are characteristics of the self.[456]

If this were so, it would follow, absurdly, that if one ascertains that there is no arising from self, then one must ascertain that there is no arising, for [according to you] (1) the refutation or proof of the existence or nonexistence

of arising is done with reference to a philosopher and not with reference to someone unexperienced in philosophy, and (2) those who accept arising from self accept that self-arising is a kind of arising. You accept all the pervasions (*khyab pa*) and reasons (*rtags*). If you accept [the premise, that is, that to ascertain that there is no arising from self is to ascertain that there is no arising,] then it follows, absurdly, that all of the realists, [who do in fact refute the Sāṃkhya notion of arising from self,] ascertain that there is no arising, [which [136] is absurd, as they accept true causality].

Again, it follows, absurdly, [from your position] that by merely ascertaining the nonexistence of self-arising one would ascertain full-blown truthlessness,[457] for (1) by merely ascertaining that there is no permanent, unitary, and independent person, one fully ascertains the selflessness of the person, and just as the apprehension of [something] arising from itself is a philosophical reification of a phenomenon, likewise, the apprehension of a permanent, unitary, and independent person is a philosophical viewpont in regard to the self of the person;[458] (2) just as there is a philosophical reification of phenomena apart from the apprehension of self-arising, likewise, there is also a philosophical viewpoint that [accepts the existence] of the self of the person [while] not being an apprehension of the permanence, unitarity, and independence of the person;[459] and (3) just as the existence [of the self as it is] grasped by the innate apprehension of the self of the person implies the existence of a permanent, unitary, and independent self, likewise, if things existed as they are grasped by the innate apprehension of truth, then they would also have to arise from their own selves.[460] The middle reason (2) follows because there exists a philosophical viewpoint [which maintains that there exists] a self that cannot be expressed to be either permanent or impermanent.[461] Therefore, these two positions [that the repudiation of a permanent, unitary, and independent self is equivalent to the understanding of selflessness, and that the repudiation of arising from self is equivalent to the understanding of the selflessness of phenomena or truthlessness] are in every respect alike, [so that if one accepts the former, as you do, one must also accept the latter]. The refutation or affirmation of the existence or nonexistence of a self is not carried out for or by one who is not experienced in philosophy; hence, it is mere blithering to say that by merely refuting philosophical [misapprehension], something that is lacking in the way in which the innate misapprehension of the self within the mental continua of animals operates, one opposes the innate [form of misapprehension]. When those who believe in the philosophical position that advocates that the person is permanent, unitary, and independent set forth their own position, they come to apprehend the person as permanent, unitary, and independent only after having mentally created [this position] by means of philosophical [speculation]. Even when the ordinary mind is not involved in speculation, however, the thought "I" still occurs in such a way that [137] it is apprehended as existing from its own side (*rang ngos nas grub pa*). At

such a time, how [can it be claimed] that the "I" is being apprehended by an advocate of a philosophical school who thinks of it as permanent, unitary, and independent.

The apprehension of the "I" when such an ordinary mind, even that of a philosopher, is not engaged in philosophical analysis is said to be the innate apprehension of the "I." There is not the slightest difference between this kind of [mind in a philosopher] and the way that the "I" is innately apprehended in the continuum of an animal. Hence, were the philosopher's innate apprehension of the "I" to contain the special mode in which it is [apprehended] as being permanent, unitary, and independent, then this would lead to the absurdity that the innate apprehension of the "I" by animals who have been continuously reborn throughout many eons *as* animals also contains this special apprehension [of the "I"] as a permanent, unitary, and independent entity.

Likewise, even those who accept arising from self and arising from another, and so forth, are not always engaged in philosophical analysis. Still, even when they are eating and drinking, they grasp whatever entity becomes the object of this mind, which, although free of philosophical analysis, grasps [things] to be true, and then apprehends that object as if it existed under its own power. How can one say that [at such a time] there is an apprehension of the sort "this entity arises from another."[462] It was with the intention of repudiating that arising from another exists in the way that the worldly innate mind apprehends it that the glorious Candrakīrti says: "Even from the worldly point of view there is no arising from another."[463]

Therefore, as regards those who engage in philosophical [speculation], there is one mode of mental apprehension that creates philosophical positions at the time that it engages in philosophical analysis, and another, the mode of apprehension of their ordinary mind (*blo rang dga' ba*), that is, the mind when it is not actually engaged in philosophical analysis. That this latter kind of mind [even in a philosopher] is in no way different from the mode of mental [138]
apprehension of those who do not engage in philosophy is something that can be established by means of one's own experience. You, however, idiot that you are, think that *any* conceptual thought in the mental continuum of a philosopher *must* apprehend things as they are set forth in that person's own set of philosophical positions. How can you be said to have understood even the smallest portion of the exposition of the distinctions [between innate and philosophical misconceptions]?

Therefore, let the wise understand [this distinction] in the following way. The consciousness that ascertains that entities do not truly arise is born in dependence upon the precondition (*byed las*) of ascertaining that entities do not arise via any of the four extremes and upon the precondition of ascertaining that if something truly arises, it must be included within the four extremes. Although ascertaining that things do not truly arise opposes (*'gal*) a mode of apprehension in which the innate mind apprehends [things to be] true, the

apprehension that things do not arise from themselves, from others, and so on, which is that in dependence upon which that [apprehension of the truthlessness of arising] is born, does not go against a mode of apprehension in which the innate mind apprehends [things] to be true.[464] This is why meditation on the fact that entities do not truly arise acts as the direct antidote to the innate apprehension of true existence, and why meditation on the fact that [entities] do not arise from another and so on does not. Likewise, the mind which ascertains that the person does not inherently exist is born in dependence upon the understanding that the person is not permanent, unitary, or independent, [and upon the understanding] that the person is neither the same substance as nor a different substance from the aggregates and so forth. Although accustoming oneself to that mind [which ascertains that the person does not inherently exist] is the antidote that goes against the innate mode that apprehends the self of the person, however, the ascertainment that the person is not of the same substance as the aggregates, not of a different substance from them, and so forth, which are [the stepping stones] based upon which that mind [which ascertains the selflessness of the person] arises, are not antidotes that go against the innate mode of apprehension that views the self (*bdag lta*).

For example, the ascertainment that sound is impermanent arises from the [139] ascertainment that sound is a product.[465] Although the ascertainment that sound is impermanent is the antidote that goes against the mode that apprehends sound as permanent, however, the ascertainment that sound is a product is not the antidote which directly goes against the mode that apprehends sound as permanent.

Therefore, what the glorious Candrakīrti has refuted is the fact that the ascertainment that [things] do not exist as they are apprehended by philosophical self-grasping (*bdag 'dzin*) is the antidote against the mode of innate self-grasping. The glorious Candra has on no occasion claimed that the refutation of the philosophical self is not a stepping stone to the refutation of the innate self. Neither has our glorious and holy master made such a claim, for the Lord [Tsong kha pa] has himself said in *The Great Exposition of Insight* (*Lhag mthong gi yi ge chen mo*):

> Thus, when one is setting forth the view [of emptiness], one must chiefly set forth the fact that objects as they are apprehended by innate ignorance do not exist. Yet, as a stepping stone to that, unless one understands the repudiation of objects as they are apprehended by the philosophical [mind], it is impossible to eradicate the mode of apprehension of innate ignorance. To think that the refutation of the self of the person is a refutation of the self of a person who is permanent, unitary, and independent, or that the refutation of the self within phenomena is the refutation of the inventions of philosophers, like partless atom qua object, partless moment of consciousness qua sub-

> ject, or an essence that possesses the three qualities. . . [to think that the refutation of the self of the person or of phenomena consists solely in the repudiation of these strictly philosophical entities] is utterly misguided.[466]

Thus, he explicitly states that the refutation of the philosophical [object] is a stepping stone to the refutation of the innate one. Therefore, do not urge on us absurdities [that are the outcome of premises] we never accepted, like the fact that the refutation of the philosophical does not *aid* in the refutation of the innate.

Therefore, unless one meditates on the antidote that counteracts the innate [140]
mode of apprehension that grasps at a self, under whose power we have been bound to cyclic existence since beginningless time, one will not be able in the least to oppose this mode of apprehension. Hence, to set forth only the refutation of an object invented by philosophers and then to meditate *only on this* is to subject oneself to purposeless hardship.

One Tibetan idiot, although accepting that we wander in cyclic existence because we err in regard to the conventional, refutes the notion that one is to meditate on the fact that, contrary to the way it appears, the conventional is empty of truth. He believes, instead, that by meditating on the fact that the ultimate truth is permanent and stable (*rtag brten*) one is liberated from cyclic existence.[467] This, however, is like saying that to eliminate the suffering of fear [that arises] from thinking that there is a snake in the east, even though there is none, one should not think that there is no snake in the eastern direction, but that instead by thinking that there is a tree in the western direction, that the suffering will be eliminated. This [latter thought] is unrelated [to the fear], and [the claim that it can eliminate it] is a source of laughter for the sage. Those who desire the best for themselves will banish to a far off place this view, which falls outside of any system, both *Mahāyāna* and *Hīnayāna*.

In this way [we see] that from among the philosophical and innate forms of reification, it is the fact that things exist as they are apprehended by the innate [mind] that one should principally refute.

The Doctrines of the Svātantrika School[468]

[THE LOGIC OF THE SVĀTANTRIKA CRITIQUE]

4.2.3.1.3.2. The Explanation of the Measure of the Svātantrikas' Object of Refutation[469]

If one does not understand the differences between the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamikas as regards the extent of the refutation, one will not be able to understand in the least the differences between the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika views. Therefore, I will first of all explain in brief the measure or extent of the objects of refutation of the Prāsaṅgikas and the Svātantrikas.

[The Analysis of the Svātantrikas' Object of Refutation Based on the Example of the Illusion]

In the exposition of the Madhyamaka view it is well known that all phenomena are to be ascertained as lacking truth by depending on the example of the illusion (*sgyu ma*), so let me here explain this point by using the example of the illusion.

When a magician conjures up a horse or an elephant out of stones and [141]
sticks, which are the things that act as the basis of his conjuring (*sprul gzhi*), [different people are affected in different ways]. Three [types of individuals are to be considered]: (1) the magician, (2) the spectators whose eyes are affected by the spells (*sngags*) and substances (*rdzas*) of the illusion, and (3) the person who arrives there after [the incantations have been performed]. Although the horse and the elephant appear to the first individual, [the magician,] he does not *conceive* of them as a horse and an elephant. The second individual has both the appearance and the conception [of a horse or elephant]; whereas the third individual has neither the appearance nor the conception.

In this regard, it is not correct to maintain that the basis of the conjuring of the illusion appears to be a horse or an elephant to an erroneous consciousness but does not appear to be a horse or an elephant in general. This is be-

cause were it otherwise, it would follow, absurdly, that there could be no error in regard to the appearing object (*snang yul la 'khrul pa*).[470]

Thus, although the basis of the conjuring of the illusion appears to be a horse or an elephant from the magician's perspective, the basis of the conjuring of the illusion does not appear [to him] as a horse or an elephant *under the sole influence of the object's own reality* (*sdod lugs*), depending also on a mind that has been affected by spells and substances, [namely, his own]. From the perspective of the spectator whose eyes have been affected by spells and substances, the object exists as a horse or an elephant in its own right without being something that is posited by the mind internally.

Now let us draw the analogy between the example and its meaning. Just like the spectator of the illusion whose eyes have been affected, when phenomena appear to common ordinary beings as existing, they are apprehended as existing in their own right (*sdod lugs su yod pa*), without being posited by virtue of the fact that they appear to the mind. This is called the *innate apprehension of true* [*existence*] and it has been present since beginningless time. Yet, in comparison to what it is that the Prāsaṅgikas consider the object to be refuted, what the Svātantrika here posit is much more crude (*shin tu rag pa*). It is not the subtle innate apprehension of true [existence].

When one finds the correct philosophical viewpoint (*lta ba*), which is the [142]
logical refutation of the true existence that is grasped by the innate apprehension of true [existence], then, like the magician, one no longer apprehends either outer or inner phenomena, [that is, external things or the mind,] to exist in their own right without being posited[471] by the power of the mind internally; one comes to understand that in reality they are posited by the power of the mind.

Those things posited by the power of a mind that is not opposed by a valid cognition are accepted as nominally existent [entities]. Not everything posited by the power of *any* mind is accepted as being nominally existent. Even though the fact that the sprout arises from the seed is established by the power of the mind, this does not vitiate against the fact that the sprout, from its own side (*rang gi ngos nas*),[472] arises from the seed. This is similar to the fact that [within the example] the basis of the illusion appears from its own nature to be a horse or an elephant.[473]

Reality is also posited as existing by the power of the mind to which it appears, but although reality is posited as existing because it appears to the gnosis that perceives [things] the way they are, the gnosis that perceives [things] as they are does not [itself] posit reality as existing.[474] It is instead posited as existing by a different, nominal mind that [thinks] "reality exists by virtue of the fact that it appears to the gnosis of an *āryan*."

Just as other people, whose eyes have not been affected, have neither the appearance nor the conception of a horse or an elephant, likewise, the gnosis of an *āryan*, which is unaffected by ignorance and perceives [things] as they

are, does not contain even the appearance of those conventional objects in regard to which it understands reality. How could it possibly be said to apprehend that things really exist without their being posited by the mind?[475]

Such is the method for interpreting the analogy between the fact that all phenomena are illusions and the example.

[Opponent:] Though the illusion appears as a horse or an elephant, it is empty of being a horse or an elephant. Likewise, though the pot appears to be a pot, it is empty of being a pot. This is what it means for things to be like illusions. That example is to be taken as meaning that things are empty of [being] themselves (*rang stong*).

[Reply:] [Though this is their basic view], some [of the opponents] claim that *all* phenomena are empty of being themselves, whereas others claim that [only] conventional, produced things (*'du byed*) are empty of being themselves. Both of these [positions] are highly nihilistic views. Were it so, it **[143]** would follow, absurdly, that no phenomenon could be itself, and if you accept that, no phenomenon would be possible. The same would be true in regard to produced things [if it were the case that only *they* were claimed to be empty of being themselves]. Also, it would follow, absurdly, that the "emptiness of being itself" could not be itself because it is empty of being itself. You have accepted the three cycles!

Therefore, in the Svātantrika system sprouts and so on are both really existent in their own right (*yul rang gi sdod lugs su grub pa*) and dependent upon being mentally posited. [That something] really exists in its own right, without it being posited by the power of the mind, is the final object their reasoning refutes.

[The Analysis of the Svātantrikas' Object of Refutation Based on Scriptural Sources][476]

In this regard the *Madhyamakāloka* clearly and explicitly explains how it is that [things] are to be posited as conventionally existing. If we reverse this, we implicitly determine what [it means for something] to truly exist. Hence, [as true existence is what is to be refuted], we can [in this way] determine the size of the object of refutation [according to the Svātantrika system]. The *Āloka* says:

> Things are really (*yang dag par*) natureless (*ngo bo nyid med par*); and the erroneous (*'khrul pa*) mind that reifies [things by thinking] the opposite of that, [that is, that things *do* have real natures,] is called the *conventional (kun rdzob)* [lit. the concealer] because it is as if it obscured (*bsgrib pa*) reality (*de kho na nyid,*) as if it covered it over (*'gebs pa*). As the [*Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*] says:

> Conventionally things arise
> But ultimately they are essenceless.
> That which is mistaken as to this essencelessness
> Is accepted as being a concealer of the truth (*yang dag kun rdzob*).[477]

> Because it arises from this conventional [mind], what this reveals are perceived things, being all false, and belonging only to the conventional [sphere]. What is more, these arise by virtue of the ripening of the latent potentialities (*bag chags*) of error that [have been deposited on one's mental continuum] since beginningless time. That [mind] reveals things to all living beings as if they were real in nature. Therefore, things that are false in their nature, that [are posited] by virtue [144] of these [mistaken] thoughts, are said to exist only conventionally (*kun rdzob tu yod pa kho na*).[478]

This is saying that things exist by virtue of thought, and that the fact that things appear to all beings to exist as if they were real in nature, and *not* as if they existed by virtue of thought, is due to the ignorance which is the ripening of the latent potentialities of error that [have been deposited in the mind] since beginningless time.

[Opponent:] But the *Madhyamakāloka* also says: "To say that ultimately there is no arising is to be explained [as meaning] that things are not [perceived] to arise by a correct (*yang dag pa'i*) consciousness."[479] So should you not be explaining the measure of, [that is, what it means for something to have,] true existence [in terms of whether the thing] is established as existing by means of the knowledge (*rig shes*)[480] that perceives reality?

[Reply:] It is extremely important to realize that in the context of both the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika [systems] there are two interpretations of [the word] *ultimate* in the expression *ultimately nonexistent* (*don dam par med pa*). In one interpretation, [conventional things] are said to be "ultimately nonexistent" [or "nonexistent within the ultimate"] because [here] *ultimate* refers to the threefold study-contemplative-meditative knowledge[481] that analyzes reality; and conventional things do not exist within the purview (*ngor*), [that is, as the objects,] of that [knowledge]. In the second interpretation truth is called *ultimate*. Hence, what does not truly exist is called *ultimately nonexistent*.

According to the first interpretation it is possible for something to be ultimate; that is, something, [namely, emptiness,] can exist within the purview of that knowledge.[482] According to the second interpretation it is impossible for anything to be "ultimate" or to "exist in that ultimate [way]" according to either [the Prāsaṅgika or the Svātantrika systems].

If something truly exists, it must exist within the purview of the knowledge that analyzes reality because if something truly exists it must *be* reality

(*gnas lugs su grub*) [lit. it must exist as or in reality]. Though something be reality, however, it need not be truly existent. Hence, even though something exists within the purview of the knowledge that analyzes reality, it need not truly exist. Therefore, taking that knowledge as "the ultimate," because the [145] sprout does not exist within the purview of that knowledge, the sprout can be posited as not ultimately existing, but although reality *does* exist within the purview of that knowledge, one cannot posit reality as ultimately existing, for a sprout's not being the object of that knowledge implies that it is not[483] reality, and if it is not reality, it cannot truly exist; but as reality (*chos nyid*) *is* the object of that knowledge, it ends up being reality (*gnas lugs su grub par song,*) although simply because it is reality does not imply that it must truly exist.

Without making these kinds of distinctions, some have fallen into such errors as believing that the measure of that which is to be refuted (*dgag bya'i tshad*) [is determined by whether something] "can withstand analysis by reasoning" (*rigs pas dpyad bzod*). They do not distinguish between something "withstanding the analysis by reasoning that examines reality" and something "being established by reasoning." Hence, the sages of old, like the translator rNgog (1059–1109 C.E.),[484] believe that the ultimate truth is not a knowable phenomenon (*shes bya*), whereas others, like Cha pa (1109–1169 C.E.),[485] assert that the "absence of true existence" truly exists. Yes, errors as huge as these *have* arisen.[486]

[The Correct Identification of the Svātantrikas' Object of Refutation]

Now I will explain what kind of "existence by virtue of own characteristic" the Svātantrikas accept on the nominal level.[487] It is quite clear that the Acārya Bhāvaviveka accepts that nominally things exist by virtue of their own characteristic, for he refutes the Vijñāna [vādins'] claim that the fact that imputed entities (*kun brtags*) do not exist by virtue of their own characteristic is the meaning of the *Saṃdhinirmocana* [passage that states that] imputed entities are characteristically natureless (*mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa*), that dependent entities (*gzhan dbang*) are causally natureless (*skye ba no bo nyid med pa*), and that reality (*yongs grub*) is ultimately natureless (*don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa*).[488] In [refuting this claim] he analyzes [the situation and determines] that imputed entities are of two types, those that do the labeling (*'dogs byed*) and those that are labeled by them, [that is, by those that label] (*des btags pa*). He explains that to accept that the word or conceptual thought, [146] which is what predicates, does not exist by virtue of its own characteristic is

nihilism (*skur 'debs*). His *Prajñāpradīpa*, commenting on the twenty-fifth chapter of the *Prajñāmūla*, says: "In regard to that, to say that mentally labeling *form* or labeling it in speech, which are imputed entities by nature, do not exist is nihilism because it is the repudiation of mental and vocal labeling."[489] In his commentary to this Avalokitavrata says:

> The Yogācāras say that what is imputed in nature is natureless in so far as it is characteristically natureless. To claim that the specific (*khyad par du*) or essential (*ngo bo*) labelings [of the word] *form* in the mind, that is, in conceptual thought, or its labeling in speech, [in short, to claim that] all that is of the nature of verbal labeling is natureless in so far as it is characteristically natureless, is to repudiate [the existence of] conventional dependent entities. Hence, it is taught to be incorrect.[490]

This therefore clearly explains that conventionally things *do* have characteristic natures.

What is more, if in Bhāvaviveka's system there were a belief that [even] nominally things do not exist by virtue of their own characteristic, that they are essenceless and do not exist by virtue of their own natures (*rang gi ngo bos ma grub pa*), [as the Prāsaṅgikas maintain,] then they would also have to accept that even nominally things do not substantially exist. This is because (1) otherwise, it would follow, absurdly, that substantially existing phenomena (*rdzas yod*) and labeled phenomena (*btags yod*) would not be mutually exclusive [categories][491] and because (2) there is no philosopher, Buddhist or otherwise, who accepts that a substantially existing phenomenon is essenceless.

Bhāvaviveka does not accept that things do not substantially exist, [that is, he accepts that they *do* substantially exist,] for he says in his *Tarkajvalā:* [147]

> No syllogism can be valid when one takes matter qua accumulation of appropriate (*rigs mthun*) atoms (*rdul phra rab*) as the predicate [of the syllogism] and then [proves it by means of] the reason that [such matter] does not substantially exist. But such a syllogism is in no way valid. How so? It is as follows. It is accepted that an object, by nature, is the joining together, that is, the accumulation, of appropriate atoms into [a whole]; and [this is confirmed by the fact that] in the mind to which the [gross object] appears there is born this aspect, namely, that [the object] is the accumulation of atoms.
>
> *We* believe that pots and so forth, which are the accumulation of appropriate atoms, and even atoms themselves are conventionally substances. It is because an atom is by nature composed of eight substances [earth, air, fire, and so on] that we accept these [atoms] themselves as substances. Likewise, pots and so forth, which are by nature composed [of those substantial atoms], are themselves substances.[492]

Therefore, it is because the Acārya Candrakīrti does not accept that things exist by virtue of their own characteristic, that they exist by virtue of their own nature even nominally, that he says that one should strike out against the fact that causality substantially exists in his commentary to the stanza:

> In this context, the logic [which proves]
> [That things do not arise from themselves or others,
> That (same) logic invalidates (these forms of causality) even nominally . . .][493]

I will explain later in a very elaborate way how it is that [Candrakīrti] refutes [that things] substantially exist even nominally.

Bhāvaviveka has said that direct perceptual consciousness (*mngon sum gyi shes pa*) perceives the thing's own characteristic, and that it is devoid of conceptual thought and the misconception to which it leads.[494] Here he is saying that a thing's own characteristic appears to direct perception. He has explained over and over again that direct perceptual valid cognitions are nonerroneous (*ma 'khrul pa'i*) consciousnesses. Hence, it is self-evident that he accepts that nominally things exist by virtue of their own characteristic.

The Acārya Kamalaśīla [another Svātantrika] also accepts that nominally things exist by virtue of their own characteristic, for when he explains the meaning of the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* [he says] that the fact that the depen- [148]
dent has an ultimate nature is an imputed entity and hence is ultimately natureless, but that as nominally the dependent possesses its own characteristic, this eliminates [the possibility of his interpretation being] nihilistic. [In this way] he interprets the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*. He also explains at great length in his *Madhyamakāloka* that the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* correctly sets forth that the extensive, intermediate, and brief *Mother,* [that is, the *Perfection of Wisdom,*] *Sūtras* are of definitive meaning. This he does by interpreting such expressions as *the nonarising of all phenomena* in the extensive, intermediate, and brief *Mothers* as expressions that cannot be taken literally, instead referring to "*ultimate* nonarising." Because the passage from this source, [that is, from the *Madhyamakāloka,*] is extensive, I will not quote it here.[495]

In addition to this, it is certain that Śāntarakṣita, the father, and his son [Kamalaśīla] accept that things exist by virtue of their own characteristic because they explain in the *Mahāpramāṇa*[496] and in the *Madhyamakāloka* that most of the reasoning[497] used in the Seven Logical Treatises [of Dharmakīrti] is something held in common by Mādhyamikas and Cittamātrins.

The Acārya Jñānagarbha [another Svātantrika] also has this to say in his *Satyadvaya:*

> Every entity (*dngos po*) down to the last has the ability to perform a function in accordance with the way it appears. One should understand the correct conventional truth (*yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi*

> ***bden pa*)** to be that which arises in dependence on causes and conditions. Which is to say that one should know that whatever object appears to [arise] from causes in accordance with how it appears to the consciousness of the infantile on up, *that* is said to be the correct conventional because entities exist in accordance with the way they appear to consciousness.[498]

Because it is self-evident that form appears to the eye consciousness as if it existed in its own right or from its own side, what Mahāyānist would deny [the existence of] this mode of appearance? Because [Jñānagarbha] explains that [149]
entities exist in accordance with the way they appear to such a mode of direct perceptual appearance, and because he explains that entities can perform a function in accordance with the way they appear, it is quite clear that he accepts that entities do not function solely by virtue of their being labeled by the mind[499] [in a certain way], but that they function by virtue of the object's own nature. Therefore, when they explain that entities are natureless, it should be taken in the context of referring to an ultimate [nature, and should not be taken as denying that things exist from their own side].

Realists accept that a thing's own characteristic is ultimate, and because Acārya [Jñānagarbha] accepts that the existence of a thing by virtue of its own characteristic is conventional, he explains that what the realists accept as ultimate, the Mādhyamikas accept as conventional, for he says in the *Satyadvaya*:

> What some accept as being ultimate, others accept as being only correct. Such is the only valid interpretation of the words of this *sūtra*. Hence, I explain
>
> What some take as ultimate
> Others take as conventional.
> What someone believes to be his mother
> Someone else believes to be his wife.[500]

The words *only correct (yang dag pa kho nar)* refer to "only correct conventional entities" *(yang dag kun rdzob kho nar)*.[501] As explained earlier, because Candrakīrti does not accept that [things] exist by virtue of their own characteristic even nominally, he refutes the notion that the ultimate of the realists is the conventional of the Mādhyamikas.[502]

Again, the *Satyadvaya* says:

> Although similar in appearance,
> [Things] are divided into conventional entities
> That are correct and incorrect
> Depending upon whether or not they have the ability to function.[503]

And in the *Vṛtti* he says:

> Although similar in that they appear to consciousness in a clear way
> (*gsal ba'i rnam pa,*) one comes to understand that things like water [150
> are correct and that things like mirages are not correct by ascertaining
> that one is not in error as regards [the capacity of the former] to function
> in accordance with the way it appears, and that one *is* in error [as
> regards the latter's capacity to so function]. Both really,[504] [however,]
> have the same nature in so far as they are both natureless.[505]

The word *really (dngos su)* means "ultimately," and hence, although similar in that they are both ultimately natureless, conventionally there is a difference as regards whether they are of a mistaken or nonmistaken nature. In this way he very clearly distinguishes between correct and incorrect [conventional entities]. It should be very clearly evident that because all Svātantrika Mādhyamikas accept [that there are] correct conventional entities, they accept that nominally things exist by virtue of their own characteristic and by virtue of their own nature. How so? Because the *incorrect* in the expression *incorrect conventional entity* refers to the erroneous (*phyin ci log*); vice versa, *correct* must refer to the *nonerroneous*. Hence, because the conventional is divided into correct and incorrect, the conventional is also said to be twofold, either erroneous or nonerroneous. Now if one accepts that *all* conventional [entities] have not the slightest semblance of existence from their own side [as the Prāsaṅgikas do], one cannot escape accepting that they are solely conceptual labels (*rtogs btags 'ba' zhig,*) but there is no one who has given any thought to logical methodology who believes [on the one hand that all] conventional entities resemble one another in being strictly conceptual labels [and on the other] that the erroneous-nonerroneous, or correct-incorrect distinction is a valid one.[506] Hence, in the very act of accepting correct conventional entities and substantially existent things, the advocate of these positions cannot escape accepting that nominally things exist by virtue of their own natures.

[The Reasoning of the One and the Many][507]

Having in this way finished explaining the object that the Svātantrika's reason- [151
ing refutes, I will now briefly mention the chief reasoning that the Svātantrikas themselves consider most important in the repudiation of that object.

The father, Śāntarakṣita, and his [spiritual] son, Kamalaśīla, explain with special emphasis the reasoning of "being devoid of being a unity or a plurality" (*gcig dang du bral*). They base their explanation on the *Pitāputrasamāgama Sūtra*, on the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, and on the line from Āryadeva that goes:

> There is no finger apart from the joints.[508]

Granted that [Kamalaśīla's] *Āloka* explains many other [types of] reasoning, yet it seems that among Tibetans this one is the most renowned. Hence, I will briefly mention [how] this reasoning is set forth.

I. Citing the reason

Subject: the person
Predicate: does not truly exist
Reason: because he or she is devoid of being a true unity or plurality.
Example: like the reflection of a thing that appears in the mirror.

II. How the criteria [for it's being a valid reason] are established[509]

II.A. The valid cognitions that establish the pervasion (*khyab pa*)

To ascertain that that reason (*rtags*) exists exclusively in things concordant [with the predicate] (*mthun phyogs*) and is strictly nonexistent in things discordant with it (*mi mthun phyogs*)[510] three valid cognitions are necessary.

1. A valid cognition that ascertains the absence of being a true unity or plurality.[511]
2. A valid cognition that ascertains that there can be no common locus (*gzhi mthun*) between, [that is, nothing that is both,] that reason and a thing discordant [with its predicate].[512]
3. A valid cognition that ascertains that true existence (*bden par yod pa*) and truthlessness (*bden par med pa*) are mutually exclusive (*dngos 'gal*).

By ascertaining that existence and nonexistence are mutually exclusive, that is, [by ascertaining] that through the elimination of one the other is affirmed, one does away with the reifying [misconception] (*sgro 'dogs*) that there could exist a third possibility besides *true* existence and nonexistence, and then it becomes possible to ascertain intuitively (*blo ka phyogs pa tsam*) that they are mutually exclusive.[513]

[Question:] True existence is devoid of being a true unity or a true plurality, so does not the reason coincide with something that is discordant [with the predicate]?[514]

[Answer:] For the reason to coincide with something that is discordant [152] [with the predicate] more than just this is required. For the reason to coincide with something that is discordant there must exist the possibility of a common locus (*gzhi mthun*) that is *both* the object to be refuted [true existence] and the reason ["the absence of being a true unity or plurality"].[515] Because there can be no common locus between true existence and the absence of being a true unity or plurality, there is no problem.

To ascertain by means of a valid cognition that a common locus between these two is impossible [the process is as follows]. The valid cognition which ascertains that unity and plurality are mutually exclusive, that is, that the elimination of one affirms the other, does away with the reifying [misconception] that a third possibility exists that is both [a unity and a plurality] or neither in

regard to just [unqualified] plain existence. [By means of *this*] one then does away with the reifying [misconception] that even in regard to *true* existence there might be a third possibility that is both [a true unity and plurality] or neither. Then one can intuitively ascertain that it is impossible for there to be a common locus between what is "devoid of being a true unity or plurality" and true existence.

II.B. Establishing [the relation] between subject and reason (*phyogs chos*)

II.B.1. Establishing [the subject] to be devoid of being a true unity

If something is a true unity, it must be partless. Hence, the refutation of partlessness does away with the notion of true unity.

II.B.1.a. The refutation of the partlessness of composite phenomena (*'du byed*)

One should refute the spatial partlessness of physical (*gzugs can*) composite things, and the temporal partlessness of the nonphysical.

In the first case,[516] it follows that two adjacent atoms (*rdul phren*) with no space between them (*bar med,*) which [you the opponent] accept as being partless, meet, [that is, touch,] because they are distinct physical entities that occupy their own positions and have no space between them. If you accept [that they meet], then do they meet everywhere, or do they meet only on one side? [153]
In the first case, it would follow, absurdly, that their spatial positions would be intermixed. If you accept *that,* then it follows, absurdly, that no matter how many atoms come together, the size of the composite would not increase. If they touch only on one side, and do not touch on the other, then it undermines the hypothesis that they are partless, [for they would have more than one side].

The refutation of the temporal partlessness of consciousness (*shes pa*) and so forth [is as follows].[517] You accept that the first and second moments of visual consciousness are direct cause (*dngos rgyu*) and direct effect (*dngos 'bras,*) respectively.[518] [Now are these two moments] interrupted or not interrupted by another moment? If they are, then it undermines the hypothesis that they are direct cause and effect. If they are not, then are they completely uninterrupted in all ways, or are they interrupted in one sense and not in another. If the former [is true], then temporal sequences would become all intermixed. If you accept *that,* then [you would also have to accept] that the effect existed at the time of the cause. If the latter [is true], then it undermines the hypothesis of partlessness.

II.B.1.b. The refutation of the partlessness of the noncomposite (*'du ma byed*)[519]

Does the part of space that extends throughout the empty inner cavity of a western pot also extend throughout the empty inner cavity of an eastern pot or not? If it does extend, then it would be no different from the empty inner cavity of the eastern pot. Were *that* so, when you pour water into the eastern pot, the western pot should fill up with water. If it does not extend, it undermines the hypothesis of space's being partless, for there would exist [at least

two] distinct parts, the space that extends throughout the empty cavity of the eastern and western pots, [respectively].

Likewise, this same reasoning easily establishes that even reality has parts. Is the part of reality that is the essence of a pillar also the essence of the pot or not? If it is, then the essence of a pillar and the essence of a pot would not be distinct, so that the pot and the pillar would become one. If it is not, then it undermines the hypothesis that reality is partless. [154]

And again, is the part of reality that is the object of Buddha's wisdom also the object of the Mahāyāna path of insight (*mthong lam*) or not? If it is, it would follow, absurdly, that the Mahāyāna path of insight directly perceives[520] the Buddha's essence body (*ngo bo nyid sku*) which possesses the two purities.[521] If you accept *that*, then it follows, absurdly, that all of the Lord Maitreyanātha's explanations of the different ways in which the gnoses of the ten [bodhisattva stages], free from adventitious defilements, perceive reality are incorrect.[522] If it is not, it undermines the hypothesis that reality is partless.

[Opponent:] There are no parts to the nature (*ngo bo*) of reality, though there do exist parts that can be distinguished depending on the basis (*rten*)[523] and so forth.

[Reply:] What does it mean to say that it has no essential parts? Does it refer to the lack of parts that exist by virtue of their own nature? Does it refer to the fact that the parts [or aspects] on the basis of which one posits something as being reality have no divisions that are different in kind? Or does it refer to the fact that if something is of the nature of reality, then it can have no distinctions?

In the first case, it follows, absurdly, that the nature of *all* phenomena is that they have no parts, [as no phenomenon can have parts that truly exist, so that not only emptiness, but *everything* would be partless in nature, thereby doing away with the distinction that you, the opponent, are trying to make].

In the second case, it follows, absurdly, that the nature of all phenomena is that they have no parts because the parts [or aspects] on the basis of which one posits [something] as being a phenomenon have no divisions that are different in kind, and this is because they are all identical in being able to be taken as objects of the mind.[524]

In the third case, it follows that the set of "the nonexistence of true arising (*bden pa'i skye ba med pa*) and the nonexistence of true cessation (*bden pa'i dgag pa med pa*)" does not have distinct parts because if something is of the nature of reality it cannot have distinct parts. If you accept [the premise], then it follows, absurdly, that nonarising and noncessation, [which are also permanent entities,] are also not distinct. If you accept *that*, if follows, absurdly, that nonentity (*dngos med*) and nonpot (*bum med*) are also not distinct and that all negations must, of necessity, be one.

Again, it follows that the truth of cessation (*'gog bden*) in the mental continuum of a *śrāvaka arhant* and the essence body [of a buddha] are not

different because [they are both forms of reality], and there are no divisions to [155]
the nature of reality. If you accept *that,* then it follows, absurdly, that all of the nihilistic forms of *nirvāṇa,* [that is, those of the Hīnayāna śrāvakas and *pratyekabuddhas,*] would be the nonabiding *nirvāṇas* [of buddhas].

It follows that the parts of the nature of reality which correspond to pillars are the parts which correspond to pots because the nature of reality corresponds to both pillars and pots and it has no parts. If you accept *that,* then it follows, absurdly, that pillars and pots are one.

These are just to exemplify [the arguments that can be used against this position]. If one becomes well versed in logic, then even in one's dreams, there will never be an occasion on which one will accept that reality is partless.

II.B.2. Establishing [the subject] to be devoid of being a true plurality
The person is not a true plurality because it is not a true unity. This follows because a plurality can be posited only as the accumulation of unities. So the reason is established as valid by the preceding refutation of partlessness.

In this way, if all phenomena have parts, it follows that each phenomenon must have parts and a whole. Though in general the parts and the whole are of the same nature, when they appear to the mind they appear to be of *different* natures. Such a discord between the way that things appear (*snang tshul*) and the way that they are (*gnas tshul*) makes them false phenomena (*chos rdzun pa*). If, however, [these phenomena] existed objectively (*yul kyi sdod lugs su*), without their being posited by virtue of their appearing to the mind, it would contradict this mode [of discord between appearance and reality], for *false* means that the mode of existence is one, whereas the mode of appearance is another, and if they truly existed, they would have to exist devoid of falsehood in *all* aspects.

If that which has parts truly existed, the mind to which the parts and the whole appeared to be of different natures would not be mistaken. If you accept [that it is *not* mistaken], then it follows, absurdly, that the pot and its spout [156]
and so on *are* of different natures, [just as they appear to be].

The same reasoning easily repudiates [the claim] that reality truly exists. Hence it is pointless [for me to say anymore], for [if despite my exposition] someone accepts reality as being truly existent, it will just be a sign of his being a fool who has acquainted his aural tract (*rna lam*) [and not his mind] in a merely superficial way with reasoning such as "the absence of being a unity or plurality."

[How the Example of the Reflection in the Mirror Is Understood][525]

As regards the analogy (*dper byed pa*) of the thing's reflection [in the mirror],[526] the reflection of the thing is not a concordant example (*mthun dpe*)

by reason of the fact that the realist [to whom the syllogism is presented] has already ascertained its truthlessness by means of a valid cognition, for if one has established the Madhyamaka view by means of a valid cognition in regard to one basis, [say a pot,] employing that same [cognition], one can intuit truthlessness in regard to all phenomena without having to depend on another [separate] valid cognition.[527]

[Question:] Well then, how *does* the concordant example work?

[Answer:] Whoever accepts that the sprout and so forth is true accepts that the sprout appears to be true and that it exists in accordance with this appearance. Now such a person, who has not understood the Madhyamaka view, has nonetheless realized that a thing's reflection is not true, [that is, that it is not] as it appears to be. The analogy works in this very way.

If, to understand how that [analogy functions] it is necessary for one to have already ascertained that the thing's reflection is not truly existent in the Madhyamaka sense [of the term], then one needs to have ascertained that that reflection is also not true. But no one, from the realists on down, have ascertained such truthlessness, [and as these must all be considered possible recipients of this reasoning, we are led to the conclusion that the analogy cannot possibly work in this way]. However, because all beings, from those experienced in terminology (*rda la byang ba*) on up, have ascertained that a reflection appears to be the reflected thing but is not truly the reflected thing, they have thus ascertained that the reflection of the thing is not truly as it appears to be. Because they do not, however, ascertain the fact that a sprout and a pot are not truly as they appear to be, there is therefore a great difference in the degrees of [157] difficulty in ascertaining the truthlessness of sprouts and so on and that of a reflection. Without understanding this, this fool, devoid of knowledge, appears to have a very difficult time with the establishment of the concordant example.

When one understands that the reflection is not truly as it appears to be, it is not necessary to ascertain that it is not truly as it appears to be *in regard to [the appearance of] true existence*, for were it necessary then one would not be able to posit the distinction between correct and incorrect [conventional entities] based on the world.[528] The reasoning from "being devoid of being a unity or plurality" is explained in [Kamalaśīla's] *Āloka* as a case of "nonperception of a more extensive category" (*khyab byed ma dmigs pa*).[529] Without a reifying misconception of the sort that a phenomenon x must be a true unity or a true plurality, there is no place for the reifying misconception of an object that is a third possibility [apart from unity and plurality], that is, of a true object. Hence, [this form of reasoning] establishes only the term (*tha snyad 'ba' zhig sgrub,*) and therefore "[reasons] that establish only the term" need not necessarily be "reasoning from the nonperception of essence" (*rang bzhin ma dmigs pa'i rtags*).[530]

[The Diamond-Granule Reasoning and the Question of the Qualification of the Object of Refutation][531]

Since the *Madhyamakāloka* and other Svātantrika texts, following such lines in the *Prajñāmūla* as "not from themselves, not from another," also explain the reasoning that refutes arising via the four extremes, known [under the name of] the *reasoning of the diamond-granule* (*rdo rje gzegs ma'i gtan tshigs*), I will explain briefly the uncommon Svātantrika [interpretation] of this [form of reasoning].

The Svātantrikas explain that the following syllogism is implied by the lines of the *Prajñāmūla* that go "not from themselves and not from another":

Subject: the sprout
Predicate: is not something that truly arises
Reason: because it does not *ultimately* arise from itself, from another, from both, or causelessly.

The *Prasannapadā* refutes that such [a way of] positing the syllogism is the [correct interpretation of] the meaning of the lines of that text, [that is, the *Prajñāmūla*]. Candrakīrti believes that it is possible to posit the reason in a more general way: **[158]**

[Subject: the sprout]
Predicate: is not something that truly arises
Reason: because it does not arise from itself, from another, from both or causelessly

[without having to qualify the four extremes repudiated within the reason with the word *ultimately*].

Although the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas agree that the three forms of arising, from self, [both, and neither,] are impossible even nominally, [only] the Prāsaṅgikas believe that arising from another is impossible even nominally. However, because the Svātantrikas accept arising from another nominally, they believe that it is necessary to affix the qualifier *ultimately* when refuting arising from another. No Svātantrika scriptures whatsoever deny arising from another nominally. It is quite clear from the scriptures of the father Śāntarakṣita and his [spiritual] son [Kamalaśīla] as well as from those of Ārya [Vimuktasena] and Hari[bhadra] that they believe cause and effect to be different substances (*rdzas gzhan*). Therefore, [by referring to these works,] those whose minds and eyes are affected by the poisonous waters of jealousy will come to understand that there exists this difference between the Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas: [the latter] accepting that nominally things exist inherently and [the former] not [accepting inherent existence even nominally].

As for the way in which the syllogism is to be posited, the *Madhyamakāloka* says:

> Whatever is devoid of ultimately arising from itself, from another, from both, and causelessly is in reality (*yang dag par*) natureless (*ngo bo nyid med pa*). It is, for example, like a lotus in the sky and so forth. All of the entities that are advocated as really existing by our own and others' [philosophical schools] are just like that [lotus in the sky].[532]

In this regard it is easier to understand the refutation of the three [positions, namely, the repudiation of the fact that things arise from themselves, from both, and causelessly], which other schools, [that is, non-Buddhist schools,] advocate. As I will explain later that it is not right to affix the qualifier *ultimately* when refuting arising from another, I take the present opportunity to mention the reasoning for refuting arising from another[533] as it is explained in the *Madhyamakāloka,* [that is, according to the Svātantrika school which *does* affix the qualifier].

If things ultimately arise from other [things], then do they arise from permanent causes or do they arise from impermanent causes?[534] In the former case, things could not arise sequentially (*rim can du,*) arising instead in one [159] simultaneous whole (*ril cig char du*). Also, a thing would either arise perpetually or else it could not arise even once.[535]

If they arise from impermanent causes, are they, at the time of the effect, born from a cause that has perished or are they, at the time of the effect, born from something that has not perished? In the former case, because that which has perished is a nonentity (*dngos med,*) it cannot be a cause. Hence, the effect would arise causelessly. In the latter case, because cause and effect would occur simultaneously, it contradicts their being, [respectively,] "what has arisen" (*bskyed bya*) and "what gives rise to it" (*bskyed byed*).

[Opponent:] Well then, let the first moment of the visual consciousness be the present entity. The second moment of the visual consciousness arises from that [first moment] at the second instant. Hence, even though the cause has perished at the time of the effect, we do not suffer from the absurdity [of accepting] a cause that is a nonentity.

[Reply:] If so, then is this arising, which is uninterrupted from one moment to the next, uninterrupted in every respect or only in one respect? In the former case, it would follow, absurdly, that the [two moments would be] cotemporal. This is just as before.[536] In the latter case, as they would be only *partially* cotemporal, this undermines their being partless. Therefore, as this undermines true existence, it refutes the fact that cause and effect are ultimately different. This is a summarized version of a more extensive explanation.

Along these [same lines], the *Āloka,* in the section dealing with the refutation of arising from another, says: "The two moments of a partless entity

uninterrupted by another [moment] cannot *but* exist simultaneously. They cannot have different aspects because the two [moments] are uninterrupted in every respect."[537] And also: "If you think [to reply] 'they are uninterrupted in one respect, not in all respects,' then it follows that the thing was momentary and had parts [all along]. Therefore the characteristic of the ultimately [smallest] moment (*dus mtha'i*) is not undermined."[538] At the end of this long ex- [160]
planation he repudiates the fact that arising from another ultimately exists by saying: "In this way ultimately arising, even from another, is incorrect."[539] Again, the *Āloka* says:

> That is why a certain Acārya's, [that is, Bhāvaviveka's,] reasoning that goes "[the eye consciousness] does not ultimately arise from another, that is, from internal organs (*nang gi skye mched,*) because they *are* other" is [claimed by an opponent to be] without a doubt revokable because it is possible for a valid cognition to exist that opposes the discordant side (*mi mthun phyogs,*)[540] like proving impermanence from existence.[541] Fools have said that in [the context of] this proof, because there is no valid cognition whatsoever that can repudiate [the existence] of [the reason], "otherness," in the discordant side, the [reason] is indefinite (*ma nges pa*). There is no valid cognition that repudiates [the existence] of what is to be proven, that is, the refutation of arising, in the discordant side.
>
> Because otherness itself is established nominally, the reason is also not nonestablished (*ma sgrub pa*). So, because the reason is a correct [logical entity, that is, because it has no faults,] it should not be characterized by any such term [as *indefinite* and *nonestablished*]. This is something I have already taught. Therefore, all that this party [Candrakīrti] asserts in regard to this reason, that is, that it is indefinite, nonestablished and so on, is meaningless (*'brel ba med pa*).
>
> The Acārya [Nāgārjuna addresses] those heterodox parties who claim that nominal causes, that is, causes other [than their effects], refer only to those entities which are really (*dngos su*) other. He expounds their refutation in the lines:
>
> The nature of entities
> Does not allow for causal conditions (*rkyen*) . . .
>
> Hence, because the otherness [advocated] by *their* scriptural tradition is not established, [Nāgārjuna] teaches that "there is no arising from another."[542]

This clearly shows that [in the Svātantrika system] nominally there is arising from another, and that it is because there is no arising from another *as it is* [161]
imagined within the scriptural system of the heterodox that Nāgārjuna explained that there was no arising from another.

The *certain Acārya* refers to Bhāvaviveka. Hence, it is evident that he is referring to Candra's critique within the *Prasannapadā* of the faults of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism when he says, "therefore, all that this party asserts in regard to this reason, that is, that it is indefinite and nonestablished and so on . . ."

In this way [we can see] that the difference as to whether or not they nominally accept arising from another is strictly due to a difference in the subtlety of what they take to be the object of refutation of the syllogism.[543]

[The Reasoning Refuting Arising via the Four Extremes][544]

Moreover, the *Madhyamaka Satyadvaya* says:

A plurality cannot create a single entity,
Nor can a plurality create a plurality.
A unity cannot create a plural entity,
Nor can a unity create a unity.[545]

To explain the meaning of the Svātantrika's famous "reasoning that refutes arising via the four extremes" (*mu bzhi skye 'gog gi rigs pa*), let us first cite the syllogism:

Subject: the sprout
Predicate: does not ultimately arise
Reason: because (1) ultimately a single lone effect does not arise from a single lone cause, (2) many effects do not arise from a single lone cause, (3) ultimately a single effect does not arise from many causes, (4) nor do many effects ultimately arise from many causes.

As regards the proof of the trimodal (*tshul gsum*) criterion, the proof of the pervasion (*khyab pa*) is carried out along the same lines as the proof of the pervasion in the case of the "being devoid of being a unity or plurality" syllogism. As regards the proof of [the relationship] between subject and reason (*phyogs chos*), [it is as follows]. The refutation of the first two extremes is explained in terms of the three conditions (*rkyen gsum*).[546]

Hence, does the eye organ [the predominant condition for the arising of the eye consciousness] act only as the cause of a second, [that is, of the next moment of the] eye organ, or does it act only as the cause of the eye consciousness alone? In the former case it would follow, absurdly, that all sentient beings would have to be blind, as eye consciousnesses could not arise from eye organs. In the latter case as well it would follow, absurdly, that all sentient beings would have to be blind because the eye organ could not be made to [162]
abide a second instant.[547]

The refutation of the third extreme [is as follows]. If many causes give rise to only one effect, then it would follow, absurdly, that among the three parts [of the eye consciousness], (1) the part that is the experience of the eye consciousness (*mig shes kyi myong ba'i cha,*) (2) the part of the appearance (*rnam par shar ba'i cha,*) and (3) the part that can apprehend the kind of object it is (*rigs su chad pa 'dzin nus kyi cha,*) one alone would be the imprint of three conditions of the eye consciousness, [instead of each of the three parts being the imprint of its own condition, as is actually the case]; and it would follow, absurdly, that the other two qualities of the eye consciousness would either be impossible or would arise without causes.

The refutation of the fourth extreme [is as follows]. If the three different aspects of the eye consciousness that come about due to the three conditions just described arise due to the combination of the three conditions in an ultimate way,[548] then do the three imprints posited by the three conditions of the eye consciousness simply appear to be different to the mind without their being ultimately different, or do they not appear to any mind as being different, or [finally,] *are* they ultimately different? In the first case, because their mode of existence would be one and their mode of appearance another, they would be false things, thereby undermining their true existence. In the second case, because the three imprints of the three conditions would end up as one, its being a case of many causes creating many effects is undermined. In the third case, it follows, absurdly, that the eye consciousness and the three qualities of the eye consciousness would also be ultimately different. If you accept *that*, then [we reply that] the eye consciousness and its three qualities are not ultimately different because (1) if they were ultimately different, the *āryan* gnosis that understands reality would have to perceive them as different, and (2) it does not perceive them as different. Part (1) is true because if something ultimately exists, it must be reality (*gnas lugs su grub*). By means of this reasoning we repudiate their being ultimately different, and by repudiating *that*, we repudi- [163]
ate that they are ultimately many, thereby repudiating that ultimately many causes can create many effects.

[The Reasoning Refuting the Arising of the Existent and Nonexistent]

Now let me explain the meaning of [the reasoning] known as "the reasoning that refutes the arising of the existent and nonexistent" (*yod med skye dgag gi rigs pa,*) which finds its scriptural source in the lines:

> The arising of what exists is not correct
> And what does not exist is like a flower in the sky.[549]

It is not at all correct to interpret this as meaning that "the existent does not arise nor does the nonexistent arise," as in fact one person does, for every

Buddhist realist has already established for himself or herself by means of a valid cognition that what [already] exists does not arise and that what does not exist does not arise, so that no opponent whatsoever would accept that [already existing] phenomena and nonexistent things arise from causes. Another person, wanting to extricate himself or herself from this problem analyzes it as the arising of something that exists or the arising of something that does not exist *at the time of the cause,* but this [suffers] from a similar [fault], for no Buddhist would accept these two [forms of] arising.

Therefore, when we analyze whether the sprout that arises is existent or nonexistent, we find that there is no difference between realists and Mādhyamikas in so far as they both accept that a sprout that exists later arises, and that a sprout that does not exist at the time of the seed arises.[550] However, if the sprout *truly* existed, this would not be possible, for if the sprout truly existed, it would have to exist at all times, and so would have to exist even at the time of its cause, and hence it could not be created by its cause. If its nonexistence at the time of its cause were a truth (*rgyu dus na med par bden na,*) it would have to be nonexistent at all times, and there would ensue the problem that it could not be created by a cause, like the flower in the sky. Therefore, there is no true arising. This is how [this verse and this form of reasoning] is to be explained.

The reasoning from interdependent origination (*rten 'brel*) will be explained in the Prāsaṅgika section.

And now, a verse of intermission:

All the distinctions between the Prāsaṅgika and
Svātantrika tenets [that they make]
Are like the analysis of the elephant by so many blind men.
Yet still they proclaim themselves as *Mādhyamikas.*
How amazing are these pseudo-scholars who possess the intellect
of cattle!

[The Doctrines of the Prāsaṅgika School][551]

[A GENERAL EXPOSITION OF PRĀSAṄGIKA TENETS]

*4.2.3.1.3.3. Explaining the Extent (*tshad*) of the Prāsaṅgikas' Object of Refutation (*dgag bya*)*[552] [164]

If you would know how it is that in the Prāsaṅgika system all phenomena are posited as being the mere labels of conceptual thought,[553] then you must understand how it is that we apprehend [things] as [truly] existing and *not* as the mere labels of conceptual thought. That [things] exist as they are apprehended by such [a mistaken consciousness] is what ultimately determines something to be the logical object of refutation (*rtags kyi dgag bya'i tshad mthar thug*). It is therefore necessary to explain at the outset how it is that all phenomena are posited by virtue of conceptual thought, and so we turn to the *Catuḥśataka:*

> Without conceptualization, attachments and so on
> Have no existence.
> So how could anyone with half a mind grasp at them
> As if they were real objects (*yang dag don*) and conceptualizations (*rtogs pa*)?[554]

The *Ṭīkā* says:

> It is only because there exists conceptualization that there is such a thing as existence. Without conceptualization there is no existence. Just as the snake that we label onto a coiled rope [is truthless], just so are those [conceptualized things] ascertained to have no self-nature.[555]

Because attachments and so on are mere examples, [it is clear that] the purport [of the passage] is to be explained [as being] that *all phenomena* are the mere labels of conceptual thought. When the color [of the rope] is variegated [and it has been set down] in a winding fashion like a snake, and is not clearly visible [because of poor lighting and so forth], at that time there is born a conceptual thought that thinks of the rope "this is a snake."

At that time neither the color of the rope nor its shape, neither the parts of the rope nor the collection [of those parts] can in any way be apprehended as being an example of the snake. Hence the snake is something that is *only* labeled onto the rope by conceptual thought.

Likewise, based on the aggregates there is born a mind that thinks "I." Neither the collection of former and later moments of the continuity, nor the collection of former and later moments at one particular time, nor the individual moments, nor the parts divided, nor the shape of the aggregates and so forth can be posited as being examples of the "I." Why it is illogical [to claim [165] that any one of these is an example of the self] will be explained later. Moreover, because there is no example of the self that is *of a different nature from* the parts and the whole of the aggregates, when it is not analyzed, the term *I* is applied [to these parts or whole]. If, however, one analyzes what is the basis onto which the term *I* is applied, one does not find anything at all. Therefore, there is only one possibility, that the "I" is merely the label of conceptual thought.

What this means is explained in the *Madhyamaka Ratnāvali*, which says:

Man is not earth, nor is he water.
He is not fire, nor wind, nor space.
He is not consciousness nor all [of these elements together].
But apart from these, what man could there be?[556]

In this way it teaches [this same point]. In this [passage] *man* refers to the "person" or to the "I." [The portion that goes] "he is not earth" up to "he is not consciousness" is repudiating that any of the parts, that is, the six elements, of sentient beings can be posited as the personality, and [the words] *not all* are repudiating that the assembled composite of the six elements can be posited as the personality.

If one understands that the person is posited by conceptual thought in such a manner, [one can apply] it to all phenomena, that also are posited by conceptual thought in a similar way. The *Samādhirāja Sūtra* says:

Just as you have recognized (*'du shes*) it in regard to the self
You should apply that same understanding (*shes pa*) to all things.[557]

The *Āryasaṃcaya* says:

Know that just as I [exist] so do all beings exist.
Know that just as all beings exist so do all phenomena exist.
To not conceptualize about either birth or no birth,
This is the supreme activity of the *Prajñāpāramitā*.[558]

Having searched for how the object onto which we label the term *I* exists, we find no example of the I. In this same way, if we analyze how the objects onto which we label the terms *pot* and *pillar* exist, they all resemble one another in [166]

that neither their individual parts nor the collection [of those parts] are found to be examples of the pot, [the pillar, and so forth].

[Does Reality Truly Exist or Is It Too a Mere Label?][559]

[Question:] Well then, is reality (*chos nyid*) also said to be a mere label of conceptual thought?

[Answer:] It is most emphatically accepted as such because, although it is theoretically possible for reality (*chos nyid*) [lit. the quality itself] to ultimately exist whereas what possesses that quality (*chos can*) does not ultimately exist, that is, [though it is theoretically possible] for conventional phenomena, which are what possess this quality, to be the mere labels of conceptual thought whereas reality is not, in actual fact, what possesses the quality and reality, [the quality itself,] have not the slightest difference as regards whether or not they truly exist, [as in fact both are truthless].

[Question:] Why are they not [different]?

[Answer:] This is because logic such as the reasoning from "being devoid of being a unity or plurality," that proves truthlessness in regard to a [mundane phenomenon] the likes of a pot has its trimodal (*tshul gsum*) criterion established by a valid cognition even in regard to [more supramundane] phenomena like reality, omniscience, and so on. In this sense they all resemble one another. This is because, as has already been explained earlier,[560] there is no difference as to the extent of difficulty in proving that a pot has parts and in proving that reality has parts. Likewise, there is for the most part no difference whatsoever in proving the truthlessness [of different things] by means of the reasoning of dependent arising.

It would follow, absurdly, that the fact that reality (*chos nyid*) is the quality (*chos nyid*) of conventional phenomena is something that is truly established because [according to you] reality is truly established [or truly exists]. If you accept [the premise], then it follows that reality and the conventional have at all times the relationship of basis (*rten*) and what depends (*brten pa*) [on that basis] because their basis-dependent relationship truly exists. This reason you accept [by having accepted that reality's being the quality of the conventional is a truly existent fact]. The pervasion, [that if the relationship is truly existent it must always exist,] holds because if something truly exists, it must exist at all times. This is so because if it existed at some times and not at others, it would be adventitious. If it were adventitious, it would contradict its being the way things are (*gnas lugs*). If you accept [that the relationship] always exists, then it follows that the basis-dependent relationship exists even at the time when it is being analyzed by reasoning that analyzes the ultimate [167]
because [reality and the conventional] are always [in the relationship] of basis and dependent. If you accept *this*, then it follows, absurdly, that the conven-

tional truly exists because it is in this basis-dependent [relationship] with a truly existent quality.[561] The reasoning used here is the same type used in the *Prajñāmūla* passage that goes: "Action possesses no causal conditions"[562] and in the *Avatāra* passage that goes: "This arising is not of a correct nature without a creator."[563]

What is more, it follows, absurdly, that there must exist a valid cognition that ultimately perceives reality[564] because [according to you] it ultimately exists. You cannot deny the pervasion, for to accept that something is the case even though it is not established by a valid cognition is a source of laughter for the sage. If you accept the premise, then you have gone against your claims that ultimately things do not exist and that ultimately the conventional does not exist, [as ultimately the perception of reality exists].

[Opponent:] Even though composite consciousness (*'dus byed kyi shes pa*) does not ultimately exist, noncomposite consciousness does, and hence it is by a noncomposite valid cognition that reality is ultimately perceived.[565]

[Reply:] Does "noncomposite valid cognition" refer to the equipoised gnosis of an *āryan* who directly realizes reality, or does it refer to reality itself? Within this context there ought not to be any [alternatives] other than these two. In the former case, it would follow, absurdly, that the truth of the path is noncomposite. This would be to advertise oneself as someone who is unfamiliar with even the mere terminology of the *sūtras, tantras,* and their commentaries. In the latter case, if one form of reality were a valid cognition, then all forms of reality would likewise be valid cognitions. From this it would follow that if something were reality, it would itself be a valid cognition that perceives itself. If you accept this, it would follow that all sentient beings would be accomplished buddhas, for all sentient beings would at all times directly realize reality with the valid cognitions of their own mental continua. All those [168] who advocate that any form of reality is an essence body (*ngo bo nyid sku*) and that all essence bodies are noncomposite valid cognitions that directly perceive reality are left breathless by this reasoning.

[An Excursus on the Essence Body of the Buddha][566]

[Opponent:] There is no problem because the essence body is not contained within the mental continua of sentient beings.

[Reply:] Well then, it follows, absurdly, that the essence body is not contained within the mental continuum of a buddha because the reality of the mind of sentient beings is not contained within the mental continua of sentient beings. If you accept the premise, then it would be impossible for the ultimate cessation [nonabiding *nirvāṇa*] to exist within the mental continuum of a perfect buddha.

Moreover, what is your reason [for claiming] that [the essence body] is not contained within the continua of sentient beings?[567] Are you saying that it is not contained within the continua of sentient beings because it is a buddha[568] or because it is noncomposite? In the first case, for the reality of the mind of sentient beings to be their essence body would depend on it not being contained within the continua of sentient beings, whereas *that,* [that is, the fact that it is not contained within their mental continua,] depends upon it's being an essence body, [that is, a buddha]. Hence, we are involved in circular reasoning (*rtogs pa phan tshun brten*).

If the latter is true, [that is, that it is not contained within the mental continua of sentient beings because it is unconditioned,] then the cessation achieved by the mental continuum of a bodhisattva on the path of seeing (*mthong lam*) would also not be possible, [as this too is uncompounded].

Moreover, it follows, absurdly, [from your position] that it is not necessary to newly accomplish the essence body by means of meditation on the path because it has existed from beginningless time [in the continua of all sentient beings].

[Opponent:] It is not true [that it has existed from beginningless time in the continua of beings].

[Reply:] Then give up [your claim] that it truly exists.

[Opponent:] Very well, I accept [that it need not be newly accomplished].

[Reply:] Then it follows, absurdly, that the effort one makes in meditating on the path is meaningless.

[The Argument Concerning Reality Continues]

[Opponent:] If reality has parts, then it would preclude its true existence. If it has no parts, then one would not be able to divide it into the twenty emptinesses.[569] There is no such paradox [in our own system] because, although allowing for its divisibility due to the conventional subjects [which are the bases of the emptiness] and are twenty [in number], we believe that there is no dividing the actual nature (*ngo bo*) of reality.

[Reply:] Please tell us how it is that "ultimate emptiness" (*don dam par stong pa nyid*), "the emptiness of essence" (*rang bzhin stong pa nyid*), and [169]
"the emptiness of emptiness" (*stong pa nyid stong pa nyid*), [all forms of the emptiness of reality,] are divided on the basis of *conventional* subjects, the bases of their emptiness, [when all of the subjects in the three preceding examples are themselves forms of reality, that is, of emptiness].

Moreover, [ask yourself this:] ultimately do things that are mere nonentities (*dngos med tsam*)[570] exist or do they not?[571] If they do, then this precludes your assertion that ultimately the merely conventional is repudiated. If

they do not, [then consider this argument]. *X*'s being ultimate must preclude *x*'s being reality because it precludes its being a mere nonentity, [as emptiness is itself a mere nonentity]. Both the reason and the predicate are correct. If [you claim] that [the reason] does not imply [the predicate, that whatever precludes nonentities does not necessarily preclude emptiness,] then it follows that precluding a larger category (*khyab byed*) does not preclude a subset (*khyab bya*) [of that category].

Although there are an infinite number of contradictions (*gnod byed*) to be enunciated in regard to the [position that] reality truly exists, I will say no more than this slight [bit I have just explained], lest this work become too lengthy.

[The Reasoning Used to Prove That One Phenomenon Is Empty Applies to All Phenomena, Including Emptiness][572]

If one proves by means of reasoning that any one phenomenon, such as a pot, is truthless, then that reasoning will prove truthlessness in regard to all phenomena, both conventional and ultimate. With this in mind [the following] has been stated:

> What is said in regard to one thing
> Is said in regard to them all.
> The emptiness of one
> Is the emptiness of them all.[573]

The *Gaganagaṃjasamādhi Sūtra* also says: "By means of one phenomenon one can understand (*rjes su rtogs*) that all phenomena are like illusions and mirages, that there is nothing to be grasped, that they are essenceless, lies and old wives' tales. He [who understands this] will, before long, enter the essence of enlightenment."[574] The *Samādhirāja* says:

> Just as you have recognized it in regard to the self,
> You should apply that same understanding to all [things].
> All phenomena are of this [same] nature.
> They are pure, like space.
> By means of one one understands all;
> By means of one one sees all.
> Though [things] as they appear are too many to explain,
> Doubt [as to their cognizability] does not arise.[575] [179]

And also:

> One thing is of the nature of all things.
> All things are of the nature of one thing.
> He who sees the reality of the two truths[576]
> Sees all things as they are.

Hence, [to show] that even *reality* is considered to be truthless, the *Sūtra* says:

> Subhūti spoke: Oh sons of the gods, if we say that even *nirvāṇa* is like an illusion, then what need is there to mention other phenomena?
>
> The sons of the gods spoke: Noble Subhūti, *do* we say that even *nirvāṇa* is like an illusion, is like a dream?
>
> Subhūti spoke: Oh sons of the gods, I say [to you] that even if there were anything more noble or special than *nirvāṇa*, I would say that that too was like an illusion, was like a dream.[577]

The Ārya Nāgārjuna has also said:

> Since the compounded does not exist
> How can the uncompounded exist?[578]

This is saying that if it is impossible for the compounded to truly exist, then there is no way for the uncompounded to truly exist. One must be of extremely dull faculties to claim that [the scriptural claims of truthlessness] apply to the existence of all the things that aid man in establishing his needs, and then to claim insistently that a noncompounded phenomenon [like emptiness], which cannot in the least help or harm man in establishing his needs, is truly existent.[579] If one says that reality is truly existent, they consider it "oh so good," and if one says that it is not truly existent, they consider it evil. In this way, like dumb sheep who cannot distinguish right from wrong, the world follows such idiocy. [Those who *do* follow it] will have their mental continua [171] utterly bound up by the many ropes of the latent potentialities that have been accustomed to apprehending true [existence] since beginningless time. This is an evil system whose [followers] resemble lustful beings who [uselessly] discuss whether or not a hermaphrodite [who could not satisfy their desires anyway] is beautiful.

In the Noble Land of India they accepted that all entities (*dngos po*) lacked true existence, so to come along and claim that there is one kind of nonentity (*dngos med*), [that is, emptiness,] that truly exists [is to show] that one is unlearned both in Buddhist and non-Buddhist tenets. Therefore, this is considered to be even worse than [accepting] all the tenets to which the heterodox adhere.

[As It Does Not Truly Exist, Emptiness Is Only a Mental Label]

Because reality does not truly exist, it is fitting that it should definitely be accepted to be only something labeled by conceptual thought (*rtog pas brtags pa tsam*). There exists the mere term *reality*, but this term does not occur by itself without someone to make use (*sbyor ba*) of it. Because nonconceptual

consciousness (*rtog med shes pa*) does not engage in the use of linguistic symbols,[580] [reality] is said to be a mere linguistic usage on the part of conceptual thought. If following the mere linguistic usage by conceptual thought of the term *reality* one does not analyze it, then one can posit the existence of reality [in this very loose way]. If, however, unsatisfied with the fact that the term *reality* is only something labeled by conceptual thought, one logically searches for how it is that the basis (*gzhi*) onto which that term is affixed exists, one finds nothing at all. Hence, as reality cannot be posited if one searches in this way, the positing of reality is the mere labeling of the term *reality* by conceptual thought, and it depends upon understanding it without subsequently logically analyzing it. That is why we say that even reality is something that is merely labeled by conceptual thought.

Because all phenomena are things labeled by conceptual thought, all phenomena are said to be mere names. What does *mere name* mean, however? [172]
When we focus on (*dmigs pa*) the various terms for persons or phenomena, as we can engage in effective action (*glang dor*) [literally taking up what is desired and avoiding what is not] based upon the mere labeling of names like *pot* and *Devadatta*, [language] is conventionally unmistaken. Were it necessary, however, to [first] search for the referent (*don*) onto which those names are labeled and *then* engage [in action], nothing could be effectively accomplished. For example, suppose there is someone who desires to meet Devadatta. If that person follows, [that is, acts in accordance with,] the mere words "Devadatta is in that house on the top of which the crow is crying," then he will be able to meet the Devadatta who lives inside that house. If, however, he were to analyze how he exists, that is, whether the basis of the name of the Devadatta who is in the house is of the same or of different substances from the aggregates, in other words, were it [first] necessary to find that [Devadatta] existed in such and such a way before meeting him, then meeting Devadatta would be impossible, for if we search for him in this manner, he is not found to exist in any way. [The example] of "please bring water in the pot" should be understood in the same way.

In a similar way, suppose that after the mind affixes the mere name *pot* onto a phenomenon we do not avoid engaging in analysis. It is because when we examine it [in this way] we do not find any referent basis onto which that name is posited, that all phenomena are said to be only names.

[The Meaning of "According with the World" in the Prāsaṅgika System][581]

What do we mean by saying that the Prāsaṅgikas set forth the conventional in accordance with the world? All ordinary beings and *āryans* still in training (*'phags pa slob pa*) have innate mundane minds,[582] and following mere names

they engage in effective action without analysis.[583] Likewise, the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika sets forth the conventional following mere words, without analysis. [173] [But suppose one interprets "according with worldly conventions" to mean that] what worldly idiots who are ignorant of tenets claim as existing one should also claim to exist and what they regard as nonexistent one should claim to not exist; if one takes this as the meaning of "positing things in accordance with the world," then one has gone far astray. Understanding that the fact that things are established by name only and are established by this kind of [worldly] conventional mind is not contradictory to, and indeed is compatible with, the doctrines of karma and its effects and the doctrines of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* is a special feature of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamikas and the ultimate point of view.[584] Hence, one should exert oneself at understanding these [two points] by seeing them as noncontradictory in one's own mind.

The way in which we label all phenomena by conceptual thought resembles the way we label a rope as a snake. Yet they are utterly different in that [the former] exist nominally as they are labeled whereas [the latter] does not. This is because when one accepts that things are the labels of conceptual thought [there can in general still] be a difference [between these labels] in that some are contradicted (*gnod*) by nominal valid cognitions and some are not.

Even though the terms *stage, path,* and *fruit* [in their technical senses] are not widespread in the world, and though their linguistic symbols (*rda*) were not at first predicated by worldly ordinary conceptual thought, nonetheless, the Buddha created these linguistic symbols to introduce them to the world [by preaching] his doctrine in accordance with the way that the worldly conceptual thought that possesses the erroneous (*'khrul pa'i*) appearance of duality predicates linguistic symbols. After this, the disciples who followed him [predicated] the mere names such as *stage, path,* and so on, using soteriological (*glang dor*) terminology without subsequently analyzing it with conceptual thought.

If one searches for the referent object (*don*) [onto which] the name is labeled, because the object is not found even in the case of the stages and the paths, even *they* exist only by virtue of their names. Though the Buddha, in [174] whose mental continuum there are no conceptual thoughts, [originally] predicated linguistic symbols such as "stages" and "paths," he created the linguistic symbols such as "stages" and "paths" based upon the conceptual thought of the disciples, so there does not occur the fault of not positing [these phenomena] based on conceptual thought.[585]

[The Scriptural Basis for Nominalism]

Many scriptures of definitive meaning and their commentaries teach that all phenomena are only labeled by conceptual thought and are posited only by virtue of their names.

The *Upālipariprccha Sūtra* states:

I have taught that the mind should fear hell;
That many thousands of beings are made miserable there.
And yet those beings who die and go to a fierce lower realm
Have never existed.
They are not harmed
By the huge swords and arrows of [hell's] guardians.
Those lower realms exist due to conceptual thought.
In these [states] there are no weapons that actually strike the body.
[Likewise,] the various pleasing things like flowers in bloom
And radiant places of gold that bring happiness to the mind,
They too have no creator whatever.
They exist only by virtue of conceptual thought,
But the childish differentiate them with the grasping of discrimination.
When neither grasping nor nongrasping arise
The understanding [sees things] as if they were dreams and illusions.[586]

Again, a *sūtra* says:

The nature of attachment, anger, excrement [mind] (*rgyags pa*) and obscuration (*gti mugs*)
Is that they arise due to misconception (*kun rtogs*) and that they understand [their object] incorrectly.
All things [come about] due to our having accustomed ourselves
[To mental states] that are neither free from misconceptions nor devoid of attachment.[587]

Again, a *sūtra* says:

This doctrine has from previous times been taught, namely, the nonexistence of a self, the nonexistence of sentient beings.
But although this is taught, it does not imply the exhaustion [of all phenomena], [175]
For I have said this after having determined them to be mere labels.[588]

And also:

The childish ones who think about the phenomena of peace and utter peace
Are abiding in a wrong path,
But to speak of phenomena in terms of the word *emptiness*
Is to teach with words that those phenomena are wordless.
There has never been a bodhisattva
Who has thought about the phenomena of peace and utter peace.
All verbal elaborations (*spros pa*) are misconceptions of the mind
And so one should think of phenomena as being thoughts.[589]

The *Samādhirāja Sūtra* says:

Even though *nirvāṇa* is profound,
It is expressed by words.
Nirvāṇa is not to be found
And neither is the word *nirvāṇa* findable.
Neither the word nor *nirvāṇa*
Can be found.
In this way it is empty phenomena
That reveal *nirvāṇa*.[590]

The *Pitāputrasamāgama Sūtra* says:

It is like this: a fairy city does not exist as it appears
In any of the cities of the ten directions or of any other [direction].
It is a city that exists only by virtue of its name.
In the same way does the *Tathāgata* see beings.[591]

The *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* says:

It is like this: this so-called bodhisattva is a mere name. And like this: this so-called perfection of wisdom is a mere name. And like this: these so-called forms, feelings, discriminations, composites, and consciousnesses are mere names. And like this: forms are like an illusion. Feelings, discriminations, composites, and consciousnesses are like illusions. Illusions and mere names do not correspond to their objects. They do not exist in any direction.[592]

And from there it goes on to explain it in more detail:

Why is that so? It is like this: names are created in regard to individ- [176]
ual phenomena and they label them. Names are terms (*tha snyad*) created adventitiously (*glu bur bas*). All names are nominally (*tha snyad du*) created. When a great being, a bodhisattva, examines the perfection of wisdom, he does not even see a name (*yang dag par rje su ma mthong*), and because he does not see it, he does not conceptualize (*mngon par ma zhen pa*) it. And again, Śāriputra, when a great being, a bodhisattva, analyzes the perfection of wisdom, he understands it to be thus. It is like this: this so-called bodhisattva is a mere name. It is like this: this so-called perfection of wisdom is a mere name. It is like this: these so-called forms are mere names. It is like this: these so-called feelings, discriminations, composites, and consciousnesses are mere names. Śāriputra, it is like this: for example, even though we express the I in language, in the expression *I*, yet, there is no I to be perceived.[593]

The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* says:

The perfect Buddha says
That the world is conditioned by ignorance.
So why can't we say
That this world is misconception (*rnam rtog*)?[594]

Commenting on the meaning of this passage [Candrakīrti] explains that the world is only something labeled by conceptual thought.

The *Ratnāvali* says:

Because the nature of form is that it is a mere name
Space is also a mere name.
When the elements do not exist, how can form exist?
Hence, even the mere name does not exist.
Likewise feelings, discriminations, composites,
And consciousnesses are like the elements.
They should be thought of as the self is.
Therefore the six sphere (*khams drug*) have no self.[595]

And also: [177]

What can exist as an object in a world
Whose only ontological status
Is that it is labeled nominally?[596]

This is stating that ultimately even names do not exist and that, except for what is posited nominally by means of a name, nothing else exists.

[True Existence, the Opposite of Nominal Existence]

As it was explained [in preceding passages], to apprehend that all phenomena exist in such a way that they are not posited only by name and conceptual thought is the innate apprehension of true existence. If things existed the way they are apprehended by this [innate form of ignorance,] then they would (1) truly exist (*bden par grub pa*), (2) ultimately exist (*don dam par grub pa*), (3) really exist (*yang dag par grub pa*), (4) inherently exist (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa*), (5) exist by virtue of their own characteristic (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*), (6) exist by virtue of their own nature (*rang gi ngo bos grub pa*), (7) exist under their own power (*rang dbang du grub pa*), and (8) exist substantially (*rdzas su grub pa*). Here, these all fit the description of what the logical reason (*rtags*) refutes by means of a hypothetical (*mtha' gzung*) examination.[597] The *Catuḥśataka* says:

These all lack self-power (*rang dbang*)
And so they are natureless (*bdag nyid yod ma yin*).[598]

The commentary on [these lines] enumerates them: "Here we are referring to own nature *(rang gi ngo bo)*, essence *(rang bzhin)*, and independence from other things *(gzhan la rag ma las pa)*."[599] *Independence from other things* does not mean "independence from other causes and conditions." It refers instead to "existence from its own side" *(rang gi ngos nas yod pa)*, [that is, an existence where the object is] not posited by means of a consciousness that is other than it.

In this regard according to the Svātantrikas one must accept that even nominally there is no such thing as ultimate existence or true existence. Yet they believe that nominally things *do* inherently exist and that they exist by virtue of their own characteristic. They believe that if something exists by virtue of its own characteristic, it need not truly exist. Hence, there is a very great difference in the subtlety of the object that their reasoning refutes, [the Svātantrikas' object being more limited and less subtle than the Prāsaṅgikas'].

4.2.3.1.3.4. Refuting Misconceptions in Regard to the [Distinction between Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas][600]

[Opponent:] It is quite incorrect to maintain that the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas differ [in the way you claim they do].[601] That is, it is not the case that the former accept that [things] nominally exist by virtue of their own characteristic [whereas the latter do not]. Do you believe that [a thing's] "own characteristic" refers to the definition *('jog byed)* [of a thing] or that it refers to true existence? If the former, then it follows, absurdly, that even the Acārya Candrakīrti, [a sworn Prāsaṅgika,] taught the own characteristic of [everything] from form to omniscience, [for he is not at all opposed to things having definitions].[602] The latter [position] is also not correct because the Acārya Haribhadra, [a Svātantrika,] has, by means of such passages as "empty of self, that is, labeled, and the external world," taught that everything is a mere label. Also, [what you claim is incorrect] because Jñānagarbha, [a Svātantrika,] teaches that even nominally there is no arising that can withstand logical analysis. As he says: [178]

If examined under the power of logical reasoning,
Even conventionally things do not arise.
This is a statement of the truth and that is why it is said
That all this is as it appears to be.[603]

Were you to claim that [the Svātantrikas] accept that objects exist from their own side because they believe that they can perform the functions *(don byed nus pa)* of the entities they appear [to be], then even the Acārya Candra would have to accept that objects exist from their own side when he accepts

that a pillar can perform the function of the pillar it appears to be. If you claim that he does not accept [this latter position,] then this utterly undermines [the Madhyamaka stance that] conventional existence implies existence.

It also follows [from your view] that there would be no difference even between a Svātantrika and a realist [because according to you they both accept existence by virtue of own characteristic,] and in this way you undermine even what the Mādhyamikas themselves believe.

It is also incorrect [for you] to claim that there is a difference in what they believe to be ultimate and what they accept as conventional because, beyond a mere semantic difference, [according to you] the Svātantrikas do not accept anything beyond the truly existing objects that the realists themselves [accept].

[It also follows according to your view] that the Svātantrikas, accepting that things exist by virtue of their own natures and also accepting that they cannot withstand logical analysis, are inferior to the realists because on top of accepting truly existing entities, as they do, they also accept a proposition contradictory to this, [that is, that they cannot withstand logical analysis].[604]

Therefore, there is no difference between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas [179] in this regard. They both accept that nominally [things] do not exist by virtue of their own characteristic. They resemble one another in *not* accepting that nominally [things] do not inherently exist and exist of their own nature. Therefore, there is not the slightest difference as regards the object that their reasoning refutes.

[Reply:] This is utterly incorrect. Although the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas accept that things exist from the object's own side, they do not accept that *this is* [what it means for something] to truly exist. The Prāsaṅgikas [on the other hand] accept that if something exists in this way, [that is, from its own side,] then it must truly exist. Hence, they *are* dissimilar. [You obviously realize that this is what we mean,] as is evidenced by your repeatedly stating that both [schools] similarly deny that things exist from the objects' own side or that they exist by virtue of their own characteristic. So to then ask whether *existence by virtue of own characteristic* refers to a definition or to true existence is an indication that you cannot be in your right mind.

Tell us why it is that the following: "it follows, absurdly, that a pillar is able to function as it appears because, just as it appears to be a pillar, it can perform the function of a pillar" is a reductio that harms the [following reductio]: "it follows, absurdly, that the pillar is potentially efficacious from its own objective side because the pillar appears to be efficacious from its own objective side and because the pillar is potentially efficacious as it appears"? [If it is a valid reductio,] then it follows, absurdly, that in reply to the following reductio: "it follows, absurdly, that the sensory perception to which two moons appear verifies that one moon is two because it is a nonerroneous perception and because one moon appears to it to be two" it would be correct to urge one

that goes: "it follows, absurdly, that [that sense perception] is a nonerroneous perception because the moon is white just as it appears to it."[605]

Again, it is just blithering on your part to say that if [the Svātantrikas] accept that objects exist from their own sides, then they are in no way different from the realists. [According to this line of reasoning] it would follow, absurdly, that the Cittamātrins are in no way different from the realists because [180] they believe that the pot-pillar [combination] and so on are objects that have the ability to occupy space (*yul go sa gnon nus*). The pervasion (*khyab pa*) and predicate (*gsal ba*) are in every way similar [to the reductio you urged on us]. If you force them into it through reasoning, then [the Svātantrikas] must accept that objects that exist from their own side truly exist, just as if you force them into it through reasoning, [a Yogācāra] must accept that if a pot-pillar [combination] is an object that occupies space it must be an outer object. [But this does not mean that either the Svātantrika or Yogācāra systems will accept these two statements respectively of their own free will].

You claim that by accepting that objects exist from their own side the Svātantrikas would not go beyond even the realist position of [accepting] ultimately existing objects. By this statement you are implicitly saying, "if I have not examined the scriptures of the realists, then how can I even possess the mere symbols [much less the meaning] of these profound [Madhyamaka] scriptures?" [In other words, you are showing us that you have mastered neither set of scriptural exegesis].

It follows [from what you claim] that in the Sautrāntika system the difference between the production of sound (*sgra'i byas pa*) and its impermanence (*mi rtag pa*) ultimately (*don dam du*) exists because the production of sound and its impermanence are different from their own side (*rang ngos nas*).[606] The latter is true because sound, by virtue of its own nature, is the opposite of all of the different things that it is not (*log sa tha dad las log pa*), such as nonproduct, permanent, and so forth.[607] [Were this not so] then how would you explain [the following verse from the *Pramāṇavārttikam*]:

> Since all things abide inherently (*rang bzhin gyis*) in their own natures (*rang gi ngo bo la*),
> They are dependent upon being the opposites of all concordant and discordant entities.[608]

Think about what the word *inherently* implies!

Therefore, in the Sautrāntika system something need not exist by virtue of its own characteristic simply because it exists from its own side. When something exists from its own side, without at all depending on being posited by conceptual thought, then it can be considered to exist by virtue of its own characteristic. That is why they say that universals (*spyi mtshan*) and [conceptual entities like] "the difference between the production of sound and the impermanence of sound" and so forth do not exist by virtue of their own

characteristic.[609] Nonetheless, according to the Prāsaṅgikas [the Sautrāntikas] can be logically forced [into the position] that one is in effect accepting [that even conceptually posited entities like "difference"] are *svalakṣaṇas,* [or exist by virtue of their own characteristic,] by merely positing such an object to exist from its own side, [though the Sautrāntikas may want to make a distinction between these two types of existence].

Again, even though [the Sautrāntikas'] expression "posited by conceptual thought" is verbally similar [to the Prāsaṅgikas' equivalent expression], what it entails (*'jog 'tshams*) is not similar. According to the Prāsaṅgikas if one searches for the referent object of which conceptual thought has created linguistic terms, one finds nothing at all. Hence, they explain that things are posited only by name and conceptual thought. According to the Sautrāntikas, one must claim that something is posited by virtue of conceptual thought when it is posited in dependence upon a conceptual thought that is in accordance with its object (*rtog pa don mthun*), [that is, a nonmistaken conceptual thought]. They accept that *in accordance with its objects* means "in accordance with the way it exists based upon an objective referent." Therefore, a conceptual thought that is in accordance with its object must definitely have a connection, albeit indirectly (*brgyud nas*), to *svalakṣaṇas*, [that is, it must have its origins in the sense perception of a *svalakṣaṇa*].[610] This is repeatedly explained in such passages as: "Because [conception] has a basis that is not an entity."[611] And also: [181]

> The conceptual thought that apprehends the nature of something
> Does not have an apprehending object (*gzung ba'i don*), though it does
> have an object similar to it, [that is, similar to the entity].
> The [actual object] is not the cause of that [conception].
> Instead, it is something that ultimately arises from something different
> from the object.[612]

So a pot appears as the opposite of non-pot to conceptual thought, and although this appearance is a reified entity (*sgro btags*) and a universal (*spyi mtshan*), [the Sautrāntikas] accept that it is not a contradiction to assert that that [appearance] exists within the very core (*gnas tshod*) of the object, [in this case] the pot. According to the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas, however, it is taught that something existing at an object's very core and its being a reified entity are contradictory assertions. One should be aware that this same method [of interpretation] can be applied to the Cittamātrins and so forth.

When one claims that the Cittamātrins accept that consciousness truly exists and also that it is evanescent (*'jigs pa*), [according to you, the opponent,] it would follow that the Cittamātrins are lowlier than the Vaiśeṣikas because (1) [they both] similarly accept consciousness to be permanent and (2) [the Cittamātrins] accept a contradiction on top of that, [namely, that it is also evanescent]. [We are not placed in this position because we maintain that the

Cittamātrins] are *forced [to accept]*, through reasoning, that if consciousness truly existed then it must be permanent. In actuality the Cittamātrins do not accept that consciousness is permanent.

[In this same way] we also claim to be able to force the Svātantrika [182] Mādhyamikas [into the position] of having to accept that if things existed from their own objective side, then they must also be able to withstand logical analysis (*rigs pas dpyad bzod*). Who is claiming, then, that the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas *do* [themselves willingly] accept that things withstand logical analysis? The fault of there being an internal contradiction in what they [actually] accept, [a fault that you urge on our interpretation,] occurs when [there is a contradiction in what they actually *do*] accept. It cannot be said to occur in regard to what they [are forced to, but in actuality] do not, accept. Hence, the Svātantrikas do not suffer from the fault of "accepting a contradiction to boot." Therefore, when someone accepts that things exist from their own side one can force them, through reasoning, into the necessity of their accepting that [those things] also must withstand logical analysis. It is not that by virtue of advocating that things exist from their own side they [actually] accept that [those things] withstand logical analysis. Otherwise, it would follow, absurdly, that by virtue of believing that a pot is an entity (*dngos po*) one would have to believe it to be material (*bem po*), for if a pot is an entity, then it must be material. So do not engage in reasoning in the dark without distinguishing between [what a school of thought] actually accepts and what it must accept [as a logical consequence of a position it actually holds].

Now I ask you this: according to you, how is one to interpret the words *own characteristic (svalakṣaṇa)*, which is explained as not even nominally existent in such passages as: "In the case of reality by whatever reasoning."[613] In whose *Bhāṣya* it says: "Thus, arising by virtue of own characteristic is true on neither level [of truth, ultimate or conventional]."[614] And also:

> Because both of these [cause and effect] are like an illusion, therefore
> There is no fault on my part, for the entities of worldly beings still exist.[615]

And in the *Bhāṣya* to this it says: "On account of which this analysis will be directed to an effect that is own characteristic and a cause that is own characteristic."[616] And also:

> Whatever two [people, one in a past and one in a future life,] are distinct by virtue of their own characteristic
> Cannot be understood to be of the same mental continuum.[617]

Do you accept [that the *own characteristic* spoken of in these passages] refer to [183] "existence by virtue of own characteristic," that it refers to the definition (*'jog byed*) or that it refers to true existence (*bden grub*)? In the first case, as I have just finished pointing out at great length that Candrakīrti does not ac-

cept existence by virtue of own characteristic even nominally and that the Svātantrikas *do* accept existence by virtue of own characteristic nominally, it would contradict [your belief] that there is no difference in what these two [schools] accept.[618] In the second case, [if you take the own characteristic refuted in these passages to refer to the definition,] then you are contradicting your own claim that even Candrakīrti accepts definitions. In the third case, [that is, if it refers to true existence,] it is utterly contradictory to [your] claim that both Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas do not accept true existence, for you are taking *own characteristic* to mean true existence.[619]

Again, [the *Madhyamakāvatāra*] states:

> If own characteristic is the basis [of phenomena]
> Then, because [the equipoise of an *āryan*] would destroy entities by annihilating them, [as it perceives the lack of own characteristic,]
> Emptiness would become the cause of the destruction of entities.
> But that is not correct, therefore entities do not exist [by virtue of their own characteristic].[620]

And in the *Bhāṣya* to this it says:

> If the own characteristic, that is, own nature *(rang gi ngo bo)*, of entities like form and feeling and so on arise by virtue of causes and condition, then when the yogi sees things as inherently empty, that is, when he realizes that all phenomena are essenceless, he must definitely be annihilating the essence that arises in this way, [that is, due to causes and conditions]. Hence, his understanding of emptiness, like the hammer which is the cause of the destruction of the pot and so forth, would become the cause for the annihilation of the essence of entities. This [of course] is not possible. Therefore the own characteristic of entities should not be accepted as everlastingly arising.[621] [184]

So the root text and commentary are saying that it follows that the gnosis, which is the yogi's realization that all phenomena are essenceless, realizes emptiness by, in the process, annihilating the essence of entities, for [by hypothesis] entities exist by virtue of their own characteristic, although that [gnosis] understands entities to be essenceless, [that is, without own characteristic].[622]

Now tell me what opponent this reductio is refuting? Were it refuting a realist there would arise the fault of having no basis of disputation *(rtsod gzhi)*,[623] for no realist accepts [such a thing] as an *āryan* gnosis that understands the essencelessness of all phenomena. Because the opponent [to which this syllogism is directed] must have already understood the Madhyamaka view when he understood the subject [of the syllogism, that is, the gnosis, the *Madhyamakāvatāra*] could not mean [to direct this syllogism] at a realist. Thus, only [in a state of] insanity would anyone deny that this reductio argument is a refutation directed at a Mādhyamika who accepts that entities exist

by virtue of their own characteristic and who accepts that *āryan* gnosis understands that entities lack a true essence (*bden pa'i rang bzhin med da*). Therefore, [this opponent] can be none other than the Svātantrika, for both of us are in agreement that there are no Mādhyamikas aside from Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas. Therefore, I have easily proven that there exists a difference between Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas in regard to whether they accept entities to exist by virtue of their own characteristic.

Moreover, [another] opponent's [view is implicit] in the following scriptural passage [from *Madhyamakāvatāra*]: "For, if you examine these entities,"[624] [and his views] are set forth in the *Bhāṣya:*

> Opponent: Because ultimately there is no arising, it is permissible to refute arising from self and from another. Yet, the essence of objects perceived by direct perception and inference, such as form, feeling, and so on, is such that they arise, without a doubt, from other [entities]. If one does not accept this, then why say that there are two [185]
> truths, for there would in fact be only one truth. Therefore, there is no such thing as arising from self.[625]

The passage explains in extremely lucid terms that the opponent is one who accepts that ultimately there is no arising and that conventionally [things] arise inherently from other [things]. What is more, [this position is held by] none other than the Svātantrikas, for there is no realist who accepts that ultimately there is no arising. Hence, it is quite clearly ascertainable that there is a difference between the Prāsaṅgikas and the Svātantrikas in regard to whether they accept inherent arising, arising by virtue of own nature, and arising from other [entities], [all of which are synonyms].

Some Svātantrika Madhyamaka scriptures *do* mention *essencelessness* and *naturelessness* on quite a number of occasions, but it is impossible merely on the basis of those [citations] to even come close to proving that [they accept] that [things] do not inherently exist even nominally. Even though the Prāsaṅgikas say over and over again that [even] nominally all phenomena are essenceless (*tha snyad du rang bzhin med*), they do not accept that essences are nominally nonexistent (*rang bzhin tha snyad du'ang med*).[626] It is even nominal absence of an "essence qua existing by virtue of own characteristic" that is said to be [what is meant by] the even nominal lack of essence.

Likewise, the Svātantrikas do not say that there is no essence because [things] do not inherently exist (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa med pa*). They say that there is no essence because there is no true essence (*bden pa'i rang bzhin med pa*). That is why [we find] in the Svātantrika scriptures the expression *ultimately natureless* (*don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa*) repeated over and over again, conjoining [the qualifying predicate *ultimately* to the more general expression *natureless,*] so that if it is not actually conjoined in this way on one or two occasions, one should intuit by context that it is necessary to conjoin

the predicate *ultimately* to the expression *natureless*, [for a Svātantrika does not accept "naturelessness," "essencelessness," and so on nominally, that is, without qualification, but only ultimately].

[On "Withstanding Logical Analysis"]

It is necessary to understand the various kinds of distinctions in the delinea- [186] tion of what counts or does not count as "logical analysis" [in the expression "able to withstand logical analysis"]. In the Prāsaṅgika system the analysis of how the basis onto which the name *pot* is posited exists in regard to (*stengs na*) the object [the pot itself] is [considered] to be reasoning that contemplates [or analyzes] the essence, [that is, the ultimate nature of a thing]. If, when one searches [for the object] in this way, one finds that there is something that exists in this way, [that is, if the pot is found,] then it must be said to withstand logical analysis. In the Svātantrika system this [criterion] alone does not make something count [as an entity] that can withstand logical analysis. Hence, [according to the Svātantrikas] the objective referent (*don*) of [a word] such as *pot* is posited after it has been determined (*bcos*) by reasoning as existing in this way or that. They believe, as [can be seen] from the lucid scriptures I have cited, that pots and so forth substantially exist (*rdzas su grub pa*). Except for those who accept an "ineffable self" (*brjod du med pa'i bdag*), [that is, the Vātsīputrīyas,][627] there are no philosophers, Buddhist or non-Buddhist, who accept that a pot substantially exists and then go on to advocate that the basis onto which the name *pot* is posited, from its own side, is found to be neither of the same nor of different substances from the parts that make up the pot, when it is analyzed in this way.

Even though the realists [posit] their own system's brand of essencelessness in regard to nonaffirming negations (*med dgag*) such as "non-pot," "nonentity," and so forth,[628] [they claim] that the essencelessness which the Mādhyamikas exclusively posit as essencelessness is not established by a valid cognition even in the case of such entities as "non-pot" and so on. Hence, [for the realist] that essencelessness is not established by a valid cognition [and therefore is not true] of any basis, [that is, of any phenomenon].

In reply to this, [one opponent has this to say].

[Opponent:] To claim that all phenomena are things that are merely labeled by conceptual consciousness is a nihilistic view and extremely heavy sinful karma. Because even the ultimate would be merely posited by the mind, it would become a mental creation and hence could not be the essence [of phenomena]. Even interdependent [arising] would be a conceptual label. If you accept this then it follows that it is a mental proliferation (*spros pa*), and if you accept *this*, then it follows, absurdly, that it is not free from mental proliferation.[629] Therefore, because that which is born from causes and condi- [187]

tions is not a mental label, it is the portion [of the causal process] that appears to truly exist, the [notion of] an effect that depends on a previous [entity] and the notion of a cause that depends on a future [entity] that are the mental labels.[630]

[Reply:] Well then, how do you interpret this passage?

Whatever arises interdependently
That is empty
And is labeled in dependence [on other entities].[631]

[Opponent:] This explains that all phenomena are labeled, one depending on the other. It is not claiming that phenomena are mental labels.

On top of this we claim that there is reasoning that refutes [three types of labeling]: (1) that labeled by a philosophical misapprehension (*kun brtags kyi 'dzin pas btags pa*), (2) that labeled by an innate misapprehension (*lhan skyes kyi 'dzin pas btags pa*), and (3) that labeled by a yogi's mind (*rnal 'byor pa'i blos btags pa*).[632] The first two kinds of reasoning, in reliance on an object of refutation, posit emptiness as the ultimate, whereas the third kind of reasoning establishes even emptiness as a false thing (*rdzun pa*) based on reasoning such as [that found in the *MMK* verse that goes]: "Were there anything at all that is not empty,"[633] for emptiness exists nominally while being truthless, like, for example, a dream. Therefore, it is with the intention [of explaining] reality, [that is, emptiness,] to be a conventional [phenomenon] that the *Yuktiṣaṣṭīkāvṛtti* says: "It is the ultimate truth from the viewpoint of worldly terminology (*'jig rten pa'i tha snyad*)."[634] And again, that same [text] also says: "Is *nirvāṇa* also a conventional truth? It is so."[635] And again, the *sūtras* say that *nirvāṇa* is like a dream, is like an illusion. Thus, in the process of refuting that emptiness does not truly exist, that it is like a dream, it is established as being a false [thing], and hence as being conventional.

Even though [this opponent] claims this, he still maintains that all phe- [18
nomena are divided into two truths, that a conventional [entity] is defined as the object found by a mind that does not abide in reality (*gnas lugs*), and that an ultimate truth is defined as the object found by a mind that does abide in reality. [He says that] the word *truth* has two meanings: (1) the "nonerroneous" (*mi slu ba*) is called *true* and (2) what "exists in reality" (*gnas tshul la grub pa*) is called *true*. From the point of view of the first [meaning, he continues,] to call emptiness "the truth" has nothing to do with the object of refutation. To apprehend the object of refutation it is the latter significance that must be [invoked]. Whatever is conventional is a conventional truth and even in the Prāsaṅgika system the conventional truth is, when divided, of two kinds, right (*yang dag*) and wrong (*log pa*).

[Reply:] This type of blithering has appeared in an extensive way, but when this huge pot filled with the vile vomit is poured out before an honorable

man, what special purpose can it have except to, in effect, make *him* vomit? Therefore, let me say just this much in regard to such a teeming mass of contradictions.

All of those who are advocates of this view do nothing more than undermine their own positions, as we shall see. It follows, absurdly, [from their views] that if something is an ultimate truth, it must be posited to be something that is found by a mind that abides in reality because "that which is found by such a mind" is [according to them] the definition of that [ultimate truth]. If you accept *this*, then it follows, absurdly, that [an ultimate truth] is something that is created (*bcos ma*) because [according to your own definition an ultimate truth] is something posited by the mind.[636] Three cycles!

It follows, absurdly, that if something is a conventional truth then it is to be posited as something found by a mind that does not abide in reality because "that which is found by such a mind" is the definition of that [conventional [189]
truth]. If you accept this, then it follows, absurdly, that the inner and outer forms of dependent arising[637] are established by way of their being mentally posited because they are conventional truths. Again, three cycles!

We have already mentioned the way in which reality is considered to be a conceptual label (*rtog btags*). We do not say that it is a conceptual label because it is labeled by conceptual consciousness as being an object that it is not.[638]

As regards it being "created," which contradicts its being the essence [of things], [here *created* does not mean simply "created by the mind," as you would have it, but instead, if something is "created" in this sense,] it must be created by a mind to which things appear as if they really existed even though they do not really exist. It is in this sense of the word *created* [that the *MMK*] says: "Essences are not created."[639] In this regard, the *Avatārabhāṣya* says:

> It is necessary to understand this in accordance with the explanation of how the three natures are to be posited, and this I will do later. When you say that all phenomena are labeled in dependence [on other phenomena], are they labeled by existing labeling entities or by nonexistent ones? If they are labeled by nonexistent ones, it would follow, absurdly, that knowledge without a knower and an effect without a cause would also be possible. If the labeling entity exists, then tell me what kind of labeling entity there could be besides the mind?
>
> [Opponent:] It is the person that labels.
>
> [Reply:] When a person sees something with his eye consciousness we say [for convenience] that *the person* has seen [something]. Likewise, when the person's mind labels [something], we say [for convenience] that the person has labeled it. Aside from this, tell me what can it mean for a person to label something? If you admit that the labeling entity is the mind, then tell me how you can avoid ac- [190]

cepting the contradiction that all phenomena are mental labels and that they are not labeled by the mind.[640]

Again, what are you calling *mental proliferation (spros pa)*? Does it refer to the appearance of duality, [which does exist], or does it refer to the "extreme of mental proliferation," [which does not exist]? In the former case, one would have to accept that dependent arising was not free from the appearance of duality, for otherwise, [as everything that exists is interdependent, were the interdependent to be free of appearing dualistically] then the appearance of duality could not exist, [for nothing would be left that could appear dualistically]. In the latter case, [that is, if it refers to the extreme of mental proliferation or inherent existence,] then it follows that it could not possibly be a conceptual label [as you claim earlier], for (1) were it a conceptual label [it would exist, hence] contradicting its being the extreme of mental proliferation, [which does not exist,] and (2) it would follow that if something exists then it would have to be devoid of the extreme of mental proliferation, [which weakens the concept to the point of triviality]. You accept reason (1), and reason (2) follows because both the extremes of eternalism and nihilism are nonexistent.

[Another opponent] replies to this by saying that *mental proliferation* refers both to speech and to conceptual thought, so that conceptual thought is what mentally proliferates, and speech is what is mentally proliferated by conceptual thought.

[Reply:] Only those not in their right minds would claim that speech[641] is a conceptual label and then claim that the view that other entities (*dngos po*) like form and so on are posited by conceptual thought is a nihilistic view. To claim that speech and conceptual thought are mental proliferations and [also] to claim that what arises interdependently is free from mental proliferation is utterly contradictory.

It follows, absurdly, that emptiness is a conventional truth because it is a conventional [phenomenon]. You actually accept both the reason, [that it is a conventional phenomenon,] and the pervasion, [that if something is a conventional phenomenon then it must be a conventional truth]. If you accept the premise, [that it is a conventional truth], then it follows that it is an object found by a mind that does not abide in reality because that is what you accept [as the definition of a conventional truth]. Again, you quite literally accept both the reason and the pervasion. If you accept [the premise, then you have accepted a contradiction, for] it follows [from your other assertions] that it is an object found by a mind that abides in reality, as it is an ultimate. You have accepted the three cycles!

Again, it follows, absurdly, that emptiness is an erroneous phenomenon (*mi slu ba'i chos*) because it is a phenomenon and it is not nonerroneous. If you claim that the pervasion does not hold, [that is, that just because something is a phenomenon and not nonerroneous it need not be an erroneous phe-

nomenon,] then desist [from asserting] the pervasion that if something [191]
nominally exists and does not truly exist, then it must exist as a falsity.[642] If you accept [the premise that emptiness is erroneous,] then you are in direct contradiction [to your own beliefs]. The first part of the reason, [that is, that emptiness is a phenomenon, is something that you yourself consider] to be correct. So desist [from the view] that if something is nonerroneous, it is false. [If you claim that] this pervasion does not hold, a *sūtra* says: "Monks, all composite entities (*'dus byas*) possess false and erroneous qualities. They are said to be false." [643] Also, the *Prajñāmūla* says:

> The Lord has said that any phenomenon that is deceiving is false.
> All composite entities are deceiving phenomena and hence false.[644]

The *Prasannapadā* says: "Because they possess erroneous qualities (*bslu ba'i chos can*) they are false."[645] So [by holding this position] you are in contradiction to all of these teachings that extensively [expound that what is erroneous is false].

You must have a failing memory if on the one hand you claim that reality is conventional and then [go on to say] that the *āryan* equipoise that understands emptiness has no appearances [of conventional entities].[646]

Moreover, when you say "that which is labeled by a yogi's mind," are you referring to reality's being labeled by the yogi's mind or are you referring to reality's being *truly* labeled by the yogi's mind? In the former case you are in direct contradiction to your claim that reality is not labeled by the mind. In the latter case let us search for some other humpback creature beside your venerable self who would dare to claim that *āryan* gnosis labels reality as truly existing. And so I say:

> The sophistry of one who refutes Candra
> Has spoiled the vast teachings of the Conqueror.
> It is the banner of demons, the messenger of evil spirits,
> Which deteriorate the vastness of one's faith.
>
> The profound doctrine is like a diamond [piercing] his heart
> Which, though claiming that conventional entities are labels, he cannot resist.
> This thief of the doctrine spreads his demonic words in all directions, [192]
> Bellowing that reality [too] is conventional.
>
> His mind is constantly drunk with the evil fluids of jealousy.
> He strives eternally to recite [the mantras] that harm the holy.
> Fooled by the devils, mistaken are the beings
> Who consider such explanations to be the scriptural sources of a virtuous friend.

These are stanzas of intermission.

4.2.3.1.3.5. An Explanation of the Implications of This

4.2.3.1.3.5.1. An Explanation of (1) the Two Kinds of Selflessness to Be Refuted and (2) the Selflessness That Is the Refutation

4.2.3.1.3.5.1.1. A Brief Mention of the Tenets Advocated by Other Systems

4.2.3.1.3.5.1.1.1. Identifying the Self That Is the Perceived Object (dmigs yul)[647] of the Innate View of a Self As Accepted by Both Buddhists and Others[648]

No matter which of the four Buddhist systems of tenets [one considers], they all definitely accept that the "person," "self," or "ego," who is the perceived object of the innate apprehension of an ego (*ngar 'dzin lhan skye*), exists nominally; for otherwise, all of the following expressions would be unfounded: "I experience the ripening of the karma I create," "I have come from a previous birth to this one and will go from this one to a future one," "This person is superior, that person inferior," and also expressions like "I see form," "I hear [193] sound," and so forth. This is why the *Avatārabhāṣya* also says:

> "Even though a creator of karma (*las byed pa po*) is not perceived (*ma dmigs*), still, there does exist karma and there does exist its ripening." From this passage one should understand that it is an essentially existing (*rang bzhin du gyur pa*) creator that is refuted. Do not think that what is labeled in dependence on nominal parts has been refuted. As [the *sūtras*] say, "the person who has interdependently [arisen from] ignorance and actualized (*mngon par 'du byed pa*) the merit (*bsod rnams*) that ought to be actualized." This point has been taught *in extenso*.[649]

Therefore, even though it is necessary to nominally accept a person, a self, a being (*skyes bu*) who is the basis of karma and its result, *the self of the person* is not accepted even nominally, for the existence of the selves of the person and of phenomena are to be refuted as existing things. If by virtue of nominally accepting a person and a self it were necessary to nominally accept the "self of the person," then it would follow that by virtue of nominally accepting existence and the ultimate it would be necessary to accept ultimate existence, the logic [in both cases] being in all ways similar.

[Question:] Well then, what is it that [the different schools] posit as exemplifications (*mtshan gzhi*) of the self that is the perceived object of the innate view of the self?

[Reply:] Some Sāṃmitīyas, a Buddhist sect, accept the exemplification [of the self] that is perceived by the innate view of the self to be the five aggregates.[650] As [the scriptures] state: "Those who reflect on the self taught by the Blessed One when he spoke of *bhikṣus, śramaṇas,* and *brahmins* are reflecting merely on the five aggregates."[651] Because it says this, they are [194]
obviously of the opinion [that the self *is* the five aggregates]. Other Sāṃmitīyas accept the mind alone to be the exemplification of the self. It says in [one] *sūtra:*

> One's self is one's own protector.
> What other [person] can protect one?
> By training oneself properly
> The sage will attain the heights (*mtho ris*).[652]

And another *sūtra* says:

> A trained mind is the good.
> A trained mind leads to happiness.[653]

Hence, it is because [these passages from scripture] say this that [this school] believes [that the exemplification of the self, or the perceived object of the innate apprehension of the self, is the mind]. That this is what the Sāṃmitīyas believe is explained in the *Avatārabhāṣya.*

The *Kośa* says:

> If one accepts the self to be an existing thing,
> One will be gnashed by the fangs of false views.[654]

And:

> Because it would imply its being nonexistent, even as a label,
> It is not said to be nonexistent.[655]

Thus it explains that there is no substantially existing entity (*rdzas yod*), the self, that exists only as a labeled entity (*btags yod*). What then is the exemplification of that self that is a labeled entity? "It is in the streams of continuity (*rgyun*) of the aggregates that the fruits of virtue and nonvirtue exist."[656] The *Kośabhāṣya* says: "Statements about the self (*bdag tu mgon par brjod pa*) refer (*'jog*) only to the continuous stream of the aggregates and to no other referent (*brjod par bya ba*)."[657] Thus it explains that the stream of continuity of the aggregates is the exemplification of the self that is the basis (*rten*) of karma and its effects. This mode [of presenting the self] is what the Kaśmīrī Vaibhāṣikas and some Sautrāntikas believe.

The Sautrāntikas who explain things according to the *Seven Logical Treatises*[658] are clear [in the exposition] of their belief that mental consciousness (*rnam par shes pa*) itself is the exemplification of the self.

Even the Acārya Bhāvaviveka accepts the mental consciousness to be an exemplification of the self.[659] He says in his *Tarkajvālā:*

In this way even *we* actually call consciousness "the self." [195]
Consciousness is also the self because it is what takes rebirth.
It is labeled onto both the body and the collection of sense organs.[660]

In explaining this he gives his proof based on (1) the two passages cited earlier, such as "one is one's own protector" and so on, and (2) the reasoning that the self takes up [new] aggregates [in rebirth] and consciousness also takes rebirth. Because the Acārya [Bhavya] does not accept the foundation consciousness (*kun gzhi*), he has no other choice but to accept the mental consciousness as the consciousness that takes up a [new] body.

The majority of Cittamātrins believe that the exemplification of the self that is the perceived object of the innate view of the self is that very foundation consciousness. The special perceived object of the afflicted mind (*nyon yid*) and its fourfold retinue, the view of self, attachment to the self, and so forth, is explained to be the foundation consciousness, whereas the aspect (*rnam pa*) is explained to be the aspect that thinks the foundation consciousness itself to be the self. [One of their] *sūtras* says:

The consciousness that takes rebirth is deep and subtle.
All the seeds fall on it as if on a falling stream.
The childish have not understood this.
They say "it would not be right for the self to be consciousness (*rtog pa*)."

In this way we see that the majority of Buddhist realists accept the self or person to be a labeled entity. But the idea that the exemplification of the self or person is the five aggregates or consciousness and the belief that consciousness and so forth are substantial entities are not contradictory in their system. [196]
This is because, though they accept that the set (*rang ldog*) "person" is a labeled entity, they do not accept that if something is a person, [that is, a member of the set,] it must be a labeled entity. For example, though a pot is an exemplification of gross materiality, gross materiality is not a substance whereas the pot *is* a substance. The belief is similar [in both cases]. Otherwise, those who advocate that the composite entities that are neither [form nor consciousness] (*ldan min 'du byed*) are labeled entities, [namely, the Sautrāntikas,] would be forced into accepting that all composite entities are labeled entities when they explain that arising, abiding, and destruction are these composite entities that are neither [form nor consciousness].[661]

4.2.3.1.3.5.1.1.2. What Faults the Glorious Candra Finds in These [Views]

If, having accepted the aggregates as inherently existing, one accepts them to be of the same nature as the self, it would be necessary to accept that the self and the aggregates are one and not at all different. Being the same nature,

however, if they appear to the mind as though they were different, [it would mean] that they existed in one way while appearing in another. Hence, they would be utterly false [things], which undermines their inherent existence. One should understand that this reasoning forces one to accept that whatever phenomenon is accepted as being inherently one in nature must also be accepted as being indivisibly one. Hence, if the self and the aggregates were one, it would follow, absurdly, that just as according to their own views there exist five separate substances, the aggregates, simultaneously in the continuum of one person, they must also find it correct to accept that the self too has five separate substances within it. This is the fault of accepting the five aggregates to be the exemplification of the self.

Whether one accepts the aggregates, only the mental consciousness, or
only the foundation consciousness to be the exemplification of the self, it [197]
would follow, absurdly, that the innate view of the self is not a mistaken mind (*log pa'i blo*), for the self [according to all of these realists] exists substantially just as it is apprehended by the mind.[662]

What is more, should it be the case that whatever is posited as an exemplification of the self or person also exists substantially, then it would contradict such *sūtra* passages as these: "Oh monks, these five are mere names (*ming tsam*), mere terms (*tha snyad tsam*), mere labels (*btags pa tsam*), and these five are the past, the future, space, *nirvāṇa,* and the person."[663] And also: "Just as we call something a *chariot* in dependence on the collection of parts, likewise we call someone a *being* in dependence on the aggregates."[664]

Moreover, because according to you the five aggregates are annihilated at the time of *nirvāṇa* without remainder, the self would definitely be annihilated. That in turn would be an extreme nihilistic view, for even *you* admit that having an eternalistic or a nihilistic attitude in regard to that basis that, when perceived, is apprehended as the self by "the view in regard to the perishable [group of aggregates]" (*'jig lta*) is a view that apprehends an extreme.

Again, if, as you believe, the former and latter moments of the aggregates or consciousness even before one obtains *nirvāṇa* are inherently different, it would follow, absurdly, that the former and latter moments of the self too would be inherently different. If you accept this, then, as they would be mutually different in the sense of being independent (*ltos med*), they would be different objects that are completely unrelated. Were that so, [the Lord Buddha] would not have said such things as "at that time, at that period of time, I was the King Māndhātṛ."[665] It would also follow, absurdly, that the fruits of
actions accumulated by one person would be experienced by another and so [198]
forth.

It may occur to you [to say] that "although former and latter moments *are* inherently different, there is no problem since they belong to one continuity." Were it not contradictory [to say that] two different unrelated objects are in the same continuum, then it would follow, absurdly, that everything would be in

the same continuum as everything else. Hence, to accept on the one hand that the former and latter moments of the aggregates are inherently different objects and on the other to believe that the person is the continuity of the aggregates is like believing that a cloak of tortoise skin[666] can protect one from the cold. Through this example [one can see] that [the former claim] is completely pointless [as a way of extricating oneself from the previously mentioned predicament].

Again, [how do you reply] when we ask, "does the self and the world (*'jig rten*) have an end or not?"[667] If by the word *world* one understands the aggregates, then, because it is your own belief that the aggregates arise and are destroyed, it would have been necessary [for the Lord Buddha] to have declared the world to be impermanent; and because according to you there are no aggregates after *nirvāṇa,* the world *would* have an end. It would also imply that he should have also declared that the Tathāgata does not exist after death, thereby undermining his having set forth the fourteen undeclared views (*lung ma bstan gyi lta ba*).[668]

Moreover, according to you when a yogi directly perceives all phenomena to have no self, it would follow that he perceives selflessness by perceiving entities, either the aggregates or consciousness, as nonexistent, as he accepts that the self and these [aggregates or consciousness] are undifferentiated. The *Avatāra* gives an explanation [of all of these faults] from [the verse] that goes:

> If the aggregates are the self,
> As *they* are many, the self too would be many.

up to [the verse that goes]:

> For you, when a yogi perceives selflessness [199]
> He must definitely perceive entities to be nonexistent.[669]

[Opponent:] Well, if it *were* necessary that in the systems which accept the aggregates or consciousness to be exemplifications of the self a yogi's perception of selflessness amounts to his direct perception of the aggregates or consciousness to be nonexistent, then it would follow that in your system, where the "I" that is a mere label based on the aggregates is accepted to be the exemplification of the self, when a yogi directly perceives selflessness he would also have to perceive the "I" that is labeled in dependence [on the aggregates] to be nonexistent. The reasoning [in both cases] is similar.

[Reply:] This is not a problem [for us]. The opponents' beliefs that the aggregates and consciousness are the exemplifications of the self are posited from the viewpoint not of a self or person that exists by virtue of [being labeled] by a mere nominal term, but from the viewpoint of [a self that is found] when the referent object labeled by that term is searched for by reasoning. In this way we see that it is necessary that the aggregates or consciousness be a self that is established by virtue of its own nature. However, when

yogis directly perceive selflessness it is impossible that they come to an understanding of a self that in the least bit exists by virtue of its own nature. Hence, they would incur the fault of having to perceive the aggregates and consciousness to be nonexistent.[670] How is it that we, who accept that the personality is posited only nominally, without searching for it with reasoning, incur the fault that when yogis perceive the nonexistence of a self that exists by virtue of its own nature they would also have to perceive the nonexistence of a self that is posited only nominally? Nonetheless, for those who lack the power of intellect that analyzes the subtle logic of this system, such points as these will be extremely difficult to understand. [200]

Again, if the aggregates or consciousness alone is the self, there would be no difference between what is taken up [in rebirth, that is, the aggregates,] and what takes them up, [that is, the self]. Hence it would follow, absurdly, that subject and object would be one. Although such faults are prevalent, to write of all of them here would make my text too wordy, and so I will not. They are presented in detail in the *Mūla[Madhyamakakārikās]*, the [*Madhyamaka*] *Avatāra*, and their commentaries.

[Opponent:] Well, if the aggregates are not the perceived [object] (*dmigs pa*) of the view of the self, then how do you interpret such *sūtra* passages as this: "Those who reflect on the self taught by the Blessed One when he spoke of *bhikṣus*, *śramaṇas*, and of *brahmins* are reflecting merely on the five aggregates."[671]

[Reply:] This is the meaning: the word *only* is refuting that there is a perceived object of the self which is a different entity from the aggregates. It does not teach that the aggregates *are* the self. Were that so it would contradict another *sūtra* that extensively refutes the fact that the aggregates are the self when it says "form is not the self, feeling is not the self," and so forth.

Hence, the former *sūtra* refutes [the notion of] a self that is a different entity from the aggregates, whereas the latter refutes [the position] that the aggregates *are* the self. The words "they are perceiving only those five aggregates which are taken up" enables us to posit, in a strictly nominal way, a self that is labeled with respect to those five aggregates, and that self is the perceived object of the innate view of the self. This is the amazing [quality] of [201] this system of the glorious Candra, namely, that having perfectly arranged all of the scriptural sources of the *sūtras*, he has set this forth after having clearly elucidated by means of unerring scripture and reasoning the true intention of the *sūtras* that, though they may attempt [to make it clear], does not come out clearly [in the treatises] of the great forders of the way of our own superior and inferior divisions of the great vehicle.

[Opponent:] It follows then that the innate view of the self of the person is not a view in regard to the perishable group,[672] for the words *perishable group* refer to the aggregates and they [according to you] are not the perceived object of the innate view of the self.

[Reply:] There is no problem here, for "the view in regard to the perishable group" refers to viewing a self that is labeled with respect to the perishable group [and not to a view that actually takes them as its perceived object].

Another person has claimed that Candrakīrti explains that if the innate apprehension of the self takes the aggregates to be the self, the aggregates *must be* the self. This, however, is completely wrong, for though the aggregates are not the self, because they are apprehended to be the self, it is necessary to posit the innate apprehension of the self to be erroneous (*'khrul pa*). Otherwise, since it would be necessary [to maintain that things] existed as they were apprehended by that [mind, that is, by the innate view of a self,] it would not be erroneous. Were this so, it would mean that all of the preceding expositions of contradictions, such as the absurdity that just as the aggregates [are many] the self too would have to be many in number, would be meaningless.[673] This is a great fault, and, like firing the arrow of refutation without noticing where the target has been standing, it is bound to take [a path] that is far afield [of one's intended target].

As was explained, all of the superior and inferior Buddhist schools accept in common a merely nominal self that is the basis of karma and its effects. There is also no disagreement among the four philosophical schools as regards the belief that although the [merely nominal self] is not the direct object (*'dzin stangs kyi yul*)[674] of the innate apprehension of the "I," it is nonetheless the self that is the perceived object. However, they *do* disagree as to what they [202] take to be the *exemplification* of this self that is the basis of karma and its effects and the perceived object of the innate apprehension of the "I." Hence, [Candrakīrti] refutes the belief that the five aggregates or consciousness is its exemplification. In this way [we can see] that both our own and others' [schools] accept the mere nominal existence of a self that is the perceived object of the innate view of a self, but [Candrakīrti] advocates that to take the five aggregates or consciousness as the exemplification of that self is to open oneself to the faults explained earlier. He never claims even once that if the aggregates are taken to be the self by the innate view of a self, that the aggregates *must be* the self. Hence, those who urge reductio arguments when [the premises] are not even accepted [by the other party] tire themselves out, the only effect [of their efforts] being mere self-inflicted suffering.

Those who claim that the innate apprehension of the "I" takes the five aggregates or consciousness to be the self have never looked within themselves or examined [this claim] in any detail. Hence, they are undermining the evidence of their own direct experience [by making such a claim]. Whether child or sage, we all have spontaneous thoughts such as "my body," and "my mind." But the fact that the thoughts "this body is me," "this mind is me" do not arise even once of their own accord is something that is proven by experience.

Those who claim Bhavya to be correct in taking mental consciousness to be the exemplification of the person that is the basis of karma and its effects [203] should think about how they would respond to the [argument that if that were so] "it would follow, absurdly, that when one is born in the state of 'nondiscrimination' (*'du shes med pa*) and when one is abiding equipoised in the cessation [of consciousness] (*'gog pa la snyom par zhugs pa*) there is nothing that can be posited as an exemplification of the self."[675] Though you may [attempt to escape this predicament] by claiming that the mere continuum of consciousness is apprehended as being the exemplification of the person, on those two occasions mentioned earlier the continuum of consciousness was itself annihilated and so there would be no way [for you] to avoid the absurd conclusion that the continuity of the person is also annihilated.

[Opponent:] At that time it is the continuity of the form aggregate alone that is the exemplification of the person.

[Reply:] This analysis of yours in which you claim that a mere physical continuum devoid of all mind and mental events is a sentient being is even more surprising than the claims of the Materialists (*Tshu rol mdzes pa pa*).

But suppose that the consciousness or the continuity of the consciousness *is* the exemplification of the person. When the *śrāvaka āryan* who has been born into the realm of nothingness[676] actualizes the transcendent path (*'das lam*),[677] it would follow, absurdly, that he who is in equipoise has his continuity as a person who belongs to the state of nothingness annihilated, for the transcendent path [itself] cannot be the exemplification of that person, and at that time there are no other phenomena, whether form, mind, or mental events, at all present.

[Opponent:] At that time there is the foundation consciousness, and *this* is the exemplification of the self.

[Reply:] Were that so, it would utterly undermine what is advocated both by the *Abhidharma* and by the system of Bhāvaviveka, for no one with any intelligence would claim that in either of these two systems there is a belief in the foundation consciousness.

4.2.3.1.3.5.1.1.3. How the Other Buddhist Schools Posit the Self That Is the Direct Object of the Two Views of the Self [the Person and Phenomena] and How That Self, Which Is Something to Be Refuted, Is Posited as Nonexistent [204]

The Lord, in the *sūtras* of the Hīnayāna, has said that by merely accustoming oneself to, [that is, by meditating on,] the direct perception of the sixteen aspects of the four truths, one attains *nirvāṇa*. Many times did he teach the selflessness of the person, which is the refutation of the self-sufficient (*rang*

skya thub pa'i), substantial (*rdzas*) existence of the person. All Buddhists, from the Vaibhāṣikas up to and including the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas, believe that even the Mahāyāna *sūtra piṭaka* does not teach a form of selflessness of the person over and above this one. Hence, there are no inconsistencies between how [these different schools] posit the selflessness of the person.

The Acārya Haribhadra says, for example: "In this regard, total knowledge (*thams cad shes pa*)[678] [is as follows]: [it is the perception] of qualities, such as that of impermanence and so on, within such phenomena as form and so forth, as the result of which one comes to abandon delusions as to the self."[679] The *Madhyamakāloka* says: "Because they come to understand selflessness by means of their understanding of the nature of arising and destruction, from the point of view of the *śrāvakas*, it is said with the intention of establishing the person's lack of self."[680] The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says: "What is the characteristic of selflessness? It is the aggregates', elements' (*khams*) and spheres' (*skyed mched*) lack of those characteristics labeled as a self by those who advocate the self."[681] The *Pramāṇavārttikam* says:

> Based on the four noble truths
> [We identify] sixteen incorrect [attitudes],
> Such as attractiveness, "I," "mine," and so forth.
> When [these are] imputed, we desire.
> Those [four noble truths] are the objects which oppose that [desire].
> By possessing an understanding of the aspects of those [four truths] [205]
> And by correctly perceiving them through proper meditation
> Desire and what follows it are destroyed.[682]

The *Tarkajvālā* says: [This citation is missing in the text]. Many explanations are in accordance with these [just cited], but were I to quote them here in their complete form [as they appear in] the original sources, it would be excessive, so I will refrain from doing so.

Hence, [we can see that] no matter what Buddhist system we consider, whether Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, from the Vaibhāṣikas up to the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas, they all believe that the very apprehension of the person as being a self-sufficient substance is the way that the innate apprehension of the self of the person operates. As to the way it apprehends [a self-sufficient and substantial self], it takes the self that is the basis of the apprehension "I" to be like the master (*rje po*) of the aggregates, and it takes the aggregates to be like its servants (*khol po*), for through such expressions as "my body," "my feelings," and so on, [we can see that] we take the aggregates to be under the influence of the self. Hence, just like the master and the servant, the self appears to be independent, that is, of a nature that is not concordant with the aggregates. [The self's] appearing to exist in such a way is the apprehension of a substantially existing self.

Now suppose one analyzes the self that is the perceived object of the thought "I," asking oneself how it exists; that is, whether it is permanent or impermanent, one or many, and so on. Based on faulty reasoning, to apprehend [that self] as a permanent entity neither born nor destroyed and to apprehend it to be a partless unitary and so forth is accepted as being the apprehension of a permanent, unitary, and independent (*rtag gcig rang dbang can*) self that is a philosophical (*kun brtags*) mode of the apprehension of a self. However, there is no Buddhist philosopher whatsoever who believes that the mode of operation of the *innate* apprehension of the self consists of apprehending [the self] to be permanent, unitary, and independent as [described earlier].

Nonetheless, if [the self] existed as it is grasped by the innate apprehen- [206]
sion of a self, *it would have to be* such a permanent, unitary, and independent [entity]. Hence, if one negates the existence of such a permanent, unitary, and independent [self], one also negates the existence of a person who is a self-sufficient, substantial [entity].[683] The very negation of the person's being a self-sufficient substantial entity whose nature is not concordant with the aggregates is the meaning of the selflessness of the person, and the object to be realized. In this regard [the lower schools] do not differ. They believe that by realizing this alone one realizes the actual full-blown selflessness of the person. They also believe that by the power of accustoming oneself to, [that is, meditating on,] the direct perception of that [fact] alone, one is able to dispel all of the afflictions. These beliefs are tenets held in common by Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, Yogācāras, and Svātantrika Mādhyamikas.

[Opponent:] All of the minds that directly realize the impermanence and so forth, that is, the sixteen aspects of the four truths,[684] are minds that directly realize the selflessness of the person.

[Reply:] This [shows] a great lack of analysis. Were this so, it would follow, absurdly, that the mind which perceives the impermanent aspect of the truth of suffering is a mind which perceives the aspect of selflessness. If you accept *that* then it would follow, absurdly, that there is no difference between how the realization of subtle momentariness apprehends things and how the realization that the person is not a self-sufficient substance operates. If you accept *that,* then it follows, absurdly, that there is no difference between the aspect of impermanence and the aspect of selflessness.

The *Pramāṇavārttikam* states:

> By perceiving emptiness one will be liberated.
> All the remaining meditations are for *its* benefit.[685]

The mind that realizes the aspect of selflessness arises based on the minds that [207]
realize the aspect of suffering and the aspect of impermanence. By accustoming oneself to the former, one will liberate oneself from cyclic existence. This method of explaining [this passage] is something that [you the opponent] have obviously never comprehended.

[The Hīnayāna's Views on Liberation and Buddhahood] [686]

Moreover, in the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika systems the Mahāyāna is not accepted as being the word of the Buddha, and they do not accept that the Hīnayāna *piṭaka* teaches the selflessness of phenomena.[687] Hence, they do not set forth the selflessness of phenomena nor that by the power of meditating on that [principle] the obscurations to omniscience (*shes bya'i sgrib pa*) are abandoned. Therefore, no scripture that teaches the tenets of the two *śrāvaka* schools, be it the *Pramāṇavārttikam*, the *Kośa*, or any other, deal with such doctrines when they are explaining the tenets of the two *śrāvaka* schools.

In the system of the two *śrāvaka* schools the person of definite *śrāvaka* type (*nyan thos rigs nges*) practices the selflessness of the person described earlier, conjoined with a method of accumulating stores of merit that are [comparatively] limited in their extent. At the very least it takes them three lifetimes to obtain *śrāvaka* enlightenment. The *pratyekabuddha* of the type that is like a rhinoceros, and who is definitely of this type, practices by conjoining [his realization of selflessness] with a method of accumulating the stores of merit that are intermediate [in their extent]. He obtains *pratyekabuddha* enlightenment within 100 eons. Although both of these types of *arhants* abandon the afflictions completely, they do not abandon the nonafflicted latent poten- [208]
tialities of unknowing, extreme forms of unclarity that block the direct perception of all phenomena.

A person of the Mahāyāna lineage generates the mind of the Mahāyāna, [that is, *bodhicitta*,] and meditates on that very selflessness of the person, conjoining it with a skill in method that in a very extensive way, for three countless eons, accumulates merit. They obtain the state of complete buddhahood by abandoning even the nonafflicted seeds of unknowing in their entirety. This is what [the *śrāvaka* schools] accept. They claim that all but [the last life's worth] of the accumulation of the stores [of merit] during the three countless eons [that it takes for someone to attain buddhahood] is [accomplished] only while one abides in the "portion concordant to emancipation" (*thar pa cha mthun*).[688] They also claim that one ascends [all of the stages] from the "heat [stage]" (*drod*) of the path of preparation (*sbyor lam*) up to the gnosis that cognizes the exhaustion and nonarising of all [obscurations], that is, complete buddhahood, within one meditative sitting (*rten gcig*)[689] by relying upon the mind of the fourth absorption.

The *Kośa* explains:

> The Teacher and rhinoceroses [attain] enlightenment,
> Doing it all in a single life [based on] the final absorption, [that is, the fourth].
> Before that, they are on the path concordant to emancipation.[690]

What is more, they say that of the twelve deeds[691] everything from the "taming of the Māras at dusk" on down were [performed] by an ordinary being.[692] From the actualization of complete buddhahood up to showing the action of *nirvāṇa* [he is considered a being abiding in the state of *nirvāṇa* with remainder], and after leaving behind the composite that is his body, he is said to actualize *nirvāṇa* without remainder, which, like the extinguishing of a lamp, is the annihilation of the continuity of both physical and mental [aggregates].

Both *śrāvaka* schools have in common that they do not at all accept the [209] hypothesis of the "body of complete enjoyment" (*longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku*). The Vaibhāṣikas claim that the form body, which is the supreme emanation body (*mchog gyi sprul sku*), is the continuity of the [form] aggregate of an ordinary being and therefore is a form of true suffering. Hence, they claim that it is not a perfected buddha. The Sautrāntikas, however, attack this position. Although there is much to be said about such topics, that is, as to whether [the form body] is accepted as being a real perfected buddha and so forth, as it would break the flow of my presentation, I will not write [anything further on this point].

Both the Cittamātrins and the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas accept that the *piṭaka* of the Hīnayāna does not in the least teach the selflessness of phenomena. They do not differ on this point. Also, I have explained in an extensive manner above what Mahāyāna *sūtras* these two schools follow and how they posit the selflessness of phenomena.

4.2.3.1.3.5.1.1.4. How the Glorious Candra's Critique Is to Be Expounded

I have already explained[693] [Candrakīrti's] critique of the position that the way the innate apprehension of a self of persons apprehends its object contains the apprehension of the person as a self-sufficient, substantial entity, and the meaning of the [verse in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* that goes:]

> Your yogi could not understand the nature (*de nyid*) of form and so on
> With his insight into selflessness.
> From his perceiving form, attachments and so forth arise
> Because he does not realize its nature.[694]

4.2.3.1.3.5.1.2. The Exposition of the System of the Prāsaṅgikas as a Distinct [System in Its Own Right][695]

As was explained, the Yogācāras and the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas accept (1) [210] that when they set forth [the doctrine of] selflessness two kinds of selves are

to be refuted, the self of the person and that of phenomena, and (2) that there are two ways that these appear. These [two selves] they believe to be of quite different types. The glorious Candra, however, states that, although selflessness is divided into parts depending upon the basis, [that is, either person or phenomena,] the self that is refuted [in each case] is not of different types. The *Avatāra* says:

> This selflessness is divided into the two kinds, that of the person and that of phenomena.
> It was taught to be of two kinds so as to liberate beings.[696]

Hence, to refute inherent existence, which is the object to be refuted, with regard to the basis that is the person is the selflessness of the person, and to refute it with regard to the basis that is phenomena is [accepted as being the meaning of] the selflessness of phenomena. The *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* says:

> Now the "self" refers to an essence which can be characterized as the fact that things do not depend on other [things]. The nonexistence of such [an essence] is selflessness. It is divided into [the selflessness] of the person and that of phenomena, and hence it should be understood to be twofold: "the selflessness of the person" and "the selflessness of phenomena."[697]

The Acārya Buddhapālita also believes that the self which is to be refuted is strictly "existence by virtue of own nature." In the section that explains how the Hīnayāna *piṭaka* teaches the selflessness of phenomena, the commentary *Buddhapālita* says:

> The Lord taught as examples of the selflessness of composite things [the following:] an illusion, an echo, a reflection, a mirage, a dream, a ball of foam, a bubble, and the plantain tree. But within these is not to be found either reality *(de bzhin nyid)* or the nonerroneous reality *(ma nor ba de bzhin nyid)*. "For these are proliferations *(spros pa)*, [211]
> they are false!" So did he also say. When we say "the selflessness of all phenomena," the word *selflessness* refers to "naturelessness," for the word *self* refers to "nature."[698]

Hence, [we see] that there is not the slightest difference between what these two Acāryas, [that is, Candrakīrti and Buddhapālita,] accept.

In general the Lord actually taught the selflessness of phenomena to two kinds of disciples. There are those who for the time being are not fit vessels for the actual teachings of the subtle emptiness of phenomena because their mental continua are not completely ripe. Still, they are even then fit vessels for receiving the actual teachings of a somewhat rougher form of the selflessness of phenomena. The continua [of other disciples], however, are completely

ripened. Hence, they are persons who from the very outset are fit vessels to be actually taught the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

To the first type [the Lord] taught, in the *sūtras* of the final wheel, [that is, in the Yogācāra *sūtras,*] a selflessness of phenomena that is the mere refutation of the fact that subject and object are different substances, [that is, the doctrine of nonduality]. To the second he taught, in such [scriptures] as the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras,* a selflessness of phenomena that is a refutation of the inherent existence of all phenomena. Though he taught these two systems, meditation only on the rough form of selflessness without meditation on the subtle one cannot bring about the most minimal elimination of the seeds of the obscurations to knowledge.

Likewise, in the *piṭaka* of the Hīnayāna, [the Lord] taught those who are of the *śrāvaka* type (*nyan thos rigs can*) but whose continua are not completely ripe; that is, [he taught] disciples who were for the time being not fit vessels for the actual teachings of the selflessness of the person. He taught them a [212]
form of the selflessness of the person that implies only the negation of the person's being a self-sufficient substantial entity. This he did by teaching them principally the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths such as impermanence and so on. To those who are of the *śrāvaka* type whose mental continua *are* ripe he taught a selflessness of the person that is a refutation of an inherently existing person. Though he taught them two forms of selflessness, a subtle one and a gross one, the latter is principally a method to generate renunciation from cyclic existence and is taught for the purpose of suppressing the active ensnarements such as attachment. It is only a path for ripening [the disciples]. It is not a path that can actually liberate one from the seeds of the afflictions. This is something that both the Acāryas believe.

All sentient beings, from children to sages, equally have had the thought "I" since beginningless time; and within that thought, the I that is the basis onto which the term *I* is posited appears to exist from the object's own side. To conceive (*zhen*) of [this I] in accordance with that mode of appearance is the way that the apprehension of inherent existence operates. That is the mode in which the innate apprehension of the "I" operates.

Therefore, the inherent existence of the "I" is the direct object of the innate apprehension of a self, and it is designated by the term *self of the person.* The fact that it does not exist even nominally is what is refuted by the reasoning [213]
which analyzes the ultimate. This negation is the selflessness of the person, and it is the ultimate truth. The Cittamātrins and the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas do not accept the selflessness of the person to be an ultimate truth. What is more, they believe that the reasoning that refutes the self of the person is reasoning that analyzes the *conventional.*

The perceived object (*dmigs pa'i yul*)[699] of the innate apprehension of the "I," nominally, is the basis of karma and its results. The exemplification [of that self that is the perceived object of the innate apprehension of the "I"] is

the nominality (*tha snyad pa*), [that is, the nominal entity,] that is the mere label based on the aggregates: either the collection of the aggregates, each individually, or an object that is no different from the aggregates. For example, this is what [the Buddha] had in mind when he said that we label something a chariot based upon either (1) only the collection of the parts of the chariot, (2) each part individually, (3) an object other than the parts, or (4) a part that is not the chariot. For this reason the *sūtras* say:

> Just as we call something a *chariot*
> In dependence on the collection of its parts,
> Likewise conventionally we say "sentient being"
> In dependence upon the aggregates.[700]

And also: "Oh Great King, man, the person, is the conjunction of the six elements, the six bases of touch, and the eighteen functions of mind."[701]

[A Brief Explanation of the Differences between the Selflessness of the Person and of Phenomena]

When distinguished as either person or phenomena, one's own aggregates, eyes, ears, and so on, are considered to be phenomena and to apprehend them as existing inherently is the apprehension of a self of phenomena. The eyes and ears contained within one's own continuum[702] are exemplifications of mineness (*nga yi ba*)[703] and are also exemplifications of the phenomena re- [214]
ferred to when we distinguish between the pair, "person and phenomena." The [eyes and so on] appear to the innate mind, however, to be a kind of "mine" that exists from its own side. Perceiving that specific "mine," to conceive of it as existing by virtue of its own characteristic is the innate apprehension of mineness. Still, perceiving the eyes and so on that are contained within one's own continuum and then apprehending them as existing by virtue of their own characteristic does not necessarily operate as does the apprehension of mineness.[704] This is something that, if one introspects, will be quite clearly established by experience. Hence, though the eye and so on are exemplifications of mine, [that is, they *are* mine,] it is quite clear that, when one perceives them, to apprehend them as existing by virtue of their own characteristic need not be the "apprehension of mine."[705] Therefore, those apprehensions that perceive the eye and so forth contained within one's own continuum and then *do* apprehend them as existing by virtue of their own characteristic, but that *do not* operate as does the apprehension of mineness, are all apprehensions of a self of phenomena and not apprehensions of mineness. When they appear to be mine and the mineness is apprehended as existing by virtue of its own characteristic, however, then it *is* the apprehension of mineness and not the apprehension of the self of phenomena.

Simply apprehending things that are not contained within one's own continuum and [other] objects as being inherently my utilities (*longs spyad bya*) is not [what is meant technically] by the apprehension of "mine." Moreover, all innate apprehensions of an "I" are both apprehensions of the self of the person and the view in regard to the perishable (*'jig lta*). But if something is these two, it does not follow that it is the apprehension of the "I," for, perceiving other persons, to apprehend them as existing by virtue of their own characteristic is the apprehension of the self of the person, but is neither the [215]
apprehension of the "I" nor the apprehension of "mine." Also, the apprehension of "mine" is both the view in regard to the perishable [aggregates] and the apprehension of the self of the person, but it is not the apprehension of the "I."

[*ŚRĀVAKAS* AND *PRATYEKABUDDHAS* UNDERSTAND REALITY]

4.2.3.1.3.5.2. The Explanation of Whether Śrāvakas *and* Pratyekabuddhas *Understand the Selflessness of Phenomena*[706]

4.2.3.1.3.5.2.1. How the Glorious Candra Goes About Explaining This

The glorious Candra proves that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* do indeed understand the selflessness of phenomena using both scripture and reasoning. As for the scriptural proof, the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* says:

> Oh children of the Conqueror, it is like this. Take for example the case of the prince who is born into the family of a king and who possesses the marks of royalty. As soon as he is born he surpasses in status all of the assembly of ministers by virtue of his being royalty, but not from the viewpoint of his intellectual prowess. But when he has grown up, he generates his own intellectual prowess and greatly supercedes all the activities of the ministers.
>
> Oh children of the Conqueror, likewise the bodhisattva, as soon as he has generated the [awakening] mind, surpasses all of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* because of the greatness of his superior thought (*lhag pa'i bsam pa*), but not from the viewpoint of his intellectual prowess. But the bodhisattva who abides in the seventh stage [216]
> of a bodhisattva supercedes all of the activities of the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddhas* because of the greatness of the understanding of his object.[707]

Having quoted this source, the *Avatārabhāṣya* says: "From this scriptural [citation] one can clearly ascertain that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have the understanding that all phenomena are essenceless."[708] Moreover, the words *first generates the [awakening] mind* refers to the generation of the first *ultimate* mind and thus refers to the first instance [in which one comes to a direct understanding of emptiness, the ultimate truth, that is, at the first *bhūmi*]. At that time, it says, this [bodhisattva] cannot surpass the *śrāvaka* and *praty-*

ekabuddha from the viewpoint of his intellectual prowess. This proves that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena, for otherwise, because [the bodhisattva] directly understands the selflessness of phenomena at the first *bhūmi*, and because the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha arhants* do not [according to you] understand the selflessness of phenomena, even from the first *bhūmi*, the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* would have to be surpassed by his intellectual prowess. This is what [Candrakīrti] intends [by the preceding passage].

As for [the three principal] logical arguments (*rigs pa*), the *Avatārabhāṣya* says:

> Were it not so, because [*śrāvakas* and so forth] would be devoid of a complete understanding of the essencelessness of things, just as [the bodhisattva surpasses the heterodox] who are devoid of worldly attachment, so too would the bodhisattva who has generated the first mind also surpass them, [the *śrāvakas* and so forth,] by virtue of his intellect.
>
> Just like the heterodox, [the *śrāvakas*] too would not have abandoned all of the proclivities for activity (*spyod pa'i phra rgyas*), [that is, the afflictions,] in the three spheres.
>
> Because they misperceive the own nature of form and so on, they are mistaken. Hence, they could not have even understood the selflessness of the person, as they misperceive the aggregates, that is, the [217]
> cause of labeling something as the self.[709]

This citation teaches three logical arguments [that prove that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* must have understood reality]. The first logical argument is this. The bodhisattvas who abide on the first level can surpass those who are devoid of worldly attachment[710] by virtue of their intellect, but they cannot surpass the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha arhants*. However, this distinction would not be correct according to you for [the bodhisattva] directly understands the reality of all phenomena, whereas neither [*śrāvakas* nor non-Buddhist yogis] in the least understand the reality of things, [so that they would have to surpass the *śrāvakas* just as they surpass the non-Buddhist yogis]. This is the meaning of the first paragraph above. To this one opponent argues as follows.

[Opponent:] Although those who are devoid of worldly attachment resemble *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha arhants* in so far as neither [group] understands reality, they do not resemble each other in so far as [the latter] understand the selflessness of the person, which can bring an end to all afflictions, whereas the former do not. Hence, there is no problem [in the bodhisattva's surpassing the former but not the latter].

[Reply:] Whosoever would claim that this is a plausible response [to Candrakīrti's criticism] is in utter darkness, for, as this is an instance in which we are engaged in the following refutation, namely, that "if *śrāvakas* and *praty-*

ekabuddha arhants do not understand the selflessness of phenomena it is not possible for them to understand the selflessness of the person," [by assuming the opposite of this in their rebuttal] they are confusing the proof for what is to be proved.

The second logical argument is this. It follows, absurdly, that it is not right for *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddha arhants* to have eliminated all of the afflictions of the three spheres because, like the non-Buddhist ascetic, for example, they have not generated within their mental continua the antidote, whose operation actually opposes the ignorance that is the root of all the negative emotions.

[Opponent:] There is no problem. The afflicted ignorance that is the root of cyclic existence is not the apprehension of true [existence] but the view in [218] regard to the perishable [group of aggregates], which apprehends the person to be permanent, unitary, and independent.

[Reply:] Were that so, there would be nothing with which you could counteract the absurd conclusion that animals and so forth, whose minds are not influenced by philosophical principles, have no ignorance, the root of cyclic existence.

This is the meaning of the second paragraph.

The third logical argument, which is taught in the remainder of that passage, is this. It follows, absurdly, that *śrāvaka arhants* do not completely understand the actual selflessness of the person because they have not generated within their mental continua the antidote whose operation actually opposes the mind that incorrectly understands the nature of the person and the aggregates, the basis labeled as the person. This demonstrates that without destroying the object (*zhen yul*) of the conceptual thought that conceives of the basis of the labeling (*btags gzhi*), the aggregates, to be truly [existent entities], one cannot destroy the object of the conceptual thought that apprehends the labeled phenomenon (*btags chos*), the person, to be truly [existent]. Hence, without directly understanding the reality of the person, it is not possible to directly realize the actual full-blown selflessness of the person.[711]

To prove that this method [of interpretation] is what the Acārya Nāgārjuna had in mind, the *Avatārabhāṣya* quotes these lines from the *Ratnāvalī:*

> To whatever extent one has an apprehension of the aggregates
> To that extent does this give rise to an apprehension of the "I."
> If one has an apprehension of the "I," again there is karma.
> And from that again there is birth.
>
> The three paths cannot be ordered in terms of first, last, or intermediate,
> And [as these three] mutually impel each other,
> The wheel of cyclic existence turns
> Like a firebrand [which when turned appears as a continuous circle].

Because this [*samsāra*] does not apply (*thob*),
Either in regard to [notions like] self, other, both, or the three times,
The apprehension of an "I" is exhausted
And so too karma and rebirth.[712]

The meaning of the first four lines is this. Suppose one does not have in one's [219]
mental continuum the antidote that actually opposes the operation of the apprehension of the aggregates as truly [existent]. To whatever extent [such an apprehension of the aggregates as real things] exists, to that extent will there exist unabatedly the innate apprehension of the "I," [that is, to that extent] will one not have generated the antidote that actually opposes the operation of [such an innate apprehension of the "I"]. If *that* exists, under its influence one accumulates karma and takes rebirth in cyclic existence. This is what it is teaching.

Although it is claiming that the apprehension of the "I" must arise in dependence on the apprehension of the aggregates as truly [existent], it does not teach that if person *X* has within his or her mental continuum the apprehension of the aggregates as truly [existent], then he or she must also have the apprehension of the "I," or that if he or she has *that,* then he or she must accumulate karma and take rebirth in cyclic existence. For example, it is just like this. If we say that the barley sprout must arise in dependence on the barley, this in and of itself does not imply that when the barley exists so too must there exist the barley sprout.[713]

The meaning of the middle stanza is this. The three paths, that is, the afflictions and the extreme afflictions of karma and rebirth, have no definite sequence in terms of one being first, one last, and one intermediate. Each instead arises based mutually on another, turning, like the wheel of a firebrand.

The meaning of the third stanza is this. The inherent birth of the aggregates, in terms of either self, other, or in the three times, does not obtain; it is perceived to be nonexistent. Hence, by the power of this the apprehension of the "I" will exhaust itself and so too will the karma and birth that [arise] from it.

Again, [this is stated in] the *Ratnāvalī* section from: "Just as the eye is mistaken" up to

Knowing the nonobjective existence of beings
Truly and as they are,
Like a fire without a cause [220]
There is no abiding, no taking [birth], just *nirvāṇa*.[714]

[Opponent:] This is said only in regard to bodhisattvas.
[Reply:] It is not, for immediately after *nirvāṇa* it says:

Likewise, bodhisattvas too
Perceive it and desire enlightenment.

Nonetheless, because of their compassion
They continue to take rebirth until enlightenment.

The words *likewise* and *too* imply that the previous [lines] *were indeed* referring to the *śrāvakas.*

[Question:] Well then, if the *śrāvakas* understand the selflessness of phenomena, then does the *piṭaka* of the *śrāvakas,* which is the basis of their study, contemplation, and eventual understanding of selflessness, *also* teach the selflessness of phenomena?

[Reply:] To prove that it *does* teach it the *Avatārabhāṣya* explains it in this way:

> For the purpose of eliminating the afflicted obscurations of the *śrāvakas,* the *sūtras* taught to the *śrāvakas* also elucidate [the nature of] compounded phenomena by means of such examples as a ball of foam, a bubble, a mirage, a plantain tree, and an illusion. Take for example this passage:
>
> The Friend of the Sun, [Buddha,] has said
> That form is like a ball of foam,
> Feeling like a bubble,
> Recognition like a mirage,
> Composition like a plantain tree,
> And consciousness like an illusion.[715]
>
> To demonstrate this very point the Acārya [Nāgārjuna] has himself said:
>
> The *Mahāyāna* teaches nonarising.
> The other [*yāna* teaches] extinction.
> But as both extinction and nonarising have the same meaning, emptiness,
> Forbear (bzod) from [disparaging either teaching].[716]
>
> Likewise, [Nāgārjuna has said in *MMK*]: [221]
>
> The Lord, with his knowledge of nonentitiness,
> In his *Advice to Kātyāyana*
> Refuted [all of the extremes]
> Of existence, nonexistence, and both.[717]

Because the meaning of the second scriptural citation [*Ratnāvalī* (IV, 86)] is more difficult to understand, I will explain it. The commentary says:

> Someone thinks that if the lack of a self within phenomena is also taught in the Śrāvakayāna, then the Mahāyāna teachings would be purposeless, but whatever system holds such an opinion should be understood to be in contradiction to the scripture and reasoning presented here.[718]

The opponent being referred to here is Bhāvaviveka, for in the *Prajñā-pradīpa*[719] he refutes Buddhapālita's explanation in the commentary to the seventh chapter [of *MMK*], where the latter claims that the Hīnayāna *sūtras* teach the selflessness of phenomena, by saying that were that so, the teachings of the Mahāyāna would become purposeless. To this one must ask, "Does it make the teachings of the Mahāyāna purposeless in general or is it that it makes the teachings of the selflessness of phenomena in the Mahāyāna purposeless?" In the former case, that is, were one reduced to the absurdity [that all the Mahāyāna teachings are purposeless simply because the Hīnayāna *sūtras* also teach the selflessness of phenomena], then it would imply that the only reason [for the Buddha's] teaching the Mahāyāna was to teach the selflessness of phenomena. This is not so, however, for in the Mahāyāna is also taught [concepts such as] the bodhisattva *bhūmis*, [the perfections] such as giving and so forth, prayer, dedication, compassion, and other such aspects of method (*thabs*), not to speak of the inconceivable powers of the bodhisattvas. The *Ratnāvalī* says:

Because the Śrāvakayāna
Does not explain the prayers of the bodhisattva,
Nor their activities, nor their dedication, [222]
How [can those who follow this *yāna*] become bodhisattvas?

The goal of abiding within the activities of the bodhisattva
Is not spoken of in those *sūtras*.
It is spoken of in the Mahāyāna;
That is why the sage will take *it* up.[720]

In the latter case it also does not follow, [that is, it does not follow that the Mahāyāna teachings of the selflessness of phenomena are purposeless simply because this is also taught in the Śrāvakayāna,] for there exists the difference that the *śrāvaka piṭaka* teaches a very condensed form of the selflessness of phenomena that eliminates only the afflicted obscurations, whereas the Mahāyāna teaches in an extensive fashion the selflessness of phenomena so as to eliminate every last obstacle to knowledge. The *Lokātīta Stava* says:

You taught that without understanding the signless
There is no emancipation.
That is why in the Mahāyāna
You taught this fully.[721]

[Question:] Well then, in the system of the Acārya [Nāgārjuna] what is meant by the claims that there exist the following differences: (1) between the Mahāyāna *piṭaka* teaching the selflessness of phenomena in a complete fashion, although the Hīnayāna does not and (2) as regards the paths of these two systems, between whether or not the selflessness of phenomena is meditated upon in a complete fashion?

[Answer:] It does not mean that in the Mahāyāna one establishes truthlessness in regard to all phenomena and then meditates on this, whereas in the Hīnayāna one establishes truthlessness only in regard to a few phenomena and then meditates on it. This is because when one has ascertained by means of a valid cognition the truthlessness of one phenomenon in dependence on a correct logical reason (*rigs pa*), one is able to ascertain the truthlessness of any other phenomenon intuitively at will (*blo kha phyogs pa tsam gyis*) simply by relying on that very same reasoning. This I have already explained.

Therefore, as was explained in the *Prajñāmūla*, in the Mahāyāna one [223] comes to ascertain the truthlessness of each and every basis, [that is, of every phenomenon,] in reliance upon all sorts of different kinds of logical reasoning; and even in regard to a single basis, one comes to ascertain truthlessness based upon "many doors"; that is, based upon different logical reasons. For this reason [in the Mahāyāna] the mind becomes much better versed in reality. In the Hīnayāna reality is established by means of a very condensed form of logical reasoning. Hence, the mind does not become as well versed in reality as in the previous case where [the understanding] is based upon "the many different doors" of reasoning. For this reason there is said to be a difference in the extent and completeness of the meditation on the selflessness of phenomena. Also, the existence of such a difference is a reflection of the fact that [in the Mahāyāna] one strives to eliminate the obscurations to omniscience (*shes sgrib*) whereas [in the Hīnayāna] one does not. This completes the exposition of how the glorious Candrakīrti explains [these points].

4.2.3.1.3.5.2.2. The Refutation of the Misconception That Believes That [Exposition] to Be Incorrect

One raving lunatic has made the following claims. (1) It is not correct for Candrakīrti to claim that without understanding the selflessness of phenomena it is also not possible to understand the selflessness of the person because the Sautrāntikas perfectly ascertain the selflessness of the person, setting it forth according to both scripture and reasoning, but do not ascertain the essencelessness of the aggregates.

(2) It does not follow that in order to ascertain the essencelessness of the labeled phenomenon (*btags chos*) it is necessary to also ascertain the essencelessness of the basis of the labeling (*btags gzhi*) because the sect of the Vātsīputrīyas understand the pot to be a labeled entity but reify the atoms, which are the basis of the label, considering them substantial entities.

(3) The following claims are mutually contradictory: (a) *śrāvaka arhants* understand the selflessness of phenomena, (b) all the apprehensions of true existence are afflictions and *śrāvaka arhants* eliminate all of the afflictions, [224] and (c) [bodhisattvas] do not eliminate their afflictions completely at the sev-

enth *bhūmi*, but from the seventh *bhūmi* on they can surpass the *śrāvaka arhant* by virtue [of the fact that they possess] the wisdom which understands the selflessness of phenomena. This being the case, it follows, absurdly, that even [the bodhisattva of] the seventh *bhūmi* could not surpass the *śrāvaka arhant* by virtue of his intellect because in that seventh *bhūmi* he has not obtained the ability to eliminate all of the afflictions by the power of his wisdom, whereas the *śrāvaka arhant has* obtained it.

(4) It follows, absurdly, that the *śrāvka arhant* has even eliminated all of the "affirmative misunderstandings" (*'jug pa gzung rtogs*) that are to be abandoned [during the path] of seeing (*mthong spangs*) [of the Mahāyāna] because he has completely abandoned apprehending things as truly [existent]. If you accept *this*, it follows, absurdly, that he would have obtained the "peak junction" (*rtse sbyor*)[722] of the path of seeing (*mthong lam*), and it would be completely absurd to accept *that*.

(5) It is not proper to accept that if one apprehends the aggregates to be truly [existent], one must accumulate karma via the apprehension of the "I" and must take rebirth in cyclic existence. [Were it so,] it would follow, absurdly, that the stream enterer who sees the four dharmas[723] takes birth in cyclic existence under the power of karma because he apprehends the aggregates to be truly [existent].

(6) The meaning of the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* is also not [as you claim]. Instead it is to be explained as follows. From the sixth *bhūmi* on down the power of the wisdom that understands selflessness does not have the most perfect ability to eliminate the subconscious (*bag la nyal*) afflicted obscurations (*snyon sgrib*). That is why [the bodhisattvas on those levels] do not surpass the *śrāvaka arhants* by virtue of the power of their intellect and [why], obtaining that in the seventh level, they surpass them [from that point on].[724] When the *śrāvaka* obtains arhantship he abandons the afflicted obscurations that bind him to cyclic existence but he does not obtain the ability to eliminate the sub- [225]
conscious afflicted obscurations.

What is more, the meaning of the scriptural citation from the *Ratnāvalī* [is not as you claim but is instead as follows]. The greater one's apprehension of the true existence of the aggregates, the greater will be one's apprehension of the "I"; and the greater one's apprehension of the "I," the greater will be one's accumulation of karma and the greater will be the [likelihood of] birth that depends on that karma.

[The Response to the Preceding Criticism][725]

(1) The first reductio is meaningless. For someone who believes that "if the selflessness of phenomena has not been understood, then neither has the selflessness of the person," the claim that Sautrāntikas correctly establish, [that

is, understand,] the selflessness of the person by means of valid cognitions remains but a hypothesis to be proven. Hence, it is quite clear that your reductio has not measured up to the standards of valid logical argumentation, for you posit to your opponent something that has yet to be proven [to him or her] as if it were a correct refutation [of his or her position]. Just ask yourself, do we [believe] that anyone from the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas on down understands by means of a valid cognition the full-blown actual selflessness of the person? [Of course not!] Just as ordinary beings who do not have even a rough idea of philosophical tenets have not destroyed the operation of the innate apprehension of the self of the person, neither have these Buddhists [from the Svātantrikas on down]. Moreover, on top of that [mere lack of understanding], these Buddhists possess in their respective systems a belief in the self of the person that is imputed by the philosophical (*kun brtags*) apprehension of the self of the person, for they accept that the person exists by virtue of its own characteristic, that is, that the referent labeled by the term *person*, if searched for with logical reasoning, *can* be posited. Hence, when looked at from this point of view, if you have anything to show us that can refute us and that does not itself require proof, some reason that is not itself disputed, then let it out! [226]

(2) What do you mean when you say that the *śrāvaka* Vātsīputrīyas understand the pot to be a labeled entity? Do you mean that they merely *accept* it to be a labeled entity or do you mean to say that they actually ascertain it to be a full-blown labeled entity by means of a valid cognition? In the former case, it would follow, absurdly, that the Cārvākas, [who are materialists and who claim that there is no rebirth,] would also understand past and future births to be nonexistent [for they accept *that*]. This [alternative] is a meaningless response to our original claim.

In the latter case, do you mean to say, taking the pot [as an example], that the ascertainment by a valid cognition that each of the parts of the pot is not a pot, and that a pot which is a different substance from all of those [parts] does not exist, that such a mere partial [understanding of] *labeled entity* is what you mean when you say that [the Vātsīputrīyas understand] the pot to be a labeled entity? Or instead, do you mean to say, taking the pot [as the example again], that it is the ascertainment by a valid cognition that, except for its being merely linguistically posited as a name *pot,* when searched for by logical reasoning, the referent of the name (*ming don*) cannot be posited, that such a full-blown understanding of "being a labeled entity" is what you mean by saying [that they understand the pot] to be a labeled entity? If the former [is what you mean], that alone cannot be posited as "the ascertainment by a valid cognition that the pot is a labeled entity," for *were* it possible, it would follow, absurdly, that the Sautrāntikas ascertain by a valid cognition the truthlessness of universals (*spyi mtshan*) because they ascertain by means of valid cognition the partial truthlessness of universals.[726] If you challenge [this latter reason,] then forsake your view that the Vātsīputrīyas understand by valid cognition the

fact that a pot is a labeled entity. If you accept [that the Sautrāntikas understand the selflessness of universals,] it follows that they ascertain by a valid cognition the selflessness of phenomena in regard to universals, for that is what you are accepting. If you accept *that,* it contradicts your belief that they do not understand selflessness. You accept both the reason and the pervasion.

What we claim is that when it comes to ascertaining by means of a valid [227]
cognition the full-blown labeled nature [of a phenomenon], if one ascertains the essencelessness of the labeled phenomenon, one must ascertain the essencelessness of the basis of the label. We do not believe that when one ascertains [the basis] to be a labeled entity, where the definition of *labeled entity* is taken as it is posited by *any* system, one is necessarily ascertaining the basis of the label to be a labeled entity. So this does not present the least problem for us, [as we simply do not consider the Vātsīputrīya understanding of what it means for something to be a labeled entity to be a complete and accurate one].

Were this not so, it would follow, absurdly, that the Sautrāntika [whose position] is explained in the *Seven Logical Treatises* is of an inferior viewpoint to the *śrāvaka* Vātsīputrīyas because [they accept the following contradiction, namely,] they understand [according to the premise] that the pot is a full-blown labeled entity, while at the same time being logicians who reify the pot into a substantial entity. You have accepted the three cycles!

If one ascertains by means of a valid cognition the full-blown essencelessness of the person, it is not possible to have the belief that the aggregates exist by virtue of an essence, [that is, that they exist inherently,] because no matter what logical reasoning one utilizes to ascertain the ultimate view of the Madhyamaka in regard to the person, one can, simply by setting one's mind [on the new object], ascertain the truthlessness of the aggregates. Otherwise, to ascertain the truthlessness of all phenomena by the power of logical reasoning it would be necessary to establish with a reason that each and every particular phenomenon is truthless. Were this the case, it would be impossible to ascertain by the power of logical reasoning the truthlessness of all phenomena until one obtained buddhahood [and was omniscient].

If you accept the second [possibility in the] preceding analysis, it would [228]
follow, absurdly, that the Vātsīputrīyas ascertain by means of a valid cognition the ultimate view of the Madhyamaka in regard to a pot.

(3–4) Think of how you would answer if we say, "It follows, absurdly, that [the bodhisattva] of the first *bhūmi* is able to surpass the *śrāvaka arhant* by virtue of his wisdom that understands selflessness because (a) his wisdom, the wisdom that directly understands selflessness, is able to eliminate every obscuration to omniscience that is to be abandoned during the path of seeing (*mthong spangs shes sgrib*), whereas the *śrāvaka arhant* [has no such antidote], and also because (b) the gnosis that directly understands selflessness within the continuum of a first *bhūmi* [bodhisattva] has the ability to lead to an aftermath state (*rjes thob*) which has 112 good qualities, whereas again the

śrāvaka and *pratyekabuddha arhants* lack this ability." You must accept the first reason because you have written in your own treatises that you believe that by abiding in the path of seeing [the bodhisattva] completely obtains a path of seeing that understands the selflessness of phenomena as the antidote to the 108 obscurations to omniscience, obscurations that are to be abandoned during the path of seeing, whereas, the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have no such [recourse]. You must also definitely accept that when the wisdom that understands the selflessness *of phenomena* within the a person's continuum eliminates [those obscurations], obscurations that are to be abandoned during the path of seeing, then the wisdom that understands selflessness in one's continuum does the eliminating. Otherwise, you would not be able to posit, absurdly, that when the inferential valid cognition that understands the impermanence of sound in the continuum of a person clears away the reification (*sgro 'dogs*) that apprehends sound to be permanent, it is the valid cognition in the continuum of that person that does the clearing away of the reification that apprehends sound to be permanent. Hence, to make the distinction that the first *bhūmi* [bodhisattva] cannot surpass the *śrāvaka arhant* by virtue of his wisdom, that is, that wisdom understanding selflessness, but that the first [229]
bhūmi [bodhisattva] *can* surpass him by virtue of his wisdom that understands the selflessness *of phenomena*, is only a cause for laughter.[727]

(6) Again [they say] that from the sixth *bhūmi* on down [the bodhisattva] cannot surpass [the *śrāvaka arhant*] from the viewpoint of his understanding of the selflessness of the person as a whole (*ldog pa nas*) because below that [stage] he has not obtained the ability to eliminate the subconscious afflicted obscurations (*synon sgrib bag la nyal*), but [they claim] that from the seventh *bhūmi* on up he does have the ability to surpass [the *śrāvaka arhant*], even from the viewpoint of the individual aspects (*-ldog- cha nas*) of his understanding of the selflessness of the person, for at that point he obtains the ability to eliminate the subconscious afflictions even from the viewpoint of the individual aspects of his understanding of the selflessness of the person. But all this is just blithering!

It follows, absurdly, [from this view] that the first *bhūmi* [bodhisattva] can surpass the *śrāvaka arhant* even from the viewpoint of the individual aspects of his understanding of the selflessness of the person because the wisdom that understands the selflessness of the person in such [a bodhisattva] is a wisdom not bound by the apprehension of signs (*mtshan 'dzin*),[728] whereas the wisdom that understands the selflessness of the person in the continuum of a *śrāvaka arhant* is a wisdom that *is* bound by the apprehension of signs. When we put it in this way, what option have you but to accept the three cycles?[729] You yourself believe that the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha arhants* do not in the least eliminate the apprehension of true existence and that the "knowledge of the basis" (*gzhi shes*)[730] in their continua is a "knowledge of the basis" that apprehends signs.

Why is it that [the bodhisattva] can eliminate the subconscious afflicted obscurations at the seventh *bhūmi*? Is the gnosis of the seventh *bhūmi* the [230] direct antidote of the subconscious afflicted obscurations, or does it lead directly into the gnosis of the eighth *bhūmi*, which is the direct antidote to those [obscurations]? The first alternative contradicts your belief that they are not eliminated until the eighth *bhūmi* is attained. In the second case, it follows, absurdly, that the "Great" [division of the the] "Supreme Dharma" [stage of the] Mahāyāna path of preparation can eliminate everything abandoned through the path of seeing because that [last stage of the path of preparation, coming as it does just before the path of seeing,] is what actually leads to the Mahāyāna path of seeing, which is what actually eliminates everything abandoned by the path of seeing (*mthong spang*). If you accept this, it follows, absurdly, that one can see reality directly for the first time during the "Great" [division of the] "Supreme Dharma" stage of the Mahāyāna path of preparation, for [at that time] one can eliminate everything to be abandoned during the path of seeing. If this were accepted, one would have to accept such absurdities as the possibility of someone's being an *āryan* while still an ordinary being, an effect's existing at the time of the cause, and so forth. Desist, therefore, from leading those who are not knowledgeable in logical analysis onto incorrect paths with your lies.

To claim that *śrāvaka arhants* do not completely eliminate the afflicted obscurations is a form of skepticism in regard to emancipation. It would follow, absurdly, [from this claim] that someone who is on the *śrāvaka* path of seeing does not completely eliminate the philosophical afflicted obscurations (*nyon sgrib kun brtags*) because the *śrāvaka arhant* does not completely eliminate the innate afflicted obscurations (*nyon sgrib lhan skyes*). If that is accepted, it follows, absurdly, that it would not be possible to consider *śrāvaka āryans* as belonging to the jewel of the *saṅgha* because they would not have utterly eliminated the seeds of ambivalent doubt in regard to the source of refuge. If you claim that the reason is not established, then you are contradicting [your claim that] they have not completely eliminated the afflicted obscurations abandoned during the path of seeing (*nyon sgrib mthong spang*).

What is more, let us consider whether the subconscious afflicted obscurations are chiefly entities that obstruct the attainment of emancipation or [231] whether they chiefly obstruct omniscience. In the first case, it would follow, absurdly, that *śrāvaka arhants* do not obtain emancipation. If you accept that, it contradicts your belief that they have completely eliminated the afflicted obscurations that bind them to *saṃsāra*. In the second case, it follows that the subconscious afflicted obscurations are obscurations to omniscience (*shes sgrib*) because they are chiefly obscurations that impede the knowledge of all phenomena. If you claim that [the predicate] does not follow [from the reason], then how would you go about refuting the claim that "even though something arises from causes and conditions it is not produced," [in other words, in both cases it is a question of definition].

[Opponent:] "That it is an obscuration which chiefly impedes the knowledge of all phenomena" is the etymology of the term *obscuration to omniscience* but is not its definition.

[Reply:] Then how would you react to my saying that "arising from causes and conditions" is the etymology of *produced* but not its definition?

[Opponent:] There are more types of obscurations than simply those two, [that is, obscurations to emancipation and to omniscience].

[Reply:] It would follow, absurdly, that there are more than the two types of enlightenment, that is, more than just emancipation and omniscience, as far as goals are concerned. This is because there are more types of obscurations than simply the two, those that chiefly impede emancipation and those that chiefly impede omniscience, where these obscurations are what impede the attainment of the enlightenments.

What is more, let us consider the definition of a subconscious afflicted obscuration.

[Opponent:] We believe that it refers to the ground of nescient latent potentialities (*ma rig bag chags kyi sa*).[731]

[Reply:] If that were so, then it would be quite inappropriate for you to accept that they are completely eliminated from the eighth *bhūmi* on. This is because it contradicts both the root text and the commentary to the *Uttaratantra* which explain that [a bodhisattva's] taking a body of the nature of mind is [232]
something conditioned by the ground of nescient latent potentialities and pure karma (*zag pa med pa'i las*) and is not abandoned until the tenth *bhūmi*. It is also [inappropriate] because it contradicts the many instances during which Mahāyāna scholars and texts, texts the likes of the root text and commentary to the *Uttaratantra*, explain that the elimination of the ground of nescient latent potentialities is something especially eliminated only by a perfect buddha, whose abandonments surpass those of any bodhisattva. What is more, if they *were* eliminated during the eighth *bhūmi*, then it would contradict the *Ārya Śrīmālā Sūtra* when it explains that an empowered bodhisattva, [that is, a bodhisattva on one of the *bhūmis*,] takes up a body of the nature of mind because it possesses the ground of nescient latent potentialities and pure karma.

What is more, it follows, absurdly, that the bodhisattva who abides on the eighth *bhūmi* would have obtained the limpid perfection, the quality of a *tathāgata's dharmakāya*, because he or she has completely eliminated the ground of nescient latent potentialities. If you claim that [the predicate] does not follow [from the reason], then you have strayed very far from the root text and commentary to the *Uttaratantra* when it says:

> Because of his inherent purity and also
> Because of having eliminated the potentialities, he is limpid.[732]

What is more, the ground of nescient latent potentialities refers to those latent potentialities that cause the error of the appearance of duality (*gnyis snang 'khrul pa*), or refers to those that cause the proliferation of the marks of

the appearance of true [existence]. Until those are completely eliminated one cannot obtain the perfection of the self, which is the pacification of all of the proliferations of the appearance of duality. In this vein the commentary to the *Uttaratantra* states:

> It is based on that very ground of nescient latent potentialities that one comes to possess the subtle misbehavior (*kun tu spyod pa*), the proliferation of marks. Because of this one cannot obtain the extreme noncomposed state, the perfection of the self.[733]

Therefore, the ground of nescient latent potentialities refers exclusively to the [233] obscurations to omniscience. That the ground of nescient latent potentialities refers to the obscurations qua afflictions is something that is not the belief of any Mahāyānist, either Mādhyamika *or* Yogācāra. Likewise, the claim that *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha arhants* do not eliminate the obscurations qua afflictions is something that is not believed by any valid text of either of the four schools of tenets. In the section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* that explains the result of the Hīnayāna path it says:

> What is the result? It is the positive, it is making others understand, it is making others believe, it is the purification of the obscurations qua afflictions, it is the purification of the obscurations qua subsidiary afflictions, it is the purification of what obstructs special qualities.[734]

The purification of the afflicted obscurations in the mental continua of *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha arhants* is explained to be the fruit of the eightfold *āryan* path of the *Hīnayāna*. Both the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* explain that the difference [between the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna paths is this]: the realization (*mngon rtogs*) of the *śrāvakas* purify the obscurations qua afflictions, whereas the bodhisattva's realizations purify the knowledge obscurations. The *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* also says:

> From the subsiding of the three [types of obscurations], the afflictions, those [impeding] omniscience and those [impeding] the path,
> There come about, [respectively,] the purifications of the trainee [*śrāvaka*], rhinosceros [*pratyekabuddha*], and that of the Son of the Conqueror [bodhisattva].[735]

In the commentary to this the *Pañcaviṃśatikāloka* says: "The purification of the *śrāvaka's* afflicted obscurations refers to the purification of desire, anger [234] and ignorance."[736] Many such scriptures, both Mādhyamika and Cittamātrin, explain over and over again that *śrāvaka arhants* do indeed eliminate the afflicted obscurations. Both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna scriptures and their commentaries explain that the cessation [achieved by] *śrāvaka arhants* is an utterly complete cessation, that their extrasensory perception (*mngon shes*) is a form of extrasensory perception that has exhausted all defilements, and that

their gnosis is a gnosis that has exhausted impurities and that knows that [these impurities] will not arise anew. You, however, discarding this great common path that is so widely renowned, are about to enter into the thick forest, the slander of *āryan* beings. Desist!

If the person who accepts this view, [that is, the view that the *arhant* has not completely purified himself], possesses the bodhisattva vows, he or she incurs a root downfall (*rtsa ltung*) as explained in these lines:

> He who holds [the view] that the path of the trainees, [that is, the Śrāvakayāna,]
> Does not eliminate desire and so on [has committed this downfall].[737]

(4) What is more, in the section of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* that teaches about the affirmative misunderstandings and the negative misunderstandings that are to be abandoned [during the path of] seeing and so forth, the teaching that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* lack an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena is posited only as a belief to *some* disciples, but it is not a position that, were we [to analyze] which belief he actually accepts, would reflect the views of the Lord [Maitreya] himself. There is no problem, therefore, if in this instance [what the Lord Maitreya said in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*] should contradict [what we have said earlier, as it was not ultimately his own view that he was expounding]. Otherwise, [were you to claim that all of the Lord Maitreya's words are to be taken literally,] think about how you would respond to the following situation. [Suppose an opponent] were to say 'that on the one [235] hand you accept the selflessness of phenomena and that on the other hand you contradict the Lord Maitreyanatha's explanation in the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* that dependent phenomena and the real truly exist, [that is, you have no alternative but to admit that not all of the Lord's words—here the latter—are meant to be taken literally].

(5) As has already been explained, we claim that the apprehension of the aggregates to be truly [existent] is the chief cause of the apprehension of the "I." We do not claim, however, that if one has the apprehension of the true [existence] of the aggregates that one must also have the apprehension of the "I." Hence, when you urge on us the absurdity that the stream enterer who sees the four dharmas must be reborn in cyclic existence under the influence of karma, it is a case of a reductio argument [whose original premise] was never accepted [by your opponent].

When you state that the following two statements are in direct contradiction, namely, that (a) the Acārya's explanation that in the sixth *bhūmi* the perfection of wisdom excels [the other perfections] and that (b) his explanation that the sixth *bhūmi* [bodhisattva] cannot even surpass *śrāvaka arhants* by virtue of his intellect, then you must be thinking to yourself that the Lord [Buddha himself] has made a mistake. The *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* explains that the [bodhisattva] on the sixth *bhūmi* or below cannot surpass *śrāvakas* and *praty-*

ekabuddhas and that very *sūtra* also explains that in the sixth *bhūmi* it is the perfection of wisdom that excels [over the other perfections]. Yet you claim that these two facts are mutually contradictory. Are you not denying what is directly evident, namely, that the *sūtra* itself is explaining this to be the case?

What is more, your explanation of the meaning of the *Ratnāvalī* passage is quite amazing. I will explain. Does the intensity of one's apprehension of the aggregates as truly existent decrease from the time one is an ordinary being to the time one is a stream enterer who sees the four dharmas, or does it not? If it does not, it follows, absurdly, that the stream enterer who sees the four dharmas is born more into *saṃsāra* under the power of karma because his apprehension of the aggregates as truly existent increases. You have accepted the three cycles! If it decreases, then is it that it decreases in and of itself without depending upon an antidote or does it decrease due to an antidote? In [236]
the first case it would follow, absurdly, that even without having meditated on the path it would be possible for the obscurations to decrease in and of themselves and that [in this way] one can eventually become enlightened. In the second case, [if it decreases due to an antidote,] then does it decrease due to meditation on truthlessness, that is, is *this* the antidote, or is it that by meditating on the fact that there is no permanent, unitary, and independent person the apprehension of the aggregates as truly [existing] decreases? In the first case, you have strayed from your original thesis, that it is impossible for *śrāvakas* to have an understanding of truthlessness. In the second case, it follows, absurdly, that by meditating merely on the nonexistence of a permanent, unitary, and independent person it is possible to completely eliminate the apprehension of true existence. It also contradicts your belief that all cases of the apprehension of true [existence] are obscurations to omniscience. Also, it is contradictory to claim that during the path of training of the *śrāvaka* the apprehension of the aggregates as truly [existent] decreases, and yet to claim that in the *śrāvaka* path of no-training, [that is, in the state of arhantship,] the elimination of the apprehension of the aggregates as truly [existent things] is impossible. To conclude, I offer this stanza of intermission:

> With strong pride as its motivating force a thought arises,
> And very diligently working it over in their minds, night and day, in the end
> They see such a method to be the way of interpreting this scripture.
> At such a time they can arouse only the disgust, the pity or the astonishment of scholars.

Now in our own system what does it mean to say that the [bodhisattva] of the sixth *bhūmi* or below cannot surpass the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha*, and what does it mean to say that from the seventh *bhūmi* on they can? We [explain it] from the viewpoint of how [the mind] comes to equipoise (*snyom par 'jug*) on reality, for at the seventh *bhūmi* [the bodhisattva] obtains the

perfection of "skill in means" (*thabs mkhas*). Hence, as it says [in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*]:

In this stage called "Gone Afar," in one instant
He will enter into cessation and in one instant [emerge].[738]

At each moment he can enter and arise from the equipoise on the "perfect end" (*yang dag pa'i mtha'*), cessation. Whereas from the sixth *bhūmi* on down [neither they] nor *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddhas* have such an ability. So the section from the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* that goes, "because of the greatness of the understanding of his object," refers to the greatness of the bodhisattva's understanding of his own object, the "perfect end," cessation.

4.2.3.1.3.5.2.3. The Exposition of the Valid Scriptural Evidence Explaining That Śrāvaka *and* Pratyekabuddhas *Have an Understanding of the Selflessness of Phenomena*

4.2.3.1.3.5.2.3.1. The Exposition of the System of the Son of the Conqueror, Śāntideva[739]

The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* [sets forth the opponents position in] the line:

They become liberated by seeing the truths
Why should it be by seeing emptiness?[740]

The meaning is this. [The opponent is claiming that] by accustoming themselves to the direct perception of the sixteen aspects of the [four noble] truths such as impermanence and so on[741] they become liberated from cyclic existence, so why should they have to make an effort at seeing the emptiness of the true existence of all phenomena? In reply it says:

Because scripture explains
That without this path there is no enlightenment.[742]

Without this path that sees [things to be] empty of inherent existence it is taught that none of the three enlightenments[743] can be obtained. As for how it is taught in scripture, the *Great Commentary*[744] *on the Bodhicaryāvatāra* interprets [this verse] by saying that the *Māta Sūtras,* [that is, the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras,*] teach that for those who possess a discrimination of things (*dngos po'i 'du shes*) there is no emancipation and that [all of the Hīnayāna fruits] of the [238]
three times, from that of the stream enterer to that of the *pratyekabuddha,* are obtained in dependence on the perfection of wisdom. It does not interpret [the word *enlightenment* in the verse] to refer only to the complete enlightenment [of a Buddha]. Then (the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*) says:

> Even though monkhood is the root of the doctrine,
> It is difficult;
> For those whose minds possess an object
> Can hardly be said [to have obtained] *nirvāṇa*.[745]

The meaning is this. It teaches that if one has not understood truthlessness, one cannot be considered an "ultimate monk," that is, an *āryan* being, and that the path which possesses an object, that is, a mind apprehending true [existence], cannot obtain emancipation. This, therefore, is the meaning of the lines that go:

> What if [the opponent says] that one achieves liberation through the elimination of the afflictions?
> Then as soon as that happens that would occur.[746]

The opponent's position is this: What if [I say that] one can become emancipated and eliminate the afflictions by meditating on the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths such as impermanence and so forth. The refutation is this: Well then, it would be necessary to say that one had attained liberation, that is, the exhaustion of the afflictions, when one had temporarily suppressed, by meditating on the sixteen aspects such as impermanence, the root [afflictions] such as desire and the subsidiary afflictions taught in the *Abhidharma*, that is to say, everything considered an affliction. This is because no matter how long one meditates on that path one will not have understood the reality of things, so that one will not be able to do away with any of the seeds of the afflictions. If one accepts that, it would imply that as soon as one directly perceived the sixteen aspects such as impermanence one would obtain emancipation. This, however, cannot be accepted because even though the manifest (*mngon gyur*) afflictions may be temporarily absent at that time, those beings are seen to [239]
throw themselves into another future existence by the force of their karma. And to demonstrate this it says:

> But though they lack afflictions
> They are seen to have karmic potential.[747]

[Opponent:] This passage should not be taken to mean that Maudgalyāyana and Ārya Aṅgulimāla and so on have no afflictions, but that [due to] the karmic potentials of their past [lives] they suffer.

[Reply:] To explain it in this way is to miss the point, for if this were [the meaning], it would be unrelated to the arguments that come both before and after it. [It is also to misunderstand the point] for, if this were the meaning, since it would be necessary to consider it as a response to [the first part of] the verse, "What if [the opponent says] that one achieves liberation through the elimination of the afflictions?" one would have to accept that Maudgalyāyana had not obtained liberation, [which is absurd].

Now should the opponent answer that the reason, "they are seen to have karmic potential," is not proven, [Śāntideva] shows it to be the case by demonstrating that the path which understands the sixteen [aspects] such as impermanence and so forth cannot annihilate the craving (*sred pa*), which is the chief cause of taking a future existence:

> If he says that it is quite certain that he lacks
> The craving for taking any further [existence].[748]

To teach the reply to that he says:

> This craving is not an afflicted one.
> Why shouldn't [there be two kinds], just like delusion?
> Craving comes about due to the condition of feeling
> And feeling is something which even *they* have.[749]

The meaning is as follows. The first two lines of the verse teach this. Craving is of two kinds: one is a kind of craving that is afflicted and this refers to the [craving that is one among] the afflictions as they are explained in the *Abhidharma*; then there is a second type of craving, which is not afflicted in such a way. Now it is correct to accept these two [types of craving] because in the case of ignorance, that is, in the case of the delusion that is the root of existence, there are also two kinds; one that is afflicted and one that is not. The [240] two cases are not dissimilar. The reason [that in the case of delusion there are these two types] is accepted by the realist [opponent], for this division into two forms of ignorance, one afflicted and one nonafflicted, is a tenet of all Buddhist schools, both the superior and the inferior ones.

This [verse] teaches that there is a nonafflicted type of craving that is different from the afflictions held in common by both the Abhidharma and the Madhyamaka. It does not teach that there is a craving that is nonafflicted, where being afflicted, [that is, where being an affliction,] is taken as the apprehension of true existence.[750]

If craving is of two kinds, how is this [division] made? In this way. Although the path that understands the sixteen [aspects], such as impermanence, can temporarily suppress the manifest craving that is one of the common afflictions, it cannot suppress even the slightest manifest craving derived from the apprehension of true [existence]. Hence, [these first two lines] are objecting [to the opponent's] reason, that this path completely eliminates the craving that is the chief cause of taking rebirth.

The meaning of the last two lines is this. If one is devoid of the view that understands reality, it is impossible to stop taking rebirth in the world. This is because as long as one is devoid of this [understanding], under the power of apprehending true existence there will arise, without a doubt, the craving for pleasant feelings [*tshor ba*] and the craving for ridding oneself of painful feelings. This is so because, as it has been said, "when a cause contains all of the

conducive conditions and lacks all of the opposing conditions [for ripening], it is certain to give rise to its effect."

How do we, in our own system, turn back the tide of this craving for feeling? [The *Bodhicaryāvatāra*] then says:

> When the one who feels does not exist
> And neither does the feeling exist
> Then how can one *but* reverse this craving
> When one sees things in this light?[751]

It is saying that by the power of accustoming oneself to the insight that the one [241] who feels and the feeling are empty of inherent existence, one, of necessity, turns back the tide of craving. Implicitly it is teaching that if one does not perceive the selflessness of phenomena, the craving cannot be turned back. This is making the same point as the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* when it says:

> How can one who possesses a mind with abiding
> Avoid the arising of the great poison of the afflictions?[752]

Then it explains that unless one destroys the object conceived of (*zhen yul*) in the perception of true [existence], one will conceive of the object as truly existent and that by the force of abiding [in such a thought] the manifest afflictions that have been temporarily suppressed by meditating on the sixteen aspects once again are born within one's mental continuum. To teach this through an example [the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*] says:

> The mind that possesses an object
> Abides within something.
> This mind, which is devoid of emptiness,
> May have stopped them but again they are born,
> As in the equipoise of nondiscrimination.
> Hence, meditate on emptiness.[753]

Be aware, therefore, that the Son of the Conqueror, Śāntideva, and the glorious Candrakīrti are singing the same tune (*dbyangs*) and are of one and the same intention (*dgongs pa*)! In every respect, whether it concerns the fact that *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddhas* understand the selflessness of phenomena, or whether it concerns their exposition of the common and uncommon afflictions, [they both hold] the special tenets of the Prāsaṅgika school.

In regard to the line "craving comes about due to the condition of feeling," Cha pa [Chos kyi seng ge][754] and brTseg dBang phyug seng ge[755] claim that were that so one could prove the existence of the effect by reason of the existence of the cause.[756] In this way they urge the absurdity of contradiction [242] upon the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. In so doing, they are just blithering without knowing whom their actual opponent is, for even in the *sūtras*, in the teaching on the twelve branches of dependent arising, it says "craving is conditioned by

feeling." Hence, [the *Bodhicaryāvatāra's* presentation] is completely identical [to that in the *sūtras*]. Such behavior, [that is, the repudiation of the Buddha's word,] is quite prevalent among Tibetan scholars.

4.2.3.1.3.5.2.3.2. The Explanations of This Point According to the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, *the* Uttaratantra, *and Their Commentaries*

4.2.3.1.3.5.2.3.2.1. How the Abhisamayālaṃkāra *and Its Commentaries Explain This Point*[757]

The [verse]:

> [Opponent:] Because there are no distinctions in the *dharmadhātu*
> The lineages cannot be different.
> [Reply:] It is because of the peculiarities of the dependent (*brten pa*) phenomenon
> That we express their division.[758]

proves that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have an understanding of reality.

In this case, the basis for the perception (*dmigs rten*), [that is, the object,] is called *basis* (*rten*). It is not [a distinction into] "basis (*rten*) and what is based [or dependent = *brten pa*] phenomenon" in the sense of "what is caused and cause" [but instead in the sense of "object perceived and perceiver"]. Therefore, even though the division of the *āryan* beings of the three vehicles into different lineages is not made in regard tō reality qua perceived basis or perceived object (*dmigs yul*) of their respective gnoses, [as these are all identical, in each case being reality,] the division into the three lineages of the three vehicles *is* made with regard to reality in so far as the three gnoses, which are the dependent [phenomena, that is, "the based" = *brten pa*], the perceivers that take reality as their object. When meditated on, these act as the causes of the different *āryan* states, hence the division into three lineages. This is the meaning.

To explain a little more extensively the way that Ārya [Vimuktasena] and Hari[bhadra] deal with such a point, in the section of the *Pañcaviṃśatikāloka* on the verse, ["Since there are no distinctions in] the *dharmadhātu*," it says:

> Conception (*rtog pa*) and misconception (*rnam par rtog pa*) refer to the conceptualization (*mgnon par zhen pa*) of entities (*dngos po*) and of their marks (*mtshan ma*), respectively. As they do not exist, they [243]
> should be understood within nonattachment itself. This very nonexistence is the reality of all phenomena. Hence, this [work, the *AA*,] is

> teaching us that the *dharmadhātu*, being the cause of the qualities of the *āryan*, is the "inherently abiding lineage" (*rang bzhin du gnas pa'i rigs*), the basis for spiritual accomplishment (*sgrub pa'i rtan*).[759]

This explains that the emptiness of truth (*bden stong*), that is, the nonexistence of entities and their signs as they are grasped by the attachment that conceives of them as truly existent, is the *dharmadhātu*.

Then the following objection is raised: "If such a *dharmadhātu* were the lineage (*rigs*), it would follow that all sentient beings abide within the lineage because that *dharmadhātu* is something that generally abides in us all," but when we say "so and so abides in the lineage" we are thinking of a lineage during the time [that person is on] the path [and not something possessed by all beings]. In response to this, the *Pañcaviṃśatikāloka* says: "To the extent that *x*, when perceived, acts as the cause of the qualities of the *ārya*, to that extent is *x* said to be the *lineage*. Hence, how can you urge such an absurdity in this case?"[760] For this same reason the Acārya Haribhadra also says: "Just as it is perceived in the stages of the realization of the *śrāvaka* vehicle, likewise, for the purpose of realizing the qualities of the *ārya*, the *dharmadhātu* is considered to be the cause. It is in this way that it is given the name *lineage*."[761]

These sources are making the point that just because [beings] have reality (*chos nyid*) does not qualify them as abiding in the lineage at the time of the path, [that is, it does not make them fully enlightened beings]. Instead, it is specifically referring to the lineage of the individual vehicles, that is, the *dharmadhātu*, which, when perceived and meditated upon by the paths of each of the three vehicles, acts as the specific cause for obtaining the qualities of [24
the *ārya*. Hence, by means of these texts that explain explicitly that the gnosis of *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha āryans* perceive the *dharmadhātu*, we can prove indisputably that they accept the position that *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddhas* understand selflessness.

Moreover, as proof that the *dharmadhātu* is the lineage of all three vehicles, we find that both the *Pañcaviṃśatikāloka* and the *Great Commentary on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā*[762] say: "Therefore it is said that all *āryan* personalities are distinguished by means of the noncomposite (*'du ma byas*) [emptiness]."[763] The meaning is this. *Distinguished* refers to the act of explanation. What [is being distinguished]? "All *āryan* personalities." From what [are they being distinguished]? From all ordinary beings. How [are they being distinguished]? By means of whether or not they directly perceive the noncomposite *dharmadhātu*. Were this not so, and instead were one to explain [the quote] as distinguishing [*āryans* from ordinary beings] on the basis of whether they *have* the *dharmadhātu*, then you may be able to distinguish *āryans* from nonexistent phenomena [in this way],[764] but you could not distinguish *āryans* from any other existing phenomena whatsoever, [as all existing phenomena, like *āryans*, possess the *dharmadhātu*].

Just as [the previous works] have expressed [this point], the *Vajracchedika* also says: "It is for the purpose of distinguishing the *āryan* personalities by means of the uncompounded."[765]

[Opponent:] Then how do you interpret the following citation from the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, which explains that though the *pratyekabuddha* path eliminates the "misconceptualization of the object" (*gzung rtog*) it does not eliminate the "misconceptualization of the subject" (*'dzin rtog*):

> The path of the rhinoceroslike one, [that is, of the *pratyekabuddha*,] should be understood, in brief, to be based [on two conditions]: (a) that a misunderstanding of the object (*gzung don rtog pa*) has been eliminated, and (b) that a misunderstanding of the subject (*'dzin don rtog pa*) has not been eliminated.[766]

[Reply:] The meaning of this scriptural citation is this. It is not correct to [245
say that though the *pratyekabuddha* establishes by means of a valid cognition that external objects exist in general, by refuting through valid cognition the fact that external objects *truly exist*, they eliminate misconceptualization of the object. Were that so, the misconceptualization of the subject would also have had to have been eliminated because, as I have explained over and over again, if one ascertains by means of ultimate reasoning the truthlessness of *one* phenomenon, one must have the ability to ascertain the truthlessness of any other phenomenon whatsoever simply by turning one's mind toward it at will. If on the other hand one claims that by refuting with valid cognition even the nominal existence of external objects one ascertains the object to be truthless, and that by refuting with valid cognition even the nominal existence of the subject one eliminates misconceptualizing the subject, then the claim that the *āryan* bodhisattva eliminates the misconceptualization of the subject, [that is, of consciousness,] is tantamount to ascertaining with valid cognition that consciousness does not exist even nominally. This is utter nihilism.

Hence, because it is the only plausible choice, we propose the following interpretation of this scriptural passage. By understanding that external objects do not exist even nominally, the misconceptualization of the object is eliminated, and because consciousness, although being established by a valid cognition as existing nominally, is *not* ascertained by a valid cognition to be truthless, the misconceptualization of the subject is *not* abandoned. The commentarial traditions of both Ārya [Vimuktasena] and Haribhadra also [interpret it] in this way. Therefore, to say:

> How amazing the scholar who understands there to be a similarity
> Between *pratyekabuddhas*, who advocate the truth of the subject,
> And the Vijñānavādin, who advocates that ultimately
> Subject and object are not two.

is a cause for laughter.[767]

Therefore, the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* repeatedly states on the one hand that, [24
because *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have no understanding of the selflessness of phenomena, *śrāvaka āryans* understand *merely* the sixteen [aspects] of the four noble truths such as impermanence and so on, that *pratyekabuddhas* understand that external objects do not exist while not understanding that consciousness is truthless, and that the bodhisattva understands that even consciousness is truthless. On the other hand it states that all of the *āryan* persons [*śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* as well as bodhisattvas] of the three vehicles equally understand the selflessness of phenomena.

Not only does the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* teach this, but even the Hīnayāna *sūtrapiṭaka* explains these two [apparently contradictory] possibilities.[768] What is the purpose of stating these [two contradictory stances]? Even among the disciples who possess the lineage of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* there are two types: namely, those whose faculties are utterly ripe and those whose faculties are not. Hence, as I have already explained, [these two different claims are expounded in the scriptures] so as to accommodate both of these [types of disciples]. Though these two sets of two explanations[769] are put forth, one must realize that the explanation that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* *do not* understand the selflessness of phenomena is set forth only for the sake of select disciples [whose mental faculties are not completely ripe], whereas the explanation that they do understand it must be taken to be the correct one. This, for example, should be understood in the same light as the *Pramāṇavārttika's* explaining that external objects both do and do not exist.[770]

Nonetheless, in the system of Ārya [Vimuktasena] and Haribhadra the understanding that "the person is not an independent substance that shares no characteristics with the aggregates" is accepted as being the full-blown understanding of the selflessness of the person. It is because of this that they accept that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena. They do not, however, accept that "to understand the full- [2
blown selflessness of the person" means "to understand the person's being empty of truly existing," [as do the Prāsaṅgikas, for example]. Be aware, however, that the ultimate intention of the *root text* of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, [as opposed to the interpretations offered by the preceding two commentators,] is a Prāsaṅgika one, as it accepts (1) that the person's being empty of true existence *is* the meaning of the selflessness of the person, and (2) that there is no such thing as "inherent existence," even nominally. This method [of interpretation] will be explained more extensively elsewhere.

What is more, as it says in the *Great Exposition of the Avatāra:*

> The meaning of saying that one should realize that in their system, that is, in the commentaries on the *Alaṃkāra*, there are two types [of interpretation] is this. It does not mean that in the system of Ārya [Vimuktasena] and Haribhadra there is taught [the existence] of two

> kinds of *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha āryans*, some of which do understand the selflessness of phenomena and some of which do not.[771] Instead, in a previous section, the possibility of these two kinds [of *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha āryans*] is taught in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* in the context of the path knowledge which cognizes the path of the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddhas* (*nyan rang gi lam shes pa'i lam shes*), and as it is taught for the purpose of accommodating those [disciples] who possess the lineage of the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddhas*, it implies that even in the Hīnayāna there are both fit and unfit vessels for the profound [doctrine of emptiness] who *are to be* accommodated. Because, [from among these two, the fit and unfit,] the latter outnumber the former, for the most part *their* path is more extensively taught.[772]

So, as it says here, come time to teach the profound [doctrine of emptiness] to those of the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* lineage whose minds are not yet ripe, there exist in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* many instances in which the sixteen aspects [of the four noble truths] such as impermanence and so on *and* only the rough selflessness of the person are taught, these being paths that ripen those who are unfit vessels. To accommodate those of the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* lineage who *are* fit vessels for actually receiving the teachings of the profound [doctrine of emptiness], however, once their minds have become ripe the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* sets forth an exposition [of emptiness] based on the [248] premise that even *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddhas must* come to an understanding of selflessness. In this way [we also see that the preceding citation] teaches us that even Ārya [Vimuktasena] and Haribhadra accept that there exist these two ways of teaching [this point in the *AA*]. How could anyone with half a mind believe that the distinction between "those whose minds are ripe" and "those whose minds are not" is made in regard to ordinary sentient beings, but that the *āryans*' minds are not ripe?

If one were to accept that in the system of the Ārya [Vimuktasena] and Haribhadra there are some *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* who do not understand reality, it would follow that some *āryans* would be "distinguished by means of the noncomposite"[773] whereas others would not be so distinguished. Were this so, how could [the texts] explain that "all *āryans* are distinguished by means of the noncomposite"? What is more, to take that to be the purport of [Tsong kha pa's] *Exposition* (*rNam bshad*) makes it seem as though [the work] is the misconceptualization of a moron who has never learned to think subtly; and so here do not explain [this gloss] as being more subtle, just explain it as being wrong (*zhib par ma bshad kyi logs su bshad par bya'o*)!

Now [it is true that] other Svātantrikas such as Bhavya believe that the Hīnayāna *arhant* does not [in general] have an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena, that is, that those whose lineages as *śrāvakas* and *pratyeka-*

buddhas are definite (*rigs nges pa*), first study the Hīnayāna path, need not understand the selflessness of phenomena, and in this way, without entering another path, obtain arhantship by means of their own path. It is not, however, right to accept that in their system they [hold the position] that *no śrāvaka* or *pratyekabuddha* has an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena. This is because in the system of *any* Svātantrika it is held that there are such things as bodhisattvas who, being of indefinite lineage (*ma nges pa'i rigs can*), first, when they abide in the Mahāyāna path, set themselves to studying and contemplating the selflessness of phenomena and after having meditated on it fall from their own path and come to abide in the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* paths; and because it is necessary to consider as a possibility their even having [249] come to perfect the continuity of the meditation *on* that selflessness which had been previously understood, one must also accept that they can come to understand it *even directly*.

4.2.3.1.3.5.2.3.2.2. The Explanation of the Meaning of the Uttaratantra *and Its* Commentary[774]

Others have used [the following two citations] to substantiate the claim that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* lack an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena. The *Uttaratantra* says: "Someone who lacks eyes cannot see the radiating orb of the sun."[775]

And the *Commentary* states:

> In brief, four kinds of personalities are said not to possess the eye that sees the *tathāgatagarbha*. What are these four? They are as follows: ordinary beings, *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, and bodhisattvas who have newly entered the vehicle. As it has been said: "Oh Lord, this *tathāgatagarbha* is not an object that can be understood by those who have fallen into the view in regard to the perishable group [of aggregates] (*'jigs tshogs la lta ba*), by those who delight in the distorted, and by those whose minds waver in regard to emptiness."[776]

[The interpretation] of this passage, however, is not [as they would have it], for by explaining it in that way it would imply, absurdly, that no ordinary being, nor even a bodhisattva who has newly entered the path, could have an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena, for this same explanation must [according to them] be interpreted to mean that no *śrāvaka* or *pratyekabuddha* has an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena [and as all four are mentioned in the citation, what applies to the latter two must also apply to the former two]. If it is accepted [that no ordinary being or bodhisattva has such an understanding], then it follows, absurdly, that even a

bodhisattva on the path of preparation (*sbyor lam*) could not understand the selflessness of phenomena. [250

Moreover, were [this interpretation correct] it would follow, absurdly, that the root text and commentary suffer from the fault of actually being self-contradictory in so far as they say [on the one hand] that:

> The self-arisen ultimate
> Is to be understood by means of faith.[777]

thereby explaining that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas do* understand the *tathāgatagarbha* by means of their faith in the Tathāgata, whereas [according to you the previous passage is stating] that they do not understand it at all. This follows because if the Tathāgata is understood by means of faith, he must have *been* understood.

Therefore, what those scriptural passages are saying is as follows. That "they fall 'into the view in regard to the perishable group [of aggregates]' " means that some sentient beings have not generated within their minds the valid cognition that counteracts the way in which the self of the person is viewed. That "they delight in the distorted" means that some *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* do not understand the subtle selflessness of the person due to their misconceptualization of impermanence and so on as truly [existing]. Because they do not possess the fortune of understanding, as yet, the subtleties of the selflessness of phenomena, [emptiness] is said not to be the object of those bodhisattvas who have newly entered the path and "whose minds waver in regard to emptiness."

In what way are they not objects experienced [by those individuals]? Those beings who lack eyesight cannot understand what the orb of the sun [is like] under their own power, that is, seeing it with their own eyes. Still, following the explanations of other beings they can come to ascertain that "the orb of the sun must be somewhat like this." Likewise, those persons [described earlier] cannot employ reasoning under their own power to understand [251
the *tathāgatagarbha*, but following the teachings of the Tathāgata they are said to come to an understanding of it gradually by means of faith. Were one to explain [these citations] as teaching that no ordinary being, *śrāvaka*, or *pratyekabuddha* understands reality *at all*, it would make no sense.

What is more, in the *Commentary* to [the stanza] that goes:

> There are four types of stains: that of the lustful,
> That of the heterodox, that of the *śrāvaka*, and that of the *pratyekabuddha*.[778]

where it explains the three types of misguidedness (*thabs ma yin pa la zhugs pa*) it says:

> The proud misperceive emptiness, and those who misperceive emptiness also misperceive emptiness even as regards the door of libera-

tion. Overpowered by this, it is easy for a mountain of misperception [to occur] in regard to the person, Kāśyapa. But the proud's misperception of emptiness is not so.[779]

If this is saying that misconceptualizing emptiness to truly exist is misguided, what need is there to claim that it must also be saying that misconceptualizing *things* to truly exist is misguided. Hence, this scripture is teaching us that they are misguided who seek liberation and yet have misconceptions [concerning the nature of phenomena], [thinking that things] truly exist, lacking as they do an understanding of the full-blown [doctrine of] selflessness. Hence, in our system all realists are misguided.

Immediately following [that latter] citation, it says:

> There are two ways to be on the right track: (1) abiding within the ascertainment of the real (*yang dag pa nges pa nyid du zhugs pa*) that is associated with the vehicle of the *śrāvakas*, and (2) that associated [252]
> with the vehicle of the *pratyekabuddhas*.[780]

Now because such an explanation that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* are on the right track does not mean that they are on the right track with regard to compassion and the arising of the altruistic mind (*sems bskyed pa*), [instead it must be claiming that they are on the right track] with regard to the wisdom that understands selflessness. Specifically, it must be referring to the fact that they realize full-blown truthlessness, for within the present context, that is, when put in terms of being on the right track or on the wrong track, it is not understanding truthlessness that is here explained to be "being on the wrong track." Hence, these scriptures make it quite clear that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas do* have an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena.

[Opponent:] Well then, why does the *Commentary* on this section say:

> that is, except for those beings who abide in the Mahāyāna and who have stainless understanding. Besides these, there are four kinds of beings, and they are (1) the lustful, (2) the heterodox, (3) *śrāvakas*, and (4) *pratyekabuddhas*. They do not understand the *tathāgatagarbha*; and the stains that do not allow [the *tathāgatagarbha*] to become manifest are also fourfold.[781]

[Reply:] This is an explanation of the fact that they do not understand the stainless *tathāgatagarbha* and that it is not manifest [within them], where what it means by "having the *tathāgatagarbha* become manifest by means of the elimination of the four stains" is the attainment of the *dharmakāya*, for the [253]
Commentary on this section says:

> Those four *dharmas*, such as trust and so forth, that is, the antidotes, are what when meditated on bring about for the bodhisattvas the at-

tainment of the perfection of the incomparable *dharmakāya*. The fourfold stains of these kinds of beings are the fourfold stains.[782]

And again, the *Commentary* to the *Uttaratantra* says:

> From the cause, which is the improper mentation in which the childish who possess subconscious [obscurations] and who possess the apprehension of signs engage in objectification, there arises the afflictions. From the cause, the afflictions, there arises karma. From the cause, karma, there arises birth. And all of these afflictions, and karma, and afflictions of birth that belong to the childish come about due to improperly understanding this one element [the *tathāgatagarbha*]. [783]

This is explaining that all of the afflictions of the childish arise under the influence of their not understanding the ultimate truthlessness [of things]. The words *the apprehension of signs* refers to the apprehension of true [existence], and the words *improper mentation* refer to apprehending things as inherently either pleasant or unpleasant, under the influence of that apprehension of true [existence]. It explains that based on that [improper mentation] all of the afflictions arise and that due to that one accumulates karma and is reborn in *saṃsāra*. This explanation is not the slightest bit different from the meaning of the previously explained quotes from the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and *Ratnāvalī*.

Moreover, in this section the *Commentary* quotes a *sūtra:*

> Oh Mañjuśrī, there can be no thought, cognition, or being conscious of what does not arise and does not cease; and that of which there is no thought, cognition, or being conscious there is no misconception (*kun tu rtog pa*), no misconception qua improper mentation. The practice of *proper* mentation does not elicit ignorance. Whatever does not elicit ignorance does not elicit the twelve links of existence.[784] [254]

It is stating that due to mistakes, namely, all of the proliferations of dualistic appearances of thought, cognition, and consciousness, [we apprehend] true arising, and that by means of proper mentation, namely, by means of the direct understanding that there is no true arising, we come to abandon the ignorance of apprehending true [existence], the misconceptualization that consists of improper mentation, and that by abandoning *that* we abandon the twelve links of existence. Therefore, there is not the slightest difference in the explanation that the innate apprehension of true [existence] is afflicted ignorance, and the glorious Candra's explanation that the counteractive force of the perfect wisdom of truthlessness is necessary to free ourselves from *saṃsāra*.

One should be aware of the fact that even though the Ācārya Āryāsaṅga interprets the purport of the *sūtras* of the final wheel from a Vijñāptimātra viewpoint in such works as the *Bhūmis*, the *Samuccaya*, and the *Mahāyanasaṃ-*

graha, and so on, in this *Commentary* to the *Uttaratantra* he properly explains the philosophical viewpoint of the Prāsaṅgikas. Though there are a multitude [255] of reasons [for saying this], as it would lengthen [our discussion] excessively, I will not write [further on this point] here.

Therefore, those who would maintain that in the *Maitreyadharmas*[785] and in the system that follows them *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* [are not accepted] as understanding the selflessness of phenomena are like those who, bereft of the eyes of intelligence, follow and then commit themselves to the mere words of their ancestors. In other words, it is pointless!

4.2.3.1.3.5.2.4. An Extensive Explanation of Scripture and Logical Reasoning Proving That It Is Correct [to Claim That] Śrāvakas *and* Pratyekabuddhas *Have an Understanding of the Selflessness of Phenomena*

4.2.3.1.3.5.2.4.1. The Exposition of the Logical Reasoning

[Question:] Among the beliefs of the Mahayanists are two great traditions, one that believes that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* understand the selflessness of phenomena, and one that believes they do not. So which do you yourself follow and advocate?

[Reply:] I myself, under my own power, am not endowed with the ability to present arguments in regard to the tradition of any Mahayanist. Nonetheless, through the kindness of my holy guru, who is free from all error, I have come to an unmistaken understanding that the stainless radiance of the logic of the glorious Candra has made clear the correct path of the meaning of the Ārya [Nāgārjuna's] purport. Based on this I have generated a fearless self-confidence in argument and analysis after having seen that, outside of the tradition of the glorious Candra, all of the explanations of the purport of the Ārya [Nāgārjuna] and the Conqueror [Śākyamuni], when examined in the light of the scriptural passages and logical reasoning that follow his methods, are like a pile of leaves exposed to a strong wind.

Some maintain that merely accustoming oneself to the direct insight [256] (*mgnon sum du mthong ba*) of the emptiness of a permanent, unitary, and independently existing person and to the sixteen [aspects] of the four truths,[786] such as impermanence and so on, one can completely do away with the apprehension of the self of the person and the stains of the afflictions. To those who advocate this position, I pose the following questions.

(1) Suppose one accustoms oneself, in accordance with the divisions of meditative practice, to the valid cognition that understands as impermanent all the entities that, from among phenomena and persons, you accept as being examples of phenomena. Will one or will one not then come to completely

perfect clarity in regard to the object meditated on in such a way that those entities are directly perceived to be impermanent?

If one does not, then, likewise, it would follow that even if one understands the sixteen aspects of the four truths, such as impermanence, and then accustoms oneself to them, that neither can one come [to perfect the clear appearance of *these sixteen*, as one was not able to perfect the clear appearance of even one]. What is more it contradicts what is claimed [in the following scriptural passage]:

Thus, by exceedingly accustoming oneself
To what is real, [that is, emptiness,] and what is not,
[that is, conventional properties of objects like impermanence etc.,]
One perfects the meditation,
Bringing as its fruits a mind clear and nonconceptual.[787]

If accustoming oneself in this way *does* lead to completely perfecting clarity, then it follows that *that alone* can rid one completely of the seeds of the reifying misconception which apprehends phenomena to be permanent, because merely accustoming oneself to the direct perception of the aspects of the four truths, such as impermanence and so on, can rid one, [completely and] without a trace, of the reifying misconception that apprehends the person to be permanent.

If one accepts *that*, then it follows that by means of completely abandoning the reifying misconception which apprehends *phenomena* to be permanent one can completely rid oneself of the obscurations to omniscience, for by [257]
means of ridding oneself completely of the seeds of the reifying misconception that apprehends the *person* to be permanent one is able to rid oneself completely of the afflictions. If one accepts *that*, then it follows, absurdly, that it is not at all necessary to meditate on the selflessness of phenomena as an antidote to the obscurations to omniscience.

(2) [Opponent:] The direct realization of the aspects of the truth of suffering, such as impermanence and so on, refers to the direct realization of the subtle impermanence (*phra ba'i mi rtag pa*) of the five aggregates that are taken up (*nyer len gyi phung po lnga*), the actual exemplifications of the truth of suffering.[788] By means of accustoming oneself to this, one rids oneself of the seeds of the reifying misconception that apprehends the five aggregates to be permanent. By means of *that*, one rids oneself of the seeds of the apprehension of the person, which is imputed on the basis of the five aggregates as something permanent, unitary, and independent. *Then* one completely rids oneself of the afflictions. This is what we maintain. We are not claiming that by means of accustoming oneself to directly seeing the impermanence of the person one gets rid of the seeds of the apprehension of the person as permanent, thereby completely ridding oneself of the afflictions. Hence, we are not at fault.

[Reply:] Well then, what are the five aggregates, phenomena or person? If they are phenomena, it contradicts the claim [made by some of you] that the exemplification of the person is the fivefold aggregates, [and by others that, from among the five, it is the aggregate of] consciousness.

If they are the person then, as you are claiming that strictly by means of accustoming oneself to seeing the person [the five aggregates] as impermanent one can rid oneself of the seeds of the apprehension of the person as permanent, and that then, by means of that, completely rid oneself of the afflictions, you have not been able to extricate yourself from falling into the same absurd conclusion I mentioned earlier.

(3) It follows [from your position] that by means of abandoning the seeds of the apprehension of a self in regard to such phenomena as the aggregates one necessarily abandons the seeds of the apprehension of a self in regard to [258] the person, for by means of abandoning the seeds of the apprehension of the permanence of such phenomena as the aggregates one necessarily abandons the seeds of the apprehension of the permanence of the person. This reason is something that you yourself actually accept. If you accept [the predicate], then your tenets are undermined, for [in your own system] you accept that to abandon the seeds of the apprehension of the self of the person it is not necessary to realize the selflessness of phenomena. When I state this, what can you reply?

(4) It follows that you are unjustified in distinguishing between the realization of the impermanence and so on of the four noble truths as a path that can extirpate the seeds of the afflictions and the rough peace (*zhi rags*) of worldly beings as a path that *cannot* extirpate the seeds of the afflictions, for there is no difference as to the way in which both of these paths apprehend their object; that is, neither of them comes to understand the ultimate reality of the object, the objects of both of these paths being conventional realities (*kun rdzob kyi gnas tshul du grub pa*). So what do you say to this?

[Opponent:] The scriptures explain that these two paths differ as to whether or not they can extirpate the seeds of the afflictions.

[Reply:] Who is claiming that the scriptures do not claim this? Just prove [to me] through reasoning that such an explanation is of a definitive meaning that is to be taken literally. We have already said that this was an exposition spoken for the benefit of those disciples who are not fortunate enough to directly realize the subtle selflessness of the person.

(5) If what is taught in the *sūtras* of the first wheel, [that is, the first turning of the wheel of the doctrine,] such as the fact that the mere realization of the person's being devoid of a permanent, unitary, and independent self is the full-blown realization of the selflessness of the person, is of definitive [259] meaning that is to be taken literally, then how do you avoid advocating that one also ascertains the selflessness of *phenomena* merely by negating that subject and object are different substances, as taught in the *sūtras* of the final wheel.

If you claim that to define the selflessness of phenomena in merely that way, [that is, merely in terms of their nonduality,] is in logical contradiction to what is taught in the *sūtras* of the middle wheel, that is, that the fact that all phenomena are empty of truly existing is the reality of phenomena, then in the same way you should also be claiming that to define the selflessness of the person in merely the way it is explained in the first wheel is in logical contradiction to what is taught in the *sūtras* of the middle wheel, namely, that the person's being empty of inherently existing is the reality of the person. Both cases are completely similar.

(6) If something is the apprehension of true [existence] (*bden 'dzin*) in regard to a phenomenon *x*, does it follow that it is also the apprehension of self (*bdag 'dzin*) in regard to that phenomenon *x*, or does it not? If it does not, then it undermines [your position] that if something is the apprehension of true existence, then it follows that it is the apprehension of self. If it *does*, then it follows, absurdly, that the mind that apprehends the true [existence] of the person apprehends the self in regard to the person, for it is the apprehension of true existence in regard to the person. There is no response to the three cycles!

(7) By reason of [your accepting] that all apprehensions of true [existence] must be apprehensions of the self of phenomena, not only are you forced into accepting, but you in fact [willingly] accept, that the apprehension of true [existence] in regard to the basis, the person, is a form of apprehension of the self of phenomena. If that is so, then it follows, absurdly, that all of the thoughts which, referring only to phenomena as the basis, apprehend them to be permanent, unitary, and independent are forms of the apprehension of the self of [260]
the person, for all thoughts which, referring to the person alone as the basis, apprehend true [existence] are forms of the apprehension of the self of phenomena. If you accept that, it follows, absurdly, that the conceptual thought that apprehends sound to be permanent and the conceptual thought that apprehends the *pradhāna* of the Sāṃkhyas and so on are also forms of the apprehension of the self of the person. This critique undermines the positions of all you "logicians" in one fell swoop.

(8) The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* states: "[The truth of] cessation is defined as [the state] in which, having perceived reality, defiled entities, [that is, the afflictions and so on,] cease."[789] In this way, [we see] that the truth of cessation is said to refer to a specific [aspect] of reality, for [it states that] based on the inherent purity (*rang bzhin rnam dag*) the various seeds of the adventitious (*blu bur*) defilements (*dri ma*) are abandoned by means of the antidote. Hence, there is no difference whatsoever between scholars of the Mādhyamika and Cittamātra [schools in this regard]. All accept that if something is a truth of cessation, then it must be [a form of] reality. Now it follows [from all this] that *śrāvaka āryans* directly understand reality because they directly understand the truth of cessation. You actually accept the reason and the opposite [of the

predicate] and, because you in principle accept the pervasion, [you are left carrying] a great burden of the most heavy internal contradiction.

(9) The Cittamātrins accept that (a) all dependent entities (*gzhan dbang*) and conventional truths are objects that, when perceived, increase the afflictions; and (b) the objects that, when perceived, purify the obscurations belong ex- [261]
clusively [to the category of] the real (*yongs grub*). Thus, for them to advocate that all the objects of the gnosis by means of which the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* completely get rid of the afflictions are *dependent entities*, and that they cannot perceive the real is a great internal contradiction in their tenets.[790]

(10) Based on the apprehension of the person as permanent, unitary, and independent there arises the mind that apprehends "mine" (*bdag gir ba 'dzin pa'i blo*) and the afflictions such as the lust that desires what pleases it and that does not desire what brings suffering. Likewise, based on the apprehension of the person as truly [existent] there arises, completely analogously, all of the conceptions of "mine" as truly [existent] and so forth. Therefore, it is a grave mistake to make the distinction that the complete abandonment of the afflictions requires abandoning the apprehension of the person as permanent, unitary, and independent, but that it does not require abandoning the apprehension of the person as truly [existent].

(11) It would follow [from your position] that there would be no relationship between all of the many instances in the scriptures when it says that at the end of the Lord's discourse on the fact that all phenomena are empty of true existence, when he had set forth that exposition of the doctrine, so many hundreds of thousands of living beings attained the fruit of stream enterer, so many attained the fruit of once returner, and so on. [There would be no relationship between the doctrine preached and the fruit attained] because it is not possible for *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* to understand the selflessness of phenomena.

4.2.3.1.3.5.2.4.2. Bringing Scriptural Exegesis to Bear [on the Problem][791]

[This section will include discussion] not only of the previously quoted [citations] from the *Avatārabhāṣya* but also other [scriptural passages] such as the follow- [262]
ing one from the *Sthirādhyāśayaparivarta Sūtra* quoted in the *Prasannapadā:*

> For example, a certain man who is present when a magician does a trick will, when he sees the woman conjured up by the magician, generate a mind of attachment. Coming under the influence of a mind of attachment, the audience becomes fearful and uneasy. Arising from his seat, the man leaves. He cultivates in his mind the fact that this woman is impure, impermanent, suffering, and void. He cultivates in his mind the fact that she is selfless.

> What do you think, oh son of the family, at that time, has that man proceeded correctly or has he proceeded incorrectly?
>
> Lord, the efforts of that man to cultivate in his mind the impurity of a woman who does not exist, to bear in his mind her impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and selflessness are incorrect.
>
> The Lord spoke: Oh son of the family, in the same way should one consider whatever monk or nun, layman or laywoman who cultivates in his or her minds the impurity of a phenomenon that was never born, never arose, who cultivates in his or her minds the impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and selflessness [of that phenomenon]. I do not say that those fools meditate on the path, for they are abiding in error.[792]

And also, the *Dhyāyitamuṣṭi Sūtra* says: "Mañjuśrī, because they do not see [263]
the noble truths as they are, sentient beings, whose minds are deluded with the four mistaken attitudes,[793] cannot go beyond this wretched *saṃsāra*."[794] In response: "Mañjuśrī said, 'Lord, please teach us what it is that, when perceived, allows beings to go beyond *saṃsāra*.' " In response to this request [the Buddha said]:

> When one meditates on impermanence and so on in such a way that one conceives of it as truly [existing], thinking, "I have gone beyond *saṃsāra* . . . I have obtained *nirvāṇa*," thinking, "I have understood suffering; I have abandoned its cause; I have actualized cessation . . . I have meditated on the path," there is said to arise the thought "I have become an *arhant*," and there arises the thought "If I temporarily abandon the manifest common afflictions, as they were explained previously, all of the defilements [must be] exhausted." But it is said that when they see themselves about to take another birth at the time of death, they come to doubt the Buddha [and his teachings] and because of this fault they fall into the great hells. Now this is something that applies to some who abide in such a [wrong] path but not to all. Then Mañjuśrī says, "then *how should* the four noble truths be understood? When I asked previously about liberation from *saṃsāra* you said that it was necessary to see the four noble truths as they are, but what is the meaning of that?" In response to that [the
> Buddha said], "Mañjuśrī, whoever sees that all composite things are [264]
> not born understands suffering. Whoever sees that all phenomena do not arise abandons the cause [of suffering]. Whoever sees that all phenomena are utterly *nirvāṇa* actualizes cessation. Whoever sees that all phenomena are totally unborn has meditated on the path.[795]

Having said that, it goes on to clearly state that that path leads to *nirvāṇa*, the end of rebirth. It states that insight into the four truths as essenceless is what

liberates one from *saṃsāra,* and that a path which is still conjoined to the apprehension of true existence cannot liberate one from *saṃsāra*. The *Vajracchedika* also says:

> "Subhūti, what do you think, does he who is a stream enterer think to himself 'I have obtained the fruit of stream enterer'?" Subhūti spoke: "No Lord, he does not. And why is that? Lord, it is because he has entered nothing. It is because of that that he is called a stream enterer."[796]

and also:

> "Lord, suppose there is a stream enterer, and suppose he thinks to himself 'I have obtained the fruits of stream enterer,' he would be apprehending its self. He would be apprehending sentient beings, he would be apprehending a life force, he would be apprehending a personality."[797]

The last three fruits [once-returner, nonreturner, and *arhant*] are treated in a similar way [in what follows of this passage]. To claim, however, that when the [265]
stream enterer thinks to himself "*in a merely nominal way* have I obtained the fruit of stream enterer" that *that* is the apprehension of the self is something both baseless and out of context. Hence, it is saying that he does not think to himself "I have obtained the fruit of stream enterer" in such a way that he conceives [of things] as *truly [existent]*. Therefore, it clearly teaches us that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* possess the wisdom that understands truthlessness.

Moreover, in [the section] on "the instruction on practice" (*sgrub pa la gdams pa*), the *Pañcaviṃśati* says:

> "If this world were filled with monks the likes of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, like a swamp packed with reeds, their wisdom would not amount even to one one-hundredth of a bodhisattva's single day of meditation on the wisdom engaged in the mother, [that is, which meditates on the perfection of wisdom]." Having said that, the Venerable Śāriputra said this to the Lord: "Lord, the wisdom of a stream enterer, once returner, nonreturner and *arhant,* the wisdom of a *pratyekabuddha,* the wisdom of a bodhisattva, a great being, and the wisdom of the *tathāgata,* the *arhant,* the perfectly enlightened one, all of those wisdoms have no divisions; they are solitary, unborn, natureless, and empty. Lord, if what has no divisions is solitary, unborn, natureless, and empty, cannot be separated, cannot be perceived as
> different, then, Lord, how can the bodhisattva, the great being, when [266]
> he meditates for a single day on the wisdom that is engaged in the perfection of wisdom be said to surpass the wisdom of all *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*?"[798]

The meaning of the question he is asking is this. One should not take it to mean that "it follows, absurdly, that it is not possible to distinguish such wisdoms because the wisdoms of all of the *āryan* persons of the three vehicles, being empty of truly existing, have no divisions." This is because, though they have no divisions ultimately, they can be divided conventionally. Hence, it is correct to give as an answer "there is no problem" [from the point of view explained earlier], whereas it would be unrelated, [that is, out of context,] to give the answer that "there is a great difference from the viewpoint of whether or not they possess all of the aspects of method and whether or not [their wisdom] is conjoined to [*bodhi*] *cittotpāda* and compassion and so on. Therefore, the critique implicit in the question is that, "it follows, absurdly, that it is incorrect to distinguish the wisdom understanding reality into superior and inferior, depending upon which of the *āryan* persons of the three vehicles it belongs to, because, all being inherently solitary, inherently unborn, and empty, that is, lacking existence by virtue of own nature, like water in water, they cannot be divided into different varieties." Therefore, the reply that goes
"even though there are no divisions as regards the aspects of such wisdoms, it [267]
is possible to distinguish them into superior and inferior from the point of view of whether or not the wisdom meditated on possesses the supreme of all forms of method and whether or not it is conjoined to *cittotpāda*" is extensively taught in such passages as the following:

> "Śāriputra, what do you think, does the wisdom of all of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* come close to the goal of the bodhisattvas, the great beings, who, when they meditate for a single day, engaged in the perfection of wisdom, are engaged in the knowledge of all aspects, which possesses the supreme of all aspects, and who think 'I will work for the benefit of all sentient beings; I will become perfectly enlightened in regard to all phenomena and all aspects; I will bring all sentient beings to *nirvāṇa*'?"
>
> Śāriputra spoke: "It is not so, Lord".
>
> The Lord spoke: "What do you think, Śāriputra, no matter how large may be the totality of *śrāvkas* and *pratyekabuddhas*, do any of them think to themselves 'I will become perfectly enlightened into a state of unsurpassed perfect enlightenment, and having done so, I will emancipate all sentient beings into a state of *nirvāṇa* without the remainder of the aggregates'?"
>
> Śāriputra spoke: "It is not so, Lord."
>
> The Lord spoke: "Therefore, Śāriputra, you should understand this exposition. The wisdom of all of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* does not approach even the hundredth part of the bodhisattva's, [268
> the great being's, single day of meditation on wisdom."[799]

Hence, it clearly explains that the inferiority of the understanding of the lesser vehicle and superiority of the greater is determined not by the fact that [the former] does not understand emptiness and that [the latter does], but by the fact that [the former's wisdom] is not conjoined to a special kind of method, whereas [the latter's] is. Although many instances could be cited in support of such a position from the *Extensive and Condensed Mother* [*Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*] as well, fearing that it would make my work verbose, I will forego citing [them here].

What is more, in many of the *sūtras* of the great vehicle many great *śrāvakas* such as the Ārya Mahākāśyapa, Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Ānanda, Anuruddha, Subhūti, Upāli, Mahānāma, Purna Maitrāyaṇīputra, Ājñātakauṇḍinya, and Aśvajit engaged in question-answer sessions with the Lord, in question-answer sessions with the likes of Mañjuśrī, and in question-answer sessions among themselves; and by means of this they set forth the essencelessness of all phenomena, they set forth the equality of existence (*srid*) and peace (*zhi*), and they did so in an extensive way. When this is the case, claiming that *śrāvakas* do not have the slightest understanding of the essencelessness of phenomena is equivalent to denying the experience [of the senses].

[Opponent:] All of those are false *śrāvakas* and not real *śrāvakas*.

[Reply:] Then it follows, absurdly, that, as the Five Honorable Ones (*lnga* [269] *sde bzang po*), [the first five disciples whom the Buddha taught,] are *śrāvakas* in their lineage, the *sūtra* of the first wheel that was taught to them as the chief disciples is not a *sūtra* of the Hīnayāna *piṭaka* [because they were not real Hīnayāna *śrāvakas*]. Also, [because you claim that all the ones I mentioned were fake *śrāvakas*,] name one example of a *real śrāvaka* in the actual entourage of the Lord.

Moreover, the *Ārya Ratnaguṇasaṃcaya* says:

> Do not rely on those who think they are
> *Tathāgatas* or *śrāvakas*,
> Who accept themselves to be *pratyekabuddhas* or to be the King of
> the Doctrine.
> There is nothing to be obtained![800]

Also: "Even those who desire to train in the *bhūmi* of the *śrāvakas* must train in the perfection of wisdom."[801] Such passages also clearly demonstrate that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have the wisdom that understands truthlessness. That this is the intention of the Acārya, the Ārya [Nāgārjuna], is also indisputable. Concurring with the previously cited passage from the *Ratnāvalī*, the *Dharmadhātustava* also says:

> Whoever does not understand it
> Circles in the three existences (*srid pa gsum*).
> I pay homage to the *dharmadhātu*
> Which abides in all sentient beings.[802]

It is saying that without understanding the *dharmadhātu* there is no emancipation from the three existences. The *Nirvikalpastava* also says:

The path to emancipation that was taught
By the *śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas,*
And buddhas is the one reality.
Realize that there is no other.

The *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* also says that if one does not understand emptiness, one will not attain emancipation. [270]

One out-and-out liar has said that that explanation from the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* is saying that if one does not understand the mere emptiness of a self *of the person,* then emancipation is not possible, that is, that it is not referring to emptiness qua ultimate [reality].

[Reply:] The one who advocates such [a view] is advertising himself or herself as one who has never seen the scripture of the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa.* This is because the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* itself says:

The pacified mind will not become deluded.
The lack of delusion is the understanding of reality,
And the understanding of reality brings the attainment of emancipation.
"Reality" and the "perfect end,"
"Signlessness" and the "ultimate,"
And the supreme bodhicitta are reality.
They are explained to be emptiness.
Whoever does not understand emptiness
Has no possibility of emancipation.
Those deluded ones will circle
Within the prison of existence, the six realms.[803]

So without having seen what precedes that passage they quote the last verse alone by itself and explain the purport [of the entire passage] merely by inference.

[On the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Understanding of Nirvāṇa*]*

Moreover, let me offer some small explanation of the following passage from the *Ratnāvalī:*

The Mahāyāna teaches birthlessness;
The other [*yāna*], extinction qua emptiness.
As there is identity in the meaning
Of extinction and birthlessness, refrain [from degrading the
Mahāyāna].[804]

As regards the view that both of these [extinction and emptiness] are synonyms (*don gcig*), one opponent says: if essences existed, because extinction

would not be possible, if one accepts that when the *śrāvakas* obtain *nirvāṇa* their composite [of the aggregates] is exhausted, it would be necessary to accept that the composite [of aggregates] was inherently empty from the very beginning. That is why the Hīnayāna *sūtras'* statement that when *nirvāṇa* is [271] attained the composite is exhausted and the notion in the Mahāyāna *sūtras* that the composite is empty are of the same meaning *(don gcig).*

[Reply:] This is utterly wrong! Were that so, there would be no way to counteract the following reductio argument: "It follows, absurdly, that entities *(dngos po)* and emptiness are synonyms because if something inherently existed, it could not be an entity." Therefore, the [actual] meaning [of their being synonyms] is this. [Let us first consider] this passage from a Hīnayāna *sūtra:*

> The complete abandonment of this suffering, definitely abandoning it, is purification, is extinction, is separation from attachment, is cessation, is pacification, is ability; not being conjoined to any other suffering, its not arising, its not being born, is peace. That is excellence. It is like this. The definite abandonment of all of the aggregates is the extinction of existence, is the separation from attachment, is cessation, is *nirvāṇa.*[805]

Now let us comment on the meaning of this passage. Because it employs the demonstrative pronoun [*this*] when it says *this suffering,* [the section that states the position] from the viewpoint of the suffering or aggregates contained within a [single] continuum in this way goes from "the complete abandonment" up to "ability." [The section] from the viewpoint of the suffering of a future birth goes from "not being conjoined to any other suffering" up to "*nirvāṇa.*"

According to the realists' interpretation of this [passage], when one realizes *nirvāṇa* without remainder to say that "the aggregates are completely extinguished" cannot be taken to mean that the aggregates have primordially extinguished all inherent [existence] because they accept that the aggregates [272] inherently exist. Therefore, they must explain the passage, and do indeed themselves accept that by the power of the path's complete abandonment [of the obscurations] the aggregates become extinct. This being the case, it follows, absurdly, that in the system of the realists the person who actualizes *nirvāṇa* without remainder could not possibly exist because (1) when one actualizes *nirvāṇa* without remainder, the person who is actualizing it does not exist, and (2) as long as that person exists, the *nirvāṇa* is not being actualized. They [the realists] accept the reasons, for they accept that when it is being actualized all composite entities and the aggregates become extinct, whereas all persons must be composite phenomena; and also because all persons must necessarily have aggregates. Because of this we cannot explain the meaning of this passage as the realists do.

According to us, the object of the gnosis of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* that completely allows them to abandon the afflictions pacifies all of the proliferations of dualistic appearances. By means of this, they actualize cessation which is [the fact that] all composite things, including the aggregates, have primordially extinguished inherent [existence]. This is what it means to actualize *nirvāṇa* without remainder in the Hīnayāna, and this is what the *sūtra* is teaching.

The Hīnayāna *sūtras* teach that the cessation which is the end of this kind of suffering is *nirvāṇa* and the Mahāyāna *sūtras* speak of a cessation that is the nonexistence of inherently [existing] birth. To claim that these two teachings are both of the same meaning is the point being made by the *Ratnāvalī* passage [cited earlier]. Therefore, it is indisputable that this is teaching us that *śrāvaka* [273]
and *pratyekabuddha arhants* directly realize the selflessness of phenomena.

In this way [we can see] that this system sets forth the standard for whether or not a *nirvāṇa* is with or without remainder based on whether the *arhant* has left behind the composite aspect of his body. It does not accept that whether or not it is without remainder is determined by whether or not the aggregates of suffering have been extinguished. Because the *arhant,* who has completely abandoned the afflictions, has no remainder of the appearance of true [existence] within the equipoise that actualizes cessation, the [fact that] the aggregates and so on have primordially exhausted inherent [existence], [he is said to have obtained] *nirvāṇa without remainder*. Because in the aftermath (*rjes thob*), when one has arisen from that [equipoise], there is a remainder of the appearance of the true [existence] of the aggregates and so on, [that non-equipoised state] is called *nirvāṇa with remainder.* Therefore, they also do not believe that there is a definite order such that one must always first actualize *nirvāṇa* with remainder and then actualize *nirvāṇa* without remainder, [as having "awakened" from *nirvāṇa* without remainder, the equipoise, it is possible to once again enter *nirvāṇa* with remainder, that is, an aftermath state]. In contradistinction to this, that is, were it as it [is advocated by] the other system, not until the *arhant* had left behind the composite aspect, his body, could he be said to actualize *nirvāṇa* because the previously cited Hīnayāna *sūtra* states that when *nirvāṇa* is actualized, all the suffering of this life is completely abandoned and extinguished. The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā,* in the process of refuting the other [system's] definition of *nirvāṇa,* says:

> If the aggregates do not cease, [274]
> Although the afflictions may be exhausted, one does not [obtain]
> *nirvāṇa.*[806]

In the commentary to this, having cited that very Hīnayāna *sūtra* quoted earlier, [Candrakīrti] says in a very extensive way:

> Now in that *sūtra,* the words "this suffering" refer to the suffering of the present [life]. It explains [the process within the present life] from

the words "completely abandoning" up to "ability". It teaches it with respect to future suffering from [the passage that goes] "not being conjoined to any other suffering" up to "*nirvāṇa*." Therefore, the words "they have extinguished birth in this [realm]"[807] teaches that there are no more births of the present [kind]; and the words "they will not know another existence beyond this one" one should understand to be referring to future suffering. If even within the present life their aggregates do not cease, then it is incorrect [to say that they have obtained] *nirvāṇa*. What if, however, one says that when they see that the nature (*ngo bo nyid*) of arising is such that it does not arise, as they [no longer] perceive arising, they achieve the exhaustion of suffering? Others, however, do not accept [such a method of interpretation, insisting that simply having understood that fact] does not qualify them as having obtained *nirvāṇa*.

The Lord taught *nirvāṇa* to be twofold: that which possesses the remainder of the aggregates and that which lacks the remainder of the aggregates. Now the one that possesses the remainder of the aggregates refers to [a state in which], though the aggregates are still present, [the person] has been freed from being bound by the afflictions. The one that lacks the remainder of the aggregates has the characteristic that [in that state] the aggregates become extinct. Because of this [some] think that the *nirvāṇa* that possesses the aggregates, though in it the bonds of attachment and so on have been abandoned, [275]
is not [really] *nirvāṇa*. If someone thinks this, how do they interpret this passage from the *sūtra*?

> Śāriputra explained,
> "I attained *nirvāṇa* earlier.
> Later on I pronounced this recitation."

To say "you should understand that he said it from the point of view of having actualized [a state in which] there were no afflictions, and not because he was devoid of aggregates" is also contradictory [to your views]. But suppose that were so, then that first set of expressions [in the original *sūtra* quote that says] "the complete abandonment of this suffering, definitely abandoning it" and so forth should not have been explained, and instead it would have been correct to have stated [only the portion] from "completely abandoning those afflictions" up to "they obtain the ability."[808]

And again, the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* says:

If what arises due to the condition of ignorance
Is analyzed with proper knowledge
One will perceive nothing,
Whether arising or ceasing.

The phenomenon perceived then
Is the actualization of *nirvāṇa*.[809]

This [refers] to the *arhants* direct realization of the inherent birthlessness of suffering. This is also the meaning of the *sūtra* when it says: "Monks, the perceived phenomenon is *nirvāṇa*," and also when it says: "My births are exhausted. I have relied on the *brahmācārya* (*tshangs bar spyod pa*). I have done what was to be done. I will know no other existence after this one."

Moreover, the following passage from the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* also explains this same point in a more extensive way:

The knowledge of existence
Is what is called *nirvāṇa*.
Just as things that arise and are then destroyed
Are labeled as having "ceased,"
Likewise the Holy Ones [276]
Accept a cessation that is like a magical creation.
Because they have been destroyed, cessation has occurred
But if it does not [require] knowing the composite,
For whom can that become an experience
And how can it be called *destruction*?[810]

Therefore, this system [of interpretation] is a special great tradition for defining *nirvāṇa*, a tenet not held in common with any other philosophical school. In the process of defining *nirvāṇa* in this way one can effortlessly determine for oneself that the fact that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena is the holy belief of the Ārya [Nāgārjuna]. It seems that in all earlier and later [schools] other [than our own] who boasted of being "Prāsaṅgika Māhyamikas" there did not even occur the slightest suspicion as to the fact that the Ārya Father [Nāgārjuna] and his son [Āryadeva's] definition of *nirvāṇa* may be different, that is, uncommon to that of other philosophical schools. Hence, we [have taken this opportunity] to clearly explain exactly the beliefs of the omniscient Lord of Yogis, our holy and glorious spiritual master [Tsong kha pa] who is a direct follower of the Ārya Father and his son.

Even though we have in an extensive way proven, by means of many scriptural citations and logical reasons, that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* do have an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena, the following question nonetheless may be asked.

[Opponent:] We must accept that the sixteen aspects, such as impermanence and so on, and the selflessness that is the refutation of a self-sufficient substantially existent person (*gang zag rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod*) are established by valid cognition. Therefore, it is also necessary to accept that the [277]
chief disciples for whom these [doctrines] were taught accustom themselves to these objects that are established by valid cognition in this way. At that time,

by virtue of accustoming themselves to those objects, it is possible that those objects, when meditated on, can be understood *directly.* This is proven by the reason that goes "because it is a quality of the special mental continuum that, by accustoming itself, the basis can be grasped by that which apprehends it without having to exert repeated efforts." That being the case, because that gnosis which newly and directly sees those objects is the path of seeing, it has the ability to eliminate all of the afflicted obscurations gotten rid of [on the path of] seeing. If that is accepted, it follows, absurdly, that by accustoming oneself to those objects that are directly perceived the afflicted obscurations to be gotten rid of [during the path of] meditation can be completely eliminated; and if that is accepted, you have repudiated your claim that simply by accustoming oneself to the selflessness that is the refutation of a self-sufficient and substantially existent person and to the understanding of the sixteen aspects, such as impermanence and so on, one is not able to eliminate even the smallest seed of the afflictions.

[Reply:] Well then, the *sūtras* of the final wheel teach a selflessness of phenomena that is the repudiation of the fact that subject and object are not different substances. It is necessary to accept that the chief disciples for whom this was taught establish this with a valid cognition and then meditate on it, and that by means of this meditation they come to newly and directly see that object. It would follow, absurdly, that at that time [they were engaged] in the Mahāyāna path of seeing. If that is accepted, it follows, absurdly, that that [path] has the ability to completely eliminate the obscurations to omniscience which are to be gotten rid of [during the path of] seeing. If that is accepted, it follows, absurdly, that by means of meditating on newly and directly seeing that object, one can completely eliminate the obscurations to omniscience that are to be gotten rid of [during the path of] meditation. If you accept that, it [278]
follows, absurdly, that to become enlightened it is not at all necessary to understand the Madhyamaka view. How would you reply to all of this, for the logic in both this [and your own argument] are completely analogous?[811]

Therefore, granted that the reasoning which establishes [the existence] of yogic direct perception (*rnal 'byor mngon sum*) proves that it is possible for one to first establish, by means of a valid cognition, such a selflessness of phenomena and then, meditating on it, to come to see it newly and directly. Nonetheless, that is not the Mahāyāna path of seeing, and though one may accustom oneself to *that*, it is not the supramundane Mahāyāna path of meditation. The statements that by means of accustoming oneself to the direct perception of such a selflessness of phenomena one can completely eliminate the obscurations to omniscience and then become enlightened must all be taken as statements of provisional meaning. Likewise, we do not claim that, even though the sixteen aspects, such as impermanence and so on, are established by valid cognition and then meditated on, it is impossible to see them directly, [that is, it *is* possible to directly experience them]. All we are saying is that to

see them newly and directly in that way is not the Hīnayāna path of meditation and that, even though one may accustom oneself to *that*, it is not the supramundane path of meditation; and that statements to the opposite effect, namely, that by completely abandoning the afflictions through meditation on the direct perception of the sixteen aspects, such as impermanence and so on, arhantship is attained, are all statements of provisional meaning.

This completes the extensive explanation determining whether or not *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena.

*4.2.3.1.3.5.2.3. The Exposition of the Two [Kinds of] Obscurations (*sgrib pa*) and the Paths on Which They Are Abandoned*[812]

The exposition of the two obscurations as accepted by this Acārya, [that is, Candrakīrti,] is different from that of any other philosophical school from the Svātantrikas on down. In the Svātantrika system the apprehension of true [ex- [279]
istence] is a nonafflicted [form of] ignorance (*nyon mongs can ma yin pa'i ma rig pa*), and all of the manifest (*mngon gyur ba*) apprehensions of true [existence] are manifest obscurations to omniscience (*shes bya'i sgrib pa mngon gyur ba*). Also, the seeds (*sa bon*) that give rise to the apprehension of true [existence] are the seeds of the obscurations to omniscience. The Mahāyāna path of seeing completely eliminates all of the philosophical (*kun brtags*) obscurations to omniscience together with their seeds. The innate (*lhan skyes*) ones are eliminated in stages within the nine *bhūmis*. The six manifest basic afflictions and the twenty manifest subsidiary ones, held in common with the Abhidharma system and others, together with their analogues (*mtshung ldan*) are the manifest afflicted obscurations (*nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa mngon gyur*) and the seeds that give rise to them are the seeds of the afflicted obscurations (*nyon sgrib gyi sa bon*). [This is what the Svātantrikas] accept.

As regards "afflicted ignorance," some Cittamātrin and Mādhyamika Mahayanists accept that [it refers to] the view in regard to the perishable [group of aggregates] that [they take to be] the apprehension of the person as a self-sufficient and substantially existent [entity]. Others believe [that it refers to] a mental factor (*sems byung*) which is unclear or deluded as to the [four noble] truths or karma and its results, and they accept that afflicted ignorance and the view in regard to the perishable are not synonymous.

In this [system, that is, in that of the Prāsaṅgikas,] *afflicted ignorance* refers to the opposite of gnosis, which is the wisdom that understands reality, that is, selflessness. This does not refer to the mere absence of that wisdom or to something that is merely different from it, however, but to the active oppo-

site (*'gal zla mi mthun phyogs*), namely, the apprehension of true [existence] that is the reification that the person and phenomena exist inherently. Therefore, [the Prāsaṅgikas] accept that even the apprehension of a self of phenomena is afflicted ignorance. The *Avatārabhāṣya says:*

> In this regard, because sentient beings are deluded in their perception of how it is that things exist, they are nescient (*gti mug*). Ignorance, [280]
> which has as its nature the ability to obscure the perception of [a thing's] essence, reifying entities that have no own-nature, is the conventional (*kun rdzob*).[813]

Also: "In this way, we set forth conventional truths based on the afflicted ignorance which is the temporary collection of the branches of existence."[814] And also, the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* says:

> One comes to possess attachment toward entities under the influence of afflicted ignorance (*nyom mongs pa can gyi mi shes pa*), which is a consciousness that reifies things into something more [than they are]. We determine [a state] to be the cessation of *saṃsāra* based upon someone's having completely eliminated the seeds that throw one into *saṃsāra*. It is because this has been taught that [the root text] says:
>
> > The seed of existence is consciousness.
> > Objects are its sphere of activity (*spyod yul*).
> > If one sees the selflessness within objects,
> > The root of existence will cease.
>
> As this explains, insight into the essencelessness of the object completely overturns the seeds of existence, the cause of attachment. From this, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* and the bodhisattvas who have obtained forbearance in regard to the dharma of nonarising achieve the reversal of *saṃsāra*.[815]

And also, the *Catuḥśataka* says:

> Just as the body organ, [that is, the organ of touch, pervades] the body
> Nescience abides everywhere.
> Therefore by destroying nescience
> All the afflictions will also be destroyed.[816]

In the *Ṭīkā* to that it says: "Because nescience is delusion [that arises] from conceiving of those [objects] as if they truly [existed], it is determined to be a reification of things into true self natures (*bden pa'i rang gi ngo bo*)."[817]
Now [let us discuss] the reason why that apprehension of true [existence] is [281]
believed to be afflicted ignorance. Because it directly contradicts the way in

which the wisdom that understands selflessness apprehends things, ignorance is the active opposite of gnosis, the cognition that is the understanding of reality. Without eliminating the apprehension of the aggregates as truly [existent things] one cannot eliminate the apprehension of the person as a truly [existent thing]. Without eliminating *that,* under the influence of the [apprehension of the person as truly existent], one accumulates karma. Because that implies, as proven by the previously explained reasoning, that *saṃsāra* cannot be overturned, ignorance is [considered] to be the root of *saṃsāra*. Therefore, because this is the ignorance that is the first link among the twelve links of dependent arising, this is what is accepted as afflicted ignorance. The great Acārya Buddhapālita himself accepts this. The [*Commentary*] *Buddhapālita* says:

> Therefore, the naturelessness of things is reality. By merely seeing *that,* emancipation is obtained. The Acārya Āryadeva also says:
>
> > The seed of existence is consciousness.
> > Objects are its sphere of activity.
> > If one sees the selflessness within objects,
> > The seeds of existence will cease.[818]

And also:

> Therefore, karma and the afflictions arise from a cause, that being conceptualizing things in an incorrect way. Conceptualizing things in an incorrect way arises from mental proliferations (*spros pa*); it arises from worldly (*'jig rten pa'i*) mental proliferations. Those who possess the thought that conceives of phenomena found in the world and those not found [there with thoughts like] "this is a true [thing]," conceive of things in this way or that, and that is why conceptualization [is [282]
> said to] arise from mental proliferations. Mental proliferations cease due to emptiness. Worldly mental proliferations [of things], both those found [in the world] and those not found [there], cease due to emptiness. The nature of entities cease due to the understanding of emptiness. They cease after having understood emptiness. Therefore, emptiness is reality, and by means of meditating on emptiness, one will come to understand reality. The understanding of reality is what we call *emancipation*. Again, the Acārya Āryadeva says:
>
> > In brief, all of the teachings of the *tathāgatas*
> > Can be condensed into two:
> > That phenomena do not endure
> > And that *nirvāṇa* is emptiness.[819]

That this same point is the belief of the Acārya, the Ārya [Nāgārjuna], is unquestionable. This is because the *Prajñāmūla* says:

Emancipation [arises] from the exhaustion of karma and the afflictions.
Karma and the afflictions [arise] from misconceptualizations.
They [in turn] arise from mental proliferation, and mental proliferation
Ceases due to emptiness.[820]

Having said that it goes on to say how that emptiness should be thought of:

One overturns that which is expressed (*brjod par bya ba*)
By overturning the objects of the mind (*sems kyi spyod yul*).
Reality is similar to *nirvāṇa*
In being unborn and unceasing.[821]

It is saying that mental proliferation, the apprehension of true [existence], is the root of karma and the afflictions and that the understanding of emptiness eliminates them, so that one, of necessity, attains emancipation. Emptiness is also explained [therein] as being the *dharmadhātu* that is the cessation of all mental proliferations. Likewise, the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* also says:

If one finds any position whatsoever
One will be seized by the writhing snakes of the afflictions. [283]
Whoever has a mind with no abode
Will not be seized in this way.[822]

It is saying that if one finds within the mind any abode, that is, any object apprehended as being truly existent, one will definitely be seized by the snakes of the afflictions. Hence, there is no doubt that he believes that the apprehension of true [existence] is the ignorance that is the root of all of the afflictions. We therefore also have proven that it is the Acārya's belief that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* understand the selflessness of phenomena [because they have obtained emancipation, which has the former as a prerequisite].

Because there are opposing ways of defining *afflicted ignorance,* there also are tremendous differences in the ways that the other afflictions are set forth, as follows. The view in regard to the perishable qua apprehension of the person as a self-sufficient and substantially existent thing, and the six root afflictions and twenty subsidiary afflictions that arise due to it, afflictions explained in a variety [of ways] in the *Abhidharma piṭakas* of both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, even in this [system, that is, in the Prāsaṅgika school], are accepted as being real afflictions. Based on the innate apprehension of true [existence], which is not recognized as an affliction in any system from the Svātantrikas on down, there arises a thought that apprehends the object as existing in an inherently pleasant or unpleasant way. Based on that there arise, one at a time, attachment, anger, and aversion. From conceiving that the three, pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feelings, exist inherently there arises craving, [aversion] and so forth. Even the attachments that arise based [284]
on the apprehension of true [existence] without depending on apprehending the

person to be a self-sufficient substantially existent [entity] are considered to be afflictions. Therefore every affliction, be it desire, anger, pride, craving, or what have you, has two ways in which it can arise: it can arise based on the apprehension of the person as a self-sufficient and substantially existent [entity] or it can arise due solely to the apprehension of true [existence] without depending on the [former]. Hence, be aware that there are two [ways of considering the afflictions]: one is the exposition of the afflictions as it is commonly regarded [among the lower schools], that is, as it occurs in the *Abhidharma piṭakas* of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna; and the other is the exclusive exposition of the afflictions as it is regarded within this [Prāsaṅgika] system alone.

These afflictions, both common and exclusive, as per [the preceding exposition], together with their analogous mental factors (*mtshungs ldan*), are the manifest afflicted obscurations (*nyon sgrib mngon gyur*) and the seeds that give rise to them are called the *subconscious afflicted obscurations* (*nyon sgrib bag la nyal*) or the *germinal aspect of the afflicted obscurations* (*nyon sgrib sa bon kyi cha*).

[Question:] Well then, what do they accept to be obscurations to omniscience?

[Reply:] The *Avatārabhāṣya* says:

> The latent potentialities of ignorance (*ma rig pa'i bag chags*) are what block one's cutting through to phenomena. The existence of the latent potentialities of the likes of attachment and so forth are also the cause of such things as engaging in [actions with] the body and speech. These latent potentialities of ignorance, of attachment and so on are also exclusively what prevent omniscience and buddhahood. There is nothing else [that does so].[823]

Hence, the point is clearly taught. In this [citation], the latent potentialities of ignorance refer to the latent potentialities of the apprehension of true existence, and the words "block one's cutting through to phenomena" are teach- [285]
ing the definition of an obscuration to omniscience. The words "engaging in [actions with] the body and speech" refer to the negative reflex actions (*gnas ngan len*) of body and speech, like "hopping like a monkey" and calling someone a *stupid woman*.[824] The word *also* expresses that not only are the latent potentialities of attachment and so on that which blocks cutting through to phenomena, they are also the cause of the negative reflex actions of body and speech. Hence, it is demonstrating that those latent potentialities are the obscurations to omniscience.

The negative reflex actions of the mind are the aspect of mental unclarity in regard to the situation of phenomena that are difficult to understand, like, for example, Maudgalyāyana's saying that he could not perceive the rebirth of his mother into the worldly realm called the *hell of brilliance* with his extra-

sensory powers no matter how long he looked. This is included among "those things which block cutting through to phenomena."

[Opponent:] Because those latent potentialities of the afflictions that are the causes giving rise to the negative reflex actions of body and speech in *arhants* are afflicted obscurations, *śrāvaka arhants* have not completely abandoned the afflicted obscurations.

[Reply:] Well then it follows, absurdly, that even the latent potentialities that are the causes of the negative reflex actions of the mind are afflicted obscurations because the latent potentialities that give rise to the negative reflex actions of body and speech are afflicted obscurations. If you accept [the premise], then it follows, absurdly, that if something is an obscuration to omniscience then it must also be an afflicted obscuration, for both the aspects of mental unclarity in the elucidation of subtle phenomena and the latent potentialities that give rise to them are [according to you] afflicted obscurations.

Therefore, the negative reflex actions of the three doors [body, speech, [286]
and mind] that *arhants* possess are accepted to be obscurations to omniscience in every school of both the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra. There is no one who holds the belief that they are afflicted obscurations.

Moreover, latent potentialities are deposited by the apprehension of true existence and by the afflictions, such as attachment, that arise due to that [apprehension of true existence], and these latent potentialities that are deposited within a mental continuum are of two kinds.[825] One has the characteristic that it gives rise to a later equivalent of itself, that is, to the further apprehension of true [existence] or to another affliction. The other has the characteristic that it has the ability to elicit the mere appearance of true [existence] (*bden snang*), that is, an appearance in which the object appears to the six active consciousnesses (*'jug shes*) [the six sense consciousnesses] as if it existed from its own side. The first kind are latent potentialities of the afflictions qua seeds of the afflictions. They are not obscurations to omniscience. The second kind are latent potentialities of the afflictions qua seeds of the obscurations to omniscience. They are not afflicted obscurations. Even though for something to be a seed of the afflictions it must be an afflicted obscuration, in order for something to be a latent potentiality of the afflictions it need not be an afflicted obscuration. The germinal aspect of such an obscuration to omniscience, described as "a latent potentiality that is in error as to the appearance of duality" (*gnyis snang 'khrul pa'i bag chags*), and the aspect of the appearance of true [existence], that is, the appearance of an object to the six active consciousnesses as if it existed from its own side, which is based on those [previous] latent potentialities, is called a *manifest obscuration to omniscience*. Nonetheless, the six active consciousnesses [themselves] need not be obscurations to omniscience. It is similar to the Sautrāntika system where, in the case [287]
of the conceptual thought apprehending a pot, the aspect of the appearance, in

which what appears appears as an external pot, is a universal and a reification, but where the consciousness to which it appears need be neither a universal nor a reification.

Without making these kinds of distinctions, to blanketly accept that in the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika system every consciousness is ignorance and every appearance is an obscuration to omniscience leaves one with no alternative but to conclude that [the Prāsaṅgikas] are the equals of the heterodox Mīmaṃsakas, who accept that being defiled is the nature of the mind itself, so that they end up accepting that when one has completely eliminated the obscurations to omniscience one does not understand phenomena in the least.

The afflicted obscurations are of two kinds: philosophical and innate. The innate apprehension of true existence and the attachment and so on that arise due to it, together with its analogues, are the manifest innate afflicted obscurations. The latent potentialities that give rise to later afflictions, whether they exist in the distant future or as an immediate effect, and which are deposited [within consciousness] by those [previous manifest thoughts], are the germinal aspects of the innate afflicted obscurations. The apprehension of true [existence] that is philosophically constructed, the afflictions such as the apprehension of an extreme (*mthar 'dzin*) and the apprehension of the superiority [of faulty disciplines] (*mchog 'dzin*) that arise due to that, the apprehension of the person as a self-sufficient and substantially existent person, and the afflictions that arise due to that, together with their analogues, are all philosophical manifest afflicted obscurations. The latent potentialities of the afflictions that give rise to these are the germinal aspects of the philosophical afflicted obscurations. Even though, for example, the mental consciousness (*yid kyi rnam par* [288]
shes pa) that is the chief of the analogues of attachment is an afflicted obscuration and actually afflicted, it is not an actual *affliction*. Hence, other analogous phenomena should be understood to be diverse in this same way.

The obscurations to omniscience are not divided into the two [categories] of innate and philosophical. The reasons are as follows. Were that so, then [each of these two] would have to be divided into two [further categories], namely, the [obscurations] abandoned during [the path of] seeing and those abandoned during [the path of] meditation.[826] If that were accepted, then it would be necessary to accept that the Mahāyāna path of meditation could eliminate the philosophical aspects of the latent potentialities [which cause] the error of dualistic appearance, and this cannot [be accepted]. Also, [the division into philosophical and innate obscurations to omniscience is not a tenable one] because it contradicts the [Prāsaṅgika's] belief that from the seventh *bhūmi* on down it is not possible to eliminate even the smallest of the seeds of the obscurations to omniscience.

[Question:] Why is it not possible to posit the minds that apprehend as correct and nonerroneous the appearance of objects to the sense conscious-

nesses as existing by virtue of their own characteristic, together with their seeds, as the philosophical obscurations to omniscience?

[Reply:] The apprehension of the appearance of an object to the sense consciousness as truly [existent] is the apprehension of true [existence]. Hence, it is contradictory to accept that [on the one hand] those are philosophical obscurations to omniscience and [on the other] to accept that every apprehension of true [existence] is an affliction.

What is more, suppose one engages in an analysis of whether or not that aspect of the appearance in which the sense consciousness' own object appears to be truly [existent] is erroneous. Based on faulty reasoning, to apprehend that [the object] exists as it appears, [that is, that it does truly exist and that the appearance therefore is not faulty,] is an afflicted philosophical apprehension of true [existence]. Were this not so, then tell us what it is that *you* accept as being an afflicted philosophical apprehension of true [existence]. If there [289]
were such a thing as a mind that arises in and of itself and that, without engaging in analysis, apprehends that it is correct for [things] to exist as they appear to sense consciousness, that is, that they truly [exist], then that would be an innate apprehension of true [existence] and not a philosophical one.

Therefore, the definition of an obscuration to omniscience is "anything that is or counts as (*rigs su gnas pa*) an obscuration that acts principally to block the attainment of emancipation, which is the mere elimination of the suffering of *saṃsāra*, [as opposed to complete buddhahood]." The definition of an obscuration to omniscience is "anything that is or counts as an obscuration that acts principally to block a single mind's directly cutting through within one instant to [all] phenomena, that is, both truths." If one subdivides afflicted obscurations, they [are said to be] of two kinds: philosophical and innate. The definition of the first is "anything that is either an affliction, together with its analogues, which arises under the influence of a philosophical position *or* a seed that gives rise to that." The definition of the second is "anything that is either an affliction, together with its analogues, which arises independently of the influence of a philosophical position, [arising instead] from the mere seeds of that past continuum that has existed since beginningless time, *or* the seeds that give rise to that." If each of these two [sets of philosophical and innate afflicted obscurations] is further subdivided, each [can be said to have members that are] manifest and seeds. The definition of a manifest philosophical afflicted obscuration is "anything that is a philosophical afflicted obscuration and a mind that apprehends either an object (*dmigs*) or its aspect (*rnam*)." The definition of a seed of a philosophical afflicted obscuration is "anything that, though not apprehending either its own object or [that object's] aspect, nonetheless has the characteristic of having the ability to be the material cause (*nyer len*) that gives rise to a philosophical afflicted obscuration as its effect." The definitions of the two kinds of innate [afflicted obscurations] should be understood analogously.

The obscurations to omniscience, when divided, are of two kinds: manifest and seeds. The definition of the first is "anything that is or counts as both (1) an obscuration existing within the mental continuum of an *āryan* still in training who has completely eliminated the apprehension of true [existence] *and* (2) an aspect of the error of dualistic appearance, the appearance in which an object seems to exist by virtue of its own characteristic." The definition of the second is "anything that is or counts as both (1) something posited on one's mental continuum by an affliction, while being a latent potentiality that is the material cause [giving rise] to the error of dualistic appearance as its effect *and* (2) an obscuration existing within the mental continuum of an *āryan* still in training who has completely eliminated the afflictions." [290]

Even though the errors of dualistic appearance, together with their seeds, within the mental continua of bodhisattvas on the seven impure *bhūmis*[827] are not obscurations that are contained within the mental continua of *āryans* still in training who have completely abandoned the afflictions and the apprehension of true [existence], because they are of the same kind as the obscurations that are contained within their mental continua, they are said "to count as" those obscurations.

"Philosophical afflicted obscurations" and "afflicted obscurations abandoned [during the path of] seeing" are synonomous. "Innate afflicted obscuration" and "afflicted obscuration abandoned [during the path of] meditation" are synonomous. All obscurations to omniscience are abandoned [during the path of] meditation. There are none that are abandoned [during the path of] seeing. This concludes the exposition of the two [kinds of] obscurations.

[How the Obscurations Are Eliminated on the Various Paths][828]

Now I will treat the subject of how those two obscurations are eliminated on the various paths of the three vehicles. The *Avatārabhāṣya* says: "The *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, and bodhisattvas abandon afflicted ignorance."[829] The *bodhisattva* spoken of is the same as the one mentioned in the previously cited passage from the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā*, namely, it is "the bodhisattva who [291] has obtained forbearance in regard to phenomena that are unborn." This refers to the bodhisattva who has obtained the eighth *bhūmi*.[830] Hence, the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha arhants* and the bodhisattvas who abide in the pure *bhūmis* have completely abandoned the afflictions. Even though both of those commentaries explain it in this way, because, as quoted earlier, this is [mentioned] within the context of explaining that the apprehension of true [existence] is afflicted ignorance, all of these three instances are referring to the [fact that] they have completely abandoned the apprehension of true existence together with its seeds.

Therefore, from the seventh *bhūmi* on down not even the smallest seeds of the obscurations to omniscience are eliminated, for (1) the seeds of the apprehension of true existence have not been completely eliminated, and (2) without completely eliminating those, it is not at all possible to eliminate the error of dualistic appearance. Therefore, one commences to eliminate the seeds of the obscurations to omniscience only from the eighth *bhūmi*. Hence, [the Prāsaṅgika belief] is not the same as the belief of the Svātantrikas and Cittamātrins, who accept that one commences to eliminate the seeds of the obscurations to omniscience from the first *bhūmi*. Likewise, one should also [292]
be aware that all of the following teachings from the *sūtras* are expositions that are of provisional meaning, which were taught for those disciples who, for the time being, could not be taught the subtle selflessness of phenomena—to wit, the teachings that the misconceptualizations which are the apprehensions of true existence are obscuration to omniscience; that they are of two kinds, the ones abandoned [during the path of] seeing and the ones abandoned [during the path of] meditation, and that the ones abandoned [during the path of] seeing are eliminated first, whereas the ones abandoned [during the path of] meditation are divided into nine [categories] such as small, medium, and so forth,[831] and that these are abandoned with the nine stages of the path of meditation as their [respective] antidotes. [All of these are provisional teachings that cannot be taken literally].

[Question:] Well then, why is it that no matter how long *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha arhants* accustom themselves to the direct perception of the selflessness of phenomena they cannot eliminate even the smallest of the obscurations to omniscience?

[Reply:] It is because the elimination of the obscurations to omniscience cannot be accomplished by wisdom alone. It requires that the wisdom that perfectly meditates on the selflessness of phenomena be conjoined in a complementary way to the inconceivable special features of method that belong to the Mahāyāna, and the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* lack those aspects of method belonging to the Mahāyāna. They also do not eliminate even the smallest of the obscurations to omniscience because, as explained earlier, their meditation, even on the selflessness of phenomena, is very condensed, lacking the perfect meditation that takes place through an extensive analysis.

Now we turn to the way in which those objects to be abandoned are eliminated by their antidotes. Let us take the path of seeing as an example. The birth of the nonobstructed (*bar chad med*) path of the Mahāyāna path of seeing and the cessation of the afflictions that are abandoned [during the path of] seeing commence simultaneously. The birth of the nonobstructed path of the path of seeing and the elimination of the afflictions abandoned [during the path of] seeing *in such a way that they cannot arise again in the mental continuum* occur simultaneously. The gnosis that in the second instant of that [process] directly understands the special kind of cessation, which is that the pure es-

sential reality (*chos nyid rang bzhin rnam dag*) of the mind is free from the stains of the adventitious [obscurations] that are abandoned [during the path of] seeing, is called the *liberative path* (rnam grol lam) of the path of seeing.

The elimination of the manifest objects to be abandoned in such a way [293] that they do not *temporarily* arise within the mental continuum does not require that a supramundane (*'jig rten las 'das pa'i*) gnosis eliminate the seeds of those [obscurations]; but the elimination of these manifest [obscurations] in such a way that it is impossible for them to arise within the mental continuum *ever again* does require that the seeds of those [obscurations] be eliminated by a supramundane path (*'das lam*). This much is something on which all of the philosophical schools of both the Madhyamaka and Cittamātra agree.[832]

According to those Cittamātrins who believe in a foundation consciousness, even though the mental consciousness in the continuum of someone who is equipoised within the path of seeing is of the nature of undefiled gnosis, it is not contradictory [to maintain, as they do,] that at that time contained within the foundation consciousness are the seeds of [obscurations] that are to be abandoned during the path of meditation. Hence, they accept that there exist the seeds of other things left to be abandoned within the continuum of someone still in training, even while they are equipoised in a supramundane path.

According to the Svātrantrika Mādhyamikas who do not accept a foundation consciousness, at that time there is no foundation consciousness, nor do they accept an exemplification of the person, [that is, something that can be pointed to as being the person,] that is not consciousness. [They believe that] if within the mental consciousness that is the direct understanding of reality there exist the seeds of the remaining [obscurations] that are to be abandoned, then that mental consciousness would be defiled, which would contradict its being undefiled gnosis. If [on the other hand] there existed at that time another mental consciousness within [that person's] mental continuum that contained the latent potentialities of [the obscurations] that are to be abandoned, then it would follow, absurdly, that the person had two mental continua. Hence, [they conclude] that within the mental continuum [of someone] equipoised within the path of seeing there cannot exist the seeds of any [obscurations] to be [294] abandoned. Nonetheless, [they say] that even though those [obscurations] to be abandoned, for the time being, do not arise because the causes and conditions [for their occurring] are incomplete, it is not the case that they have been prohibited from arising again due to an antidote. Even though those [obscurations] that are to be abandoned are not present within the mental continuum at that time, [they maintain that] they have not been eliminated, [so that they can arise again when the meditator emerges from such an equipoise].

In the Prāsaṅgika system, even though there is no foundation consciousness, as will be explained later, [it is the belief that] it is possible for the mere "I" that is labeled in dependence on the aggregates to act as the basis into which the latent potentialities of the afflicted phenomena are deposited.

Hence, [in this latter system] it is not contradictory for there to exist the seeds [of the obscurations] to be gotten rid of [during the path of] meditation within the continuum of someone equipoised within the path of seeing.

The gnosis of the "End of the Stream," the tenth *bhūmi*, is the nonobstructed path that eliminates the most subtle of the remaining obscurations to omniscience, and [the state of] omniscience is the liberative path that depends on the first instant of that [nonobstructed path]. The detailed arguments (*mtha' dpyad pa*) as to how those antidotes eliminate [those obscurations] that constitute "what is to be abandoned" should be known from other more extensive explanations.

[THE STATUS OF INFERENCE IN THE MADHYAMAKA]

4.2.3.2. As Regards the Refutation of That [Object of Refutation], the Explanation of the Differences between the Prāsaṅgikas and the Svātantrikas[833]

4.2.3.2.1. Refuting What Others Believe. [Do Mādhyamikas Have Philosophical Positions?][834]

Many later scholars who think themselves to be Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas make the following claim.

[Opponent:] The Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas have no system of their own, no belief, and nothing at all that they accept.[835] Were they to have such beliefs, then they would also have to accept such things as the syllogisms (*gtan tshigs*) that prove the beliefs of their own system, logical examples, and so forth. Were *that* so, they would essentially become Svātantrikas. It is for this reason that the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* says:

(1) Had I any beliefs [295]
Then I would suffer from that fault,
But since I have no belief
I alone am faultless.

Were I to perceive anything
As the objects of direct perceptions and so on
Then that would have to be either proven or disproven,
But since I do not you cannot accuse me.[836]

And again, the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* says:

(2) Great beings take no sides;
They have no arguments.
How can they who take no sides themselves
Accept the positions of others?[837]

The *Catuḥśataka* says:

(3) Whoever takes no sides
Such as "is," "is not," and "is-is not"
Cannot be accused
No matter how long one tries.[838]

The *Prasannapadā* states: (4) "If one is a Mādhyamika, it is not right to use the *svatantra* form of reason,[839] for they [the Mādhyamikas] do not accept the alternative position."[840] And also: (5) "The point which is refuted in a reductio argument is something related to the opponent, not to us, for *we* have no beliefs."[841] The *Madhyamakāvatāra* says:

(6) Does the annihilator come into contact with what is annihilated
  or not?
If so, then the faults which already have been mentioned
Will definitely be incurred by those who hold to this [view];
But since I do not have a position, this reductio does not apply
  to me.[842]

Hence, whatever expositions, whether of the conventional or of the ultimate, a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika may set forth, are carried out merely for confronting others, but not because it represents [the Prāsaṅgika's] own system. The *Madhyamakāvatāra* says:

(7) I do not accept, even conventionally, [296]
A real (*dngos*) dependent entity (*gzhan bdang*) as you yourself do.
Since they are effects, though they do not exist, I say that they exist
In light of worldly [convention].[843]

The *Vigrahavyāvartanī* says: (8) " 'Since there is nothing to be refuted, I refute nothing.' Hence, there is even no such thing as the refutation of another's position."[844] This is what the opponent claims.[845]

[Reply:] Those who make such claims have, as I have said earlier, misapprehended the extent of what is to be refuted. Hence, they think that the reasoning of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas is refuting *all* phenomena. Then, once refuted, seeing that all those forms of reasoning can be used to refute what they themselves accept, they refute that all those absurdities urged on others are applicable to themselves. Should such absurdities *be* urged, being totally unaware of how to avert such arguments [when turned against them], their one last hope is to say, "we accept nothing."

This is what should be said to them. It follows, absurdly, that Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas are not advocates of philosophical tenets (*grub mtha' smra ba*), for they accept no philosophical positions (*grub mtha'*). If this is acceptable to you, then [the view that] they are the supreme among all advocates of philosophical tenets has been lost.

You, the person who advocates such [a position], *have* beliefs because you are a true believer in the position "I accept nothing."

[Opponent:] To say that "accepting nothing" is accepting something is similar to saying "give me some money," and when answered "I have no money at all," to then reply "give me some of that money you call 'no [money] at all'."[846]

[Reply:] It is a great mistake to say this, for we are [not engaged in mere word games and are instead] claiming that the heartfelt (*zhe bas*) claim to accepting nothing is an acceptance [of something]. We are not advocating that accepting nothing is accepting something. For example, although the permanence of sound is not a tenet, the *heartfelt claim* that sound is impermanent *is* a belief. [297]

It is also not right [*for you*] to make the distinction that the reductio [form of argument] is not to be refuted but that the *svatantra* is. Why? Because in your own system, just as you cannot accept the *svatantra*, you also cannot accept the reductio, and [just as you accept that the reductio is posited as a valid mode of reasoning merely for the sake of some disciples and not because it *actually is* valid reasoning,] there is no contradiction in maintaining that according to the Prāsaṅgika system the *svatantra* is acceptable [as a valid form of reasoning] merely for the sake of some disciples, [hence reducing both the *svatantra* and the reductio to the same fate]. If you accept [the premise], then it contradicts your making such a distinction.

In your own system it follows, absurdly, that even though the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas do not accept philosophical tenets, one can still consider them to be Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas because they accept them when confronting others.[847] This is because Candrakīrti's acceptance of "Prāsaṅgika tenets" merely when confronting others, though he does not accept them in his own system, is enough to make him a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika. The reason is something you yourself accept. If you accept the premise, then it follows, absurdly, that the Conqueror Śākyamuni is a Cittamātrin because, though he does not accept the tenets of the Cittamātrin himself, when he taught the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* he accepted them merely for the sake of other disciples.

It follows, absurdly, that even when merely confronting others, it is not correct to accept the tenets of the Prāsaṅgikas because the person in whose presence one accepts [these tenets], one who accepts [the tenets] when confronting that other person, and the tenets themselves, all of them, are nonexistent [according to you]. If you do not accept [this latter] reason, then you have transgressed [your own view] that it is incorrect to say that any phenomenon exists. [298]

It follows, absurdly, that by advocating from the heart that all words are false one is advocating from the heart that those very words are true in their meaning. This is because the heartfelt claim that "we accept nothing at all" does not imply [according to you] that one is a believer in accepting nothing.

Hence, these two expressions are self-contradictory, resembling each other in every way.[848]

It follows, absurdly, that such scriptural citations as "had I any beliefs" are scriptures belonging to no advocate of philosophical tenets, for they are not the scriptures of any one [school] from the Svātantrikas on down and [according to you] they are also not the scriptures of the Prāsaṅgikas. If you accept the premise, it follows, absurdly, that they are not Buddhists scriptures.[849]

It follows, absurdly, that the distinction between scriptures of definitive and provisional meaning is an incorrect one because the Buddha has [according to you] no system of his own. If you deny [this latter] reason, then you have transgressed [your own claim] that the person who perceives the ultimate Madhyamaka view can have no system of his or her own.

It follows, absurdly, that one cannot declare the *śrāvaka* Vātsīputrīyas to be at all at fault after they examine whether or not the person and the aggregates are of the same or of a different substance [from the aggregates] because they advocate that whether the person and the aggregates are one substance or different substances is ineffable (*brjod du med pa*). If you claim that [the premise] does not follows [from the reason], then you must also give up the [299] claim that the fact that the Prāsaṅgikas do not accept in their own system any such thing as annihilator and annihilated implies that no fault can be declared of the Mādhyamika Prāsaṅgikas when they examine whether the annihilator comes into contact with the annihilated.[850]

Again, the Ārya Nāgārjuna and the glorious Candrakīrti and so forth repeatedly made one-pointed statements like "this is so," "this is not so," "this is correct," and "this is not correct" in the treatises they themselves have composed. Now if these statements do not represent the views of the authors who compose these [works], then tell me, whose views *do* they represent?

Not only that . . . there are many instances in those treatises when [the authors] actually use expressions like "I believe such and such" or "I accept such and such." In the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, for example, it says: "If we did not *accept* convention, however, we could explain nothing."[851] The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* says:

> Those who *believe* that dependent things
> Are neither true nor false
> Like the reflection of the moon in water
> Cannot be deposed by [wrong] views.[852]

Also, the *Lokātītastava* says:

> Clearly, whatever arises from causes
> Must be *accepted*
> As being similar to a reflection
> For they are neither nonexistent nor existent.[853]

The *Prajñāmūla* says:

> Whatever arises interdependently
> Is *accepted* as being empty.[854]

The *Prasannapadā* says: [300]

> It is due to the mere fact of its conditionality that [a thing] is *accepted* as existing conventionally, but not on account of accepting the four [extreme] positions (*phyogs bzhi*), for [otherwise] it would follow, absurdly, that we would be advocating things to have an essence, and this, again, is not correct. When we *accept* the mere fact of its conditionality, as [this implies] the mutual dependence of cause and effect, [it implies that the thing] does not exist by virtue of its own nature, and hence that we are not advocating things to have an essence.[855]

This is clearly making the case that in our own system we accept the conventional fact of mere conditionality, but do not accept an entity that inherently exists. Again, the *Prasannapadā* says: "In this way too does this exist conventionally. Hence, the Acāryas have expounded the fact that [things] exist by existing merely in mutual interdependence. This should be accepted in just this way, without a doubt."[856] This is saying that without a doubt we should accept conventional entities that exist one in dependence on the other. The *Avatārabhāṣya* also says: "The sages believe that this position is free from fault and full of benefit. We should accept it without a doubt."[857] And also:

> Hence, just as we accept the mere fact of the conditionality of that which is interdependent, as we also accept that [things are] labeled in dependence on [other things] (*brtan nas btags pa*), in our system we do not suffer from annihilating anything that nominally exists (*tha snyad*). This is not something that should be accepted [of us] even by our opponents.[858]

Again, the *Avatārabhāṣya* makes many statements like the following:

> [Question:] Does the Acārya at all accept such a special kind of essence, [referring here to emptiness]? [301]
>
> [Reply:] It is when confronted with such [a question] that the Lord [Buddha] taught in a very extensive way that whether or not the Tathāgata arises, the reality of phenomena will nonetheless abide. "Reality" exists![859]

The *Prasannapadā*, commenting on the [*Prajñāmūla*] verse "not from itself, not from another," says: "Hence, one should apply [the adjectives ***no***, ***never***, and ***in no way***] as follows. '***No*** thing is ***in any way ever*** born from itself.' Likewise, [the adjectives] should be applied to the other three beliefs [born from other, both, and neither] in the same way."[860] Again, the *[Avatāra]bhāṣya* says,

[commenting on the verse,] "When it does not arise from itself how can one claim that it does not arise from other things,"[861] "Having elucidated the four beliefs, he explains them by proving them with reasoning."[862] This clearly shows that the four beliefs, the fact that things are not born from themselves and so on, are the beliefs of the [Prāsaṅgika's] own system. Hence, the *Avatāra* says:

> Just as there is no Dharma
> Apart from this one,
> Likewise should the wise understand
> That what exists in these [treatises] exists in no others.[863]

And in the *Bhāṣya* it says:

> Just as there are no other treatises apart from the Mādhyamika treatises that elucidate without error the Dharma called *emptiness*, likewise the wise should understand that the Dharma of emptiness that comes about from this system of explanations, encompassing our own views together with the arguments, exists in no other treatises.[864] [302]

This is insistently stating that this method of setting forth emptiness, as it is explained by Candrakīrti, is a special and uncommon system different not only from that of the realists, but also from that of the Mādhyamikas [who follow] the *Ārya Saṃdhinirmocana*. He adds that this is something the wise should by all means understand. Those who are poor in intellect and fortune may not be able to understand such a special system following the path of reasoning, but at least they should not slander it by saying "there is no such system"! To say "we do not accept any system, whether Prāsaṅgika or Svātantrika Mādhyamika" clearly identifies one as not being a Mādhyamika. So do not take up such a contradictory system that prides itself on being the best among philosophical schools.

How do we then explain the meaning of the scriptural passages cited above?

(1) The verse from the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* that goes "had I any beliefs" is the answer to an objection that goes as follows:

> If the essence of all things
> Did not exist in them all,
> Your own words too would be essenceless
> So that they could not repudiate essences.[865]

The meaning of this scriptural passage, which presents the [opponent's] argument, is as follows: if nothing had an essence, then the words of the Mādhyamika's belief, "nothing has an essence," would also lack an essence. If *that* were so, then that belief would not have the ability to repudiate the existence [303]
of an essence, nor could it bring about an understanding of essencelessness.

The meaning [of the verse that is] a response to this is as follows: were I to accept that everything is essenceless and then accept that the few words of the belief, "everything is essenceless," exist by virtue of an essence, then I would suffer from this fault [which you bring up]. In my system, however, the words of such a belief do not exist by virtue of any essence. Hence, I alone am without the fault you describe, namely, that of being self-contradictory. This is what is meant. [The passage] is not teaching that in general there are no beliefs.

As has been explained previously, the verse, "were I to perceive anything"[866] is teaching that a valid cognition and the phenomenon that it perceives are not *inherently* subject and object. It is not teaching that phenomena and the valid cognitions on which they depend are nonexistent. This is the very point expressed in the *Ṭīkā* on the *Catuḥśataka* line that goes: "Existence, nonexistence, both existence and nonexistence . . .[867]" when it says:

> It is impossible ever to refute someone who is an advocate of emptiness. Since you do not even believe in emptiness, how is the realm of nothingness possible? Therefore, since there is nothing to the extremist positions that accept existence, nonexistence and so forth as inherently existent things, it is impossible to ever offer a rebuttal of someone who advocates emptiness.[868]

(2) The meaning of the passage, "great beings take no sides," is as follows. The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* passage that precedes this verse states:

> Those who have not fathomed this reality, which is interdependence, apprehend the self-characteristic of entities. Without a doubt: [304]
>
> In those who believe in entities
> There arises attachment and anger.
> Their views are inexhaustible, they hold on to what is inappropriate
> And it is from this that disputation comes about.

As this says, for those who do not adhere to the position that entities exist by virtue of their own characteristic there is no disputation that involves upholding one's own position and the refutation of other's position, where these positions are reified into real entities. It is not teaching that we have no system of our own.

(4) The passage from the *Prasannapadā* that says that "we do not accept the alternative position," should be interpreted in the context of the passages from the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and the *Catuḥśataka* and understood in a similar way.

(8) If one interprets the passage that states, "Because there is nothing to be refuted, I refute nothing," to mean that "inherent existence is not refuted because there is no inherent existence," this becomes an instance of a contra-

dictory pervasion. Hence, the meaning is this. The refuting agent does not exist by virtue of its own characteristic because there is not the slightest bit of inherent existence in what is to be refuted, the reified entity. In our own system we *do* believe that both what is to be refuted and what does the refuting are false and illusory things, for the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* states:

Just as one magically created thing can obstruct another
And one illusory man can obstruct another,
Just as an illusion blocks another illusion,
This refutation works in just this way.[869]

(5) The *Prasannapadā* passage that goes, "for we have no beliefs," means that we have no *svatantra* beliefs. It does not mean that we have no system of our own. This is how it is to be explained.

(6) When the *Avatāra* states that it has no position it is saying that the [305]
faults that arise for the realists when they analyze causality in terms of the contact or lack of contact of cause and effect do not similarly apply to ourselves under an analysis of whether what is annihilated comes into contact with what annihilates. Realists believe that causality exists inherently and that it is necessary to establish [its existence] by means of reasoning that exists inherently; that is, that it must be established as something that can withstand analysis. We, on the other hand, have no inherently existent position involving things that are annihilated or things that annihilate. For us, it is not proper to claim that an inherently nonexistent and false thing can be thought of in any terms when it is analyzed through reasoning. This is the meaning.

In the *Bhāṣya,* it states:

> We do not fall into a similar absurdity in our own system, for, from our perspective, even if the annihilator comes into contact with what annihilates, there is no annihilation; and even if the annihilator does not come into contact with what is annihilated, there is no annihilation, for neither the annihilator nor what is annihilated inherently exist. Therefore, we do not think in terms of contact or noncontact.[870]

The phrase, "for neither the annihilator nor what is annihilated inherently exist," is the commentary on the lines [of the root text] that go "I do not have a position."

What is more, in the commentary to those lines it is stating that it is impossible for there to be a form of annihilation that, when analyzed with reasoning in terms of the two possibilities, is determined either to have or to lack contact. A form of annihilation that, when unexamined and unanalyzed, exists only nominally, however, is possible. The *sūtra* passage that involves a question and answer session between the two great *śrāvakas,*[871] which is cited
as a proof text for this point, very clearly states that if one analyzes things by [306]

examining them with reasoning into two possibilities, neither attainments nor realizations exist, but that attainments and realizations do exist in terms of mere worldly conventions when left unanalyzed and unexamined.

Both the root text and the commentary of [*MA*] teach that the annihilation of what is annihilated by the annihilator is possible and that it is necessary to accept the existence of attainments and realizations. It does not teach that we have no beliefs.

Moreover, those who believe that causality exists inherently can be refuted by examining whether a cause does or does not come into contact with its effect when it gives rise to it. As a rebuttal of the possibility that we also suffer from such a fault, the response is made from the viewpoint that we accept essencelessness, not through advocating that we have no system of our own. The *Avatārabhāṣya* states:

> How so in your case?
>
> > Because both [cause and effect] are like an illusion
> > Therefore, I do not suffer from the fault and worldly entities still exist.
>
> For you who analyzes own characteristic in terms of what is produced and what produces it, this is what happens. Our system, however, maintains that because entities are mistaken reifications they arise, but are unarisen and illusory by nature. It maintains that, though essenceless, they become the object of misconception, like the false hair that is perceived by one whose eyes are diseased. It is this system that is the inconceivable one. Therefore, the fallacy, as you have explained it, does not apply to us, and as the entities of the world are still established without examination, everything exists.[872]

What is more, if there are no beliefs or philosophical positions in our [307] system, then how could the Conqueror Maitreya have said: "This [system] accepts this to be real and that belief depends on compassion"? The belief that the three jewels that can arise within one's own continuum in the future are something to be attained, the belief that the teacher is the Buddha, who has already in the past attained this in his own continuum, that the Dharma is the path, and that the Spiritual Community are those who help one on the path—all such beliefs, being part of the common and uncommon practice of refuge, would not be possible. Nor would it be possible to engage in the practice of the superior thought (*lhag bsam*) that accepts the task of dispelling the suffering of all sentient beings, or of the aspirational [altruistic] mind (*smon sems*), that pledges to attain enlightenment for the sake of others, or of the active [altruistic] mind (*'jug sems*), that accepts the task of training in the practices of the bodhisattva, or of the disciplined mind (*spong sems*) that pledges to abandon every action that is not in accord with the training of the monk. This,

of course, implies the complete destruction of the sprout that brings about the great medicinal tree that is the Tathāgata, the one that heals all beings.

[Opponent:] Although we do not accept these things in our own system, we *do* accept them when confronting others. Hence, there is no fault.

[Reply:] That being the case, your moral discipline, the generation of your [altruistic] mind *(sems bskyed)*, your going for refuge, and so forth become for you mere words and are not from the heart. All these points have been very clearly set forth [just as Maitreya does in the preceding passage]. To state that all of the fallacies we set forth apply equally to you, and to *accept* this without reservation, is truly amazing.

According to the tales told by most of the meditators of this Land of Snows, to have the "view" *(lta ba)* is to be devoid of beliefs. "Meditation" is [308] being devoid of all thought, being devoid of all action, both positive and negative. The "fruit" is to be devoid of all hope. This is what they advertise. However, all of this reduces to nothing more than the view that maintains that the mind should be blanked out, that nothing should be apprehended. Thinking that nothing is so or not so, they pride themselves on having generated understanding in their minds. Those who maintain this great nihilism, that in our own system we have no beliefs, are singing the same tune as those who maintain the view of Hva Shang, that the mind should be blanked out.

This has been an extensive refutation of the view that in the Prāsaṅgikas' own system nothing is to be accepted. This also serves as a proper refutation of the fact that the difference between the Svātantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas consists of the fact that the Svātantrikas are the Mādhyamikas who believe in valid syllogistic reasoning to establish the beliefs of their own system, whereas the Prāsaṅgikas only go about refuting the beliefs of the realists by means of reductio arguments, not accepting valid syllogistic reasoning themselves. This is because if they accept nothing in their own system, all of the previously stated faults will arise; and because if they do accept something, then they have transgressed their view that it is possible to believe in things without establishing them through valid knowledge. If one were to accept that whatever one believes must be established by means of the valid cognition of direct perception, then it would follow, absurdly, that all phenomena should be evident to one [because they would be ascertained through the direct perception of the senses], and there would be no difference between one's own system and that of the Cārvākas who maintain that the only valid cognition is direct perception. If one accepts that understanding through inference is possible, one has strayed from one's original assertion that [Prāsaṅgikas] do not accept valid syllogistic reasoning.

[The previously mentioned distinction between Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas is also to be refuted] because, as explained earlier, it has been stated that there exist four positions: that things do not arise from themselves, and so

forth. Those positions cannot be established simply by direct perception without depending on syllogistic reasoning. [309]

[It is also to be refuted] because many passages, like those that follow, teach a logical reason (*gtan tshig*) to prove the beliefs of our own system. The *Avatāra* states:

> Because things arise interdependently,
> Concepts cannot be analyzed.
> And so, by the logical reason of dependent arising
> The infinite net of wrong views is cut.[873]

And also:

> Because there is no such thing as arising from self, from another
> From both, or causelessly, everything is essenceless.[874]

And also:

> Because there can be no action without an agent,
> There can be no "mine" without the self.[875]

Also, in the *Bhāṣya* on the lines:

> Just as one [can see the negative consequences such as eclipses and so on even in the reflection]
> Of the variations that exist within the orb of the sun [when it reflects in water, for example,]
> [So that this occurs in a merely dependent and nominal way
> Without first having to determine the correctness of whether or not the sun and the reflection meet or do not meet][876]

it says:

> Because what we call a *reflection* does not exist in the least, it is in no way possible to entertain thoughts like "it [the sun's reflection] arises when it comes into contact or when it lacks contact with the orb of the sun." Nonetheless, when the reflection is perceived due to its nearness to the condition, the form [of the reflected object, here the sun,] it permits one to ascertain the point that one desires to understand. Likewise, one should be aware that it is an annihilating entity, empty of inherent existence, that annihilates the entity to be annihilated and that it is a syllogistic reason that is devoid of adequate reality (*'thad pa dang bral ba*), that is, that is empty of inherent existence, that proves a premise; and as there is no need to split them up into two [possibilities, for example, contacting or not contacting,] a similar reductio cannot be urged upon our own words.[877]

This is making the case that it is our own position [to accept that] it is a syllogistic reason devoid of the possibility of inherent existence that proves a premise.

[Another Opponent:] A Svātantrika is one who on examining reality, accepting such a thing as a proof of essencelessness has the belief in essencelessness within his or her own system, whereas a Prāsaṅgika is one who, though nominally accepting a position of his or her own on the occasion of examining reality, does not in his or her own system accept even the syllogistic [310] reason that proves essencelessness, but who instead refutes the beliefs of others who accept the existence of an essence by means of a reductio argument.

[Reply:] This too is not correct, for by refuting the existence of an essence one is affirming the nonexistence of an essence, as these two are in direct contradiction to one another, being mutually incompatible. Were this not so, just ask yourself how you would answer someone who says "we affirm essencelessness, but we do not refute the existence of an essence."

Now what reason is there for not accepting a belief on the occasion when one analyzes reality?

[Opponent:] It is because if something exists when one is analyzing reality, it must ultimately exist.

[Reply:] Well then, take the analysis of reality [itself]. It follows, absurdly, that it does not exist when one is analyzing reality because were it to exist at that time, it would have to ultimately exist. If you accept [the premise], then it follows, absurdly, that it is impossible to analyze reality by means of Madhyamaka reasoning; this is because it does not exist when reality is being analyzed. One should realize that this same methodology can be applied to the *reasoning* that analyzes reality, to the *proponent* (*snga rgol*) who is analyzing it, to the *opponent* (*phyir rgol*) for whom the analysis is being done, and so forth.

It follows, absurdly, that the refutation of others' beliefs simply by reductio arguments does not take place upon the analysis of reality because it does not ultimately exist. You have accepted the three cycles.

The following are contradictory beliefs: (1) to advocate on the one hand that on analyzing reality there are no beliefs and (2) to accept that in one's own system all phenomena are accepted [as existing] nominally; this is because the [311] occasion on which one analyzes reality is itself a mere nominal entity.

You are also very mistaken if you think that not having any beliefs ultimately means not having any beliefs on analyzing reality, for not even Svātantrikas accept having beliefs ultimately, and hence this cannot be a distinguishing feature of the Prāsaṅgikas.

Although there appear to be many different variants on this view on the part of previous [scholars], such as the belief of the Pandit Jayānanda and so on,[878] I will not go into them here because (1) were I to mention them one by one it would make this work voluminous, and because (2) it is very easy to refute these other positions simply by following what I have already explained.

[Another Opponent:] The Prāsaṅgika is one who carries out the refutation of the logical object of refutation (*rtags kyi dgag bya*), such as *arising, cessation* and so forth, without affixing the qualifier *ultimately,* whereas the Svātantrika is one who carries out the refutation after having affixed the qualifier *ultimately.*

[Reply:] This too is not correct. Take, for instance, the citation of the *Extensive Mother Sūtra* in the *Avatārabhāṣya.*

Nominally there is attainment and realization
But ultimately there is no attainment or realization.[879]

So it *does* actually affix the qualifier *ultimately,* and so one can see that there are many *sūtras* of definitive meaning which *do* affix the qualifier *ultimately* to the logical object of refutation. The *Ratnāvalī* says:

"I" and "mine" do exist
But not in an ultimate sense.[880]

And also:

How could the arising of a [sprout]
Whose seed is false be true [or ultimate]?[881]

And also:

Likewise, though cause and effect
Appear in the world to be born and destroyed,
In reality arising
And also cessation do not exist.[882]

Because these sources affix the predicates *ultimately* and *in reality* to the logical object of refutation, it would follow, absurdly, that all of these *sūtras* and *śāstras* according to you are Svātantrika scriptures.

[Opponent:] Well then, how do you interpret the *Prasannapadā* refutation of [312]
[there being a need] to qualify the object to be refuted with the word *ultimately?*

[Reply:] The meaning of this is explained in the *Avatārabhāṣya* where he says that the Acārya Nāgārjuna refuted arising in general by saying "there is no arising from self" without making any qualifications. So one should realize that in the syllogism, "no entity is ultimately born from itself because it exists, like sentient beings, for example," the word *ultimately* acting as a qualifier is superfluous.

This is refuting that the qualifier ultimately should be added in the refutation of arising from self. It is not refuting the fact that there may be a need to qualify other objects of refutation with *ultimately.* That is why the *Prasannapadā* makes such statements as: "It is by reason of the fact that things do not arise from themselves *even conventionally* that it is not appropriate to qualify [its refutation with the word] *ultimately.*"[883]

Therefore, one cannot totally refute phenomena that nominally are established, [that is, proved to exist,] by means of valid cognitions without first qualifying the refutation with such expressions as *ultimately* or *inherently,* whereas things that do not exist even nominally *can* be refuted without any qualification. Nonetheless, though the Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas do not differ in their belief that such things as the eye [consciousness] etc. must be refuted only after qualifying them with the word *ultimate,* according to the Prāsaṅgikas there is no difference between "not existing inherently" and "not existing ultimately," whereas according to the Svātantrikas things do inherently arise *nominally.* Hence, they believe that it is necessary to qualify [the refutation] by saying that [things] do not inherently arise *ultimately.* This is because there is a great difference in subtlety [between the Svātantrikas' and Prāsaṅgikas'] logical object of refutation. Hence, those many instances in the [313]
sūtras and *śāstras* of definitive meaning in which qualifiers such as *ultimately* and *inherently* are actually affixed to the logical object of the refutation one should understand to also apply to those few instances in which [the qualifiers] are not actually affixed, being intended as [so qualified] by the context.

The *Heart Sūtra of the Perfection of Wisdom* [for example] says "form does not exist, sound does not exist," and so forth, but the affixing of a qualifier during the synoptic preamble (*mdor bstan*) [of that work], "those aggregates should also be seen as being *inherently* empty" is an "initial clarification" (*thog ma'i gsal byed*), so that by applying it to all [other cases], one should say that "form does not *inherently* exist" and so forth [for sound and so on].[884]

In this way [we see that] many *sūtras* of definitive meaning must be explained through the application of a clarification. Otherwise, the belief that in the Prāsaṅgikas' system it is not necessary to apply the qualifier *ultimately* to the logical object of refutation is once again a case of the emergence of this evil system that believes that even nominally no phenomena exist. Hence, [this belief] must be refuted by means of all the reasons that I have outlined.

Another ignorant opponent says this.

[Opponent:] Even Prāsaṅgikas accept *svatantra* syllogistic reasoning (*rang rgyud kyi rtags*) because they accept a trimodal syllogistic reasoning (*tshul gsum pa'i rtags*)[885] that proves a specific quality (*khyad par kyi chos*) based on a subject (*chos can*) that is established by the valid cognitions of both the proponent [of the syllogism] and the opponent [to whom it is proposed]. Should you not accept that this alone is what makes something a *svatantra* syllogistic reason then, just as [the Prāsaṅgikas would not be accepting *svatantras* simply by accepting the trimodal criterion for a syllogism], even the realist logicians could not be said to accept a *svatantra* form of syllogistic
reason, [which of course they do].[886] Likewise, because the position that is [314]
born from a desire to infer a certain particular quality of a subject that is accepted as established by valid cognition is a *svatantra* position, even Prāsaṅgikas have *svatantra* positions. However, in the Prāsaṅgika system *sva-*

tantra syllogistic reasons and positions are accepted when contemplating the nominal, whereas they are not accepted when analyzing the ultimate and when contemplating reality. Why is that? It is because when analyzing the ultimate, within the purview (*rigs ngor*) of this understanding that analyzes the ultimate, the subject disappears (*snang ba ldog*). Hence, we accept that for a Prāsaṅgika the subject is not established by a valid cognition, [and where there is no subject there can be no syllogism].

In the system of the Svātantrikas, that is, for Bhāvaviveka and so on, there is no disappearance of the subject within the purview of the understanding that analyzes the ultimate. That is why in their system they accept *svatantra* syllogistic reasoning even during the analysis of the ultimate. Also, in explaining the meaning of the scriptural passages of the *Prajñāmūla*, Buddhapālita and Candra use for the most part reductio arguments, whereas Bhavya uses for the most part *svatantra* syllogistic reasoning. These are the differences between Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas. Apart from these there are no differences.

This is the position advocated [by this opponent].

[Reply:] We find [in the Indian texts] that the syllogistic reasonings of the Prāsaṅgikas are repeatedly called "inference based on what is renowned to [or accepted by] others" [*iro*] (*gzhan la grags kyi rjes dpag*). Now if all trimodal logical reasons whose subjects are established by the valid cognitions of both proponent and opponent are *iro*'s then tell me how you would go about refuting the position that all syllogistic reasoning used by the realist logicians are *iro*'s?

It follows, absurdly, that even when they are analyzing the ultimate, the Prāsaṅgikas accept a *svatantra* logical reason because when a Prāsaṅgika [315] proves to a realist that the sprout is truthless, for example, the subject, that is, the sprout, is established by the valid cognition of both the proponent and the opponent and it is based upon this subject [the sprout] that the Prāsaṅgika sets forth the trimodal logical reason for the purpose of proving the particular quality, namely, truthlessness.

[Opponent:] At that time the subject is not established by means of a valid cognition in the proponent's, [that is, in the Prāsaṅgika's,] system because he accepts that within the purview of the understanding based on that logical reason the subject disappears.

[Reply:] Then it follows, absurdly, that every valid cognition that perceives the subject of that logical reason must be an inferential understanding based on that logical reason. This is because, when the subject disappears within the purview of the understanding based on that logical reason, at that very time the subject cannot be established by a valid cognition. If you accept the premise, then it follows, absurdly, that when a Buddhist cites "being a product" (*byas pa*) as a logical reason to prove to the Sāṁkhya that sound is impermanent, any valid cognition that perceives the subject [sound] must be the inferential valid cognition that understands that sound is impermanent.

Were this so, one would be forced to accept that the subject of that logical reasoning could not be established by a valid cognition *before* the inference based on that reasoning arose. [Hence, yours] is but the blithering of someone who has never studied logical methodology.

What is more, when you accept that the subject does not disappear within the purview of a Svātantrika, you are in clear contradiction to the claim that the Svātantrikas do not in any way accept phenomena that can withstand logical examination. So show me where there is to be found a Mādhyamika who accepts that conventional phenomena exist within the purview of an ultimate analysis. Not only does this hermeneutic force one to accept that there are no differences between Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas in terms of which [of the two schools] is best, but in fact it [implicitly] condemns the Svātantrikas to a position that is inferior even to that of some realists, for not even the Cittamātrins accept that the dependent (*gzhan dbang*) exists within the purview [316] of the understanding that realizes the ultimate truth.

Again, such a hermeneutic is a repudiation of direct experience, implying [as it does] that the person who claims that it is not correct for a Mādhyamika to accept *svatantras,* [Candrakīrti, for example,] himself accepts *svatantras.* The *Prasannapadā* states: "It is not right for a Mādhyamika to employ svatantric inference."[887] And also: "It is my understanding that he who advocates, on the one hand, that he accepts the Mādhyamika viewpoint and, on the other, uses svatantric syllogistic reasoning suffers from a variety of very serious errors."[888]

[Opponent:] These [passages] imply that it is not correct to use the *svatantra* when analyzing *the ultimate.*

[Reply:] To claim this is to reveal oneself as the hopeless idiot one actually is. This is because the *Prasannapadā* extensively explains the reasons for why the use of the *svatantra* is incorrect within the context of refuting arising from self. Also, the logical reasoning that proves the nonexistence of arising from self is not reasoning that analyzes the ultimate, and the valid cognition that ascertains the nonexistence of arising from self based upon that logical reasoning is only a valid cognition that analyzes the nominal and is not an understanding that analyzes the ultimate. Were this not so, then all forms of logical reasoning would end up being reasoning that analyzes the ultimate.

4.2.3.2.2. Setting Forth Our Own Position

4.2.3.2.2.1. The Explanation of the Meaning of Svatantra *and* Prasaṅga

As it has been said: "Proof is something that exists for both parties" and also:

> The enunciation [of a reason possessing] the trimodal [criteria] and the nonestablishment [of the predicate in the eyes of the opponent]

> ascertained by both parties constitutes "a proof" or "a refutation," whereas if such an enunciation already has been established, or if it is doubted by either one, it is not. This is because it would require proving it again.

As this says, when positing a *svatantra* position or logical reason, it is not [317] enough that both the proponent and the opponent establish by means of valid cognition the subject of the inquiry (*shes 'dod chos can*), which is the basis on which a predicate is posited. Instead it is absolutely necessary that [the subject] be established compatibly (*mthun snang du*) in both the system of the proponent and opponent. Also, the trimodal criterion of the logical reason that proves the position [in question] must also be established by a valid cognition in such a way that it be established compatibly in the system of both proponent and opponent.

For the subject to be established compatibly in the system of proponent and opponent, the way in which valid cognitions establish their subjects must exist compatibly in both their systems. In the system of the realists, evident subjects[889] such as form and so on must be established by the valid cognitions of direct perception (*mngon sum*) and they accept that any direct perceptual valid cognition is a valid cognition that perceives a *svalakṣaṇa* (*rang mtshan*) as the object it witnesses (*rang gi zhal bya*).[890] Even when apprehending a concealed entity (*lkog gyur*), such as the eye organ and so forth, as the subject, though the valid cognition that actually perceives that subject is inferential in nature, it must reach back to a direct perception via a string [of thoughts which extend back to it]. So it does not matter whether or not one actually calls that perceived object in regard to which that inference is a valid cognition a *svalakṣaṇa* [because, due to the fact that it must extend back to a direct perception, it has its roots in the perception of a *svalakṣaṇa*]. All realists without exception accept that the perceived object is not something posited just nominally (*ming tsam kyis*), but that it exists from the object's own side (*yul kyi sdod lugs su grub pa*). That is why in the system of the realists all valid cognitions that perceive their subject are believed to be valid cognitions in regard to subjects that exist by virtue of their own characteristic. Also, in the system of the realists, as all valid cognitions are consciousnesses that are non- [318] erroneous in regard to the objects of which they are valid cognitions, it is believed that if the subject of a logical reason is established by a valid cognition, that very subject must be an object found (*rnyed don*) by the valid cognition that is nonerroneous with respect to it. Hence, as existence by virtue of something's own characteristic is *even nominally* impossible according to the Prāsaṅgika system, even nominally there is no such thing as a valid cognition that perceives an object that exists by virtue of its own characteristic. Therefore, the way in which the subject is established by a valid cognition in the two systems, the realists' [and Prāsaṅgikas'], cannot be compatible. Because

of this, [the Prāsaṅgikas] generate in the minds of their opponents an ascertaining consciousness that understands truthlessness simply by means of *iro*'s and reductio arguments.

If this were to be enunciated in a brief and easily understandable way, one would say this: a *svatantra* logical reason is what is posited as a syllogistic reason for proving that predicate which the proponent wishes inferred in regard to a subject that is compatibly established in the system of both proponent and opponent, [a subject that is] the object found by a valid cognition that is nonerroneous in regard to a perceived object that exists by virtue of its own characteristic. An *iro,* on the other hand, is a syllogistic reason in which the subject, though not established by a valid cognition in a way that is compatible to both the proponent and opponent, is nonetheless a subject established by a valid cognition in the system of the proponent and by a valid cognition in the system of the opponent and that is posited while embracing (*khris nas*) what the opponent's system believes as regards the establishment by a valid cognition of the subject, of the relation between the subject and reason (*phyogs chos*), and so forth.

The realist opponents do not refute that the eye consciousness is a valid
cognition in regard to form and so on, and neither do [the realists explicitly] [319]
admit it to be a valid cognition in regard to form that exists by virtue of its own characteristic. Nonetheless, the realists *implicitly* presuppose and accept in their hearts, [even if they do *not* admit it,] that the eye consciousness is a valid cognition in regard to form that is established by virtue of its own characteristic. Hence, until the time one abandons the philosophical tenets of the realists and understands those of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas, nothing can be found that can be shown to be compatible between the realists and the Prāsaṅgikas, for whom [the eye consciousness] is not a valid cognition in regard to form that is established by virtue of its own characteristic, but is a valid cognition in regard merely to form [alone and unqualified]. One should therefore realize that in the realists' system there is no such thing as a valid cognition that fails to be valid in regard to form that is established by virtue of its own characteristic, nor is there such a thing as a valid cognition with regard to mere form. What is more, this does not contradict the fact that [whether or not they accept it] there exist valid cognitions in the continuum of a realist that are *not* valid cognitions in regard to form that exists by virtue of its own characteristic, but that *are* valid cognitions in regard to mere form.

To accept that an *iro* refers to [a logical syllogism] in which the subject and trimodal [criteria] and so on are not accepted by the proponent, but either are or ultimately will be accepted by the opponent, once again is the emergence of this tenet which accepts that the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika accepts nothing whatsoever in its own system. Hence, it is pointless [to even consider it].

[Opponent:] Well then, show us an example of an *iro* syllogism, how its trimodal [criteria] are established, and how, in dependence on that, an understanding of the predicate is born.

[Reply:] In this regard, in the third chapter of the *Prajñāmūla* it says:

Were sight to see its own nature
That would not be sight. [320]
And how can whatever does not see itself
Ever possibly see others?[891]

Therefore, positing as a logical reason that it does not see itself, it proves that the eye cannot see other things, like the [color] blue, by virtue of its own nature. It is true that in the Prāsaṅgika's own system all three things—the subject of that syllogism, the reason, and the predicate—are established by a valid cognition, but still there is nothing that can be shown to be compatible about the way the realist opponent and [the Prāsaṅgika] establish these by a valid cognition in their respective systems. So embracing the beliefs that are accepted by the opponent as regards the establishment of the subject and reason by a valid cognition, it is because [this logical reason] is posited for the purpose of refuting another's belief in "sight that [exists] by virtue of its own nature" that it is called "an inference based on what is renowned to others" [*iro*]. It is in this vein that the *Prasannapadā* explains:

> We do not use *svatantra* inferences, for inferences must have as a result the refutation of another's belief. In this way, the understanding that "another is not seen" is an outcome of the eye's not seeing its own nature. Also, they accept that seeing other things is concomitant (*med na mi 'byung ba*) [with seeing itself]. Therefore, when there is no such thing as seeing a thing's own nature, there can be no such thing as seeing another, as in [seeing] a pot, for example. The eye does not see its own nature, hence it does not see another. Therefore, not seeing its own nature and seeing another, such as [the color] blue and so on, are contradictory. It is contradictory to inference [based on] what is renowned in one's own system (*rang la grags pa'i rjes dpag*). This is what is elucidated by the inference which proves that [point].[892]

The logical reason, namely that the subject, the eye, does not perceive itself, is established by a valid cognition; and because seeing another [entity], such as form, where the seeing is established by virtue of its own nature, is impossible even nominally, therefore, that reason can refute the object of the refutation. How could that logical reason refute the object of the refutation, however, if whenever the logical reason existed in the subject, so did the object of the refutation, and whenever one did not exist in the subject, neither did the other? Hence, even in our own system we must be able to make the [321

distinction that the subject of a syllogism based on what is renowned to others and the reason both exist, whereas the object of the refutation does not exist. It is not sufficient that the reason and subject and so forth be accepted merely by the opponent. That which is called "inference based on what is renowned to the opponent" is synonymous to "inference based on what is renowned to others," given that the proponent is a Mādhyamika.

Now let us turn to how the logical reason is proven. It is not necessary to prove [or establish] the existence of the subject, reason, and example to the opponent because he or she already accepts them. The concomitant relation (*khyab 'brel*) [between the reason and predicate] is as follows. For example, because we see water to be wet it is also possible to see earth that has [water] to also be wet. Were water not wet, then it would be impossible to perceive earth that had it to be wet. Likewise, if an entity had any essence that existed by virtue of its own nature, having perceived that essence in [the thing] itself, one would also have to perceive it in others that possessed it. In this way the opponent comes to understand the general concomitance by means of being shown an example which is renowned to him or her.

Now let us put this within the present context. If the eye could see inherently, first of all sight of itself would be perceived, and then sight of form and so on, and of the form within the composite whole in any object, would be perceived. Buddhapālita's commentary on the line: "Were sight to see its own [322]
nature" explains:

> If the nature of phenomena were such that their own nature were seen, as other things would also possess it, other nature would also be perceived. For example, when water is seen to be wet, because it possesses it, even earth is perceived [to be wet]. When fire is seen to be hot, because it possesses it, even water is perceived [to be hot]. When the sweet fragrance of a jasmine blossom is experienced, the cloth that possesses it should also be perceived [to smell sweetly]. When an entity does not appear in terms of own nature, how could it be perceived in terms of other nature? Just as a jasmine blossom is not experienced to have a foul smell, neither will [that foul smell] be perceived within the cloth. Therefore, if sight sees its own nature then it would be possible to say "it is sight because it sees form and so on." But in fact sight does not see its own nature, and how can what does not see its own nature see other things? Therefore, it is not possible to say "it is sight because it sees form." The Acārya Āryadeva also says:
>
> > Were it the case that the essence of all phenomena
> > Must first appear in things themselves,
> > Then why wouldn't it also be
> > That the eye apprehends the eye itself?[893]

Even though the eye's not seeing itself even nominally does not imply that it does not see form and so on, were the sight of form to exist by virtue of its own nature, that sight would effectively become the essence of the eye, and then it would be necessary to see [things] independently of any causal conditions. In this way, we see that because the distinction between not seeing itself and seeing form is impossible [when sight exists inherently], it would have to see both itself and another [entity such as form].

[Opponent:] Just as fire does not burn itself but can burn another, likewise, though the eye does not see itself this does not vitiate against it seeing form.

[Reply:] It is not the eye's seeing form that vitiates against fire's merely burning kindling. Instead, the former must be compared to the burning of kindling by fire [in such a way that this process] exists by virtue of its own nature. It is in *this* way that your example would resemble the predicate. If it *did* exist in this way, then are fire and kindling a unity that exists by virtue of its own nature or different [by virtue of their own nature]? If they are one, it would follow, absurdly, that just as fire burns the kindling, it would also burn itself. In the second case, [that is, if they were inherently different,] it would follow, absurdly, that fire could arise independently of the kindling because they would be unrelated and different things, like a horse and a cow. If you repudiate this, then you have undermined [your own view] that they are a kind of "different" that exists by virtue of its own nature. It is with the idea of expressing this same point that the *Prajñāmūla* says: [323

It is because sight is established
That it cannot [be compared] with the case of fire [you bring up].[894]

4.2.3.2.2.2. The Explanation of the Reasons Why the Svatantra *Is Not Accepted*[895]

One should be able to understand the point [being made in this section] from what has already been explained earlier, but for those of inferior intellect I once again will mention it in a condensed and easily understandable way.

It is incorrect for a Mādhyamika to posit a *svatantra* logical reason to a realist. This is because it is impossible for the subject, reason, and example to be established by any kind of valid cognition in a compatible way within the systems of the opponent and proponent, no matter what logical reasoning the Mādhyamika is positing to a realist.

[Opponent:] The Buddhist posits to the Vaiśeṣika the following [syllogism]:

Subject: sound
Predicate: is impermanent
Reason: because it is produced
Example: like a vase.

In so doing [the subject] is not qualified as "[sound] that arises by the transformation of the elements," which is the Buddhist's special belief [regarding the nature of sound], nor is it qualified as "[sound] that is of the quality of space," the Vaiśeṣika's special belief. Instead, merely sound itself is the subject established compatibly by the two [parties]. [324]

Likewise, when the Prāsaṅgika posits for the realist the syllogism:

Subject: form
Predicate: does not inherently arise
Reason: because it arises interdependently,

[the subject, form,] is not qualified as "existing by virtue of its own characteristic," the special belief of the realist, nor is it qualified as "[form] that is empty of existing by virtue of its own characteristic," the special belief of the Prāsaṅgika. Instead, form alone is taken as the subject. So why should we not accept it to be something that is compatibly established by both the proponent and opponent?

[Reply:] The subjects of those two syllogisms do not resemble each other as regards their being compatibly established by both proponent and opponent. Why? Granted that [the valid cognition which establishes the subject] is not actually a valid cognition in regard to the properties of sound's being a quality of space. Still, [the valid cognition] does establish compatibly in both the Buddhist realist and Vaiśeṣika systems simply a sound that is the object found by an auditory cognition considered to be a valid cognition that is nonerroneous in regard to sound that is established by virtue of its own characteristic.

Form is, in the system of the realists, the object found by a valid cognition that is nonerroneous in regard to form's being established by virtue of its own characteristic. In the Prāsaṅgika system, although form is not established by virtue of its own characteristic, it is an object found by an erroneous valid cognition to which [the form] appears as if it existed [by virtue of its own characteristic]. Just as all phenomena are divisible into two categories, those that are objects found by erroneous valid cognitions and those found by nonerroneous valid cognitions, likewise, valid cognitions themselves are also divisible into two categories, those that are erroneous in so far as objects appear to them to exist by virtue of their own characteristic, and those that are nonerroneous in so far as [objects] do not appear in this way. The mere fact that an object is the object found by an erroneous valid cognition does not contra- [325]
dict the fact that there does exist a nonerroneous valid cognition which perceives it. Hence, just because it is an object found by an erroneous valid cognition does not contradict its being an object perceived by the Buddha's gnosis, which understands things as they seem to be (*ji snyed pa*). For example, it is true that the appearance of falling hair (*skra shad 'dzag pa*) to the visual consciousness whose organ has been affected by eye disease is merely an erroneous appearance, yet this does not contradict the fact that it also ap-

pears to the nonerroneous gnosis of a Buddha. Likewise, granted that the truthlessness of a sprout is the object found by the inferential valid cognition that perceives the truthlessness of the sprout, and granted also that all inferential valid cognitions are erroneous cognitions,[896] this does not imply however that the truthlessness of the sprout is merely an object found by an erroneous valid cognition, for otherwise it would follow, absurdly, that because sound is found by the auditory consciousness and because sound is like an illusion, the auditory consciousness finds sound to be like an illusion.

4.2.3.2.2.3. Bringing the Prasannapadā *to Bear on This [Question] and Explaining [Its Meaning]*

Having accepted the teaching that a Mādhyamika who accepts a *svatantra* logical reason suffers from the fault of having the basis [of the syllogism] not being established, that is, of having no subject, then, in stating the position of the opponent, the *Prasannapadā* says:

> [Opponent:] In saying "sound is impermanent," the predicate and subject are taken as generalities and not as particularities. Were their specific peculiarities to be apprehended, then it would be impossible to call one *what is inferred* and the other *that of which it is inferred.* If, for example, "sound qua transformation of the four great elements" were to be apprehended, it would not be established for the opponent. On the other hand, if one were to apprehend [as the subject, "sound qua] quality of space," it would not be established for the Buddhist. Likewise, even if one Vaiśeṣika accepts that sound is impermanent, were sound qua product (*byas pa*) to be apprehended [as the subject], it would not be established for others. On the other hand, the Manifestationist (*mNgon par gsal bar bya ba*)[897] position would not be established for [the Vaiśeṣika]. Likewise, if what is variously de- [326] stroyed requires a cause, that would be unacceptable to the Buddhist, whereas if [destruction] were causeless, that would not be established for the opponent. Hence, just as in these [cases] the predicate and the subject qua mere generalities are apprehended, in the present case [within the discussion of the Mādhyamika's use of *svatantra* reasoning] it is a mere subject that is apprehended, apart from any specific peculiarities.[898]

The Buddhist proves to the Vaiśeṣika that sound is impermanent. The Vaiśeṣika also proves to the Manifestationist that sound is impermanent. At both those times it is a merely general kind of sound that is apprehended as the subject, without its being distinguished by the specific beliefs of either propo-

nent or opponent. Likewise, [continues the Svātantrika,] the Mādhyamika proves to the realist that the eye, form, and so forth do not truly arise, and to the Sāṃkhya that they do not arise from themselves. At such times, it is merely a general kind of eye that is apprehended as the subject, without specifying it as either true or false according to the specific beliefs of either opponent or proponent. Therefore, as the subject is compatibly established, there is no fault [with our position]. This is a statement of Bhāvaviveka's beliefs.

Wishing to set forth the refutation of that [position], the *Prasannapadā* first teaches that that point is incorrect:

> That is not so! When one accepts, as in this case, the refutation of arising as the predicate which is to be proven, then it vitiates against the claim that in reality the basis of that argument, that is, the subject, is found to be a self-existing entity by a mistaken (*phyin ci log*) cognition. That is your own belief [as a Mādhyamika]. The mistaken and unmistaken are two distinct [categories]. Therefore, when a mistaken [cognition], such as that of someone with eye disease perceiving falling hair, apprehends what in fact does not exist [the hair] to [327]
> exist, then how could he or she be said to be perceiving any existing object? When someone without eye disease does not incorrectly impute [the existence of a nonexistent object] such as falling hair by means of his or her incorrect [cognition], then at that time how could the person be said to perceive any object that does not exist conventionally? That is why the Acārya has himself spoken these words:
>
> > Were direct perception and so forth
> > To perceive any object whatsoever
> > Then there would be something to be proven or disproven;
> > But as there is no such thing, there is no accusing me.
>
> Because the incorrect and correct [forms of cognition] are distinct [categories], therefore, while [a cognition] is correct it cannot be incorrect. So how could the eye that is taken as the subject [of your *svatantra* syllogism] exist conventionally? Hence, you have not disproven the faults [we have accused you of, namely,] that your subject (*phyogs*) is not established and that your logical reason is not established. What you have offered is no answer at all![899]

Now to explain the meaning of this [passage]. The part from "That is not so!" up to "the mistaken and unmistaken are two distinct [categories]" is the explanation in brief. From "therefore" to the end of the verse it is the explanation of the line "the mistaken and unmistaken are two distinct [categories]." Everything below "because" is the condensed meaning. So first of all let us explain the meaning of the words of the explanation in brief.

It is the correctness of the belief that when Mādhyamikas prove to a realist [328]
that the eye and so on have no true arising they take a merely general "eye" as their subject without qualifying it either by [the word] *true* or *false* [that is repudiated with the words] "That is not so!" It is taking the eye as the subject, as the basis [of the predicate that] in reality there is no true arising, that is refuted, and the fact that it does not exist in reality is something that Bhāvaviveka himself accepts. Why is that? It is because this is a case during which "the eye and so forth" is taken as the subject, and "the repudiation of true arising" is taken as the predicate to be proven. In this way we see that a Mādhyamika must accept that the eye is found to be a self-existing entity only by a mistaken consciousness that has been affected by ignorance as to reality. The realists, on the other hand, accept that the eye and so forth are objects found by an unmistaken consciousness unaffected by the causes of error. Hence, the subject, the eye and so forth, will not be established compatibly. The object found by a mistaken consciousness and the object found by an unmistaken consciousness are distinct [categories]; that is, they are mutually exclusive.

Now the extensive explanation: because they are distinct [categories] just as a person with an eye disease [apprehends] hair that is not there, a mistaken [consciousness] that has been affected by ignorance apprehends form and so on, which do not exist by virtue of their own characteristic, as if they existed by virtue of their own characteristic, that is, [form] *appears* [to such a mistaken consciousness] and a valid cognition finds the form and so on to exist. At such a time, however, how could a perception of any object, such as form, actually exist by virtue of its own characteristic? That valid cognition does not find form and so on to exist by virtue of its own characteristic!

Just as a person who does not have eye disease [does not perceive] imag-
inary hair, the unmistaken gnosis of the *āryan,* which is unaffected by the [329]
cause of error, ignorance, and which does not impute the form and so on to be something it is not, does not find [true form]. At that time also the valid cognition that finds the form to exist is an erroneous consciousness.[900] Why does a *nonerroneous* valid cognition not find form and so on to exist? It is because when the unmistaken *āryan* gnosis arises, there can be no perception of any kind of form whatsoever within the purview of that [gnosis]; that is, there can be no object that is conventional and no object that exists by virtue of its own characteristic. Because there is no valid cognition that perceives an object that exists by virtue of its own characteristic the Acārya [Nāgārjuna] has stated [the verse quoted in the *Prasannapadā* passage] and that goes "Were direct perception and so forth."

Now the condensed meaning is this. Because the object found by a mistaken [consciousness] and the object found by an unmistaken [consciousness] are mutually exclusive, as we have seen, at the time it is not mistaken, that is, within the purview of a nonerroneous valid cognition that understands reality,

no object can be found by a mistaken valid cognition. Therefore, how could the conventional entity, the eye, be the subject established compatibly for the two sides?

Hence, you have not been able to overturn the faults [I have pointed out], namely, the fault of the subject (*phyogs kyi skyon*), that the basis, the subject, does not exist, and the fault of the logical reason (*gtan tshigs kyi skyon*) which [ensues from] the basis, the subject, not being established. So it says, "this is no answer at all." This is the meaning [of the passage].

The Svātantrika Mādhyamikas believe that form does not truly exist even nominally, but they also accept that the eye consciousness of an ordinary limited being (*tshur mthong*) is a nonerroneous valid cognition in regard to form's own-characteristic [existence]. Still, [according to us] if form and so on do not truly exist even nominally, they cannot exist even nominally by virtue of their [330] own characteristic, and so it becomes necessary to accept that the consciousness to which [form] appears as existing by virtue of its own characteristic is erroneous. Hence, it is necessary to accept that form and so on are the objects found by an erroneous valid cognition, and because in the realists' system all form and so on are objects found by valid cognitions that are nonerroneous in their perception of [the fact that these objects] exist by virtue of their own characteristic, it is impossible for the objects to be established compatibly. It becomes incorrect, therefore, to posit *svatantra* logical reasoning. This is the way [the Prāsaṅgikas] logically force [the Svātantrikas into giving up this form of reasoning]. It shows the contradiction in accepting that all phenomena are truthless and accepting the *svatantra*. This very fact is the reason why it is incorrect for a Mādhyamika to accept the *svatantra*.

Following that, the *Prasannapadā*, wishing to demonstrate that the stated example [of the syllogism proving sound to be impermanent] does not resemble the actual case [of the syllogism proving form or the eye to be truthless], says:

> Even the example does not work. Both parties are alike in that neither accept [a syllogism] in which the specific properties of the general entity "sound" and the general entity "impermanence" are expressed [but take as the subject and reason only the unqualified general entities themselves]. Likewise, the general entity "the eye" is something not accepted even conventionally either by the advocates of emptiness or by the advocates of nonemptiness, and because it is also something [that is not accepted] ultimately, it has no resemblance to the example.[901]

One person interprets this as follows.

[Opponent:] The meaning is this. Even though there does exist in the systems of both parties a sound that is neither the transformation of the elements nor a quality of space, no form that is neither true nor false is established compatibly in the system of both the realists and the Mādhyamikas.

[Reply:] The one who claims this is no better than an amateur philosopher. Instead, I interpret it as follows. When a Buddhist proves the impermanence of sound to a Vaiśeṣika, though neither of the two sides have [valid cognitions establishing the subject] that verify either that sound is the transformation of the elements or a quality of space, both parties do have valid cognitions that [they think] establish a mere sound that exists by virtue of its own characteristic. Hence, it is the heartfelt belief of both parties that the mere sound that is the object found by such a valid cognition is to be taken as the subject. It is impossible for there to be in the system of both Mādhyamikas and realists a valid cognition in regard to the eye alone, a valid cognition that is neither nonerroneous in regard to the eye nor erroneous. Therefore, a general entity, "the eye" that is neither the object found by an unmistaken valid cognition nor the object found by a mistaken valid cognition, is not accepted, either conventionally or ultimately, by those who advocate emptiness and [by those who advocate] nonemptiness. This is why it has no resemblance to the example, and *this* is what [this latter passage] means. [331]

This same procedure demonstrates that the logical syllogistic reasoning also is not compatibly established for the realist and the Mādhyamika. The *Prasannapadā* says: "This same method that is used to express the fault of having a basis, [that is, a subject,] that is not established should be applied to express the same fault of not being established in regard to the logical reason 'because it exists.' "[902] It is very easy to understand, applying these arguments, why the reason is not established by a valid cognition in a compatible way.

Immediately after this [passage] the *Prasannapadā* states:

> What is more, the logician [Bhavya] himself accepts the outcome of the aforementioned argument. How so? An opponent posits the following counterargument [to him]: "The causes and so forth that bring about the internal *āyatanas* in fact do exist because the Tathāgata has said so, and what the Tathāgata says goes! For example, didn't he say that *nirvāṇa* is peace?" In response to this [he asks]: "What is the object you accept as the logical reason, is it that the Tathāgata said this conventionally or that he said it ultimately? If conventionally, the object of the logical reason would not be accepted by yourself; if ultimately, then when the existence or both existence and nonexistence of the predicate (*chos*) is not established it eliminates the possibility of a causal condition, [that is, a logical reason,] whose nature is to have an existent result, nonexistent [result], or both existent and nonexistent result. Hence: [332]
>
> How can you call it a reason that proves [the predicate]?
> Were that so it would be incorrect.

> The meaning of these words is that this is simply *not* a reason that proves [the predicate]. Therefore, as ultimately there is nothing to be proven nor a proof, the point is that your logical reason is not established and is contradictory." This is how [Bhavya] enunciates the faults [of his opponent], and it is because he accepts this very method himself as proving that this logical form of reasoning is not established, that in *all* cases of inferences in which one posits a real phenomenon (*dngos po'i chos*) as a logical reason the logical reason and so on will not be established for himself, thereby destroying all notion of proof.[903]

One Tibetan who believes himself to be a follower of Candrakīrti interprets the meaning of this passage as follows.

[Opponent:] When Bhāvaviveka posits the syllogism:

> Subject: earth
> Predicate: is not ultimately solid in nature
> Reason: because it is an element [333]
> Example: like wind.

[Candrakīrti analyzes this syllogism of his as follows.] If you [Bhavya] are positing [the reason] "because it is an element" ultimately, then it is not established for yourself, and if you are positing [the reason] "because it is an element" conventionally, then it is not established for the realist opponent, so that you suffer from the fault of having a logical reason that is not established. Were this methodology not to suffer from the fault of having the logical reason not established, then you, Bhāvaviveka, are contradicting your own statement that the logical reason posited by another, "because the Tathāgata has said so," suffers from the fault of being a logical reason that is not established by [your analyzing it as you do, that is, by arguing,] "if you are saying 'because the Tathāgata said so' ultimately, it is not established for the Mādhyamika and if you are saying 'because the Tathāgata said so' conventionally, then it is not established for yourself."

[Reply:] This system of interpreting [this passage makes it seem as though it is] merely a case of the fault falling on [Bhavya] himself, as if he had no familiarity with the science of reasoning, so it definitely does not represent Bhavya's intention. Therefore, the refutation of such a method [of interpretation] that so underestimates [Bhavya] cannot be the intention of this passage from the *Prasannapadā*.

Hence, I explain the meaning of this scriptural passage as follows. When Bhāvaviveka refutes the opposition he asks them which of the two positions they accept, either that the object posited as the reason "because the Tathāgata said so" exists ultimately or only conventionally, because a third alternative apart from these is impossible. If it exists ultimately, it is not established for

the Mādhyamika, and if merely conventionally, it is not established for the opponent. Hence, he states that the logical reason suffers from the fault of not being established for either party. Then the glorious Candra says, "Well then, [334]
when we analyze the reason that Bhāvaviveka himself uses to prove to the realist the nonexistence of true causality, we see that both the subject and the reason must be either objects found by an erroneous valid cognition or else objects found by a nonerroneous valid cognition, apart from which there is no third alternative. If it is the object found by a nonerroneous valid cognition, then it would not be established for a Mādhyamika, and if it is the object found by an erroneous valid cognition then it would not be established for the realist, so that it becomes necessary to accept that the subject and logical reason suffer from the fault of not being established because it is analogous to the reasoning by which you, Bhāvaviveka, have demonstrated, through your analysis of your opponent, that they suffer from the fault of having a logical reason that is not established. This is the meaning.

In this regard [let me say that] according to Bhāvaviveka, because the subject and the reason, merely nominally speaking, are objects found by nonerroneous valid cognitions even in the Mādhyamika system, the fault of their not being compatibly established in the system of both parties does not occur. Though he would explain it in this way, however, the glorious Candra refutes him by demonstrating the contradiction between [claiming] on the one hand that form and so on are empty of truly existing and on the other that the eye consciousness and so on are valid cognitions that are nonerroneous in regard to form and so forth. Hence, in the *Prajñāpradīpa* we find the expression *independent* (*rang dbang*) in such passages as "spoken from an independent or negativist (*sun 'byin pa*) perspective" to be synonymous with *svatantra*. From [such contexts we know] a *svatantra* logical reason to refer to [a reason that] [335]
generates an inference which understands the proposition (*bsgrub bya*) after the opponent has ascertained the subject, reason, example, and so on *and* the trimodal conditions in such a way that they are established compatibly by both parties, where the valid cognition establishes the object from its own side, perceiving it to be independent—[all this] without [the proponent merely] accommodating to the beliefs of the opponent [but actually accepting this faulty method of establishing the subject and so on]. Therefore, in a logical reason that is mutually posited among two parties both of which have correctly understood the Prāsaṅgika viewpoint, for the purpose of setting forth some kind of nominal fact, the subject and trimodal criteria *are* established compatibly within the system of both parties. However, [even in such a case where the reasoning is between two Prāsaṅgikas, the reason] is not a *svatantra* logical reason.

[MADHYAMAKA LOGICAL STRATEGIES AND RELATED POLEMICS]

4.2.3.3. The Explanation of the Reasoning That Refutes the Object of the Refutation

4.2.3.3.1. The Actual Explanation of the Reasoning That Refutes the Object of the Refutation

4.2.3.3.1.1. The Reasoning That Refutes the Self of the Person[904]

The *Avatāra* says:

> The chariot is (1) not accepted as being different from its own parts, (2) it is not nondifferent, (3) nor is it that which possesses them, (4) it is not *in* the parts, (5) nor are the parts in it, (6) it is not their mere aggregation, (7) nor their shape, and in the same way . . .[905]

If one searches for the chariot by means of the sevenfold analysis (*dpyad pa rnam pa bdun*), though no essence is found within the chariot, as long as one does not analyze it, it is possible to unerringly posit all the functions of a chariot, which is merely labeled as such in dependence on the chariot's parts. Taking this as an example, the same methodology is also applied to the person, and among all of the forms of reasoning that set forth the selflessness of the person, this one is praised as supreme.

First of all, let me briefly state the method by which the chariot itself is [336] searched for by means of the sevenfold analysis, and thus established as essenceless. If the chariot exists inherently, then is it inherently one with or inherently different from its parts? If the former is true, then, just as the parts are many, so would the chariot become many. If it were inherently different [from its parts], it would be of a different nature (*ngo bo tha dad*) [from them], and whatever are of different natures and yet cotemporal must be unrelated different objects, and hence, like a horse and a cow, the chariot would have to be perceived separately from its parts. Therefore, neither of the two possibilities, being the same or being different [from its parts], is possible.

The two possibilities, of the parts inherently depending on the chariot and of the chariot inherently depending on its parts, also do not work. This is because in either case [the chariot and its parts] would have to be inherently different things and I have just finished explaining why this would not work.

Neither will it work to say that the chariot inherently exists in such a way that it possesses its parts, as, for example, Devadatta might possess a cow or as Devadatta possesses his nose. In the former case of possession, [the two entities] are of different natures, whereas in the latter case of possession, they would have to be inherently of the same nature, and both of these [possibilities] already have been refuted.

It also does not work to say that the mere assembly (*tshogs tsam*) of the chariot's parts is the chariot, for were that so, it would follow, absurdly, that the mere assembly of the complete [set of parts] set down in a certain place, wheels, nails, axle, all taken apart and deposited loosely, would be the chariot.

It is also not correct to posit the special shape of the parts of the chariot to [337]
be the chariot, for were that so, is it the shape of the individual parts that is the chariot or is it the shape of the assembly of parts that is the chariot? In the former case, is the shape identical to the shape when it has yet to be put together [that is the chariot] or is it another shape, different from the former? In the first case there would be no difference between the shape of the wheels and so forth at an earlier time, when it was yet to be put together, and at a later time, when it already had been put together. Hence, just as there is no chariot at the earlier time, when it has yet to be put together, likewise later, when it has already been put together, there would also have to be no chariot. The second case, [its being another shape,] also does not work, for were there to be any other special features in the shape of the wheels and so forth when, at a later time, it already has been put together, features that do not exist in the wheels and axle and so on when, at an earlier time, it has yet to be put together, they would have to be perceived, and they are not.

It also does not work to posit the shape of the assembly of parts to be the chariot, for in our own system the shape of the assembly of the parts is the basis of labeling the chariot, nor does it work in the realist system, for they claim that the shape of the assembly [of parts] cannot exist as a substance, as the assembly itself does not exist as a substance, while accepting that the chariot must exist as a substance.

In this way, if searched for in these seven ways, no chariot is found; but if it is not analyzed, it is labeled as a chariot in dependence on its parts. In this same fashion one should realize that this [applies] in a similar way to all phenomena, such as pots and so on, for [it can be applied] analogously in accordance with all of the previous explanations of the reasoning that refutes [the inherent existence of the subject] by analyzing it in terms of whether or not it [338]
is inherently one or different from its parts. Hence, the *Avatāra* says:

It is not correct to say that the mind [which apprehends] a pot [arises] in regard to a pot
Which exists in terms of matter and so on, [that is, as the accumulation of atoms].
Because it does not exist, neither can its matter exist.
Therefore, [the pot] cannot be the shape of the [matter].[906]

Let us now explain this by applying the methodology used in the case of the chariot to the person. We must first ask ourselves whether that "I" or that "person" which is the basis that we conceptualize when we think "I" is the same as or different from the aggregates. If it is the same, then just as the aggregates [are many,] so would the self be many, even at one instant of time. That is not all, for the *Prajñāmūla* says:

If the aggregates are the self
It would arise and be destroyed.[907]

Upon the destruction of the human aggregates during a previous birth a new set of god aggregates may arise that are of the same continuity, [that is, belonging to the individual who was previously the man]. When this occurs, it would follow that just as the aggregates of the man and the god are different, so too would their selves. Were that so, it would not be possible to remember [former] births. The karma already created would be wasted and we would encounter karma that we had not created. All of these three faults would ensue. What is more, if the selves within past and future lives were different by virtue of their own characteristic, they would be distinct unrelated objects, and because of this those three faults would ensue. Although it is not contradictory to say that the self and the aggregates are merely different nominally, to say that they are *inherently* different would make them unrelated distinct objects, which follows from the previously explained reasoning. Were that so, we would have to perceive the self apart from the aggregates, whereas this in fact is not perceived. As the *Prajñāmūla* says:

Were the self different from the aggregates
[The self] would not have the characteristics of the aggregates.[908] [339]

The self would not possess the characteristics of the aggregates such as arising, destruction, and abiding, for it would be an object distinct from, and unrelated to, the aggregates, just as, for example, a horse does not possess the characteristics of a cow. Now if *this* is accepted, [that is, that the self does not arise and so forth,] then the self would be a noncomposite phenomenon and it could not be the one who accumulates karma or experiences its ripening, [being a permanent unchanging thing]. This very same reasoning refutes the inherent existence of the dependence of the self and the aggregates, as well as the possession [of one by the other], for these three positions [identity, depen-

dence, and possession] have as a definite prerequisite that [the self and the aggregates] be different.

If the mere assembly of the aggregates is the self there would then ensue the fault of the object of the action and the doer of the action being identical, for just as the aggregates are those taken up by the self [at birth], so too is the *assembly* of the aggregates taken up by the self, [whereas the assembly itself *being* the self, by hypothesis, it becomes both what is taken up and what takes up, thereby annihilating the distinction between action, object, and doer]; and because the continuity of the aggregates is also accepted as being that taken up by the self, this same reasoning refutes the possibility that the continuity of the aggregates is the self.

It is also not possible for the shape of the aggregates to be the self because, were that so, it would follow, absurdly, that the self was material[909] and it would also follow, absurdly, that when one is born into the formless realm the self would cease to exist.

The fact that if it is searched for in these seven ways no self at all is to be found is what it means for the self to be essenceless. This, however, does not repudiate the fact that, if it is not analyzed, the notion of person is a functional one. It being established by a nominal valid cognition, the person *does* nominally exist. What is more, when the mind that thinks "I" arises, it does so in dependence on, that is, using as a basis, the five aggregates within one's own continuum [if one is in the form realm or below], and the four, [excluding the form aggregate, if one is a formless being]. Without using [such a basis it [340]
would not arise] and that is why it [is said] to be merely labeled in dependence on the aggregates.

When one repudiates the self through reasoning one also establishes the essencelessness of mineness because mineness is something that must be established in dependence on the self. That is why the *Prajñāmūla* says:

If the self does not exist
How could "mine" exist?[910]

4.2.3.3.1.2. The Explanation of the Refutation of the Self of Phenomena[911]

4.2.3.3.1.2.1.(A) The Actual Explanation of the Reasoning That Refutes the Self of Phenomena

Although many forms of reasoning setting forth the selflessness of phenomena are taught, the *Prasannapadā* states that if one negates that *arising* exists inherently, the refutation of all other objects of refutation, such as inherent exis-

tence and so on, becomes very simple. What is more, the *Avatāra* states that to refute true arising the most powerful form of reasoning is the one that refutes arising via the four possibilities (*mu bzhi skye 'gog*).[912] Therefore, let me very briefly mention this method here.

The Sāṃkhyas[913] think that if things do not exist at the time of their causes, then they could not arise. Hence, they claim that [a thing] exists in an unmanifest way within the nature of its cause, that the manifestation of that [preexisting effect within the cause] is what we call *causality*, and that what has already become manifest need not arise again.

The Vaiśeṣikas, all of the realists of our own system, and the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas all accept that things, by virtue of their own characteristic, are different from their causes, thereby exclusively believing in "arising from another."[914]

The Nigranthas [Jains][915] claim that everything arises both from itself and [341] from another in the following way. They say that a porcelain pot having the nature of clay arises based on the clay, thereby arising from itself; and being dependent on the potter and wheel and so on, it arises from other [things]. Humans, being strictly of the nature of the vitality (*srog*) of their previous births, arise based on vitality, thereby arising from themselves; and being dependent on parents and previous karma, they arise from others.

From among the twentyfive different philosophical schools that derive from the Sāṃkhyas, the ascetic Lokacakṣuḥ (*'Jig rten mig*) composed the *Hundred Thousand Scriptures of the Cārvākas.* He and all his followers accept that things arise causelessly.[916]

None of these four ways of arising are apprehended by modes of *innate* misapprehension of true [existence]. Nonetheless, if things existed the way they are apprehended by the innate apprehension of true [existence], they would definitely have to exist in one of these four ways. The reasons for this I have already explained.

First of all let me briefly mention something of the reasoning that refutes arising from self. The exposition of the *Avatāra*, namely its pointing out such absurdities as the seed and sprout having to have the same color and shape and so on, are easy to understand. The *Prasannapadā* presents how it is that Buddhapālita explains this point as follows:[917]

> The Acārya Buddhapālita himself states that things do not arise from themselves because that would make their arising purposeless and because utter absurdities would follow. It is unnecessary for things that exist in and of themselves (*bdag gi bdag nyid du yod*) to arise again, for if things arose even though they already existed, they could never stop arising.[918]

Then, to state the way in which Bhāvaviveka attempts to counteract [this [342] position],[919] the *Prasannapadā* says:

> In response to this, one opponent [Bhavya] says, "this is not correct because [Buddhapālita] states neither logical reason (*gtan tshigs*) nor example (*dpe*) and because he does not eliminate the fault advocated by the others. Because these are words of a reductio argument, we must take the opposite object [in order to determine the proponent's true belief][920] and because it is evident that the proposition (*bsgrub bya*) and its predicate (*chos*) must be reversed, [it follows] that things would be born from others, that causality is efficacious (*'bras bu dang bcas pa*) and that it is finite (*skye ba thug pa yod pa*). But these positions are contrary to our own tenets." This is the fault of which he accuses [Buddhapālita].[921]

Because this argument and the response to it are extremely difficult to understand I will explain them. Let me, however, first [give the faulty interpretation of] one person.

[Opponent:] The meaning of the section that goes "we must take the opposite of the present context" is as follows. All valid reductio arguments must imply (*'phen*) a positive proof (*sgrub byed*). Hence, so too must the reductio put forth by Buddhapālita imply a positive proof. We know that we arrive at the predicate [of such a positive proof] by taking the opposite of the reason of the reductio and that the logical reason [of such a proof] is the opposite of the predicate of the reductio. Hence, (the positive proof) that must be accepted as valid logical reasoning is:

> Subject: all things
> Predicate: have purposeful and finite arising
> Reason: because they arise from others.

But to do so is to contradict our own tenets. This is [Bhavya's refutation of Buddhapālita].

The way the glorious Candra refutes that such a fault exists is as follows. Because it is not correct for a Mādhyamika to accept *svatantras*, they also do not accept a positive proof qua implication of a reductio. Merely positing a reductio does not imply a positive proof because the speaker does not speak [343] with the desire to imply a positive proof and because words show only the meanings that their speakers desire them to express, not expressing anything independent from the speaker.[922] Therefore, since Buddhapālita's reductio is only one that demonstrates the internal contradiction in what the opponent accepts, there is no fault. This is [Candrakīrti's] response.

[Reply:] This interpretation is utterly misguided, for, as I have already explained at great length, there is no contradiction in rejecting the *svatantra* and accepting valid forms of logical [syllogistic] reasoning, not to speak of the fact that it is quite incorrect to consider the Prāsaṅgika a system that advocates that reductio arguments cannot imply positive proofs. The *Avatārabhāṣya* says:

If what is dependent on others arises strictly from another, then from a flame heavy darkness could arise because of its otherness; but this is neither evident nor reasonable. Therefore, it cannot be, and therefore the otherness of cause and effect is untenable.[923]

Also, in the *Bhāṣya* to the verse that goes "everything would arise from everything else because,"[924] it says: "If, as you say, the rice sprout arises from a rice seed which is different from it, then so too would a pot, cloth, and so forth, and that is not seen to be the case. Therefore, it cannot be."[925] So we see that the commentary clearly explains the positive proofs implied by those two reductios that the root text explicitly teaches. Although there are many such [examples of reductios implying positive proofs in Prāsaṅgika treatises], as it would lengthen [the work excessively], I will not cite them.

The *Prasannapadā* explains the meaning of Buddhapālita's reductio arguments. The line "things that exist in and of themselves" is the extensive explanation of the word *their*; then it posits that as the reason. The line "it is necessary [for them] . . . to arise again" is the extensive explanation of the line "that would make their arising purposeless," and "if things arose even though they already existed, they could never stop arising" is the extensive explanation of "utter absurdities would follow." These latter two are explained to be the predicates of the reductios. Because "the purposelessness of its arising" and "the neverendingness of its arising" are not explained to be the reasons [of the reductios in the *Prasannapadā*], anyone who accepts that in our own system these are accepted as the reasons [can be considered only] to be poorly versed [in this literature]. There is also no way that anyone who is half acquainted with logical reasoning would ever maintain that all valid reductio arguments must imply a positive proof. So how could it be possible for someone like Bhāvaviveka, a completely perfected *mahāpaṇḍita,* to accept such a thing? [344]

Therefore, the opponent's position is to be interpreted as follows. Buddhapālita's stated syllogism expresses no example or reason to prove that there is no arising from self, and hence it is nothing but a mere belief. Also, it does not eliminate the fault expressed by the Sāṃkhya when he analyzes the belief as follows: "If by the words *nonarising from self* you mean [nonarising] from a result whose nature has become manifest, you have proven something already established for us. If [you mean nonarising] from a cause whose nature is that it has unmanifest potential [to produce the effect within it], then, as everything that arises can arise *only* from such [causes], your concomitance is reversed."

The words translated [into Tibetan] in the *Prasannapadā* as "because these are words of a reductio argument"[926] are translated in the *Prajñāpradīpa* [of Bhāvaviveka where they first occur] as "because these are words which offer an opportunity [for the opponent to accuse us]." This means that, as these are words that offer the other party an opportunity to accuse us [of a fault], they are not correct. How does this opportunity arise? It arises because [345]

it is necessary to take the opposite of the words as they are literally arranged within the present context. If, as per the literal interpretation, the proposition to be proven were "things do not arise from themselves," and the logical reason "[because] arising *is* purposeless and endless," then the relationship between reason and subject (*phyogs chos*) is not established [because the arising of things *is not* purposeless and endless]. If the logical reason is that "if [things] arose from themselves, [arising] *would* be purposeless and endless," then for the relationship between subject and reason to be established the proposition to be proven would also have to be established, [making the syllogism useless]. So it is not possible to take [Buddhapālita's reductio] as it literally stands. Therefore, it becomes evident that here Buddhapālita himself believes the two opposites [of the literal] meaning to be the reason. This is how Bhavya interprets the beliefs of Buddhapālita.

How does it become evident that it is the opposite [of the literal] meaning that he believes to be the reason? It is evidenced by the former and latter uses of the words *because it would,* which are words that imply the opposite. How is this evidenced? In this way. From the fact that "their arising *would* be purposeless" [we understand that he believes it to be actually] finite. This is how it is done. Hence, Buddhapālita, as proof for the previously stated belief, namely "that [things] do not arise from themselves," does not posit the actual literally stated "arising would be purposeless and endless" as his reason. Although he does not actually state it literally, the word *would* has the ability to indirectly imply that it is the opposite [of the literal] meaning, that arising is [346]
purposeful and finite, that is to be posited as the reason. It is clear that this is Buddhapālita's belief. This is the meaning [of Candrakīrti's interpretation of Bhavya's interpretation of Buddhapālita's reductio].

In this regard, when [Tsong kha pa's] *Great Exposition* [of the *Prajñāmūla,* called] *An Ocean of Reasoning,* says: "If it is necessary to take the opposite of the literal reason, one must also take the opposite of the literal predicate (*dam bca'*) because they are similar,"[927] it is not teaching that the reasons for both [the reversal of the logical reason and predicate] are similar, for there is no question at all that the faults arising from taking "the purposelessness and endlessness of arising" as the reason are similar to the faults arising from taking "no self-arising" as the predicate. Nor is it simply insisting that the predicate must be the opposite of the literal predicate because the reason is the opposite of the literal reason. Well then, what *is* the meaning of this passage? This is not [a general principle that is] being claimed of everything that is a reductio or a logical reason. Here [Tsong kha pa is saying] that they are similar in that, when Buddhapālita cites as the reason that proves no self-arising the purposefulness and finiteness of arising, it becomes necessary to accept as the predicate an opposite entity, that is, the opposite of the nonaffirming negation (*med dgag*), which is the mere repudiation of self-arising.

How they are similar as regards the need to accept that is as follows. It does not mean that they are similar in that [the predicate must be reversed by] citing "it arises from another" [as the new predicate]. The meaning instead is this. The object that is the reversal of the given predicate, that is, the nonaffirming negation that is the mere repudiation of self-arising, is a predicate that is an affirming negation (*ma yin dgag*). If the purposefulness and finiteness of arising is posited as the reason, then the words of the proposition, that is, that "things do not arise from themselves," indirectly suggest (*shugs la 'phen*) that the quality being proven is that things arise from others. The reason is as [347]
follows. By directly expressing that things arise in a purposeful and finite way, it is expressing that things arise; and by the words "they do not arise from themselves," it repudiates arising from self. Given that they arise, there are no two choices *but* that they arise either from themselves or from another. Hence, by claiming on the one hand that things arise, and on the other that they do not arise from themselves, it is suggesting that they arise from another. It is just like the case of claiming that fat Devadatta does not eat during the day. This indirectly suggests that he eats at night. Because Bhāvaviveka himself accepts arising from another nominally, he advocates that [all arising] is included within these two [possibilities]. The meaning of the following two passages from the *Great Exposition* should be understood in this same way. "In this regard, it is not that just as the reason is reversed, so too must the predicate [be reversed]. Therefore, the reversed object is the nonrepudiation of self-arising."[928] And also: "When it says: 'because arising is purposeful and finite, if the self-arising of things were not repudiated . . .' they would arise from others."[929] The *Exposition* also says: "The [suggestion of the arising from another] does not [occur by] reversing the reason of the reductio because it is explained to occur by reversing the proposition, and because no self-arising is never claimed to be the reason."[930] [This passage demonstrates the beliefs of] one individual who has never subtly analyzed such an issue and holds to the conception that Bhāvaviveka's statement to the effect that "by the reversal of no self-arising, arising from another [is suggested]" is a statement [meaning] that Buddhapālita posits as the reason of his reductio argument "no arising from self" and that because it is necessary to take the opposite of this reason to be the predicate [of the positive syllogism implied by the reductio], arising from another becomes this predicate, [thereby being suggested or implied by the reductio]. Because this individual has this doubt, for the purpose [348]
of dispelling it [the *Exposition*] teaches this not to be the case.

Bhāvaviveka does not think that the reversal, [that is, the opposite,] of the mere repudiation of self-arising is the reversal of the reason of the reductio that Buddhapālita urges on the Sāṃkhyas, for Bhāvaviveka himself says that "because it becomes manifest that the predicate is an object to be reversed, things would arise from others." He is not saying that by reversing *the reason*

their arising from others [is suggested], and also because Buddhapālita does not claim, nor does he posit, "no self-arising" as the reason of his reductio. This is what [Tsong kha pa] intends to say [in the *Exposition* passage].

So what does Bhāvaviveka think he is proving by showing the fault of having to take the reversed entities as the reason and predicate? He states, "there arises the fault of contradicting our own tenets." There arises the fault of contradicting which of our own tenets? Now this definitely is *not* claiming that because [Buddhapālita] is accepting that arising is purposeful and finite, he is contradicting the tenet which advocates that it is purposeless and endless, and that because he is accepting arising from another, he is contradicting the tenet that there is no arising from another, for neither the Ārya [Nāgārjuna] nor Buddhapālita accept arising that is purposeless and endless. Well then, how does it [contradict our own tenets]? In the same way as it was just explained. Advocating, on the one hand, that things arise purposefully and, on the other, that they do not arise from themselves indirectly implies [according to Bhavya] that they arise from another. If this is so, then as it is not the nonaffirming negation, that is, the mere repudiation of the self-arising of things, that acts as the proposition (*bsgrub byar ma song*), but the affirming negation indirectly implied by the predicate [of the reductio] that acts as the [349]
proposition, then it contradicts our own tenet that the proposition must be a nonaffirming negation. This is Bhavya's intention.

That a nonaffirming negation is the proposition is a tenet not only of Buddhapālita, but a fundamental tenet of all Mahayanists who comment on the purport of the Ārya [Nāgārjuna], whether Prāsaṅgika or Svātantrika. That is why the *Exposition* says: "in this way it contradicts our own tenet that the words *not from self* are referring to the mere repudiation of self-arising."[931]

It is an indication of extreme dilettantism on one's part to interpret this to mean, as does the *Explanatory Commentary to the Prajñāpradīpa,*[932] that it is in contradiction to the scriptures of the Acārya Nāgārjuna, that is, in contradiction to the tenet that one should not accept arising from another and purposeful and finite arising, for it seems [that if one interprets Bhavya in this way], one has not understood even the mere fact that Bhāvaviveka himself believes that the arising of things from others *is* the purport of the Āyra [Nāgārjuna].

[Opponent:] [The *Explanatory Commentary*] is claiming that it is in contradiction to the tenet that one should not accept the arising from others *ultimately.*

[Reply:] But then it would be necessary to say that it is from the reversal of "no arising from self" that "*ultimately* arising from another" becomes the predicate, reducing one to advocating nonsense. So here it is not this that is being advocated, but instead that the reversal of no self-arising comes to establish arising from another. So to say that [Bhavya means that] it is in contradiction to the tenet that one should not accept arising from another *ultimately* is [actually] refuting Bhāvaviveka because he accepts that there is arising from another but no arising from another *ultimately.*[933] In this same

way it is easy to understand that it is not correct to reject purposeful arising and to analyze it by [determining] whether he is not accepting purposeful arising altogether or whether he is not accepting purposeful arising ultimately. [350]

[Opponent:] Bhāvaviveka accepts that, even though purposeless and endless arising are posited as the reasons literally, it is the two reversed objects that, according to the intended meaning, become evident as the posited reasons. If that is so, then why does he teach that there is a fault of not expressing a reason?

[Reply:] There is no problem here, for he believes that this [reductio] does not express a *svatantra* reason that can prove no self-arising. In this regard the glorious Candra answers this by putting the meaning of the *Prasannapadā* in an easily understandable way.

The *svatantra* reason that proves no self-arising does not suffer from the fault of not eliminating the objections advocated by others because in general Mādhyamikas should not accept *svatantra* reasoning, and in this [particular] case no *svatantra* reason is posited to prove no self-arising anyway. We have already explained the reasons why the *svatantra* should not be accepted.

[Opponent:] Be that as it may, it is still necessary to state a faultless syllogistic reason [based on what is] renowned to others with an example and so on, and this is *not* stated, so the previously mentioned fault still ensues.

[Reply:] Even though an inferential [argument] is not stated, simply by means of a reductio [argument] that states the contradictions, an opponent can come to see the problems, that is, the internal contradictions, within his or her own position, thereby [eventually] abandoning that position. If they see such [faults] and yet do not abandon [their position], then it would do no good to expound an inferential argument. Do not argue with the insane!

Therefore, it does not follow that inference [based on what is] renowned to others must definitely be stated to *all* opponents. When it *is* necessary to state [this form of argument] to someone, it is stated. Buddhapālita's statement, [351]
"there is no need for what exists in itself to arise again," are the words extensively explaining the passage, "that would make their." Hence, *exists* is the reason and the *arising again of things is purposeless* is the proposition. In this way we see that the explanation that extricates the power of the great meaning of these words of Buddhapālita is as follows:

> Subject: the clay pot that is an entity accepted as existing in an unmanifest state at the time of its cause
> Predicate: does not arise from itself
> Reason: because it exists, having already been established in its own nature
> Example: as in the case of the pot that is accepted as being manifest.

This is the explanation of the way of positing the inference [based on what is] renowned to others as it is taught [by Buddhapālita]. Therefore, he does not

suffer from the fault of not having stated a concordant example that possesses both [the qualities of] the reason and predicate [of a syllogism based on] the renown of others, for the Sāṃkhyas themselves already have established that the pot which is already manifest need not arise again. That very [syllogism] proves to the Sāṃkhyas, who accept that the thing which they believe to be in an unmanifest state must arise again, that it does not arise again. So he does not suffer from the fault of proving what already has been established. Hence, we are free of the fault as stated [by Bhavya].

How we are free of the fault that "since it is necessary to accept something that is the opposite of the reductio, we are contradicting our own tenets" is a point taught in the *Prasannapadā* and extremely difficult to understand. For this reason those who are devoid of the seeing guide of intelligence, in the [352] midst of their darkness, spew forth the continuous and inexhaustible clamor in which they clearly announce their own concocted stances.

Now this point that Bhāvaviveka variously analyzes and in regard to which he faults Buddhapālita on this one occasion is that having to do with the four lines [of *Prajñāmūla* (I, 1)] that go "not from self, not from another." In his explanation, Buddhapālita sets forth the four positions of our own system, namely, that things do not arise from themselves and so forth. Then, to prove these four positions of our own system, he does not actually posit a trimodal syllogistic form of proof, but instead literally states only a mere reductio argument that demonstrates the problems involved in accepting the opposite of these, our own, positions.

This is the point on which Bhavya faults him. That is why our own Lord [Tsong kha pa] in his *Great Exposition of Insight* says:

> "No thing, either inner or outer, can ever or in any way arise from itself" and likewise should [all of the adjectives and adverbs like *ever* and *in any way*, and so on] be applied to each of the other three positions[934] [and not be isolated as predicates of a syllogism]. Arising from self is refuted by a reductio, and these positions, without being statements of example-reason that prove these [points], nonetheless teach the problems of the opposites of these positions.[935]

So must it be understood.

Bhāvaviveka states our own position to be that "things do not arise from themselves" and then posits as proof of this, [that is, as the reasons,] "be- [353] cause their arising would be purposeless" and "because their arising would be endless," and this [he says] is not correct. That purposelessness and endlessness should not be posited as the reasons has been previously explained. Also, [he says that] establishing our own position and the arising of certainty in regard to it cannot be accomplished merely by means of a reductio that exposes the faults of the other's [position], hence requiring that a trimodal logical reason be stated as proof of that position. What is more, the words "their

arising would be purposeless" in actuality implies the absurdity of purposeless arising and "would be endless" implies the absurdity of endlessness. A mere reductio argument urged against another, however, cannot prove our own position, that is, that things do not arise from themselves, which is why it is necessary to take the object that is the opposite of the absurdity, that is, of purposelessness, namely, that there does exist purposeful arising [as the reason], and because of this he thinks that there arises the fault of contradicting our own tenets. This is then, as it was explained earlier, how [Bhavya] disputes [Buddhapālita's interpretation of *Prajñāmūla* (I, 1)]. How could anyone then claim that his argument is a case of his thinking that all valid reductio arguments imply a positive proof?

Therefore, when Bhāvaviveka interprets the belief of Buddhapālita, he takes the two reductios:

Subject: things
Predicate: absurdly, arise purposelessly
Reason: because they arise from themselves.

and

Subject: [same]
Predicate: absurdly, arise endlessly
Reason: because they arise from themselves.

to be the actual exposition (*dngos bstan*) of the passages "their arising would be purposeless" and "utter absurdities would follow," and then he thinks that [354]
the two objects that are the opposite of the absurdities are evidently being believed to be the positive proofs, [that is, the reasons,] of [the proposition] "things do not arise from themselves." In this way [we see that] Bhāvaviveka, in explaining the meaning of Buddhapālita's commentary, sets up the force of the former and latter sets of arguments in such a way that the passage, "it is necessary for things that arise in and of themselves to arise again," becomes the extensive explanation of the passage, "because that would make their arising purposeless." Then he disputes [the validity of Buddhapālita's claims] in this way, when [in actuality what he is refuting] is a mode of urging the reductio that, according to Candrakīrti's interpretation, was never intended. Candra himself takes the former passages as the brief expositions and the latter ones as the extensive expositions.[936]

Now, for the meaning of his [interpretation]: [according to him] the first reductio is:

Subject: things that are accepted as existing in an unmanifest way at the time of their cause
Predicate: absurdly, arise again, purposelessly
Reason: because, their own nature being already established, they [already] exist.

Whereas if it is necessary to arise again even though they already exist, their own nature being already established, then the second reductio is [posited]:

> Subject: the mere arising of a seed
> Predicate: occurs in a continuous fashion without any end or finality
> Reason: because, even though it already has been established in its own nature, it must once again be planted and grow.

He [Candra] comments that these two reductios are the ones urged [by Buddhapālita]. He does not posit as the reasons that prove the nonexistence of self-arising "purposeful arising," the opposite of the absurdity "their arising would be purposeless," and "finiteness," the opposite of the absurdity of endlessness. When he posits a syllogistic reason [based on] the renown of others in proving that things do not arise from themselves, he posits [as the reason] that "their own nature, being already established, they already exist," and so [355] there does not arise the fault of his having to accept that "purposeful arising" and so on are posited as the reason. Also, these two reductios, which have just been explained, are not urged [on the opponent] to prove the opposite of the absurdities, having posited the opposite of the absurd fact (*thal chos*) as a reason proving that things do not arise from themselves. Instead, these are mere reductios urging absurdities, that is, facts not accepted [even by the opponents], to show an internal contradiction in the Sāṃkhya position that accepts both (1) that things, having already been established at the time of their cause, already exist; and (2) that once again they must arise from their own nature. Hence, the opposites of the absurdities—"arising again that is purposeful" and "the mere arising of a seed not occurring in a continuous fashion without any end or finality"—are related to the beliefs of the opponents, the Sāṃkhyas. In the position of us, the Buddhists, there is no acceptance of a belief in these two opposites. Hence, we do not incur the fault of contradicting our own tenets via the acceptance of the opposites of the absurdities. This being the meaning of the *Prasannapadā* when it says, "the fact that is the opposite of the absurdity is something related to the opponent and not our own [position], for we have no beliefs," there is no fault.

Therefore, Bhāvaviveka, not realizing that the former and latter words of Buddhapālita's commentarial [passage] are to be taken as the brief exposition and extensive explanation [of the same point and not as expounding different points] and that he urges in this way the unacceptable absurdity that it is purposeless for things to arise again, [Bhavya] says that [Buddhapālita] should posit a positive proof of our own position, but that he has not actually done so. [356] Hence, [Bhavya claims that] by the statements, "because that would make their arising purposeless" and "because utter absurdities would follow," [Buddhapālita] is taking as the reason he posits the opposite of the absurdities he actually urges, namely, [the opposite of] the absurdity that the arising of things is purposeless and the [opposite of the] absurdity that it is endless.

When [Bhavya] states this fault [in Buddhapālita's system], Candra answers him in the way that we have just explained. For this reason the *Great Exposition* says:

> He [Candra] teaches that Bhāvaviveka, not understanding that the absurdity being urged is the purposelessness of having to arise *again* and the absurdity of endlessness, takes as the urged absurdities the purposelessness and endlessness of arising *in general*, and in this way claims that their opposite must be accepted.[937]

Hence, not exactly understanding the word *again*, [he faults Buddhapālita from an honest mistake]; he does not in any way state a fault that consists entirely of wishful thinking.

[Opponent:] This is not so. When Bhāvaviveka exposes the fault [in Buddhapālita's system], he is stating that [arising from self] cannot be refuted simply by means of a reductio ad absurdum [argument] that does not imply a positive proof, hence requiring that the reductio imply a positive proof. The reductio being:

> Subject: the sprout
> Predicate: absurdly, does not once again arise in a purposeful and finite way
> Reason: because it arises from itself.

The opposite of that [reductio], that is, the positive proof implied by it, is:

> Subject: the sprout
> Predicate: does not arise from itself
> Reason: because its arising again is purposeful and finite.

Hence, [Bhavya claims that Buddhapālita is] contradicting the Acārya [Nāgārjuna's] belief that arising again is not purposeful or finite.

[Reply:] Because the pervasion (*khyab pa*) of [your proposed] reductio has no efficacy against the beliefs of the Sāṃkhyas, [that is, it is not accepted by them,] it is reduced to being a proof based on what the one who is urging the reductio has [only] himself or herself determined to be the case (*tshad grub*). [But even this can not be, as for us] it is a completely improper reductio whose [357]
pervasion is the opposite of what it should be. What is more, the reason of the implied positive proof, the opposite of that [reductio], is a nonestablished syllogistic reason, [that is, it is nonexistent]. The relation between subject and reason (*phyogs chos*) is contradicted by valid cognition, and the pervasion is actually the opposite of what it should be. This is what you have as your reason! How could the faults of a reductio or a syllogism be any greater than these? What is even more surprising, however, is that you should claim that a great pandit the likes of Bhāvaviveka, without actually finding even a single one of those stated faults, should have nonetheless gone ahead and claimed

that [Buddhapālita] was contradicting the Acārya's tenet that one should not accept arising again to be purposeful and finite.

[Opponent:] When the absurdity not accepted by the other party is urged, the one urging it must definitely accept the opposite of the absurd fact. Therefore, it is not correct for Candrakīrti to not accept the opposite of the absurd fact of those two reductios he claims to be the meaning of Buddhapālita's commentary.

[Reply:] The *Prasannapadā* says: "How could the absurdity occur that, when the advocate of essencelessness proves an absurdity to an advocate of essences, he or she comes to possess the opposite of that absurdity?"[938] This does not refer to absurdities in general, but to the two absurdities which refute arising from self. When undesired facts are urged by means of those two [reductios], it is not necessary for the one who urges them to necessarily accept the opposite fact. This is because when a word demonstrates a meaning, it does so only following the speaker's intention to express it (*brjod 'dod*) and not independent of the speaker,[939] and [in this case], the one who is urging [the absurdity] urges it with the intention merely of refuting that arising again [358]
is purposeful, [without implying anything else].

[Opponent:] Well then, the Sāṃkhyas believe and teach that it is merely the awakening of what already exists by means of conditions that is the meaning of arising. Because they say "the sprout arises," it would follow that [such an expression] would mean "the sprout that they advocate arises."

[Reply:] There is no problem, for [when the texts] say "if it has the ability," they mean that both the ability of a word to teach a certain meaning, and [the speaker's] desire to enunciate [that meaning] are necessary [for the word to have that meaning]. In this section I have already explained the meaning of the *Prasannapadā's* refutation of the *svatantra*. As the remainder is slightly easier to understand, I do not explain it here.

4.2.3.3.1.2.1.(B) The Refutation of Arising from Another[940]

Those who accept arising from another believe that effects are *inherently* different from their own individual causes, and [they are refuted as follows]:

> Subject: smoke
> Predicate: absurdly, is independently different from fire, and vice versa
> Reason: because it is inherently different.

The pervasion holds because if something is a created thing[941] that depends on another it contradicts its being an essence. If [the proposition] is accepted, then it follows, absurdly, that [smoke] is a different object unrelated [to fire]. If *that* is accepted, then it follows, absurdly, that just as smoke arises from fire [without being at all related to it], so too could darkness arise from a flame,

as, in so far as they are different unrelated objects, they have a similar relationship [to the relationship between fire and smoke]. Likewise, it would follow that from causes and noncauses alike both effects and noneffects would arise.

[Opponent:] Even though they are similar in being different, a barley seed and a barley sprout belong to one continuity and are of a common family and so forth. The barley seed and the rice sprout, however, do not [belong to this [359]
same continuity], so the fault, the absurdity of everything arising from everything else, does not arise.

[Reply:] If [two things] are inherently different, a distinction of the kind [you are making] is not possible. This is because if [two things] are different in such a way that they are mutually independent [of each other], and yet still belong to the same continuity, then everything would belong to the same continuity as everything else. This very point is expressed in the twentieth chapter of the *Prajñāmūla:*

> If cause and effect are different
> Causes would resemble noncauses.[942]

The *Avatāra* also says:

> If a thing arises in dependence upon something different from it,
> Then thick darkness could arise even from a flame,
> And everything would give rise to everything else
> Because of the similarity of the difference even with everything that is not a cause.[943]

Such are the forms of reasoning expounded [by Nāgārjuna].

As regards the reasoning that leads to the faults of the extreme absurdities [implicit in the position of] those who accept arising from another, one Tibetan says that it is because cause and effect must be asynchronous, [the former occurring first and the latter later,] whereas if they were different, they would have to be cotemporal. But this is not correct, for were one to take such a stance, all of the faults [pointed out by one in] the refutation would similarly and in just the same way apply to oneself.[944]

Another Tibetan Opponent: According to the logical (*rtog ge*) treatises, when one understands the pervasions, "wherever there is special smoke, there is fire" and "if something is produced, it must necessarily be impermanent," they are understood unerringly in regard to all places and times. At the time of understanding them, having understood them in regard to a single isolated case, such as [fire and smoke] in the kitchen and [the production and impermanence] of the pot, then by reason of the similarity between these [two [360]
specific pervasions] and the two pervasions in regard to other objects, one comes to correctly understand the two pervasions in regard to all objects and times. In the same way, [Candrakīrti] urges these extreme absurdities [like darkness arising from flame] by means of the reason of the similarity of [the

two things] being merely different. This kind of reasoning is called ***induction*** (*ldog pa gcig pa'i dpung 'phul ba*).

[Reply:] This method of interpretation is consistent with the logical exposition of neither the higher nor the lower philosophical schools [for the following reasons]. The logicians do not claim that when causal or essential reasons (*'bras rang gi rtags*)[945] are posited, having [first] understood the pervasions, "if there is smoke in the kitchen, then there must be fire in the kitchen" and "if the pot is produced, then the pot must be impermanent," one then goes on to understand [the more general] pervasion in regard to other objects and times by analogy. Instead, it is based on *the examples* of the kitchen and the pot that the [general] pervasions, "where there is smoke there is fire" and "if something is produced, then it must be impermanent," are understood. When such pervasions are ascertained by a valid cognition, it cuts through the doubt that it is possible to negate fire and yet not negate smoke; that it is possible to negate impermanence and yet not negate being a product. But here, even though [the understanding of this pervasion] manages to refute that cause and effect are different, it does not undo the doubt that the multitude of noncausally [related] things are different.[946]

Again, another opponent says this: the Prāsaṅgikas accept in their own system that nominally there is arising from another, for, merely nominally, cause and effect are different objects.

[Reply:] This is quite incorrect, for, as it says in a previously quoted [passage] from the *Prasannapadā:*

> It is due to the mere fact of its conditionality that [a thing] is accepted as existing conventionally, but not on account of accepting the four [361]
> [extreme] positions, for otherwise it would follow that we were advocating things to have essences; and this again is not correct.[947]

This is making the general distinction that the four [positions], arising from self and so on, are not accepted conventionally, and that it is an interdependent arising that is accepted conventionally. It is stating that no matter which of these four one accepts, one must accept that things exist inherently. The *Avatāra* also says that arising which is [any of] the four extremes cannot be considered to be either of the two truths when it says: "On that occasion, no matter what reasoning [one uses], [arising from self or other cannot be considered to be correct either from ultimate or from conventional viewpoints]."[948] Also, when it says "arising from another does not exist even from a worldly [point of view]," it is explicitly stating that arising from another is not possible even nominally. Hence, you [the opponent] are flying in the face of all of these scriptural passages [by advocating that the Prāsaṅgikas accept arising from another conventionally, that is, nominally].

Therefore, the arising of results from a cause *that is an inherently existing different object* is what is meant by "arising from another." This is very

clearly the purport of those scriptures. All those who accept arising from another, from the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas on down, accept that cause and effect are different substances. There is no one, however, who accepts that there is arising from another simply by virtue of the fact that cause and effect are different objects with different names.[949] Were that not so, that is, if in the Prāsaṅgika system a cause's merely being a different object from its effect entailed arising from another, it would follow that in the Prāsaṅgika system there would also be auto-cognition (*rang rig*)[950] because there exists a consciousness that cognizes an object that is of its own nature.[951] Therefore, those who accept this, confusing the apparent etymology for the actual meaning, think that all of the etymologies of words imply their [meaning], which is [362]
absolutely absurd.

4.2.3.3.1.2.1.(C) [The Refutation of the Arising from Both Self and Other]

The position that accepts the arising from both suffers from the faults stated of both arising from self and arising from another.

4.2.3.3.1.2.1.(D) [The Refutation of Arising Causelessly and Conclusion]

As regards the position that accepts [arising] to be causeless, the *Avatāra* says:

> If their view becomes one in which arising is simply acausal,
> Then everything would always be arising from everything else,
> And for the purpose of growing rice, the world would not amass
> The hundreds of [required conditions], such as [planting] the seed and so on.[952]

The *Catuḥśataka* also says:

> There would be no point to erecting pillars
> For the sake of building the house.[953]

It is easy to understand that the faults that these passages imply [arise from accepting this fourth alternative].

All of the multitude of reasoning taught to refute arising via the four extremes ultimately depend on the syllogistic reasoning of dependent arising (*rten 'brel kyi gtan tshigs*), which is the refutation of the fact that things exist by virtue of

their own characteristic by means of the reason that everything, whether external or internal, arises in dependence on its own causes and conditions. As the *Avatāra* says:

> Because things arise interdependently,
> Concepts cannot be analyzed.
> And so, by the logical reason of dependent arising,
> The infinite net of wrong views is cut.[954]

Therefore the reasoning of dependent arising is the chief of all reasoning. Now the [relation between] the subject and the reason[955] within the syllogistic reasoning of dependent arising already has been proven for all the other [opponents] except those who accept that things arise causelessly, and so there is no need to prove it. The pervasion[956] is proven by means of demonstrating that arising in dependence [on causes and conditions] is contradictory to inherently existing. This is because if something is interdependent, then it must rely [on [363] other things] (*ltos bcas*), and if it exists inherently, then it cannot rely on another entity.

[OTHER UNIQUE TENETS OF THE PRĀSAṄGIKA SCHOOL][957]

4.2.3.3.1.2.2. Explaining Other Facets [of the Prāsaṅgika Tenets] That Are Not in Common with the Cittamātrins and Others

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.1. The Explanation of the Uncommon Exposition of the Three Times

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.1.1. The General Explanation of the Three Times[958]

The Vaibhāṣikas[959] posit the sprout as existing within each of the three times. Hence, they believe that the sprout exists both at the time of the future sprout and at the time of the past sprout, and they believe that the same is true of all entities.

(1) In addition, the Venerable Dharmatrāta [Chos skyob] says that when the sprout proceeds from the future to the present, and from the present to the past, the future and present *entities* are abandoned, but the *substances* within future and present time are not abandoned. For example, when a gold container is destroyed to make ornaments, it loses its shape; and when milk becomes curd, it becomes another flavor—but [in either case] they do not lose their color.

(2) The Venerable Ghoṣaka [dByangs sgrogs][960] says that even though each time possesses the characteristic of all three times, whether something is the "past," for example, is determined by whether *it* [the past] is predominant. For example, when a man has the greatest attachment for one woman, it does not mean that he lacks attachment for other women.

(3) The Venerable Vasumitra[961] says that when a specific period, like the future, even of a single entity like a sprout, has passed, it nonetheless exists in the future. For example, when a single playing piece (*ri lug*) is placed in stages in the first, hundredth, and thousandth position, it is called *one, hundred,* and *thousand,* [respectively, though it is still the same piece]. [364]

(4) The Venerable Buddhadeva[962] says that just as one woman can be a mother or a daughter depending on whom [the relationship] is based, likewise,

a single entity is future in regard to a previous [moment], and past with respect to a later one.[963]

The first viewpoint, because it advocates change [of a substance from a nonmanifest to a manifest status and then back again], is similar to the Vaiśeṣika system. The second system makes topsy-turvy of the characteristics of the three times. In the third case, if an action that is of a different nature from the phenomenon, such as the sprout, were being accepted, then the sprout and so on, would become a noncomposite entity, [that is, permanent]: If [the action] were of the same nature [as the sprout], then the occasions on which the action occurred and did not occur would not be different. In the fourth case, because it is necessary for the advocate of such a position to maintain that at every moment, previous, final, and intermediate, all three times must exist, at each of the three times all of the three times would exist in their entirety. Again, if the sprout and so on existed in its own nature at past and future moments, what would be the point of saying that the sprout and so on has "passed away" or "has not yet arisen"?

This is the way that the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Bhāṣya* refute [these different views]. It then explains its own position, [that of the Sautrāntikas,] to be that, even though the cause of an entity exists in general, the nonarisen [aspect] of a present entity is the future. The passing away once again of an entity that already has arisen from its cause is the past; whereas what has arisen and not yet ceased is the present.[964] [365]

There is no difference among the three schools, the Sautrāntikas, Cittamātrins, and Svātantrika Mādhyamikas, as regards accepting the characteristic definitions of the three times in this way and believing that neither past nor future exist as entities. Moreover, they think that when an entity such as a sprout passes away, all of the entities that are the parts (*cha shas*) of the sprout cease. Due to that cessation, it does not become any other entity such as a pot. Neither past nor future have even the slightest nature of their own apart from the mere negation of the ceasing object. Hence, they think that no past or future thing can be an entity, [that is, can truly exist] (*dngos por ma grub pa*).

Although the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas accept that the three times *are* entities (*dngos po*), they do not accept that the sprout exists at the times of the future sprout and past sprout. Hence, they do not resemble the Vaibhāṣikas. As regards the exposition of the three times in this system, [that is, in the Prāsaṅgikas',] the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* says:

> In this regard, the future is the not passing into the present. The past is the going beyond it. For something to come about in the present means for it to arise and not cease. Because the arising of something in the present is referenced to the present, it is primary. Because they are yet-to-come and over, [respectively,] the exposition of these two times, future and past, are not primary.[965]

So, for example, let us take a sprout. The passing away in its own second moment of a sprout that already has arisen from causes and conditions is the past time of the sprout. Even though the sprout in general does have causes that give rise to it, the temporary nonarising of the sprout within the context [366] of a certain time and place due to the fact that its causes and conditions have not completely come together in such a setting, that is, in the eastern direction during wintertime, for example, is the future time of the sprout. A sprout that has arisen and not yet ceased is the present time of the sprout.

The *Abhidharmapiṭaka* mentions nonexistent things, such as the horns of a rabbit, and nonentities (*dngos por med pa*), such as space. Although these do not arise, [the former because it does not exist, the latter because it is permanent,] this aspect of their nonarising is not considered to be their future. It is to exclude this that the text says, "even though they have causes, their nonarising . . ." Therefore, even though in general there exist the causes to give rise to a phenomenon, the aspect of its nonarising due to the incompleteness of some causes that give rise to it at a specific time and place is posited as the future. The aspect of the nonarising of a phenomenon whose causes are impossible, [phenomena whose causes] cannot come about under any circumstances, is not posited as the future. This is what is meant.

Hence, when an opponent claims that "mere nonarising or nonarrival" is posited as the defining characteristic of the future, [it is an indication] that he or she has not understood the exclusion [implied by] the passage, "even though it has causes." The opponent also is contradicting the passages frequently taught in the scriptures of the Mahayanists that say that the two times, the past and future of a phenomenon, are posited based on its present time. This is because the opponent is contradicting the fact that the future time of noncomposite space depends on its present time; and *this* because the opponent advocates that if something is present it must necessarily be an entity [and space is not].[966]

This much is something held in common by everyone from the Sautrāntikas to the Prāsaṅgikas. Nonetheless, whether or not the past and future are entities is not agreed on. The Prāsaṅgikas believe that just as the [367] previous moments of the sprout give rise to the later moments, so the previous moments of the passing away of the sprout give rise to the later moments of its passing away.

[Opponent:] Well then, the moments of the passing away of the sprout that have arisen and not yet ceased would be present and, were that so, then the past and the present would not be mutually exclusive things.

[Reply:] There is no problem here. The first moment of the passing away of the sprout is the passing away of the sprout. The subsequent later moments of the passing away are the passings away of their own previous passings away. The passing away of the sprout is not the passing away of the simultaneous passing away of the sprout, [that is, it is not its own passing away,] but

still it is the passing away of the sprout. Therefore, it is in general a passing away, and so it is only the past and not the future.

In this same way, no matter what subsequent moment of the past there may be, its own nature must be posited via the passing away of some other entity. Likewise, no matter what subsequent moment of the future there may be, its own nature must be posited via the nonarising of some other entity. The present need not be posited with regard to either the passing away of another entity or its nonarising. Its own nature is that which has arisen and not yet ceased, like a sprout. Hence, the three times are mutually exclusive.

Therefore, an exemplification of the past, for example, is that aspect of the passing away of the sprout in its second moment. An exemplification of the future, for example, is that aspect of the nonarising of the sprout due to the incompleteness of the causes and conditions in the eastern fields during wintertime. An exemplification of the present is, for example, a sprout. [368]

As for the characteristic definition of the past in the Prāsaṅgika system, it is as follows. Whenever it is posited it must be posited in dependence on the entity's own time, and it is the completed passing beyond of an entity from its own time, where the entity is the basis of such a dependence. Whenever it is posited it must be posited in dependence upon the entity's own time, and it is the phenomenon of the nonarrival at the entity's own time, where the entity is the basis of such a dependence, that is the characteristic definition of the future. That it has arisen and not yet ceased *and* that the appearance of its image [to the mind] does not depend on the appearance of the image of another phenomenon that already has completed going beyond its own time or not yet arrived at it is the characteristic definition of the present.

[Opponent:] If something is the passing away of the passing away of the pot, then it follows that it is the nonpassing away of the pot because it is the passing away of the passing away of the pot. If you say that the premise does not follow from the reason, then you have not understood the nature of double negation.

[Reply:] This is nonsense! [Now I ask *you,*] does the nonarising of the wintertime sprout that lacks water, manure, and so forth arise or does it not? If it does, you must repudiate your advocacy of the fact that the future is not an entity, [that is, a causal thing]. If it does not arise, it follows, absurdly, that such a sprout arises because the nonarising of such a sprout does not arise. When it is put this way, you cannot answer the three cycles (*'khor gsum la lan med*). Were you to say that the predicate does not follow from the reason, then we would reply that "you have not understood the nature of double negation." When it is put in this way, again you have no reply to the three cycles. What is more, it is clear that the advocate of such a position does not at all under- [369]
stand the meaning of "not understanding the nature of double negation." It is quite possible for [someone who advocates] that "the passing away of the passing away of the pot need not be the nonpassing away of the pot" to un-

derstand the nature of double negation. This is because the passing away of the pot is not mutually exclusive with either the pot or the nonpassing away of the pot,[967] as there exists a multitude of things in a third category that is neither of the two. Therefore, "understanding the nature of double negation" has meaning only in the context of exclusion of things the negation of one of which affirms the other *(rnam bcad yongs gcod)*.

Again, it is a joke to claim that in the system of the glorious Candra the present is defined as "what has arisen and not yet ceased," [omitting the second portion of the definition that we posited earlier,] and that the future has as one portion of its definition "what is about to arise." Think about the kind of answer you would give to the three cycles [when the following argument is made]. It follows that the nonarising of the sprout is produced, as it is an entity. You accept the reason. If you accept the premise, then it follows that it arises because it is produced. If you accept *that,* then it follows, absurdly, that it is present because it has arisen and not yet ceased [because this is what you posit as the definition of the present].[968] If the nonarising of the sprout has not already arisen from its own cause, one loses the fact of its being an entity, and if it has, it contradicts its being about to be born. Therefore, all you have done is failed to distinguish between the nonarising of the sprout about to arise and the sprout's being about to arise.

Every system from the Sautrāntika up to the Prāsaṅgika accepts that the passing away of the sprout is the past time of the sprout, that the nonarising of the sprout is the future time of the sprout, and that the time when it has arisen and not yet ceased is the present time of the sprout. They do not differ in this regard. Therefore, whether or not something is the present time of the sprout must be determined based on the sprout's own time. It is not the case that the [370]
sprout is not [temporally] present simply because it does not exist at the time when it is being spoken of by the persons who are engaged in a disputation over it, for its nonexistence at the time of those persons does not imply its nonexistence during its own time.[969]

[Opponent:] If something is past, then it must be a passing away and if it is future, then it must be a nonarising. Causes exist previous to their effects, which exist later. Yet, former moments are past and later ones are future.

[Reply:] Anyone who claims this has just failed to recognize that his or her own words are contradictory.[970]

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.1.2. The Explanation of the Proof of Why the Past and Future Are Entities[971]

This point is explained in the *Prasannapadā*[972] in two ways, according to scripture and to reasoning. First the scripture: the *Dasabhūmika Sūtra* says: "Old age and death occur due to the condition of birth."[973] Hence, it is say-

ing that death is the passing away of the sentient being who dies, and that that [passing away] arises due to the condition of birth. Again, that very same *sūtra* says: "Death functions in two ways: it acts to destroy the compounded, and it brings forth ignorance, the cause of not being able to cut through the continuity [of the defiled aggregates]."[974] It is saying that death performs two functions: passing away occurs due to its cause, and the passing away itself creates ignorance. This implies that passing away has a cause which brings it about, and that the passing away itself has the ability to create an effect. It is with this same intention that the *Prajñāmūla* says: "Entities and nonentities are produced."[975] It is saying that both the entity, which is the pot, and its nonexistence after it has passed away are produced. The *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* [of [371]
Nāgārjuna] also says:

> The peace that results from the exhaustion of a cause
> Is what is perceived as "exhaustion."[976]

Hence, the exhaustion of a cause such as oil causes the exhaustion of an effect such as the [flame of the] lamp. Because [the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*] says this, there is no doubt that this is the intention of the Acārya [Nāgārjuna] himself.

As for the [arguments from] reasoning, the *Prasannapadā* says:

> Some accept destruction (*'jig pa*) to be causeless and then advocate that momentariness (*skad cig ma*) [belongs only] to the compounded (*'du byas*). They say "because of its being causeless, like a sky flower, it does not exist." But then how could the momentariness of things be possible? How could there be composition in what is devoid of destruction? Therefore, this entire [position] should be understood to be incorrect.[977]

The Buddhist systems that accept that "passing away" and "destruction" are different things believe that as soon as entities exist, they are destroyed, no longer abiding in the second moment. They also believe that, as this destruction arises from each entity's own cause, it does not depend on some later cause that is different from [the entity's] own cause. Yet they believe that the passing away in the second moment is a nonentity (*dngos med*) and hence completely acausal, [that is, permanent].

These [claims] are taught in the [*Prasannapadā*] to be fault ridden by pointing out that both passing away and not passing away must either similarly arise from causes or both must not arise from causes, [but that the latter being causal and the former not is not acceptable]. This is done as follows. If its not having abided at the second moment is causeless, then its nonabiding within the second moment would also have to be causeless; and so it could not be momentary. If that were so, then it could not be compounded; and it would not be right for them to advocate that compounded things are momentary. This is the meaning [of the preceding passage]. In short, [we must ask] whether the

passing away that is causally independent exists or does not exist. If it exists, then it contradicts the fact that the destruction of the sprout is causally depen- [372] dent. If it does not exist, then it contradicts that the passing away of the sprout is causally independent. Because *destruction* refers to what is about to pass away, [to claim that] what is about to pass away depends on a cause, and yet that the passing away does not depend on a cause, is utterly contradictory. Otherwise, similarly and absurdly, it would follow that even though what is about to arise is causally created, arising is not causally created. Therefore, it is an extremely easy task to prove by means of the reasoning that says "old age and death occur due to the condition of birth" that in this, [our own] system, the passing away in the second moment depends only on the arising within the first moment and on nothing else, and therefore entities are momentary things that do not abide in their second moment.

[Opponent:] Even though it is not necessary for something to be causally created after it already exists, its existence nonetheless must be causally created. Hence, there is no fault.

[Reply:] Well then, to say that "even though it is not necessary for something to be causally created after it has passed away, the passing away itself is causally created" is an analogous claim [which is anathema to you].

Also, previously, at the time of the seed, the sprout's own nature does not exist. Later it does, and hence the arising of the sprout is accepted as having a cause. Likewise, the passing away of the sprout also does not exist previously at the time of the sprout. Later it comes to exist newly, and hence, as its nature is periodic (*res 'ga' ba*),[978] it exists in dependence on causes. Also, as the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* says: "the exhaustion of the butter and its nature is the cause of the passing away of the lamp."[979] Thus, it is correct to accept that [373] the past has causes and effects.

[Opponent:] The exhaustion of the butter and the wick is not the cause of the passing away of the lamp. The exhaustion of the butter and the wick is the noncompletion of the conditions for the final moment of the lamp to give rise to a subsequent future. It is because the conditions for a subsequent future are not complete that it does not arise, [and not that its passing away has something as its cause].

[Reply:] If that were so, when the conditions for that subsequent future are complete, it will definitely arise, and hence you have ended up accepting that the noncompleteness of the causes is the cause of the nonarising of the future effect; and you have ended up accepting that the exhaustion of the causes of the abiding [of the sprout] brings about the exhaustion of its abiding, [thereby accepting that both future and past are causal entities]. This is how the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* explains [the reply].

Likewise, the cause of the future, that is, of the temporary nonarising of the sprout in a field during wintertime, is accepted as being the noncompleteness of causes and conditions; that is, the exhaustion of previous causes and

the nonarising of later ones. Therefore, it is necessary to set forth the causality of seeds and sprouts and so on as they are witnessed by the world. In the world, people say: "because there was no water, my rice went bad," and "for want of food my son died." Such expressions, to the effect that for lack of a previous thing a later thing came to be lost, are common. Just as it is necessary to accept that the nonexhaustion of food and water are the causes for the life of the boy and good rice, [respectively,] so too must their exhaustion be accepted as the cause for the exhaustion [of the life of the boy and the good crop of rice]. There is no difference.

This way of positing the past and the future is not correct for those who accept that entities exist by virtue of their own characteristic, that is, that the method of a cause's giving rise to an effect must be posited in such a way that it is found by logical reasoning, but it is correct for those who posit all enti- [374]
ties, cause and effect, action and actor, and so forth, merely nominally (*ming tsam*), without analyzing or examining them. This is because darkness arising from the passing away of a lamp and a sprout's arising from a seed are in every way identical as regards the status of their being posited merely nominally, [which they both are].[980]

*4.2.3.3.1.2.2.2. The Explanations of [Two Other Factors] Differentiating [the Prāsaṅgikas from Other Schools], Namely, the Rejection of the Foundation Consciousness (*kun gzhi*) and the Acceptance of External Objects (*phyi don*)*

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.2.1. The Explanation of How, Even Though We Do Not Accept the Foundation Consciousness, the Relationship between Karma and Effects Is Still Possible[981]

Although the position of those who believe that entities do not exist inherently, [that is, of the Mādhyamikas,] is that they do not accept the foundation consciousness and so forth, they nonetheless preserve in a perfectly pure way the relationship between karma and its effects. This is as follows. Even though karma and its result may be interrupted by a period of many lives or eons, that virtuous and nonvirtuous karma give rise to happiness and suffering, [respectively,] is something that all Buddhist [schools], both upper and lower, accept.[982]

[Opponent:] In this regard, if the karma remains until it gives rise to its effect, then it would be permanent, and as what is permanent cannot possibly be efficacious (*don byed pa*),[983] no relationship between cause and effect would be possible. If, on the other hand, that karma passes away in the second moment of its activity, then there would exist no previously existing karma to

give rise to an effect. What is more, as the passing away of the karma is a nonentity, how could the result arise from the karma? [375]

It is in response to such an argument that [different schools posit different entities to act as intermediaries between karmic cause and effect]. To explain how, when karma is about to cease, that is, before the second moment of its activity in which it already has ceased, karma has the potential to bring forth an effect in the future, as the basis onto which those potentials are deposited, the Cittamātrins conceive of a foundation consciousness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*). Some Vaibhāṣikas, the ones who are different from the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas, believe in a substance (*rdzas grub*) which is a product that is neither [mind nor matter] (*ldan min 'du byed*), which they call the *inexhaustible* (*chud mi za*).[984] This entity is an object different from karma and like a contractual agreement for a loan (*bu lon gyi dpang rgya*). Then, among the Vaibhāṣikas themselves some believe in the so-called attainment (*thob pa*)[985] of both virtuous and nonvirtuous karma, again a substance which is a product that is neither [mind nor matter] and which is an object different from both karmas. Others, such as the Sautrāntikas and the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas, conceive of a continuity of consciousness (*rnam shes kyi rgyun*) that is contaminated with latent karmic potentialities (*las kyi bag chags*).[986] Therefore, they believe that even though the karma ceases, there is no contradiction in its bringing forth an effect even after a long time.

[According to the Yogācāras] karma deposits latent potentialities onto the foundation consciousness, and those latent potentialities are the results of the karma. The evolutionary continuity of those [latent potentialities] brings forth the effect, and so there is no contradiction in a previous karma's giving rise to a future effect. According to the Prāsaṅgikas, after a karma has ceased, there is no contradiction in the cessation of the karma bringing forth an effect even after a long time because the cessation of the karma is an entity [having causal [376]
properties], for how it is that the past and the future are [causal] entities is something we have already mentioned in great detail.

[Opponent:] To have a ripening, [that is, an effect,] arise from the essenceless cessation of karma would entail the absurdity of unending ripening and the absurdity of nonsensically bringing forth the ripening [effect].

[Reply:] There is no problem here. For example, the aspect of illusory hair, and not the horn of a rabbit, appears to the eye consciousness affected by eye disease, though both [the illusory hair and the horn of the rabbit] are similar in being nonexistent. Likewise, one should understand that even though [two] karmas are similar in that they do not inherently exist, an effect is born from the passing away of the karma that has not yet given rise to its ripening [effect] and not from the one that already has given rise to the ripening [effect], virtuous and nonvirtuous karma giving rise to happiness and suffering, [respectively], without there being a mixing up of the individual [elements].

[Opponent:] Now we must analyze [the situation] as follows. Is the self at the time of the accumulation of the karma the self at the time of experiencing the ripening [result] or is it not? If it is, the one who accumulated the karma would be permanent. If it is not, the creator of the karma does not experience the ripening [result], and the one who experiences the ripening [result] is not the one who created the karma, thereby entailing that karma already created can be wasted and that the one not created can be encountered.

[Reply:] There is no problem here. The self at the time of accumulating the karma does not experience the ripening. Still, the self at the time of accumulating the karma and the self at the time of experiencing the ripening are "selves" that are part of the "mere general self" (*phyir nga tsam*), [that is, the self unqualified by any temporal prescriptions]. Hence, it becomes possible to say that the self creates karma and that the self experiences the ripening [result], and therefore one does not encounter karma that has not been produced, nor does one waste the one that has been produced. One should understand this method [of interpreting karma and its results to be analogous] to all of the instances in which one is first a layman and later a monk [when, though it is not the monk who did a certain thing, he nonetheless says, "I did such and such as a child"]. It is the same as all of the cases in which the Buddha, [377]
quite rightfully, engaged in linguistic expressions such as: "At that time, at that epoch, I was the king of beasts, called 'Superior Limbs,' " [describing his exploits in a past life].

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.2.2. Refuting the Fact That the Ārya [Nāgārjuna] and so on Accept [the Foundation Consciousness]

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.2.2.1. The Reason Why They Do Not Accept [the Foundation Consciousness]

The glorious Candra does not accept a foundation consciousness that is of a different nature from the mental consciousness. He says in the *Avatārabhāṣya:*

> Therefore, as neither [ultimate nor conventional] truth has any essence, not only does this exile into far reaches the views of eternalism and nihilism, but in fact it assures that, no matter how much time passes after the karmas have ceased, they are still related to their effects, without the need to conceive of the foundation consciousness, the continuity of consciousness, the "inexhaustible," "attainment," and so forth. How so?
>
> Because it does not inherently cease,
> Therefore, though there is no foundation consciousness, it is
> still possible.

One should know that no matter how much time passes
After the cessation of the karma, the effect still arises.[987]

[Opponent:] This teaches that the foundation consciousness does not exist *ultimately*. It does not teach that it is *nominally* nonexistent.

[Reply:] This would imply that [Candrakīrti was saying] that even though the foundation consciousness does not ultimately exist, karma and its effects are still possible, hence implying that Candrakīrti accepts that karma and its effects are ultimately possible [which of course he does not].[988]

Again, it is explained [by Candrakīrti] that accepting the foundation consciousness is like believing in God (*dBang phyug*) as the creator of beings. Therefore, no intelligent person would dispute that the root text of the *Avatāra* and its *Bhāṣya* do extensively refute, through both scripture and through reasoning, [the existence of the foundation consciousness]. Nonetheless, one should not content oneself with knowing the mere fact that "even though we do not accept the foundation consciousness, it is still possible to posit karma and its effects." We must be able to state [reasons why, that is,] "if it is [378] accepted, such and such a fault will ensue." What are these faults? Those who accept a foundation consciousness that is of a different nature from the mental consciousness (*yid shes*) when consciousness (*rnam shes*) is divided into eight groups, must accept the way its perceived object (*dmigs pa*), its aspect (*rnam pa*), its nature (*ngo bo*), and its analogues (*mtshung ldan*) are posited in such works as the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, the *Nirṇayasaṃgrahāni*, the root text of the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* and its *Commentary*, and the root text of the *Triṃśikā* and its *Commentary*. Because no other text whatsoever explains the nature, referent, aspect, and analogues [of the foundation consciousness] in a way that disagrees with the expositions set forth in those [works], such exegesis as are in disagreement with those [works] cannot but be considered mere self-fabrications, and something that exists in this way, [that is, in contradiction to the way it is presented in these works,] cannot be proven either by means of scriptures of provisional or definitive meaning or by reasoning.

[Opponent:] Even though [the Mādhyamikas] do not accept [the foundation consciousness] ultimately, they concur with those [Cittamātra texts] in accepting it nominally.

[Reply:] If this were so, then as the *Triṃśikā* says:

The *vijñapti* that is the appearance
Of the taking [of rebirth] and abiding [in the world]
Is born . . .[989]

And as the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and the *Nirṇayasaṃgrahāni*, concurring with this, explain in great detail, it would be necessary to accept that everything that appears, both in the external world and internally within the bodies of sentient beings, is the mere appearance of the evolution (*yongs su 'gyur ba'i*

snang ba tsam) of the latent potentialities of the foundation consciousness. They also say that "therefore the referents within the foundation consciousness are indistinguishable (*ma chad pa*)." If one accepts this, there is no possible way to accept external objects even nominally.[990] Because it is a logically well-founded tenet of this system [the Prāsaṅgika] to accept the existence of external objects, their repudiation of the foundation consciousness is equally well founded. Therefore, it is proven that neither the Acārya [Candrakīrti] nor [379]
the Ārya [Nāgārjuna] accept it. This is because the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa (Byang chub sems 'grel)*[991] explains this just as per the reasoning of "the ontological equivalency of object and consciousness" (*don shes yod med mtshungs pa'i rigs pa*), which is taught in the *Avatāra* to refute the nonexistence of external objects. This will be explained later.

What is more, if one accepts the foundation consciousness as it is explained in those texts, because it cannot [in the Cittamātrin system which accepts that consciousness ultimately exists] be established by a nominal nonfaulty consciousness that exists [only when] it is not being analyzed and examined, when one searches for how the object labeled by the name *foundation consciousness* exists, it must be found by reasoning; and this forces one into accepting an inherently existing object even though one may not wish to do so. Therefore, the acceptance within the glorious Candrakīrti's system of (1) the existence of external objects, (2) the lack of inherent existence, and (3) the existence of the foundation consciousness is nothing but a continuous rosary of mutual contradiction; [hence, we discard the latter].

If one accepts the foundation consciousness, it would be necessary to accept that it is the perceived object of the afflicted consciousness (*nyon yid*), of the misperception of the perishable (*'jig lta*), and of the innate misapprehension of the "I" (*ngar 'dzin lhan skye*), which would make pointless the *Avatāra*'s extensive refutation of the position that consciousness is the referent [object] of the misperception of the self (*bdag lta*), for then it itself would be accepting that position. Therefore, that the foundation consciousness is not to be accepted is proven to be the purport of the Ārya [Nāgārjuna], because, as has already been proven, the Ārya accepts the way of positing the referent object of the misperception of the self as it is explained by Candra.

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.2.2.2. The Refutation of the Belief That [the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas] Accept It

[Opponent:] Even the Acārya Candra accepts the foundation consciousness to [380]
be of provisional meaning. He does not advocate it to be nonexistent, like the horns of the rabbit. In the *Avatāra* he says:

> The existence of the foundation consciousness, the existence of
> the personality,

And the existence of the aggregates alone . . .
These teachings were given to those who could not understand
The extremely profound meaning [of reality].[992]

If his stating them to be of provisional meaning implies that he does not accept them, then it would be necessary for him also to not accept the personality and the aggregates themselves because he treats them similarly. Then why is it, [you may ask,] that in the *Avatārabhāṣya* he says: "The claim that God is the creator of all and the claim that the foundation consciousness is the creator of all are, except for the fact that the former is accepted as being permanent and the latter impermanent, identical."[993] This is showing merely the similarity of the belief that they are the creator of all; it is not showing that there is no difference as regards their ontological status. Were this not so, it would be necessary to refute the meaning of the *sūtras*. The *Ghanavyūha* says:

Just as the moon abides
Together with the stars in space,
Likewise does the foundation consciousness
Abide together with the seven consciousnesses.[994]

It would be necessary to refute the meaning of this citation [if the existence of the foundation consciousness were denied]. Would you not also be refuting the meaning of the *Suvarṇaprābhāsottama*, which states the functions (*gnas gyur*) of the eightfold group of consciousnesses separately.

[Reply:] Such claims are pointless blithering, for it is a case of the mind being possessed by the demon of jealousy that, oneself not being trained even in the terminology of different systems, makes one biased in favor of even the slightest claim that opposes the system of others, hence being speech that throws all caution to the wind.

What do you mean when you say that "the teaching that the foundation consciousness exists is provisional"? Do you mean that it cannot be accepted literally or do you mean that, even though it can be accepted literally, simply [381] because the foundation consciousness is a conventional entity, it is provisional from this point of view? Under the present circumstances there are no other methods [for distinguishing] definitive from provisional apart from these.

In the first case, [if the teaching of the existence of the foundation consciousness cannot be accepted literally,] then it follows that *the existence* of the foundation consciousness cannot be taken literally because the teaching of the existence of the foundation consciousness cannot be taken literally. If you accept [the premise], then it flies in the face of what you claim. In the second case, [where the teaching of the foundation consciousness is called *provisional* simply because it is conventional,] then [it is necessary to identify] within the system of the glorious Candra the basis of intention, which is that basis intended, [the entity the Buddha] had in mind, when he taught that the founda-

tion consciousness exists. Having searched for such a basis of intention, even though it will not be the foundation consciousness that is one among the eightfold group of consciousnesses, there must still be some object that is the basis of intention, onto which, for some reason, the term *foundation consciousness* is labeled and taught. This, however, is not the case [for you]; the object designated by the term *foundation consciousness* you accept as being the foundation consciousness that is one among the eightfold group of consciousnesses. This is because you accept the teaching that such a foundation consciousness exists literally, that is, as a statement of the existence of a foundation consciousness that is one among the eightfold group of consciousnesses. If you accept [the original premise that the basis of intention is the foundation consciousness itself and not some other phenomenon], then what of the scriptural passages in which [the Buddha] guides beings attached to heterodox views, who would be fearful if taught the profound doctrine of emptiness directly, as well as the statement in the *Avatārabhāṣya* which says that it is intending [to refer to] the object emptiness that the words *foundation consciousness* are taught as a term: "It should be realized that, for the purpose of demonstrating (*rjes su zhugs pa*) that it is the nature of all entities, it is emptiness alone that is identified by the words *foundation consciousness*."[995] So it is saying that, intending emptiness as the *meaning*, the term *foundation consciousness* is taught *verbally*. Would you erase these [statements] by an action of your hand? Either that, or else why not go ahead and unabashedly claim [the absurdity] [382] that Candrakīrti accepts that emptiness is consciousness!

[Opponent:] Candrakīrti accepts that such a foundation consciousness exists merely nominally, but that it does not exist ultimately, and he accepts that it is that portion of the *sūtras'* teaching of a foundation consciousness that truly exists that is of provisional meaning [and not the entire teaching of the foundation consciousness itself that is provisional].

[Reply:] Well then, it would be also necessary to claim that the passage that says "the existence of the personality and the existence of the aggregates alone" is teaching that statements as to the inherent existence of the personality and the aggregates are of provisional meaning [and not mere statements about the personality and aggregates themselves].[996] This is because you advocate a similar way of interpreting the provisional meaning of the foundation consciousness. If you accept such a thing, that reductio you previously urged on us would be utterly meaningless,[997] for you should be advocating "it follows, absurdly, that the personality and the aggregates are not accepted as truly existing, because such a teaching, [that is, in the *MA*,] accepts them as being of provisional meaning," whereas you advocate instead "it follows, absurdly, that the personality and the aggregates would not be accepted." Should you claim such a thing, [that is, that the aggregates are not accepted as truly existing,] then we would answer "a thousand times yes!" However, this would

be in direct contradiction to your own claim that Candrakīrti does not accept true existence even nominally.

[Candrakīrti's] very statement regarding the similarity of (1) advocating God to be the creator of the world and (2) the Cittamātrin claim that the foundation consciousness is the creator of the world proves that he does not accept the foundation consciousness, for we have already proven that [those who accept the foundation consciousness accept it to be the creator of all]; that is, that in the texts, according to such explanations as that of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, it is accepted as the totality of the seeds of all afflicted phenomena (*kun nas nyon mongs kyi chos kyi sa bon thams cad pa*). Otherwise, it means that one is positing something not explained by any *sūtras* or commentaries and accepted only by oneself. One would be accepting the nature, causal characteristics, and so on of a foundation consciousness that is not in accordance with any exposition such as that of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and [383] advocating *that* to be the foundation consciousness that is of a different nature from the mental consciousness. If [that is your claim], then think deeply about the kind of refutation you would wage against us should we accept that there are 108 different types of consciousnesses![998]

To say that "you are repudiating the meaning of the *sūtras* [by refusing to accept the foundation consciousness]" is merely a fault that boomerangs upon yourself. What response would you have to the three cycles should we state the following argument: "it follows, absurdly, that both the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Mādhyamikas repudiate the meaning of the *sūtras,* for [some] *sūtras* and their commentaries state that dependent entities (*gzhan dbang*) truly exist, whereas both the Prāsaṅgikas and the Svātantrikas refute true existence even nominally." It would also follow, absurdly, that you yourself should repudiate the meaning of the following passage:

> There is no essence, there is no *vijñapti.*
> There is no foundation consciousness, there are no entities.
> But the infantile logicians
> Impute these things, themselves no better than corpses.[999]

for you accept the foundation consciousness. Nor does this exhaust all of the possible absurdities [that could be urged against you].

Therefore, we are not advocating that no *sūtras* teach that the foundation consciousness exists. We simply claim that those *sūtras* have an ulterior purport (*dgongs pa can*) and are not to be taken literally. According to you, however, if something is the word [of the Buddha] (*bka'*), then it must be taken literally, for if one repudiates the literal meaning of one *sūtra*, there would ensue [according to you] the great fault of repudiating the meaning of that *sūtra* [in its entirety]. Although there is a great deal to be said [in this regard], as it would lengthen [this work] excessively and be of little purpose, I will not

expand on this any further. Therefore, the claim that even the glorious Candra accepts the foundation consciousness is to completely misconceive something [to be the case] that is not the case. Hence, I say:

The puerile who think of themselves as sages
Are the *most* childish ones.
If such be the likes of sages [384]
Then what must fools be like?

[Opponent:] The Ārya Nāgārjuna accepts a foundation consciousness that is of a different nature from the mental consciousness, for he says:

The closer it gets to a magnet
The quicker will a compass spin
And even though it has no mind
It seems as though it possesses a mind.

Likewise the foundation consciousness,
Though untrue, [appears] as if it were true.
When there is fluctuation and movement
Then it takes up an existence (*srid pa*).

Just like the ocean and wood,
They are tossed about [by the wind].
In the same way the foundation consciousness
Wavers based on the body.[1000]

[Reply:] This is not as [you would have it]. This scriptural passage is itself a portion of the refutation of the Cittamātra position. Cittamātra ["mind only"] refers to [the tenets that] repudiate external things that are different objects from the mind, without repudiating the inherent existence of the mind alone. Such a teaching [is propounded] for the purpose of eliminating the fear that the childish have toward the teaching that all phenomena are essenceless. It is not a definitive reality. [Nāgārjuna] refutes the fact that the inherently existing purity of an eternal mind (*gnas gyur pa'i sems kyi dag pa rang bzhin gyis grub pa*), as accepted by the Yogācāras, is the direct object of an individual autocognitive gnosis (*so so rang gi rig pa'i ye shes kyi spyod yul*). When he does so, he first sets up the hypothetical rebuttal [of a Yogācāra]: "if the mind does not substantially exist, it would be impossible for the action of movement to occur, that is, impossible for [the mind] to come here from a previous [state of existence] or to go from this one to the next." As a response to this, he states that, even though the compass and the driftwood have no minds, they move as if they did. Likewise, even though the foundation consciousness does not truly exist, it appears as if it did, possessing the movement [385]
of going and coming. Therefore, he does not accept a foundation conscious-

ness that exists by virtue of its own characteristic, as propounded in such works as the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*.

[Opponent:] Nonetheless, might he not accept [the foundation consciousness to be] an illusorylike totality of the seeds of all utterly purified phenomena (*sgyu ma lta bu kun byang gi chos thams cad kyi sa bon thams cad pa*) that is of a different nature from the six groups of consciousness?

[Reply:] If he did accept that, he would have to accept that external objects did not exist, and that form, sound, and so forth appeared due merely to the ripening of the latent potentialities within the foundation consciousness, whereas in that same work [cited earlier] he states:

> Phenomena are understood by consciousness.
> Were phenomena to be nonexistent, so too would consciousness.
> How is it that you reject
> The known but not the knower?[1001]

So in such passages [Nāgārjuna] states that the object and consciousness must either both exist or both not exist together, that they cannot have a different [ontological status]. Hence, that consciousness exists but that external objects do not is most certainly not the belief of the Ārya [Nāgārjuna].

Therefore, when a "foundation consciousness" is mentioned in those scriptures, it is the *mental consciousness* being labeled by the term *foundation consciousness,* for, as a response to the objection to the refutation of the inherent existence of the mind in general, [by calling the mental consciousness *foundation consciousness*] it is demonstrating how a mind that lacks true existence nonetheless can function (*bya byed rung ba*). [We also know that it is the mental consciousness being called *foundation consciousness* by Nāgārjuna] because in that work the mind designated by the term *foundation consciousness* is taught to be the mind that, at the point of transferring to another existence, takes up that existence.[1002] In another set of the scriptures of the Ārya [Nāgārjuna], the father, and his son, Candrakīrti, in the context of the Guhyasamāja practice, it is stated over and over again that the death mind and the birth mind are both the mental consciousness. What is more, as regards this [latter scripture], in the second chapter of the *Root Tantra of Guhyasamāja,* the *tathāgatas* recite the verses of *bodhicitta.* From among those, some are the verses of *bodhicitta* spoken by Vairocana. Because it comments on the meaning of these [verses, [386]
the work of Nāgārjuna paraphrased earlier] is called the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa,* [*The Commentary on Bodhicitta*] (*Byang chub sems 'grel*). Hence, this work is one that is a part of the *Guhyasamāja* [literature].

[Opponent:] Having given thought to the several instances of terms like *foundation consciousness* and *afflicted consciousness* (nyon yid) occurring in the *Guhyasamāja* cycle, the Ārya father and his son have come to accept within the *Guhyasamāja* a foundation consciousness that is of a different nature from the six groups.

[Reply:] This stance is the blithering of fools who have not come to understand even the basic terminology of either the great scriptural exegesis that teaches about the foundation consciousness or of the *Guhyasamāja* cycle. As this is not a subject over which experts dispute, and as this is also not the proper place [for such a discussion], I will not set forth an answer to their arguments here.

Therefore, in many *sūtras,* such as the *Extensive, Intermediate,* and *Condensed Mother* [*Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras*],[1003] when the number of consciousnesses is taught, only six groupings of consciousness are explained. No more than that are explained. The *Saṃdhinirmocana* and so on explain that [in addition to those six there exist] a foundation consciousness and an afflicted consciousness that are of different natures from the six groupings. Hence, the *sūtras* expound two methods: one that posits a foundation consciousness, and one that does not.

In accordance with this, the Lord Maitreyanātha, when he comments on the meaning of those *sūtras,* also [does so in two different ways]. In the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga,* in the *Sūtrālaṃkāra,* and in the *Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga* he posits the foundation consciousness and puts forth the position that there are no external objects. In the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and in the *Uttaratantra,* he does not posit a foundation consciousness and sets forth the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika system[1004] that does not repudiate external [objects]. The Acārya Ārya Asaṅga also does not explain the intention of the *Uttaratantra* in accordance with the Vijñapti, [that is, Cittamātra,] or Svātantrika systems; he explains it in accordance with the Prāsaṅgika system. In the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* he cites, [387]
as proof for the [existence of] the foundation consciousness, the following passage from the Abhidharma:

The element (*khams*) from time beginningless,
It is the abode of all phenomena.
It is because it exists
That all beings can attain *nirvāṇa.*[1005]

This very passage, however, he cites in the *Commentary to the Uttaratantra* as proof that all sentient beings have a *tathāgatagarbha,* the inherent purity of the mind. Hence, accepting the teaching of the foundation consciousness as being of provisional meaning, of having been spoken with a basis of intention, emptiness, in mind, he is in no way different from the glorious Candra.[1006]

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.2.3. The Explanation of How External Objects Are Posited Nominally[1007]

The *Madhyamakāvatāra* sets forth in an extensive way the beliefs of the Cittamātrins as the position of an opponent [to be refuted]. In so doing, the Cittamātrins [are portrayed] as accepting that *external* objects such as form

and so forth do not exist and that consciousness truly exists; they [are not portrayed] as accepting that consciousness truly exists and that form does not exist [at all]. Were the Cittamātrins to accept that [there is no such thing as form], then they could not accept any term like *form aggregate*, [the list] *form, sound, . . .* , the *three worlds* (*khams gsum*), the *environment*, and so on. In India there were not even any *heretics*, let alone Buddhists, who, while realizing that they must be flying in the face of everything directly seen [by the world], nonetheless claimed their position to be supreme. Even the Cārvākas are nihilistic only in regard to those things that are not witnessed. They do not claim that what is directly seen, [for example, an object such as form,] does not exist. It seems, however, that in Tibet there are many who take those tenets [388] that fly in the face [of experience] to be supreme.

[Opponent:] Then how do you interpret the line in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* that goes, "If form does not exist, then do not grasp the mind as existing,"[1008] [as this seems to indicate that the Cittamātra position being refuted accepts that form does not exist altogether, and not just that form qua external object does not exist]?

[Reply:] It means that "form qua external object does not exist" and not that form is altogether nonexistent. Were that not so, that is, if you accept such a thing, [namely, that the Cittamātrins repudiate form altogether] on the basis of those words alone, then the Cittamātrins would also have to accept that phenomena (*shes bya*) do not exist because [the *Madhyamakāvatāra*] also says: "If the mind were to exist while phenomena do not."[1009]

Hence, in the *Bhāṣya,* in the section [commenting] on the verse that goes, "the *vijñapti* arising from the sense organ,"[1010] it says: "Hence, having shown in this way that there is no eye organ different from consciousness, so as to teach that even form exists in a way that is not separated from consciousness, we say . . ."[1011] In the commentarial passage after [the verse] it says: "Although external objects such as blue and so on do not exist, the appearance of blue and so on does occur within consciousness."[1012] [The position of the Cittamātrins] should be understood just as it is stated here.

For those idiots who would claim that the Cittamātrins accept external objects nominally, all of these arguments and rebuttals in the *Avatāra* and its *Bhāṣya* become unintelligible, for [both Candrakīrti and the Cittamātrins] would be holding similar views, that is, that nominally external objects exist but that ultimately they do not.

[Opponent:] Well then, what is the reason by virtue of which external objects are accepted in the Prāsaṅgika system, and how do they explain the purport of those *sūtras* that teach that there are no external objects?

[Reply:] The ultimate reason is this. Form and so forth appear to sense [389] consciousness as if they were external objects, distant [from consciousness] as it were. If they did not exist in this way of appearing *even nominally,* then the refutation [of its existing in this way] could not be carried out by a valid

cognition that analyzes the nominal independently of a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate. This is because it is impossible for a valid cognition that analyzes the nominal to refute external objects, and when it is analyzed by a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate, even consciousness does not exist.[1013] Not even the Cittamātrins themselves would advocate that [external objects] could be repudiated by a valid cognition that analyzes the nominal, for in the Cittamātrins' own system the refutation of external objects must depend upon valid cognitions that analyze the ultimate, such as [the valid cognition born from an understanding of the] syllogistic reason of the simultaneity of the object and perception (*lhan cig dmigs nges*);[1014] [they believe that the refutation of external objects can be performed only in dependence on a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate also] because the emptiness of things existing as they appear qua external objects is the ultimate truth or reality according to the Cittamātrins' own system.

What is more, if there were no external objects nominally, it would be necessary to accept that form was of the nature of consciousness. If *that* were so, there could be no way in which it could be established by an ordinary nominal consciousness that understands its object without analyzing or examining it logically. Hence, when form is analyzed logically, that is, analyzed as to whether it is of the nature of matter or of consciousness, it would have to be found to be of the nature of consciousness. If *that* were so, as form would have to exist by virtue of its own characteristic, we consider it far more pleasing to accept that form is an external object nominally.

For these very same reasons we do not accept the foundation conscious- [390
ness. This is because it is impossible for an ordinary nominal valid cognition to establish the existence of the foundation consciousness independently from a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate, and when it is analyzed by a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate, it does not exist. Even though the Cittamātrins do not accept that all valid cognitions that establish the existence of the foundation consciousness are valid cognitions that analyze the ultimate, they *do* accept that they must *depend* on valid cognitions that analyze the ultimate because they accept that [the establishment of the existence of the foundation consciousness] depends upon the reasoning that refutes external objects.

As regards the reasoning which the Cittamātrins use to systematically refute [external objects], from spatially partless atoms on up, it goes:

> If you put six [of these atoms] around the one [in each of the four directions, top and bottom],
> The subtle atom [in the middle] would have six parts [the parts facing each of the atoms placed around it];
> But if these six parts were the same,
> Then even the composite [of the seven] would become one atom.[1015]

But such an argument does not vitiate against the Prāsaṅgika's acceptance of external objects, for the Prāsaṅgikas do not accept external objects as things that are found when searched for logically. They only accept them when [they are left] unanalyzed, unexamined. [It also does not refute the Prāsaṅgika position] because, though they accept external objects, they do not accept spatially partless atoms *even nominally.* That if one accepts a partless entity one must accept true existence is something on which all Mādhyamikas, both Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas, agree.

[Opponent:] It is not right for Prāsaṅgikas to accept external objects, otherwise it would follow, absurdly, that the Cittamātrins would be inferior to the Sautrāntikas, as, on the one hand, both [Cittamātrins and Sautrāntikas] accept that consciousness is truly existent and, on the other, those who advocate that external objects exist, [as do Sautrāntikas,] are better off than those who do not, [the Cittamātrins].

[Reply:] Whoever holds this misconception is making it clear that he or [391]
she understands nothing of the higher or lower philosophical schools. [There is this relative superiority of Cittamātra over Sautrāntika and of Prāsaṅgika over Cittamātra] because the Sautrāntikas accept that partless atoms and the kind of reasoning to which [such beliefs] give rise [are things that can be established] when examined logically, whereas the Cittamātrins, justifiably, repudiate such external objects by means of the reasoning that refutes such external objects [that are independent and composed of partless atoms]; the Cittamātrins [on the other hand fail in that] they do not accept an external object that exists just nominally while it is not being logically analyzed or examined, [and so] the Prāsaṅgikas refute that [position] by means of the reasoning that [points out] the ontological similarity of object and subject, [that is, that one cannot be any more real than the other]. Therefore, though the Sautrāntikas and Prāsaṅgikas resemble each other in the mere fact of their both accepting external objects, the *way* in which each accepts them is utterly different.

[The Prāsaṅgika Interpretation of the Cittamātra Sūtras][1016]

Now we should mention the way in which the meaning of those *sūtras* that teach the Cittamātra are to be interpreted. The Cittamātrins, in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha,* [for example], cite as proof [of their doctrine] the following *sūtra* passage from the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra:* "These three realms are mind only (*sems tsam*)."[1017] However, both Bhāvaviveka and the glorious Candra [state] that the word *only* in that *sūtra* does not eliminate [the possibility of] external objects. Just as the passage that states that even the three realms in their entirety "are borne from the karma of various worldly beings,"[1018] [the former passage is claiming that the three realms] are created by karma. Karma is of two kinds: mental (*sems pa*) and mentated (*bsam pa*).[1019] Therefore, the

three realms are created by the mind, and hence the word *only* is stated [by the Buddha] to refute a creator other than the mind, such as God. This is how [Bhavya and Candra] answer [the Cittamātrins' interpretation]. That [such passages as the one in the *Daśabhūmika*] are refuting creators other [than the mind] is something that the *Laṅkāvatāra* also teaches: [392]

I have explained as being mind only
The continuity of the personality, the aggregates,
And also causality and atoms,
And creators, such as *pradhāna* and God.[1020]

Because the three realms are a creation [of karma], mind is said to be more basic than matter, as is shown, once again, by the following *sūtra* passage:

Under the influence of karma
Sentient beings are born into times of darkness.
Mind is like color and a precious crystal
In the worlds of hell and heaven.[1021]

Again, the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* says:

It is not external objects that appear.
It is because the mind, appearing as the variety [of things],
Resembles the body, its possessions, and the abode,
That I have explained them all to be mind only.[1022]

Here is how Bhāvaviveka replies to the Cittamātrins' interpretation of this passage. This *sūtra* is not refuting external objects, thereby teaching the mind-only [doctrine]. It is refuting that consciousness apprehends [its object] without the aspects (*rnam med du 'dzin*). There is no appearance without aspects. The mind is born in a likeness to, for example, the body sense organ and the form that is experienced, via the multifarious appearances of the aspects. There is no seeing without aspects. The glorious Candra, on the other hand, does not repudiate the fact that this *sūtra* is teaching the Mind Only [Cittamātra]; instead, he interprets the teaching of mind only to be of provisional meaning.

Now there are two kinds of proof for the fact that this *sūtra* is not to be taken literally: scriptural and logical. The logical one is the very same reasoning that establishes the ontological similarity of [external] objects and consciousness which was explained earlier. As for the scriptural [proof], the *Avatāra* says: "This was taught by the teacher to be of provisional meaning."[1023] [393]
And in the *Bhāṣya* to this [verse], the following passage from the *Laṅkāvatāra* is quoted:

Just as a physician gives
Different medicines to different patients,

In the same way has the Buddha also taught
The mind-only [doctrine] to sentient beings.[1024]

The words *this scriptural passage* [in the lines from *MA*] that go:

Other *sūtras* of this same type
Are elucidated by this scriptural passage as being of provisional meaning.[1025]

do not refer to the just cited passage [from the *Laṅkāvatāra*], but to three groups of scriptural passages quoted in the *Bhāṣya*.[1026] In general, at this place in the text, the root text of the *Avatāra* and its *Bhāṣya* [explain that] there are five things[1027] which must be proven to be of provisional meaning, and four scriptural passages that prove them [to be so]. The five things that must be proven to be of provisional meaning are

1. The *Laṅkāvatāra*'s teaching that there are no external objects, and that [everything] is mind only.
2. The teachings of other *sūtras* that there exists a permanent, stable, and truly existent *tathāgatagarbha* (*rtag rten bden grub kyi bde shegs snying po*) that is the totality of the Buddha's qualities and that has existed inherently in the mental continuum of every being since beginningless time.[1028]
3. The *Saṃdhinirmocana*'s teaching that there is a foundation consciousness that is of a different nature from the mental consciousness.
4. Again, the *Saṃdhinirmocana*'s teaching that the dependent (*gzhan dbang*) and the real (*yongs grub*) exist by virtue of their own characteristic.
5. And also, the teaching from that [same *sūtra*] that there are three final vehicles.

(1) The scriptural passage which proves that the first one is of provisional meaning has been previously cited, [that is, it is the *Laṅkāvatāra* passage].[1029] The necessity (*dgos pa*) for teaching that there are no external phenomena is to revert excessive attachment that arises with reference to external form and so on; and [even though the teaching that there are no external objects is of a provisional character], based on the ascertainment that *external* objects are essenceless, [Cittamātrins] will [eventually] come to ascertain that consciousness [too] is essenceless.

(2) The scriptural passage which proves that the second [doctrine] is of provisional meaning is in the *Laṅkāvatāra:*

"Likewise, the doctrine of a *tathāgatagarbha* has been taught within the *sūtras* spoken by the Lord; and this the Lord has said to be inherently pure clear light, and hence primordial purity itself, possessing the thirty-two exemplary marks and existing within the body of every [394]

sentient being. The Lord said that, like a jewel of great worth wrapped within a dirty cloth, it is enwrapped by the cloth of the aggregates, *dhātus* and *āyatanas*, that it is suppressed by attachment, anger, and obscuration, that it has become stained by the stain of conceptualization (*yongs su rtog pa*), and that it is permanent, stable, and enduring (*rtag pa rten po ther gzugs*). How is this *tathāgatagarbha* advocated by the Lord any different from the self advocated by the heterodox? Lord, the heterodox also teach the advocacy of a self that is permanent, creator, without qualities, pervasive, and indestructible."

The Lord spoke. "Mahāmati, my teaching of the *tathāgatagarbha* does not resemble the self advocated by the heterodox. Mahāmati, the *tathāgatas*, the *arhants*, the utterly perfected buddhas teach by the word *tathāgatagarbha* notions such as emptiness, the perfect end, *nirvāna*, nonarising, marklessness, and wishlessness. To eliminate the abode of the fear that the childish have in selflessness, we have [395]
taught, via the teachings on the *tathāgatagarbha*, the state of nonconceptualization (*rnam par mi rtog pa'i gnas*), the experiential object of no appearance (*snang ba med pa'i spyod yul*). Mahāmati, future and present bodhisattvas, great beings, should not be fixated upon the self. For example, Mahāmati, a potter will make a variety of different vessels out of a single pile of clay particles with his hands, his skill, instruments, water, string, and effort. Likewise, Mahāmati, the Tathāgatas, in a variety of ways, possessing skill in means, and wisdom of the reality that is the reversion of all misconceived characteristics, that is, of the fact that phenomena lack a self, just like a potter, teach [but a single ultimate doctrine], using a variety of words and letters, whether you call it *teaching tathāgatagarbha* or *teaching selflessness*. Therefore, Mahāmati, the teaching of the *tathāgatagarbha* does not resemble the claims of the heterodox regarding the self. In this way, Mahāmati, the Tathāgatas teach the *tathāgatagarbha* by means of the *tathāgatagarbha* teachings so as to lead those who are fixated on the claims of the heterodox regarding the self. How can those who possess an attitude that has fallen into the view that conceptualizes a real self come to possess an attitude that abides in the experiential object of the three emancipations (*rnam par thar pa gsum*); how can they quickly become perfectly awakened within the supreme and utterly perfect enlightenment?"[1030]

This is cited in the *Bhāṣya* [to *MA*].[1031] The fact that if such a *tathāgatagarbha* [396]
existed, it would resemble the self of the heretics [indicates that such teachings] are not to be taken literally. The intended basis (*dgongs gzhi*) [of the teaching of the buddha essence, that is, what the Buddha was actually refer-

ring to,] is the essential purity, the reality of the mind. The purpose (*dgos pa*) is to eliminate the fear of emptiness in those who have extremely solid latent potentialities that are fixated upon the self of the heterodox, and who, if taught emptiness directly, would be frightened. Because the *sūtra* teaches [things] in this way, one should know that those individuals who nowadays advocate that the teachings of such a *tathāgatagarbha* are of a literal and definitive meaning are themselves attached to the self of the heretics![1032]

The teachings of such a *tathāgatagarbha*, which are stated in the *Laṅkāvatāra* and in the *Bhāṣya* to be of provisional meaning, are not [the teachings found in the work] whose meaning is extensively set forth in the *Mahāyānottaratantra*, that is, the *Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra*, one of the "ten *garbha sūtras*" renowned nowadays among latter-day Tibetans. This is because this [latter] *sūtra* is one that merely teaches that the *tathāgatagarbha*, the reality of the mind (*sems kyi chos nyid*), though temporarily stained, is essentially pure. Still, to the extent that it possesses adventitious defilements it cannot actualize the qualities of a Buddha; but when the adventitious stains are cleared away, then all of the qualities of a Buddha, such as the [ten] powers and so on, are actualized. This doctrine is taught in terms of nine examples and nine [exemplified] meanings, and the *Uttaratantra* also comments on this in this way. Hence, it is because this *sūtra* does not at all explicitly teach that [397]
the *tathāgatagarbha* truly exists, that even when it possesses adventitious defilements it inherently possesses all of the qualities of the Buddha, such as the powers, and because it has no meaning that must be interpreted in an ulterior way, as it literally teaches that because the reality of the mind is uncompounded, it is permanent, stable, and enduring, and that when it becomes free of adventitious defilement, the qualities of the Buddha such as the powers are actualized; [it is for all of these reasons that the *Tathāgatagarbha sūtra* is not the *sūtra* being claimed to be of provisional meaning by the Prāsaṅgikas]. Anyone who claims: "as becoming free of the adventitious defilements brings about the actualization of all of the qualities of a Buddha, even at the time of possessing defilements, the powers and so on are inherently present" is making himself known to be a real fool.

(3) The *Bhāṣya* states that this very same *sūtra* proves that the teachings on "the existence of a foundation consciousness of a different nature from the mental consciousness" are of provisional meaning. How is it that the provisional status of the existence of such a *tathāgatagarbha* proves that the *foundation consciousness* is also of provisional meaning? The *Ghanavyūha* teaches, for example:

> The various *bhūmis* are the foundation consciousness
> And the *tathāgatagarbha* are the virtuous ones.
> The *tathāgatas* teach this *garbha*
> By means of the words *foundation consciousness*.

Even though the *garbha* is known as the foundation consciousness,
Those whose minds are weak (*blo zhen rnams*) do not realize it.[1033]

The *Laṅkāvatāra* also states repeatedly that these two are synonyms; that is, that the *tathāgatagarbha* is known as the foundation consciousness and that it comes together with seven [other] consciousnesses. This does not mean, however, that the foundation consciousness and the *tathāgatagarbha* are mutually [398] encompassing categories, so that if something is one it must also be the other. Instead, it means that the object that [the Buddha] had in mind when he used the words *foundation consciousness* and the object he had in mind when he used the word *tathāgatagarbha* are the same, for he used both of these words to refer strictly to emptiness, the reality of the mind. That is why the *Bhāṣya* says: "It is because it is the essence of all things that one should know that emptiness alone is designated by the words *foundation consciousness*."[1034] Hence, because (1) the teachings of the foundation consciousness and such a *garbha* both have the same basis of intention, that is, that [the Buddha] had the same thing in mind [when he taught both of them]; (2) the purpose of both [is also the same], namely, the elimination of fear in those who are attached to heterodox views; and (3) were they to exist as literally [taught], then both of them would likewise suffer from the absurdity of being in no way different from the self of the heretics,[1035] the scriptural passage that teaches the *tathāgatagarbha* to be of provisional meaning also proves that statements [concerning] a foundation consciousness are also of provisional meaning.

The statements that the *tathāgatagarbha* truly exists; that it is a permanent, stable, and primordial entity that is positive and independent; and that it inherently contains the qualities of the Buddha such as the powers and so forth cannot be taken literally. Still, the basis of intention of those statements, that is, what was [actually] intended [when the statements were spoken], the reality of the mind covered with stains (*sems kyi rang bzhin dri bcas*), is the actual *tathāgatagarbha*. Because this too is the object that is the basis of intention of the statements concerning the foundation consciousness, the [*sūtra*] passage quoted in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* as proof of the existence of the foundation [399] consciousness,

The element (*khams*) from time beginningless;
It is the abode of all phenomena.
It is because it exists
That all beings can attain *nirvāṇa*.[1036]

is quoted in the commentary to the *Uttaratantra* as proof of the existence of the *tathāgatagarbha*. Although a great deal is to be said as regards these [points], as the size of the document would become too large, I will write no further on it here.

(4) Again the *Laṅkāvatāra* says: "Mahāmati, the characteristics of emptiness, nonarising, nonduality, and essencelessness are to be found within the

sūtras of all the buddhas."[1037] This is quoted in the *Bhāṣya*,[1038] and immediately after that the *sūtra* says: "No matter what *sūtra* it may be, they should all be understood to contain that very meaning, [that is, emptiness]."[1039] These are the scriptural passages that prove the provisional status of the *Saṃdhinirmocana*'s statements that the dependent exists by virtue of its own characteristic. The *reasoning* that proves that those passages are of provisional meaning is as taught extensively in the *Avatāra*.

(5) As for the scriptural passage that proves the *Saṃdhinirmocana*'s expanation of three final vehicles to be of provisional meaning, realizing that it already had been quoted [by Nāgārjuna] in the *Sūtrasammuccaya*, it is not quoted [by Candra] in the *Avatārabhāṣya*.[1040] As for the reasoning [used to disprove the doctrine that there are three final vehicles], the purpose of teaching three vehicles, even though there do not exist three final vehicles, is taught in such passages as: "Because, when its reality is understood, all defilements are eliminated."[1041]

In this way [we see] that both our accepting external objects and our not accepting the foundation consciousness stems from our not accepting inherent existence even nominally.

In the *Madhyamakāvatāra* it says that the Cittamātrins cite such things as [400] the consciousness in dreams, the sense consciousness to which imaginary hair appears, and so forth as examples that, even though external objects do not exist, the subject, that is, the consciousness, to which they appear as if they were external, exists inherently. At such times, even though there are no external elephants or imaginary hair, because it appears as if there were, the objects are considered to be false (*rdzun pa*). [Though the Cittamātrins claim that only the external object and not the consciousness is false, however, the Mādhyamikas] answer that such examples are not appropriate, for just as the object is false, so too should the subject, the consciousness, be a false thing that does not exist by virtue of its own characteristic, so that there is no difference between whether or not object and consciousness exist inherently. This is an extremely powerful argument for refuting [the position] that there is no external [world] but that consciousness exists, for by this method [of argumentation], the actual example [offered by the Cittamātrins] is repudiated, and an example that is proved by means of other reasoning, as is the case in the proof of the existence of past and future lives, is not found, so that a valid syllogistic reason to prove [the idealist] position becomes impossible.[1042]

In our own system we do not accept that sense consciousness exists within a dream. Hence, because the appearance of a herd of elephants within the dream consciousness is an appearance only within the mental consciousness, it is not a form element (*gzugs kyi skye mched*). Though nothing external can be said to be the form of an elephant at that time, the appearance that appears as the form of an elephant *is* form that is external. It is form that is a dharma element (*chos kyi skye mched*) which is the object of the mental consciousness

alone (*yid shes kho na'i yul du gyur*); and from among this [latter category], it is a form which is imaginary (*kun brtags pa'i gzugs*), like the appearance of the world filled with bones within the mind that has meditated upon the unpleasantness [of cyclic existence].[1043] The appearance that appears as imaginary hair to the sense consciousness [affected by cataracts], the appearance in which a mirage appears as water, and the appearance in which the reflection appears as one's face [within a mirror], *are* form elements because they are [401]
forms that are the appearing objects (*snang yul*) of sense consciousness. Now we must examine the following question.

[Sense Perception Across World Spheres: The Case of Water][1044]

[Opponent:] [If there are external objects and the world is not of the nature of mind,] how should [one consider], then, a river of water that appears to a *preta*[1045] as pus and blood? Is it the pus and blood that it appears to be or not? Also, is [the pus and blood] to be accepted as an external object or is it not?

[Reply:] In this regard, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says:

> Because a single thing is different for different minds,
> Depending upon what family [of beings] they belong to,
> Whether *preta*, animal, human, or god,
> We accept the object to be nonexistent.[1046]

In the explanation (*bshad sbyar*) of that [work] by the venerable spiritual friend Niḥsvabhāva it says:

> By virtue of the ripening of his or her own karma, a *preta* sees deposits of water such as rivers to be filled with pus and so forth. An animal, [for example, a fish,] conceives of it as its own abode. Humans conceive of it as sweet, pure, fresh water and think "I will wash in it," "I will drink it," "I will enter it." The gods who are equipoised in the element of infinite space see it as space, for they have no recognition of form.[1047]

[Opponent 1:] It is for this reason that all phenomena are whatever one's own mind makes them out to be. It is impossible to say in a definitive way "it is this" or "it is not this."

[Opponent 2:] Because it is true [for a being] as it appears within the purview of that being's own mind, a single entity that [has the properties] of wetness and fluidity[1048] is true pus within a *preta*'s purview, and true water for a human.

[Reply:] Those who advocate these positions are making themselves [40
known to be utter fools, to be the likes of the Nirgranthas.[1049] The entity that [possesses the characteristics] of wetness and fluidity appears to be pus and

blood to the eye consciousness of a *preta*. It appears to be water to the eye consciousness of a human, and nectar to the eye consciousness of a god. At that time do you accept those eye consciousnesses to be valid cognitions or do you accept that some [among the three] are valid cognitions, whereas others are not? In the first case, it would follow that there was something that was pus and blood, clear water, and nectar [all at the same time], whereas there exists a valid cognition that is unmistaken about [these three] being mutually exclusive. Because that single entity would be established as being pus and blood by a valid cognition and not being pus and blood by a valid cognition, valid cognitions could no longer serve the slightest function as agents of verification. To accept this, and to claim that only that is true which appears to one's own mind, and that it is not therefore possible to decisively posit something to be *x* or not *x*, reduces one to being unable to decisively distinguish between the correct philosophical position of the Buddhists and the incorrect position of the heterodox. Therefore, because the teachers of the heterodox and our own teacher, the perfect Buddha, would not be distinguished in goodness, what worse karma is there than this, the slandering (*skur ba bdebs pa*) of the three jewels?

[Opponent:] Some [of these eye consciousnesses] are valid cognitions, but some are not.

[Reply:] Then which are not valid cognitions?

[Opponent:] Some gods seeing nectar and the *pretas* seeing pus and blood are mistaken appearances that have been affected by [these beings'] own particular karma, that is, those eye consciousnesses are not valid cognitions, whereas humans seeing [it as water] *is* a valid cognition.

[Reply:] Then tell us why humans seeing it as cool, clean water is not the [403] result of *their* karma as well. Therefore, [the humans' perception] is in every way analogous. It too could not be a valid cognition. If only the eye consciousness of a human could be a valid cognition and if the eye consciousnesses of other sentient beings could not be valid cognitions, then the same would be true of the ear consciousness. Because [this would mean] that there could then be no valid cognitions in the continua of any nonhuman beings, it would be impossible for there to arise ascertaining consciousnesses (*nges shes*), and for there to occur the elimination of reification (*sgro 'dogs chod pa*) in regard to any object within the continua of any nonhuman beings. Because that would imply that these other beings could not even recognize each other, those who advocate such a thing are more stupid than even animals.

Now if you are wondering what we ourselves accept; it is this. We believe that the eye consciousnesses of all three [beings], god, human, and *preta*, are valid cognitions. Nonetheless, we do not believe that the vessel filled with the wet and fluid [substance] is the common basis of all three [substances]: clean and cool water, pus and blood, and nectar, [that is, the liquid is not all three substances]. [Instead, we believe] that *one part* is pus and blood; that *one part*

is clean, cool water; and that *one part* arises as nectar. It is not the case, however, that as soon as that vessel filled with the wet and fluid [substance] comes into existence, these three parts also come into existence; it is not that for as long as the continuity of the vessel filled with the wet and fluid [substance] exists, so long does it engage in possessing the continuity of the three [404]
parts. Instead, it is when the *preta* comes close to it that the previous moment of the wet and fluid [substance], acting as a material cause (*nyer len*), and the *preta*'s own karma, acting as the dominant cause (*bdag rkyen*), make one part of that vessel filled with wet and fluid [substance] arise as pus and blood. Likewise, when a god approaches it, the previous [moment of the] wet and fluid [substance], acting as the material cause, together with the god's own karma, which acts as the dominant cause, cause one portion to arise as nectar. When the god and *preta* leave it, however, because the karmic dominant cause is not complete, the later continuities of pus and blood and nectar do not arise. It is by virtue of the *preta*'s evil karma that he sees the pus and blood part, and it is because he has not accumulated good karma that he does not see the nectar part. By virtue of his good karma, the god sees the part of the nectar and does not see the part of the pus and blood. Therefore, when the *preta* takes that vessel in his hand and begins to drink from it, all of the parts become exclusively pus and blood as soon as it reaches the *preta*'s mouth. This is because it has become an object used exclusively by a *preta*. The other two cases should be understood in the same way, by analogy.

[Opponent:] What was this vessel filled with the wet and fluid [substance] before the three beings, god, human, and *preta*, had arrived at that place? Was it water, or pus and blood, [or nectar]? [405]

[Reply:] If it were a river, a spring, or a well that came from the earth, or were it taken from [any one] of those, then it would be originally ordinary water, as it originally arose from a karmic domain in which humans are dominant. The pools of nectar that exist in some special god realms are originally nectar, as they arise from the dominant cause of the karma for enjoying such things as pools of nectar, [that is, the karma that gods possess]. In short, whether it is water or nectar before the *preta* and so on arrive depends on the environment from which that wet and fluid [substance] came; that is, whether the environment came into existence due to the dominant cause of humans' karma, or from the dominant cause of gods' karma, and so forth.

This same method of explanation can also be applied to the following example. When the hand that has been blessed by certain special mantras touches a red-hot piece of iron, it does not feel hot, but if the hand of another man were to touch it, it would be hot and it would burn. This piece of iron has two tactile parts: one that is hot and one that is not. The hand that has been enchanted by spells experiences a tactile sensation that is not hot and does not experience the heat. When the hand of another man touches it, however, it experiences the tactile sensation of heat and does not experience the tactile

sensation of no heat. Likewise should one understand that the division into [406] parts and whole applies to such scriptural passages as:

> *Pretas* in the springtime are burnt even by the moon,
> And in the winter, even the sun makes them cold.[1050]

So, when the rays of the moon and the karma of a *preta* come together in the springtime, the one part of the moon's rays that has become the object of the bodily sensations of the *preta* causes a feeling of heat at that time. When the rays of the sun in wintertime and the karma of a *preta* come together, the one part of the sun's rays that has become the object of the bodily sensations of the *preta* causes a feeling of coolness. Whenever it has not come together with the karma of a *preta*, the rays of the moon are not accepted as having these two different feelings, that is, the hot feeling is not accepted; also, there is no one who accepts that the sun possesses the substance of darkness.

Hence, without having understood the meaning of the texts, do not create suffering for yourself by laboriously refuting these [points that no one accepts]. Even though a single entity will arise as clear water, pus and blood, and nectar, depending on the karma of individual beings, we believe that the karma of each will not [permit them] to see the other parts, that they only see that part which is the fruit of their own karma.

[Opponent:] [A non-Buddhist] claims that when a single being is seen by a friend and a foe he is [seen] to be pleasant and unpleasant [respectively], but is not seen to be both [pleasant and unpleasant] by each, for these [two qualities] are mutually obscured by active form (*las gzugs*). This, however, has been refuted by the reasoning of Dharmakīrti. [Likewise is your position that a single entity cannot be seen in two ways, but that only different parts are seen in different ways, also refuted by Dharmakīrti].

[Reply:] You are only making it clear to all that you are completely unfamiliar with both the scriptural exegesis of Dharmakīrti and with the beliefs of those whom you are trying to refute. The lines:

> If, in dependence upon sight of that,
> Another form were to arise . . .[1051]

[are to be interpreted as follows]. [A heterodox school believes that,] when [407] viewed up close, there arises a transparent active form between the organ and the object; and that, when viewed from afar, there arises a nontransparent active form between the organ and the object. Hence, [they believe] that there is a difference in the clarity or lack of clarity in the sense consciousness of [the object] blue and so on when close or far, but they do not attribute this to the appearance (*rnam pa shar ba*) [of the object] to the consciousness [but instead to the presence of this intervening active form]. Having expressed what this position accepts, [the Buddhist] refutes them [as follows].

When viewed from up close, if the active form that arises between the eye consciousness that apprehends blue and the blue [itself] obscures the blue, then it follows, absurdly, that the eye consciousness apprehending blue does not see the blue. If it does not obscure it, then again it follows, absurdly, that the eye consciousness that perceives it from up close individually sees both the clear active form and the blue simultaneously, and that the eye consciousness seeing it from afar individually sees both the nontransparent active form and the blue simultaneously. These are the reductios urged [on those who accept "active form"]. No one is accepting anything about the form [or body] of one man being both pleasant and unpleasant. There is nothing more amazing than the meaningless explanation that tries to fit these scriptural texts to conform to such a refutation, [as you attempt to do].

Here we are not accepting that between the eye consciousness of a *preta* and clean water there arises an active form of pus, through which [filter] the clean water is seen by the eye consciousness; and if you try and urge upon us the absurdity that the eye consciousness of the *preta* does not see that part [of the liquid] that is clean, cool water, we would heartily agree! Because you yourself share this same belief, that it is not seen by that [being], is this not a reductio of one who is still affected by sleep? Get your act together! Therefore, it is not in regard to such a belief that the reasoning of Dharmakīrti [408]
is directed.

The glorious Dharmakīrti extensively refutes the belief that the five diseases, such as wind, bile, phlegm, and so on; the five [elements]—earth, air, fire, water and space; the five spirits (*gdon lnga*);[1052] and so forth are all the direct effects of the five poisons, the afflictions. [He refutes the fact] that attachment and phlegm, anger and bile, and so on have an invariable relationship in which the latter proceed from the former, in the lines: "Because they are not invariable, wind and so on are not their qualities."[1053] By changing the words of this reasoning that refutes the heterodox one should know that [the resulting argument] perfectly refutes [the preceding opponent's view]. The view that noncompounded space is a direct result of jealousy is the deceiving thought of a bunch of utter fools. Hence, do not become partisan to these babblings, which are much worse even than what the heterodox accept.

[Opponent:] By claiming that there are six objects seen in six different ways you are also contradicting the explanation that a single object is seen in six different ways, as expressed in the line "because a single thing is different for different minds."[1054]

[Reply:] This is extremely unrefined talk. How would you respond, for example, to the claim that when the five limbs of a single man, his head, and so on, perform five distinct kinds of action, it becomes five actors doing five actions and not a single man doing the five actions?

[Opponent:] Because these five limbs are limbs that are parts of a single man, when they perform five different actions, we say that that one man is performing five different actions. There is no contradiction.

[Reply:] [Well, in exactly the same way], because the single entity that [has the characteristics of] wetness and fluidity is a whole that has [six different] parts that are seen in six different ways, how is [this view of ours] in [409
contradiction to the line "because a single thing is different for different minds"? [Have we not given a rationale, via this example, for calling these six different ways of perceiving the parts of the object "ways of perceiving the single object," just as the five different actions of the five limbs are called "actions of the man"—each of the former being in the relationship of part and whole to the latter?]

[Opponent:] Let the object that occupies the place of the single [entity that possesses the characteristics of] wetness and fluidity, that is, the whole, be perceived by those who possess the condition, that is, the karma, of a god, a man, and a *preta*. You believe that occasionally, when [such beings] come together, the parts of that whole, the pus and blood, the nectar, and the clean, cool water, are actually present. If that is so, then it would be necessary that in the place occupied by the one river there exist those various substances. Hence, one material thing would not displace another, [as is commonly accepted by all].[1055]

[Reply:] The one who advocates this has not yet come to understand the nature of reasoning; before the dawning of an opponent, the sun of his refutation has already risen.[1056] It follows [according to him] that it is impossible for many different entities, the parts, to exist in the place occupied by a single whole, for were it possible there would arise the absurdity that other material things would not be blocked from arising in the place occupied by one material thing. If you accept the [original premise, that the parts cannot exist where the whole does,] then it follows, absurdly, that in the place occupied by a ceremonial pot there do not exist the many [parts] such as the spout, the base, the hollow cavity, and so forth. What is more, when a bowl is filled with a mixture of clean, cool water, milk, beer, and blood, it follows, absurdly, that other material things are not blocked from arising in the place occupied by one material thing because four different things, clean, cool water, milk, blood, and beer, exist simultaneously in the place occupied by that bowl full of liquid. Our omniscient Lord [Tsong kha pa] believes that at that special time [when all three beings simultaneously witness the bowl of liquid we call water] there exist at one time many parts, which arise as pus, nectar, and so forth, in the bowl full of liquid. He does not at all accept that in the place occupied by the [410
bowl full of [substance possessing the characteristics] of wetness and fluidity there exists a bowl full of pus, a bowl full of nectar, and a bowl full of clean, clear water; nor does he at all accept that at the place occupied by one molecule of water there exist simultaneously a molecule of nectar and a molecule of pus. As he in fact claims no such thing, when you demonstrate any fault [in his position], thinking that he *does* teach this, then you are only showing [what kind of person] you yourself are [and not what the Lord Tsong kha pa is like].

[Opponent:] Well then, how do you interpret Vinitadeva's explanation [of this point], "When there is not even the slightest drop of pus, how could there be a river full of it? It is due to the ripening of their karma that they see it [to be pus]," in his *Viṃśatikāsvavṛttiṭīkā*? [1057] All these arguments and analyses carried out in great detail in the *Viṃśatikā*, in the *Svavṛtti*, and in the *Svavṛttiṭīkā* are performed strictly to refute external objects. If the appearance of the aspect of blue within the eye consciousness is an aspect bestowed (*gtad*) [on consciousness] by an external object, then a human's perception of an entity, a single river, as clean, cool water, and a *preta*'s perception of it as pus, blood, and feces would become appearances that arise due to the external object. Hence, the arising of those appearances would have to be appearances that do not at all depend upon the awakening of karmic latent potentialities. It appears only to *pretas* and so forth whose latent potentialities have awakened accordingly and not to others. In general, they appear in this or that way due to karma that is of the nature of consciousness. Thus, [the passage] is saying that when there is no single drop of pus that is an external object, that is, that exists as it appears [to that being], how could there exist a river filled with external pus; nonetheless, [it does not deny that] these [beings] see it [as pus and so on] due to the ripening of karma. Were it not so, [that is, were this [411]
passage not teaching principally the nonexistence of pus and so on qua external objects, but the nonexistence of pus altogether,] then [why] immediately after this [passage], in rebuttal to an [opponent's] argument, does there ensue the absurdity that the pus and blood appearing as pus and blood to the *preta* cannot possibly act as food and drink, does he answer that even though it is of the nature of consciousness alone and empty of being an external object, this does not contradict the fact that it can act in a manner that is either beneficial or destructive. This is explained extensively via many examples in the root text and commentary in such lines as: "they function, just as a dream can be destructive." [1058] So, were it not [as we have explained], it would contradict all of these [passages]. This is because in the *Viṃśatikā*'s own system it is believed that when it appears in this way to a *preta* there is in reality no pus that can act as food and drink apart from the mere appearance of pus.

Now you, who take refuge in believing the mere literal interpretation of the words without at all analyzing the layout of the meaning, consider what it says in the *Viṃśatikāsvavṛtti*: "Likewise, although the Lord has said that the elements such as form and so forth exist, this teaching is for the purpose of the disciple's spiritual growth (*'dul ba'i skye ba'i ched du*). Those words have an ulterior purpose." [1059] Because it says this [and because you insist on taking everything in the scriptures literally], then go right ahead and accept the absurdity that there is no form except for the mere appearance of form to the eye consciousness. This makes you more nihilistic than even the Cārvākas. If you accept that this [one passage] teaches that there is no external form and so on, [hence not taking it literally,] and yet accept the previous [*Viṃśatikā* passage]

as you explained it earlier, [that is, literally,] then has fear besieged you [into the present action] or is it just a cover-up?

[Opponent:] If the eye consciousness of some *pretas* to which a river filled with pus appears is really a valid cognition in regard to real pus, then consider [412]
this passage from the *Suhṛllekha:*

> Trees become fruitless for them
>
> And their mere glance makes a river dry.[1060]

It would then be correct [for you] to also accept that the eye consciousness of a *preta* to which things appear in that way is a valid cognition in regard to the drying up and nonexistence of rivers such as the Ganges, and that it is a valid cognition in regard to the sudden disappearance of the fruits of trees very heavily laden with fruit. This would therefore imply that it was correct to accept that at that time the River Ganges actually *was* dry, and so forth.

[Reply:] There is no problem. Such a *preta* first sees that river from far away. If he did not, he would not go to it with the thought that desires to drink [from it]. Thus, desiring to drink, he approaches; but obstructed by his karma, his eye consciousness does not see the river. When he does not see it, he sees instead the bottom, a river bed filled with dirt, rubble, and so forth. If it were not obscured by the river, men too would see that. In this way, they directly see the dirt on the bottom of the river. Due to their not seeing the river, which would act as an obstruction, they see the bed at the bottom of the river, and doing so they conceptually think "the river is dry." Such a conceptual thought (*rtog pa*) is a mistaken consciousness (*log shes*) in error with regard to its conceived object (*zhen yul*). It is not a valid cognition in regard to its conceived object. That eye consciousness *is* a valid cognition in regard to the rubble and pebbles of the river's bottom. These do actually exist. It is the case that their eye consciousness does not see the river and not that the river ap- [413]
pears to be nonexistent.[1061] Likewise, it is the case that karma obstructs their seeing the fruit so that they do not see it, and see only the branches of the tree. Hence, [that eye consciousness] is a valid cognition in regard to the branches of the tree, but it does not perceive the fruit to be nonexistent. The conceptual thought that apprehends the fruit to be nonexistent *is* a mistaken consciousness that is in error as regards its conceived object. That is why we do not accept it to be a valid cognition in regard to the conceived object.

Therefore, when we consider the river and the dirt at its bottom, the eye consciousness of man is a valid cognition in regard to the [river] water and is not a valid cognition in regard to the dirt at the bottom; whereas the eye consciousness of a *preta* is a valid cognition in regard to the dirt at the bottom, but is not a valid cognition in regard to the [ontological status of the] river. Likewise, before some kinds of food reach the mouth of some *pretas*, they are ordinary food, but when they reach their mouths, the further succession [of

moments] of the food actually becomes fire, by virtue of the *preta*'s karma. Were this not so, that is, were the fire that is the basis of that appearance not real but only a mere appearance of fire to the mind, it would follow that it could not scorch their mouths and burn their throats and stomachs, which would be a form of skepticism in regard to karma and its result. If the mere appearance that appears to the mind in this way could burn and so on, then the mere appearance that appears as hair [to the one suffering from cataracts] could act as hair, that is, it could be braided and so forth; and the mere appearance that appears as a bee to the one suffering from eye disease could act as a bee, stinging one's body. Hence, all of the distinctions between whether the basis appearing to any consciousness actually exists or not would become utterly without purpose, and it would follow, absurdly, that even the appearance of a mirage as water could act as water.

Therefore, a river appears as pus and blood to some *pretas,* as nectar to [414] the gods, and as a home to some creatures, and so forth; and these eye consciousnesses as well as the way in which [their objects] appear are valid cognitions. If the entities that are the basis of the appearance, [that is, the pus, nectar, and so on,] did not exist, then the entities that are the basis for what appears to a hell being, that is, fire, weapons, and so forth, would not at all exist over and above the mere *appearance* of fire, molten iron, the forest of razor leaves, and the weapons and so on that appear to the eye consciousness of a hell being. This is because the reasoning in both cases, [that is, in the case of *pretas* seeing pus and hell beings seeing weapons and so on,] is analogous. If you accept *that,* [that is, that what hell beings witness being done to them is mere appearance,] then there would follow the absurdity that there is no possibility for the real burning of the body or the cutting of the limbs over and above the mere arising of such appearances to the mind. Thus, it would follow that hell beings and *pretas* and so on would have no feelings of bodily suffering whatsoever, over and above mere mistaken mental appearances. What greater skepticism can there be in regard to karma and its effects than the likes of this? How would you refute someone who advocated that the appearance of fire and water and so forth to the eye consciousness of a man was a valid cognition in regard to the mere appearance but that there was not the slightest entity such as fire or water that was the basis of the appearance, [that is, you would end up refuting such a person just as we are refuting you].

[Opponent:] Because it is established by the experience of men themselves that [fire and water] have the ability to perform functions such as burning and cooking, and [acting as sources for] washing and drinking, fire and water do actually exist.

[Reply:] Well then, why do you deny the actual existence of pus and blood and so on, for it is established by the experience of *pretas* that pus and blood, and the fire that has fallen into their mouths and so on, can act as food and drink, can burn their throats and so forth?

[Opponent:] That is mere fancy (*rloms pa tsam*) due to an error in so far as it is established by the experience of those *pretas*.

[Reply:] Then even with men it would be mere fancy established by experience under the influence of error. [415]

[Opponent:] Well then, they would *not* really perform the functions of cooking and washing.

[Reply:] To say "well then, they would not really burn the throats of those *pretas*" would be completely analogous. Hence, you are either accepting that there is no phenomenon whatsoever that can really perform a function or else you are accepting that the entities that are the bases of whatever appears to beings in the lower realms and gods, due to their individual karma, do not have the slightest ability to perform the functions of creating happiness or suffering. Because [in either case] this would mean that [these entities] would be in no way different from the fictitious hair that appears to one who suffers from eye disease, you are confusing a view of skepticism in regard to karma and its effects for an exposition that has been set forth via valid reasoning. Don't go showing off!

The *Avatāra* says:

> Similar to the sense organ of one who suffers from eye disease
> Is the *preta*'s perception of pus in a river of flowing water.[1062]

Both the root text and the commentary explain that both the eye consciousness of *pretas* who see pus and blood in the river, that is, the consciousness that possesses the object, and the object itself, equally lack any inherent existence; and that, just as there exists a consciousness, a possessor of objects, in a merely nominal way, as long as it is not being examined or analyzed, there also exist external objects. [The *MA*] is showing that this situation is similar to one previously explained, that is, that the eye consciousness of the patient with eye disease and its external object both lack inherent existence, but that from a strictly nominal [viewpoint] the eye consciousness to which the falling hair appears and its external object both exist.[1063] How could it possibly be [416] showing [instead] a similarity between the fact that the hair that is the basis of the appearance can perform no function over and above its merely appearing as hair to the consciousness to which the hair appears and there being in reality no pus and blood that is the basis of the appearance over and above their appearing to the eye consciousness of *pretas* to which they appear? [Were that so,] it would mean that the argument between the Mādhyamikas and Cittamātrins was not over whether or not object and consciousness had the same ontological status, but over whether or not the basis of appearance of the appearances of erroneous consciousnesses exist; and it would be clear that you have not even seen the section of the *Bhāṣya* [to *MA*] that deals with the verse that goes, "Due to the power of the eye disease, the hair that is seen,"[1064] in which the opponent's position is set forth. It makes it clear that you are just

another one of those who are for the most part false teachers in the midst of retinues satisfied with the mere sound of the words of the lecturer, [as opposed to requiring that the meaning make sense].

[Opponent:] The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* says:

> Who purposely creates the weapons
> [Used to torment] the beings of hell?
> Who creates the ground of burning iron?
> Who creates those multitudes of fire?
>
> All such things have been said by the conqueror
> To arise from sinful minds.[1065]

This is indicating that the weapons of hell and the ground of burning iron and so forth do not really exist. If they did, then who created them? These are all the mere mistaken appearances of the mind. Hence, it is analogous to the mind of the *preta* [who sees] pus in the river of flowing water.

[Reply:] To claim this is to claim that the fact that a holy being who has correctly trained himself or herself in the path of the ten virtuous actions and is born as a god and the fact that a sinful being who has committed the five heinous sins and is born into hell are both mistaken appearances of the mind with no difference in desirability; that is, that there is not the slightest difference as regards the pleasure or suffering that is actually experienced by the body [in these two states]. Hence, there would be no difference between dharma and nondharma, and it would be fitting for all great beings to make [417]
only that kind of mental prayer to exert themselves in the practice that takes demerit as its object.

[Opponent:] Well then, what *is* the meaning of that scripture, [that is, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* citation]?

[Reply:] The words *who purposely creates* and *who creates* are indicating that there is no other being, no one at all, not even God, who creates the weapons and burning iron of the hells in a premeditated way.

[Opponent:] Then who or what is the creator of them?

[Reply:] The creator is the sinful mind of those beings who have accumulated that karma in their own previous lives and who then experience the ripening of it [in hell]. It is indicating that, as this is the source, the mind itself is the chief creator of happiness and suffering. Do not claim that because it arises from the mind which is the cause of this [suffering or happiness], it therefore does not exist!

[Opponent:] Well then, do you accept that when a god, man, and *preta*, possessing the proper karma, assemble, there appears in the place occupied by a bowl full of [liquid possessing the characteristics] of wetness and fluidity a [whole] bowl full of nectar to a god, a [whole] bowl full of pus to a *preta*, and so forth?

[Reply:] At that place, pus does appear to the *preta*, and the basis of that appearance does actually have the ability to act as pus. Nectar does appear to the god in that place, and the basis of that appearance does actually have the ability to act as nectar. We believe this. It is not necessary, however, that there appear with absolute precision the same amounts; that is, a [completely] full bowl of nectar or a [completely] full bowl of pus. Were it necessary, then it would also be necessary that the amount of a bowl full [of liquid] appear even to a microbe the likes of which cannot be seen by the ordinary eye, and that lives in the bowl full of liquid [possessing the characteristics of] wetness and fluidity with the thought of its being a home. Were *that* so, then the depth, [418] width, and breadth of the ocean would have to appear exactly as it is to the tiny fish who lives in the ocean. It would also be necessary for it to appear as a bowl full of weapons when it appears as weapons to some demigods (*lha ma yin*) [which it of course does not]. Even if it *were* necessary that at that time there appear exactly similar proportions, that is, a [complete] bowl full of pus, a [complete] bowl full of nectar, and so forth, this still presents no problem for us. This is because no one could refute the assertion that, though those eye consciousnesses are valid cognitions merely in regard to pus that has the ability to act as such and in regard to nectar that has the ability to perform the function of the basis of appearance, they are not valid cognitions in regard to the aspect of the proportion; that is, of just *how much* it is that appears. In these [various] ways, this point has been misapprehended by those of small intellect using [as their source] the mere words of those who cannot analyze it, so that they do not realize the eloquence of the holy to *be* eloquence. Seeing their incertitude in regard to karma and its effects, I have explained it in a slightly more elaborate way.

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3. The Explanation of Why We Do Not Accept Autocognition (rang rig)[1066]

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1. The Explanation of How We Refute the Position That Does Accept It

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1.1. The Explanation of the Opponent's Position

The autocognition accepted by the Sautrāntikas and the Cittamātrins is as follows. The *Tarkajvālā* clearly indicates this by setting forth the opponents' position:

> The Cittamātrins claim that consciousness appears in two ways: self-reflectively (*rang snang ba*) and reflecting the object (*yul snang ba*).

> The consciousness that reflects the object takes on the aspect of the external object. This [latter consciousness] then becomes the object of a self-reflective consciousness.[1067]

Self-reflective refers to the subjective aspect (*'dzin rnam*), and *reflecting the object* refers to the objective aspect (*gzung rnam*). The objective aspect, which [419] takes on the aspect of the object, is explained to be the object of the subjective aspect. Hence, the experience of the objective aspect by the subjective aspect is the meaning of autocognition. Therefore, in the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra systems both, every consciousness has a subjective aspect which is of [that consciousness'] own nature. This [subjective aspect] is directed strictly internally, and it is devoid of all dualistic appearances.[1068] It cognizes itself. It is a subjective aspect that is independent (*yan gar ba*) and that cognizes both itself and the objective aspect without at all depending on the appearance of any object whatsoever. These same points are clearly expressed by many scriptures such as the *Pramāṇavārttika* in such lines as "Permanently it faces within, toward itself"[1069] and "Both the cognized and cognizer have no aspect."[1070] Moreover, in the *Satyadvayavṛtti* it says:

> When refuting autocognition . . . that consciousness, [that is, autocognition,] should be understood to be the cognition of the nature [of something] nondualistically and [it should be understood] to be nonexistent. If that were not so, it would not be correct.[1071]

which means that because there is no such thing as autocognition devoid of all dualistic appearances, there is no such thing (*gzhan dbang*) as the lack of subject-object duality.

The chief form of reasoning that the realists claim proves the existence of such an autocognition is this. If they were to posit a [standard syllogism of the form]:

> [Subject:] the autocognition that autoexperiences the eye consciousness
> that apprehends blue
> [Predicate:] exists . . .

there could be found no example possessing [the characteristics of] both the reason and predicate that could be posited, [that is, accepted by,] the opponent [to whom the syllogism is being posited]. So they do not go about proving it in this way, and instead do so as follows.

After the eye consciousness has seen blue, there arise consciousnesses that remember the object and that think, "I have seen blue." They remember the possessor of the object, [that is, the eye consciousness itself,] and think, "I [420] have seen." Just as it is impossible for there to arise a consciousness that remembers the blue unless it was preceded by an experience of the object blue, likewise it would be incorrect for there to arise a memory of the *eye con-*

sciousness apprehending blue unless it was preceded by an experience of the possessor of the object, the eye consciousness apprehending blue. Therefore, [they claim that] there does exist the experience of the eye consciousness apprehending blue. This can only be of two types: either it is a reflexive experience (*rang myong*), or an experience of something other (*gzhan myong*). Were it experienced by a consciousness that is something different from [the eye consciousness] itself, whether cotemporal with it or occurring after it, it would be necessary to accept yet another entity that experienced [that one experience], and so on ad infinitum. If the latter moment of the eye consciousness apprehending the blue experiences the former, there would follow the absurdity that the latter moment could not transfer its attention [lit. the action of apprehension] to the blue [as it would be preoccupied with apprehending the eye consciousness, hence implying that we see everything for only one moment]. This disproves its being an experience of something other. Therefore, it is established as being a reflexive experience. Because it is impossible for it to appear distant to itself, we have established the existence of autocognition devoid of all dualistic appearances. This is what they say.

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1.2. The Explanation of How to Refute It

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1.2.1. The Refutation of the [Logical] Proof

Do you infer [the existence of] this experience using as your reason the fact of memory qua inherently existent thing, or do you posit as your reason mere memory [unqualified by whether or not it inherently exists]? In the first case, because for a Prāsaṅgika there is no difference between [inherently existing memory] and autocognition, both being nonexistent, [positing the reason of inherently existing memory] as proof of autocognition is improper. In the second case, positing mere memory, the result [of the reflexive experience of autocognition], as the reason proving the existence of a preceding special cause, namely, the reflexive experience [of autocognition], involves an erroneous pervasion (*khyab pa 'khrul ba*).[1072] It is just like inferring the [existence] of fire glass from the mere [presence of] fire and the [existence] of water glass from the mere [presence of] water.[1073] Even though it is possible to establish that a mere experience preceded it by reason of having a memory, that experience cannot be fit into a pattern of "reflexive experience," and "experience of another" as accepted by both Sautrāntikas and Cittamātrins. It is just like [421]
the fact that one cannot repudiate that a butter lamp is of a radiant nature (*gsal ba'i rang bzhin*) even though one *can* repudiate that the lamp radiates itself and that it is radiated by an object different from itself.

[Opponent:] But a butter lamp *is* radiated by itself.

[Reply:] Then it follows, absurdly, that darkness is obscured by itself. If you accept that, then it follows, absurdly, that there should be no obstacle to

clearly seeing the form of a pot within pitch black darkness, for at that time, the darkness, being obscured by obscuration, [that is, by itself], would not be seen, [thereby leaving the seeing of the pot unhindered]. As the *Prajñāmūla* says:

> If the self-, or other-, nature of a lamp
> Is what makes it appear [luminous],
> Then there is no doubt that the self-, or other-, nature of darkness
> Is what obscures it.[1074]

Because, according to you, the earlier experience and the later memory are inherently different things, they become different in such a way that they are mutually independent of each other. If that is so, they would have to be unrelated different things, and it would therefore be incorrect for the later memory to remember the earlier experience. Otherwise, [if a consciousness unrelated to another one could remember it,] then the memory consciousness within Devadatta's continuum could, absurdly, remember an experience in the continuity of Yajña.

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1.2.2. The Refutation of the Belief[1075]

By repudiating the [Yogācāra's] proof for the existence of autocognition as explained, we also repudiate the existence of autocognition itself.

If that subjective aspect, to which there appear no objects of a different nature from [the mind] itself, apprehends that very subjective aspect, then the existence of valid cognitions would not depend on the perceived [objects] (*gzhal bya*), and neither would the existence of perceived [objects] depend on valid cognitions.[1076]

No matter how much thought one gives to the independent subjective aspect that is directed internally, [that is, to autocognition,] it is impossible to get an image of any difference between the cognized [object] (*rig bya*) and cognizing [subject] (*rig byed*).[1077] Were that so, [that is, were it impossible to gain a conceptual mental picture of the relationship between subject and object within autocognition,] and despite that were one to still maintain that there can [422]
be posited a cognized [object] and a cognizing [subject], then it would be just as correct to maintain that within a single sprout there exists its own arising agent, [that is, its own cause,] (*skyed byed*) and its own arisen [effect] (*bskyed bya*). If *that* were so, then there would ensue the absurd fault that all actions and their doers (*bya byed*) would become identical, which is why [the *Madhyamakāvatāra*] says:

> When the actor, the action, and the process are not one,
> Then it is not reasonable for something to experience itself.[1078]

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.2. The Explanation of How We Posit Our Own System, Which Does Not Accept [Autocognition]

[Opponent:] Even the Acārya Candrakīrti accepts that from a merely nominal point of view there is such a thing as autocognition, the subjective aspect experiencing itself.

[Reply:] This claim flies directly in the face of instances in the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* in which [Candrakīrti] says that, though autocognition does not exist even nominally, memory can still arise.[1079] For example, after refuting the existence of any form of autocognition and memory that exist by virtue of their own characteristic, he says:

> [Opponent:] But from the point of view of worldly parlance (*'jig rten gyi tha snyad*) . . .
>
> [Reply:] Even according to that, it is impossible for memory to possess autocognition as its cause.[1080]

and also: "I will show in this way how memory arises without autocognition."[1081]

Well, how does memory arise in our own system if there is no autocognition even nominally? Let me take the meaning of what is extensively taught in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* root text and its *Bhāṣya* and put it in a somewhat more easily understandable form.

Subject: indefinite[1082]

Predicate: even though the subjective appearance that is internally directed and devoid of dualistic appearances does not experience itself, there is nonetheless a reason for why a memory arises that thinks "I have previously seen this blue lotus"

Reason: because (1) the eye consciousness that previously perceived the blue lotus and the later memory of it are not inherently different; (2) one can, by seeing one's own eye consciousness, say "I see"; and (3) due to the fact that both the object seen by the previous eye consciousness and the object remembered by the memory are the same [423] object, such a memory arises.

This perfectly establishes it.

The glorious Śāntideva explains it in a like manner. In the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* he says, first citing the opponent's position:

> If autocognition did not exist,
> How could consciousness remember?[1083]

He gives the answer that the pervasion is uncertain, [that is, that just because there is memory does not imply that there must be autocognition,] as follows.

Even though there is no autocognition that experiences the subject, [lit. that which possesses the object, that is consciousness,] there does not occur the fault that it is incorrect for the memory of that subject to arise. When a memory of form arises, that memory does not occur at the expense of the subject, [that is, at the expense of losing memory of the consciousness that apprehended the form,] for both object and subject are remembered in an associated way, as when we say, "I have seen this form before." When at a later time we remember the object and subject in an associated way, it does not necessarily follow that the subject need have been experienced when previously the object was experienced. For example, if a mouse bites a [hibernating bear] during wintertime, although the poison of the mouse abides within the body [of the bear], at that time he experiences the bite but does not experience the poison. At a later time, when [the bear] hears the sound of thunder [and awakens from his hibernation], there arises a memory and he thinks, "previously, when I was bitten, poison must have entered my body." Therefore, even though the poison was not experienced when it previously entered, later, the memory of the bite elicits the memory that poison must have entered. Likewise, even though the object-possessor may not have been experienced when the object was previously experienced, later on it nonetheless is possible for the memory of the object to elicit the memory of the object-possessor, [that is, of the consciousness that earlier had perceived that object]. This is what [Śāntideva himself] accepts. He continues in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra:*

> From its relationship to the experience of
> what is other, [that is, the object,]
> [The object possessor] comes to be remembered, like the poison of
> the mouse.[1084]

This must be analyzed. Even in the Prāsaṅgika system it is necessary to accept that all of the [five] sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness (*yid shes*) exist. If these consciousnesses establish, [that is, verify,] their [424] own existence, it would contradict our refuting autocognition. Were it necessary, on the other hand, that they be established as existing by other consciousnesses (*shes pa don gzhan*), there would ensue the fault that [the process of existential verification] would be endless:

> How could their existence be known?
> It is not fitting to say they exist if they are not apprehended.[1085]

So how do we escape from such a fault, [that is, from the fault of either accepting autocognition or of giving up the idea of existential verification,] that seems to apply similarly to our own position? This point is extremely difficult to understand. Nonetheless, I will mention the stainless opinion of my omniscient, glorious, and holy master [Tsong kha pa]. The *Prasannapadā* says:

> Because the determination of the number of valid cognitions depends on the perceived [objects that those valid cognitions apprehend], and because the nature of the two valid cognitions is posited in such a way that it corresponds to the nature of the kinds of perceived [objects] . . .[1086]

As it says, the number of valid cognitions is determined by the number of perceived [objects] (*gzhal bya*).[1087] Only by virtue of the arising within valid cognitions of the aspects of the perceived [objects] is the nature of the perceiving valid cognitions posited. These words refute that, apart from this method of establishing such valid cognitions, there is any separate method, such as their being established by autocognition.

[Opponent:] Then what does it mean to say that valid cognitions are established as existing merely by the fact that the valid cognitions establish the perceived [object]?

[Reply:] In this regard, let me first analyze a source of doubt that could occur to another. The meaning of such an explanation is that the eye consciousness that apprehends blue is established as existing by the perception of blue on the part of eye consciousness that apprehends blue. Therefore, it is necessary to accept that the eye consciousness that apprehends blue establishes the existence of the eye consciousness that apprehends blue. If this is so, then it is necessary to accept that the eye consciousness that apprehends blue establishes the eye consciousness that apprehends blue. Do not think, however, that because this is so, it is necessary to accept that it *cognizes* (*rig*) it or that it *understands* (*rtogs*) it. Were that the case, then it would be necessary to accept [425] that the eye consciousness is both what cognizes and what is cognized by the eye consciousness. If this were so, all of the problems demonstrated during our refutation of the realists' belief in autocognition likewise would apply as well to us, [statements like]: "it is not correct for the subjective aspect that is devoid of all dualistic appearances and is of the same nature as the consciousness [it perceives] to itself experience itself because, no matter how much thought one gives it, the image of the cognized [object] and cognizing [subject] never appear differently, so that all actions and their doers would become identical."[1088]

If that [eye consciousness] *understood* itself, then it would be necessary to accept it as either a direct understanding (*dngos rtogs*) or an indirect understanding (*shugs rtogs*), and we cannot accept it as either. You may be wondering what fault there is in accepting the proposition that "in the process of (*shugs kyis*) the aspect of the object appearing to that consciousness, that consciousness is itself established." Well, [if that were so, that is, if a consciousness understood itself indirectly in the process of directly understanding its object,] then it would follow, absurdly, that the equipoised gnosis of the Mahāyāna path of seeing that realizes reality understands itself, the gnosis,

possessor of the object, in the process of directly understanding reality. Why are we urged not to accept that? [If we do,] it would follow, absurdly, that the reality, the perceived [object], in regard to which that gnosis is considered a cognitive valid cognition (*rig shes tshad ma*),[1089] would not be a strict nonaffirming negation (*med dgag*), the mere negation of true existence, being instead an affirming negation (*ma yin dgag*). This is because in the process of making the mere negation of true existence its direct object, it affirms a positive object, the gnosis, as a mental object. It would also follow, absurdly, that the word *truthlessness* indirectly affirms as its expressed [meaning] (*brjod byar*) *the mind* that understands truthlessness. That is why [Tsong kha pa's] *Great Exposition of the Prajñāmūla* says:

> [Hypothesis:] Then even the *existence* of essencelessness must be understood indirectly, hence being established by a cognitive act (*rig shes*).
>
> [Reply:] Were that so, then the words *the sprout is essenceless* [426]
> would have to indirectly teach the *existence* of essencelessness, for the mind that follows [the hearing of] those words indirectly understands its existence. Therefore, it would be an affirming negation that indirectly affirms another phenomenon apart from the mere negation of the object to be refuted, thereby prohibiting its being a nonaffirming negation.[1090]

Try to interpret that passage [and still maintain that the understanding of emptiness indirectly understands anything like the mind that is cognizing it or even the *existence* of the emptiness itself]. If the cognitive act that understands essencelessness were to establish the existence of the subject, [that is, of the cognition itself,] indirectly in the process of directly understanding the essencelessness, then what need is there to say that it would also indirectly understand the existence of the essencelessness [and hence, as Tsong kha pa has clearly stated that the latter does not take place, how could the former]. If the direct understanding of an object indirectly establishes the existence of the object possessor, then it would be contradictory to claim that it did not indirectly establish the existence of the object itself. If you accept that, then, as it is necessary to definitely accept, as the Lord himself has repeatedly said, that the existence of essencelessness is established by a nominal valid cognition and not by a cognitive act, [and as your position violates this, your attempt at] setting forth the Madhyamaka's own system collapses once again.

To accept that a consciousness *x* directly understands itself is to misconceive the position of this system because it would follow, absurdly, that every cognitive valid cognition would be both a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate and a valid cognition that analyzes the nominal. If, by the power of taking as its direct object the negation of true existence, the existence of the consciousness itself is directly understood, then, by the power of taking the

negation of true existence as a mental object, a positive phenomenon, [the existence of the consciousness,] would be affirmed, hence degenerating the status [of emptiness, reality,] as a nonaffirming negation. To sometimes accept that all direct understandings must have [their objects] appear to them (*rnam par shar bas khyab pa*), and on other occasions to accept that every consciousness is directly understood by autocognition is to have a major problem with one's [427] memory.[1091] As the *Great Exposition of the Avatāra* [of Tsong kha pa] says:

> Were it as others believe, that is, that a valid cognition is established by a valid cognition, without allowing that a valid cognition be established simply by the establishment of its perceived [object], then a valid cognition could be established independently of the perceived [object].[1092]

So, to claim that the author of the *Great Exposition* accepts that a valid cognition is established by itself, by a valid cognition, either directly or indirectly, is to completely misinterpret [his intention].

What we advocate is as follows. The eye consciousness apprehending blue establishes the existence of the eye consciousness apprehending blue. How does it establish it? We do not claim that it establishes it by virtue of its perceiving the blue. The eye consciousness apprehending blue, by virtue of its perceiving blue, leads directly to a consciousness that remembers the apprehension of the blue by the eye consciousness apprehending blue. It is that very consciousness which remembers the apprehension of blue by the eye consciousness apprehending the blue that eliminates both the reification that "blue does not exist" and that "the eye consciousness apprehending blue does not exist," so that it is a valid cognition which can lead to the ascertainment that these *do* exist simply by one's turning one's mind to the matter (*blo kha phyogs pa tsam*). Hence, the memory consciousness itself is a valid cognition in regard to the existence of the eye consciousness. When this later memory consciousness remembers the blue, it does not do so at the expense of making the *apprehension of the blue* its object. It is a memory that, thinking "I have seen blue," picks out the apprehension of the blue. Hence, it is a memory of both the blue and the apprehension of the blue. Therefore, even though the eye consciousness apprehending blue establishes the eye consciousness apprehending blue in dependence on the perception of the blue, it is not established by the eye consciousness apprehending blue [directly, in an autocognitive way]. Likewise, even though the eye consciousness apprehending blue perceives the [428] blue, the eye consciousness apprehending blue is not a valid cognition in regard to the *apprehension* of blue by the eye consciousness apprehending blue. Instead, it is the consciousness that remembers the apprehension of blue by the eye consciousness apprehending blue that is a valid cognition in regard to this [apprehension].

The nonaffirming negation that is the mere negation of true existence is perceived by the *āryan* trainees' equipoised gnosis understanding reality in a way that resembles water mixed with water, [the object, emptiness, and the gnosis appearing to be inseparable]. It does not at all perceive either the *existence* of the truthlessness nor the existence of the gnosis itself. Nonetheless, the later memory consciousness that remembers the understanding of reality on the part of that gnosis establishes the *perception* of reality by that gnosis, and hence it also establishes the gnosis. Therefore, *in dependence on* the cognitive act, both the existence of the cognitive act and the existence of reality are established, but the cognitive act itself does not establish the existence of the cognitive act and the existence of reality. That is why the *Great Exposition of the Prajñāmūla* says:

> Without depending upon any other intervening valid cognitions, based on the power of the cognitive act, there can arise a mind that is in direct opposition to the misapprehending mode of the reification that misapprehends essencelessness to be nonexistent. Because that very [mind] eliminates that reification, [we say that] based on the cognitive act the reification is eliminated. It is not that the cognitive act [itself] cuts through the reification, however.[1093]

From such citations, together with their examples [in the *Great Exposition of the Prajñāmūla*], the way of positing the later memory consciousness as a valid cognition is extensively explained. Then, in the *Great Exposition of the Avatāra*, the way of establishing a valid cognition by means of establishing the perception of the perceived [object] by a valid cognition is explained. One ought to know how to explain [these points] by fitting together these two explanations.

In the *Exposition of the Avatāra* it says: [429]

> The apprehension of blue is established by the very establishment of blue. For example, it is similar to the fact that the subject, [that is, the consciousnesses that apprehends the object,] is remembered by that very memory of the object; and that memory does not arise due to the subject experiencing itself, as others accept.[1094]

And also: "In this way [we see that] the apprehension of blue is not established by autocognition as others accept, but is instead taught as being established by the valid cognition of direct sense perception."[1095] Even though [Tsong kha pa says this], he is not claiming that the apprehension of blue perceives itself, and that the direct perception that apprehends blue is a valid cognition in regard to the existence of the apprehension of blue. [The meaning] of the previous [citation] we have already explained. The latter one means that "the existence of the apprehension of blue is taught as being established *in dependence on* the direct perception which apprehends blue."

Likewise, nonconceptual mistaken consciousnesses such as the sense consciousness to which two moons appear or to which imaginary hair appears, as well as the conceptual mistaken consciousnesses such as the apprehension of sound as permanent and the apprehension of a self, are all valid cognitions in regard to the portion of their appearance; that is, in regard to the appearance of the two moons and the appearance of sound as permanent.[1096] Hence, these consciousnesses' perception of such appearances establish the existence of these consciousnesses in a way similar to the preceding [case of nonmistaken valid cognitions]. However, in the case of those still on the path of training, though reality directly appears to their equipoised wisdom that directly understands reality, the portion of the appearance, that is, the direct appearance of reality to those gnoses, is not the object of those gnoses. This is because, if the portion of the appearance were their indirect object, it would contradict that reality appears *directly*, and if it were the direct object, there would have to exist the appearance of duality within that [gnosis], because that [appearance] is a conventional object different from that gnosis. If that were so, [that is, if a dualistic appearance existed therein,] then it would contradict that [the gnosis is equipoised on reality] the way water mixes into water, for, except for the mind of a perfect Buddha, it is impossible for a single mind to be the [430] common locus of those two, [that is, it is impossible for a single mind to directly cognize both the ultimate truth and the conventional truth]. Nonetheless, the memory of reality directly appearing to that gnosis establishes: (1) the existence of the gnosis, (2) the existence of reality, and (3) the portion of the appearance that is the appearance of reality. This concludes the exposition of how we reject autocognition.

[THE TWO TRUTHS AND THEIR COGNITION]

4.2.3.3.2. The Explanation of the Two Truths, Which Is the Basis Set Forth by Reasoning[1097]

4.2.3.3.2.1. The Basis for the Division [into Two Truths][1098]

[The set of all] phenomena themselves is taken as the basis for the division. As the *Pitāputrasamāgama Sūtra* says:

> In this way, the Tathāgata has an understanding of both the conventional (*kun rdzob*) and the ultimate (*don dam pa*). Phenomena themselves become used up [when fit] into this [framework] of conventional and ultimate truths. Because the Lord has seen emptiness, has understood it, has perfectly actualized it, because of this, he is said to be omniscient.[1099]

The Great Translator rNgog[1100] and others explain that it is the intention of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* that the ultimate truth is not something known, a phenomenon (*shes bya*), but this is a mistaken position,[1101] for it contradicts [Śāntideva's] explanation in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya,* where he quotes that very *sūtra* [just cited] and says that the known, that is, phenomena, are the basis for the division into two truths. [It is also mistaken] because it would follow, absurdly, that the Buddha taught the ultimate truth without understanding it, [as, according to you, it cannot be understood]; and also because it would follow, absurdly, that the very way in which pillars and pots and so on appear is their reality because phenomena could have no thusness (*de bzhin nyid*) qua reality. [Finally, it is mistaken] because it would follow, absurdly, that there would not be the slightest difference between the way things appear to the minds of ordinary beings and to that of *āryans.*

[Opponent:] Well then, how do you interpret this passage from the *Bodhicaryāvatāra:*

> The conventional and the ultimate
> Are what are accepted as the two truths.
> The ultimate is not an object of the mind;
> The mind is accepted as being conventional.[1102]

[Reply:] It is an extremely erroneous pervasion[1103] to claim, as some do, [431]
that the mind's being a conventional [entity] is proof that the ultimate is not an object of the mind. This instead should be explained as follows. The first two lines teach the division into the two truths. Then, for the purpose of clarifying the nature of each of these categories, [it explains in the next two lines] that the nature of the ultimate truth is as follows. It says that the object that is reality and not an object of a mind *deluded by dualistic appearances* is the ultimate. The nature of the conventional is as follows. The mental object of a nominal mind is accepted as being conventional. This is how it must be explained, for the meaning of the following passage from the *Pitāputrasamāgama Sūtra* quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* applies to the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* as well:

> That the conventional is the usage (*spyod pa*) of the world is seen by the Tathāgata. That which is the ultimate is inexpressible *(brjod du med pa)*, unknowable (*shes par bya ba ma yin pa*), utterly unknowable (*rnam par shes par bya ba ma yin pa*), completely unknowable (*yongs su shes par bya ba ma yin pa*), not demonstrable (*ma bstan pa*).[1104]

The division of phenomena into two truths is a [bipartisan] enumeration meant to exclude any third alternatives. This is because when one affirms somethings as being a false, deceptive object, one must be negating its being the object reality, which is not deceptive; and also because the deceptive and the nondeceptive are mutually exclusive, contradictory things (*phan tshun spangs pa'i dngos 'gal*). Along these lines the *Madhyamakāloka* says: "Two phenomena that possess the characteristic of being mutually exclusive must be related in such a way that the negation of one affirms the other, and hence it is
not correct to conceive of something that is neither."[1105] And also: [432]

> Two things related in such a way that the affirmation of one negates the other are said to [possess] the characteristic of being mutually exclusive. Whatever two things possess the characteristic of being mutually exclusive must include everything [within them]. Whatever two things include everything else within them exclude any other alternative. For example, [this is so] in such particular cases as "embodied and disembodied."[1106]

That in the case of things that are directly contradictory (*dngos 'gal*) the affirmation of one negates the other is [a point accepted] without distinction in both the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika systems. For this reason the *Pitāputrasamāgama Sūtra* again says:

> The "Knower of the Universe" did teach
> These two truths without hearing them from another.
> There is the conventional, and likewise the ultimate.
> There can never be a third truth.[1107]

[Question:] Then how are the four truths collected into the two truths?

[Reply:] The truth of cessation is an ultimate truth, whereas the other three truths are conventional truths. This is because the *Avatārabhāṣya* says: "Then how could there be four noble truths that are different from the two truths?"[1108] Having asked this question, it says, by way of an answer: "The truths of suffering, cause, and path are included within the conventional truth. The truth of cessation is of the nature of the ultimate truth."[1109] What is more, [433] [Candrakīrti's] *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* also explains it in this way.

[Opponent:] The truth of cessation is not reality (*chos nyid*) because the refuted objects negated to posit the truth of cessation are the adventitious stains that are a refuted object that in general can exist, whereas that which is negated to posit reality, true existence, is a refuted object that cannot possibly exist.

[Reply:] This is an extremely erroneous pervasion, for it would follow, absurdly, that a nonpot could not be a non-"rabbit's horn" because the refuted object that is to be negated in positing nonpot, that is, the pot, is a refuted object that in general exists, whereas the refuted object that is to be negated in positing non-"rabbit's horn," that is, the rabbit's horn, is a refuted object that cannot exist.

The belief that the truth of cessation is an ultimate truth is something characteristic not only of Prāsaṅgikas; it is held in common by both the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika systems.[1110] Were that not so, then let us consider the liberative path (*rnam grol lam*), one of the two parts of the equipoised gnosis of the path of seeing that directly understands reality, [the two being] the unobstructed path (*bar chad med lam*) and the liberative path.[1111] [If the Svātantrikas did not accept that cessation was an ultimate truth,] then it would contradict the fact that in their system this liberative path is accepted as actualizing (*mngon par byas pa*) a cessation that is the abandonment of the seeds of the obstacles [removed during the path of] seeing (*mthong spang sa bon*). [They must accept cessation to be an ultimate truth, for otherwise] it would be in utter contradiction to the following position. They accept that the nature body (*ngo bo nyid sku*) and the final truth of cessation of a perfect Buddha are synonyms. Accepting this, they claim that the reality possessing the two purities is the nature body.[1112] [They must also accept this, for otherwise] it would [434] follow that this system should not accept a position which advocates that the nature body is an ultimate body and that composite bodies (*'du byed kyi sku*) are conventional bodies. [Finally, they must accept this, for otherwise] it would follow that the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* commentaries of Ārya [Vimuktasena] and Haribhadra become meaningless when they divide the aspects of the truth of cessation into the sixteen emptinesses.[1113]

Therefore, for the great translator rNgog, the father, and his sons, to believe as they do is to advocate that the ultimate truth is not a [knowable] phenomenon and to hold in their hearts what they cannot [out of shame] advocate [openly], namely, that the truth of cessation is not an object of the

mind. When the Lord [Tsong kha pa] himself states in the *Exposition of the Avatāra*, "Whether the truth of cessation is advocated as being a conventional truth is undecided,"[1114] he is not referring to the Mahāyāna Svātantrikas of India nor to the belief that arose in Tibet that in the Prāsaṅgika system the truth of cessation is a conventional truth. He is referring to those scholars, which we have just mentioned, who advocate what they do when they explain the scriptures of the Svātantrikas. What is more, take the syllogism, "the truth of cessation is not reality because the refuted object negated in positing reality is a nonexistent refuted object whereas the refuted object negated in positing the truth of cessation, the stains, is a refuted object that exists." According to this system, the difference between the Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas is that according to the Praśaṅgikas [the syllogism] lacks a pervasion, [that is, the predicate does not follow from the reason,] whereas according to the Svātantrikas, it has a pervasion. Apart from this they have no reason whatsoever for claiming that in the Svātantrika system the truth of cessation is a conventional truth.

4.2.3.3.2.2. The Meaning of the Words [Ultimate and Conventional]

The meaning of *ultimate truth* [lit. highest object truth, (*don dam bden pa*) is as follows]. Most Svātantrika Mādhyamikas explain that the word *highest* re- [435] fers to the undefiled equipoised gnosis that understands reality, and that the word *object* refers to its object. Nonetheless, as regards [the etymology] in this [system, that is, in our own, the Prāsaṅgika,] the *Prasannapadā* states: "Because the object is that, and as it is also the highest, it is the highest object; and because it is the truth, it is the highest object truth, [that is, the ultimate truth]."[1115] Hence, because that very object itself is the highest or correct (*yang dag pa*) reality, it is the highest object. In the world something is considered to be deceptive if in reality it is one way while appearing another. The opposite of that is said to be nondeceptive. Because it is this, [the highest object] is said to be the truth. [436]

Therefore, the *true* in the expression *empty of true existence even nominally* and the *truth* in the expression *ultimate truth* are completely different [in what they refer to]. That is why, when the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* says "*nirvāṇa* is the sole truth,"[1116] the *Vṛtti* says:

> How so? Because the compounded appears mistakenly, it deceives the childish, but *nirvāṇa* is not like that, for it always abides in a nature, an essence, which is acausal. It never appears to the childish to be causal in nature as the compounded does. Therefore, it is because *nirvāṇa* always abides in *nirvāṇa*ness that in strictly worldly terms it is called a *highest truth*.[1117]

Even though *nirvāṇa* is an object found by the gnosis of an *āryan*, and even though the ultimate truth is an object found by the gnosis of an *āryan*, this does not vitiate against the fact that [the proposition] "*nirvāṇa* is an ultimate truth" must be established by a nominal, worldly valid cognition. For example, sound is an object found by the ear consciousness, and impermanence is an object found by direct perception, nonetheless, [the proposition] "sound is impermanent" must be set forth by inferential means.

[Opponent:] We accept that there is a single common locus that is three things—an object (*don*), highest (*dam pa*), and the truth ((*bden pa*)—and that the word *truth* has two connotations. Sometimes what is nondeceptive is called the *truth*, and sometimes what really exists (*gnas tshul la grub pa*) is called the *truth*. Emptiness is called the *truth* in the first [sense of the word *truth*] and not [in the second, which is a reference] to the object to be refuted.[1118] Both emptiness and the ultimate truth are false things (*rdzun pa*).

[Reply:] This is just one giant menacing mass of direct contradiction. Because a false thing refers to something that is deceiving, the two [concepts] of truth and falsity, in this sense, mutually exclude each other in a direct way. As the *Prajñāmūla* says:

> The Lord has said that any phenomenon
> That is deceiving is false.
> All composite things are deceiving phenomena,
> Hence they are false.[1119]

And in the commentary to that, the *Prasannapadā* says: "All compounded things are false and have the quality of being deceptive, hence they are like a mirage. Whatever is true does not have the quality of being deceptive, like, for example, *nirvāṇa*."[1120]

Let us now turn to the meaning of the words *conventional truth (kun rdzob bden pa)*. The basis of the etymology of the word *conventional* is the innate [437]
misapprehension of truth that grasps an object as existing by virtue of its own nature. It is because it is true within the purview of that [innate ignorance] that it is called *conventional truth*. The reason for that etymology (*sgra bshad*) [that is, the reason why ignorance is given the name *conventional*—lit. "concealing,"] is because it obscures our seeing the nature of things as they are. If the etymological criteria of a word *x* are fulfilled, it follows that that [entity which fulfills them] is an etymological basis (*sgra bshad gzhi*) of that word; but just because something is the etymological basis of a word *x* does not imply that it is the referent (*sgra 'jug gzhi*) of the word *x*. For example, a turtle born from a lake fulfills the etymological criterion of being lake born, so it is an etymological basis of the words *lake born*. However, anything that is the referent of the words [*lake born*] must be a flower.[1121]

Therefore, although the likes of the gnosis that directly understands reality is a referent for the word *conventional truth*, it is not an etymological basis for

it; and even though reality is a truth within the purview of the innate apprehension of true [existence], it need not be a "conventional truth," for [simply fulfilling the criteria for being an] etymological basis does not imply [that it is the true referent of the term], as is the case, for example, with "the limbed one."[1122] This method of explaining the etymology of the words *conventional truth* is spoken of in the context of both the root text and commentary of the *Avatāra* [dealing with the verse that goes]: "Because delusion obscures its nature, it is a conventional truth."[1123] The *Bhāṣya* on this passage states: "In this way, conventional truths are posited under the power of the afflicted ignorance that has been accumulated by the different parts of existence."[1124] The meaning has already been explained. Again the *Bhāṣya* says:

> Moreover, the *śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas,* and bodhisattvas who have abandoned ignorance see composite entities to be like the nature of reflections. For them they are of the nature of feigned things (*bcos* [438] *ma*) and not true, for they do not conceive of things as truly [existent]. The childish, however, become confused (*bslu bar byed pa*), but for those different from them, [that is, from the childish,] by [their perceiving them to] arise interdependently, like illusions and so forth, those [composite things] become for them mere conventionalities.[1125]

Now as regards the meaning of this [passage, one opponent has this to say].

[Opponent:] This is demonstrating that form and so forth are for ordinary beings conventional truths, but for the *āryans* who have abandoned afflicted ignorance they are not a conventional truth, for they do not conceive of them as truly [existent].

[Reply:] Any such teaching is just blithering, for (1) to cite that something is not apprehended as truly [existent] by a certain mind as proof of the fact that for that mind it is not a conventionality is a contradictory pervasion (*'gal khyab*); (2) to cite that for the conventional mind of ordinary beings [things] appear to truly [exist] as proof of the fact that it is lacking within the [minds] of *āryans* is a completely unrelated pervasion (*khyab 'brel gang yang med*); and (3) also because it follows that if a conventional truth does not exist within the purview of a buddha's [mind, as you are suggesting, because he has abandoned apprehending things as truly existent,] then it must, absurdly, be nonexistent.

Therefore, the meaning of the commentary is this. Whatever mind within the continuum of an *āryan* has the truth [present within it] is not a conventional mind that posits [things] as being conventional truths. This is because, as they have abandoned the apprehension of true existence completely, they see form and so forth as mere conventionalities, never seeing them as truly [existent]. That is what it means.

Even though that mind does not perceive [things] as truly existent, it need not be the case that within its purview another mind does not see [things] as

truly [existent]. Pots, pillars, and so forth are conventional truths. Even though pots and pillars and so forth are established by the valid cognitions of ordinary [439] beings who have not found [certainty] in regard to the Madhyamaka view, they cannot be determined *to be* conventional truths by the valid cognitions of ordinary beings who have not found the Madhyamaka view. This is because, if a valid cognition determines [something] to be a conventional truth as it is accepted by a Madhyamaka, it is necessary that the valid cognition determine it to be conventional. If it determines *that*, it must determine it to be a false [thing], and if it determines that, it must repudiate that it is a truly existent [thing, thereby having to have cognized emptiness, which an ordinary being who is not a Mādhyamika has, by definition, not done].

The *conventional* in the expression *conventional truth* and the *conventional* in *existing conventionally* do not mean the same thing. This is because we call something a *conventional truth* on account of it being true within the purview of the innate apprehension of true existence of a conventional mind, whereas something is considered to exist conventionally because a valid cognition that examines the conventional finds that it exists. Therefore, the first *conventional* should be understood to refer to the innate apprehension of true existence and the second to the valid cognition that analyzes the conventional. With this we complete the explanation of the etymology of the two truths.

4.2.3.3.2.3. Considering Whether They Are the Same or Different

As both the root text of the *Avatāra* and its commentary say in the context of the verse that goes, "Both of the natures of things that are found are apprehended,"[1126] all conventional and ultimate phenomena have natures, and if their natures exist they must be either the same or different because whatever [two things] exist must be either one or different. Therefore, those multitudes of former [scholars] who claimed that the two truths were of neither the same nor different natures are just advocating that the two truths do not exist.

In this way [we can see] that the two truths are either of the same or of different natures. If they are of different natures they must be distinct unrelated [440] things because things that are of different natures cannot have a single-nature relationship (*bdag gcig 'brel*) and also because, as reality is a noncomposite phenomenon, it cannot be related to anything else causally (*de byung du 'brel ba*).[1127] If they are unrelated things, then it follows, absurdly, that reality is not the essence of the conventional because it is a thing that is distinct and unrelated to the conventional. If [one claims] that [the predicate] does not follow [from the reason], then there would be no way to avoid the absurdity that everything is the essence of everything else. If this is accepted, then it follows, absurdly, that the stains of the mind could never be eliminated be-

cause the reality that is the inherent purity [of the mind] (*rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag pa'i chos nyid*) is not the essence of the mind.

Therefore, the two truths are of the same nature but have different opposites[1128] (*ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad*), having a single-nature relationship such that if one did not exist neither could the other (*med na mi 'byung ba'i bdag gcig 'brel*) just like production and impermanence. Just as it says in the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*, reality is not perceived as being different from the conventional:

> The conventional is explained to be emptiness.
> Emptiness alone is the conventional.
> In the sense that if one does not exist neither will the other,
> They are like production and impermanence.[1129]

[Opponent:] The expression "of the same nature but having different opposites" occurs within the context of logic (*rtog ge*) but not within this [system of] scriptural exegesis. Nor is it correct for them to be of the same nature because (1) when the conventional arises or ceases so too would the ultimate have to arise or cease, and also because (2) neither of them *has* a nature. If both of them had natures their natures would be dual. My own system is [to accept] that the two truths are [the brand of] "different" that repudiates identity (*gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad*).[1130]

[Reply:] How would you answer if I were to tell you that [your own] expression, "[a brand of] 'different' that repudiates identity," is "a logical term and not one that occurs in the scriptural exegesis of this [Madhyamaka system]?" [441]

[Opponent:] Even though the term does not actually exist [there], the meaning does.

[Reply:] Then what applies for the one case, [that is, your use of the term,] applies in general, [so that my use of the technical term is also justified].

As for your claim that what is of the same nature must arise and cease in unison, it comes about based on a faulty understanding of the meaning of following passage from the *Pramāṇavārttikam:* "If they are not different they would have to arise and be destroyed in unison."[1131] Based on the [misinterpretation of that passage], you mistakenly think that [two things] that are of the same nature must be the same. How would you answer if we [present you with the following argument]? Is a pot and [the category of] knowable phenomena (*shes bya*)[1132] of the same or of different natures? If they are of different [natures], it would follow, absurdly, that the pot would not be a knowable phenomenon. If they are of the same nature, then [following your line of reasoning] when the pot arises or is destroyed, so too must [the category] of knowable phenomena arise and be destroyed.

Those who, on the one hand, claim that the two truths have no nature and yet advocate that the real essence [of things] is emptiness are scoffing at their own words. How would you answer if I present you with this argument: it

follows, absurdly, that the two truths have no essence because they have no nature, for if they had essences, it would follow, absurdly, that reality would be dual.

[Opponent:] Just because something is an essence does not mean that it must be an essence qua logical object of the refutation.

[Reply:] Then likewise, just because something is the nature [of something else] does not mean that it need be the nature qua logical object of the refutation.

4.2.3.3.2.4. The Nature of Each [of the Two Truths] Individually

4.2.3.3.2.4.1. The Definitions

The definition of an *ultimate truth* is "that [phenomenon] which, when found by a certain valid cognition, [characterizes that valid cognition] as one that is engaged in an ultimate analysis." The definition of a *conventional truth* is "that [phenomenon] which, when found by a certain valid cognition, [characterizes that valid cognition] as one that is engaged in a nominal analysis." [442]
These are definitions that can be considered faultless, both in the system of the Prāsaṅgikas *and* that of the Svātantrikas.

4.2.3.3.2.4.2. The Divisions

4.2.3.3.2.4.2.1. The Divisions of the Ultimate Truth

If it is divided in an extensive way, [the ultimate truth can be said to have] sixteen emptinesses;[1133] if in an intermediate way, (1) the emptiness of entities, (2) the emptiness of nonentities, (3) the emptiness of own nature, and (4) the emptiness of other nature; if [divided in] a brief way, there is the selflessness of the person and of phenomena. This is explained in the *Avatāra*.

Now this is how it occurs in the scriptures of the Svātantrikas, the *Satyadvaya* says:

> Because the refutations of arising and so forth
> Are concordant with reality (*yang dag pa*),
> We accept them to be ultimate.[1134]

And the *Madhyamakāloka* says: "Because even the nonexistence of arising is concordant with the ultimate in this way, it is called *ultimate* but is not actually so, for in reality the ultimate is beyond all mental proliferation (*spros pa*).[1135] So they claim that there are two kinds of ultimates: real ones (*don dam dngos*) and concordant ultimates (*mthun pa'i don dam*). Real ultimates

are the nonconceptual cognitions that directly understand reality via the complete reversal of the proliferations of the dual appearance of its object. Although the conceptual ones, like the inferential cognition that understands reality, within their own purview, can overcome the proliferations of the apprehension of true [existence], because they cannot overcome the proliferations of dual appearance, they are ultimates that are concordant to those former [443] [real ultimates]. Here the cognition (*rig shes*) is considered ultimate and then divided into real and concordant ultimates.

Even though the truthlessness of the sprout is a real ultimate, it is also said not to be a real ultimate that eliminates the two kinds of proliferations within the purview of the inferential cognition [of emptiness] when compared to the way in which things appear to the direct understanding of reality in which both the proliferations of true [existence] and dual appearances have been eliminated. A nonaffirming negation, such as truthlessness, is a real ultimate, and such affirming negations as the composite (*tshogs pa*) of truthlessness and sprout are considered to be concordant ultimates. Hence, one must understand the way in which [ultimates] are divided into objects and subjects.

4.2.3.3.2.4.2.2. The Divisions of the Conventional[1136]

Within the Svātantrika system, we find that the *Satyadvaya* says:

> Even though they are similar in that they appear,
> We divide the conventional
> Into "correct" (*yang dag*) and "incorrect" (*yang dag ma yin*)
> Because some are efficacious (*don byed nus*) and some are not.[1137]

So as it says, they accept these two [kinds of conventional entities], real conventional entities and unreal conventional entities. Because in their system all consciousnesses exist by virtue of their own characteristic, it is impossible to have an unreal conventional entity that is a consciousness. Hence, subjects are not divided into real and unreal, only objects are divided into real and unreal.

As for the Prāsaṅgika position, as the *Avatāra says:*

> Whatever is apprehended by the six healthy organs
> Is understood by the world.
> Some are true from [the viewpoint] of the world itself;
> The remaining are considered false even from [the viewpoint] of
> the world.[1138]

One can divide things into real and unreal based on worldly consciousness, but we do not do so in our own system,[1139] so that even though, within the purview of worldly consciousness, [things] can be divided into correct and incorrect, this division that exists within the purview of worldly consciousness is

not accepted in the Prāsaṅgika's own system. This is the meaning. It is definitely not to be explained to mean that, because the division into correct and incorrect is based on worldly consciousness, the Prāsaṅgikas do not accept it in their own system. Were that so, then it would follow, absurdly, that they could not in their own system set forth the exposition of the conventional truth [with all of its valid divisions] because to do so one must depend on worldly consciousness. [444]

Therefore, when we say that the division into correct and incorrect exists within the purview of worldly consciousness, we mean that the division into correct and incorrect [conventional entities] is made by an ordinary innate worldly mind (*'jig rten pa'i blo lhan skyes rang dga' ba*), and not at all that the division into correct and incorrect [conventional entities] is made by a worldly nominal valid cognition (*'jig rten pa'i tha snyad pa'i tshad ma*). This is because to say that one is accepting [the correct] as an object established by a valid cognition and yet to not accept it in one's own system is an indication that one has transgressed the methodology of those who advocate logical reasoning; and also because that worldly mind in the purview of which form is apprehended to be correct is an apprehension of true [existence,] and hence cannot be a valid cognition.

Let me put this in a more easily understandable way. Both the eye consciousness to which the reflection of a face in the mirror appears as if it were a reflection and the reflection of the face itself are understood to not exist as they appear, even by ordinary worldly beings.[1140] Ordinary worldly beings can in no way understand that the actual face does not exist as it appears, hence there is a difference between these two [the actual face and the reflection] in that, within the purview of the consciousness of an ordinary worldly being, [the former] exists as it appears whereas the latter does not.

In the Prāsaṅgika's own system there is no difference between the face [445]
and the reflection as regards whether they exist as they appear, for both are similar in being empty of existing as they appear. Likewise, within the purview of worldly consciousness, both the sensory perception to which two moons appear and the appearance of one moon as two are both mistaken (*log pa*). This is because both, completely independently of a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate, can be understood independently not to exist as they appear by an ordinary worldly mind that has not been affected by the cause of the illusion. Pots, pillars, and so forth, *and* the eye consciousnesses to which they appear are correct within the purview of worldly consciousness. This is because, within the purview of ordinary worldly minds that have not been affected by the cause of adventitious illusion, both exist the way they appear; and also because understanding them to be empty of existing as they appear definitely depends on a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate.

Therefore, the glorious Candra has said that there is a division into correct and incorrect within the purview of worldly consciousness. He has never said

that there is a division into correct *conventionalities* and incorrect *conventionalities* within the purview of worldly consciousness. My own spiritual master also does not accept this. In fact, it is utterly *inappropriate* to accept it because, within the purview of ordinary worldly minds, pillars, pots, and so forth are not conventionalities, and also because it is utterly absurd to posit something as false based on a mind in the purview of which things are posited as truly [existing, which is exactly what a mind that apprehends something as correct is doing].

[Question:] What is the reason why, in the Prāsaṅgika's own system, they do not accept that the conventional can be divided into correct and incorrect [conventional entities]? [446]

[Reply:] I will tell you. It is not appropriate to divide the conventional into correct and incorrect because it is not possible to divide the conventional into things that exist as they appear and those that do not; and that is so because, even merely nominally, all conventional entities exist in one way while appearing in another, [so that none of them can exist as they appear]. This is so because all conventional entities, even from a merely nominal [viewpoint], are erroneous subjects (*bslu ba'i chos can*); and that is so because all conventional entities, even from a merely nominal [viewpoint], are false things.

[Opponent:] That [last reason] is not established, [that is, they are not false].

[Reply:] Then it follows, absurdly, that nominally they truly exist. This follows because truths and falsities are mutually exclusive directly contradicting [concepts] (*phan tshun spangs pa'i dngos 'gal*).

Moreover, it would follow, absurdly, that [if there were such a division of conventional entities into correct and incorrect], then nominally the objects that appear (*snang yul*) to the consciousnesses of ordinary beings could be divided into erroneous ones and nonerroneous ones, for nominally there exists this division of conventional entities into correct and incorrect ones. If you accept [the premise that the objects appearing to ordinary beings are divisible in this way], then it follows, absurdly, that nominally there is such a thing as an inherently existing entity because (1) the appearance of form to the eye consciousness of an ordinary being is an appearance of form as if it existed from its own side (*rang ngos nas*) and under its own power (*tshugs thub tu*), and (2) the eye consciousness [by the premise you accepted] is not erroneous in regard to the objects that appear to it. To deny (1) is to contradict direct experience, and to deny (2) means that you must give up your acceptance of the former absurd hypothesis.

If, from among the two divisions of the conventional into correct and incorrect, something were to be correct, then it would have to be unmistaken (*phyin ci ma log pa*). Hence, if there existed an ordinary being's consciousness that, from among the two divisions of the conventional into correct and incorrect, was *correct* then without a doubt it would be necessary to accept that [447]
there existed an ordinary being's consciousness to which things appeared in an

unmistaken way. If *that* were accepted, though anathema to one, one would have to accept that nominally things did inherently exist. Yet [as Prāsaṅgikas] we have the belief that even nominally inherent existence is impossible. Therefore, to accept that in our own system it is possible to divide [the conventional] into correct and incorrect [entities] is an incorrect and obscured view that is compatible with none of our philosophical tenets.

Therefore, the difference between the Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas as regards whether ordinary beings can have a nonerroneous consciousness, [the former accepting that they cannot and the latter that they can,] stems from the fact that they differ as to whether in their own system they accept a division of things that are conventional entities into correct and incorrect ones; and that in turn stems from whether they believe that nominally things exist by virtue of their own characteristic. This being the case, the Svātantrika's method of dividing the conventional into correct and incorrect is improper, whether they claim that it is so only within the purview of the world or they claim it to be so according to the Mādhyamika's own viewpoint. Whether or not someone believes in substantial existence (*rdzas grub*) is based on whether that person believes in existence by virtue of [a thing's] own characteristic and whether he or she divides things into correct and incorrect. Whoever would claim that in the Prāsaṅgika system there is a belief in substantial existence in a merely nominal way has no intuition as to how in this system all phenomena are considered to be merely labeled existent things *even nominally*. The *Avatārabhāṣya* says, after an extensive citation of the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra:*

> Therefore, anyone with intelligence [will realize] after seeing the citation from this [source] that the conceptualization that consciousness exists substantially, that this utter conceptualization, is an involvement with views.[1141] [448]

And also:

> We understand that because those with no intelligence become attracted, in whatever small measure, to the [idea of] substance, then, like pouring water into the dependent phenomenon of a pot before it has been fired, their intelligence becomes polluted, and hence all the worldly terminology established from strictly worldly [usage], like *sit! go! do! cook!* and so forth, as well as *form, feeling,* and so forth, are all destroyed. Because of that, the mind [involved] in these [ideas will remain] strictly in existence and not attain higher states.[1142]

This is stating that if one accepts dependent entities to exist substantially, none of the terminology of the world becomes possible. Also, in the commentary to the line that goes, "In this context whatever reasoning,"[1143] it explicitly says that substantial arising is impossible even nominally. And both the root text and the commentary on the line, "Because it is engaged in substantialism it

would not be incorrect,"[1144] are explaining that if the object substantially existed, the mind qua subject must be unmistaken. The *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* also explicitly explains that *true existence*, *substantial existence*, and *inherent existence* are synonyms. Without realizing [that you are contradicting all of these texts], you boastfully claim [that the Mādhyamikas accept substantial existence nominally].

[Opponent:] Well then, how do you interpret the *Bhāṣya* when it says:

> For example, suppose someone says, "[someone] has stolen my possession [lit. substance]," and someone else argues and examines [what the first person said asking], "what possession [has been stolen]" and [449] [the first person replies], "it is a pot," to which [the second person replies], "the pot is not a substance because it is a knowable phenomenon, just like the pot in a dream." Such a refutation of the one by the other, in that it is the repudiation of worldly meaning by worldly usage, is contradicted by the world.[1145]

[Reply:] The claim is being made with the presupposition that in the world wealth is called *stuff* and it is teaching that it is not correct to logically analyze [this and by such means] to refute such worldly [usage of] terminology. If, by the mere fact that we employ the terminology (*tha snyad byed pa*) of a certain amount of possessions [lit. substance] to refer to a certain amount of wealth, one must accept substantial existence nominally (*tha snyad du*), then it follows, absurdly, that this [system, that is, the Prāsaṅgika,] must accept autocognition nominally, for in the world there exist such expressions as "I see myself." It would follow, absurdly, that nominally there must exist such things as a permanent entity (*rtags dngos*) and true existence because in the world we employ expressions like "water always (*rtag tu*) falls" and also because there exist expressions like "only this one is true, the other is false."

Having given an explanation of the exposition of the two truths, I will now turn to some topics that are ancillary to this.

[The Prāsaṅgika Interpretation of the Three Nature Theory of the Yogācāras][1146]

If the exposition of the two truths in the Prāsaṅgika's own system is as I have explained [earlier], then what is the Prāsaṅgika's own exposition of the three natures (*ngo bo nyid gsum*) like? The Avatārabhāṣya says:

> For example, as regards the dependently arisen phenomenon of a rope [450] that is imagined to be a snake, it is an imaginary [entity], for it does not exist in that way. As regards the real snake, it is real, for it is not imagined. Likewise, an essence is also imagined within dependent phenomena that are produced (*byas pa can*); but as it has been said that:

> Essences are not created.
> They do not depend on other [things].

> the nature of things is *not* produced. The analysis in which previously apprehended dependently arisen produced entities are determined to be similar to reflections is the true one among the Buddha's mental objects (*spyod yul*), for it is not imagined. This is because it is due to the fact that they have realized reality by actualizing the sole essence [of things], without contacting (*ma reg par*) produced entities, that they are called *buddhas*. Therefore, one should explain the intended meaning of the *sūtra* after having understood, in this very way, the exposition of the three natures called *imaginary, dependent*, and *real*.[1147]

Let me condense the meaning of this and put it in an easily understandable way. An essence qua fundamental reality is imagined within things that dependently arise; that is, within phenomena that are dependent. The object in regard to which the Buddha's gnosis perceiving reality is a gnosis understanding reality is the real. By saying this it is teaching us that the conventional, that is, the objects as they appear, are the dependent. That part which is the reification of those [objects] into reality, or into the fundamental nature of things, is the imaginary, and their being empty of inherent existence is the real. "With- [451
out contacting produced entities" means that within the purview of a cognition that is a gnosis understanding reality there can be no objects at all that are causally created entities; and not only are [causal] entities [excluded], no conventional phenomenon whatsoever can be its object.

4.2.3.3.3. The Explanation of the Valid Cognition That Ascertains the Two Truths, [That Is, All Phenomena]

4.2.3.3.3.1. The Definition

The definition [of a *valid cognition* in general] is "the consciousness that is not deceived in regard to the phenomenon that is its own apprehended object (*'dzin stangs gyi yul*)."

[Opponent:] Well then, [if the valid cognition cognizing a conventional object does so in a nondeceived way,] how can you avoid contradicting your claim that all conventional [phenomena] are deceptive objects [and hence objects that deceive]?[1148]

[Reply:] There is no problem, for it is not contradictory that, on the one hand, it be an object that deceives in so far as, within the consciousness that takes it as its object, [the way in which it appears] does not accord with the way it exists, and that, on the other hand, this [valid cognition] is nondeceived in regard to the phenomenon in so far as it establishes that phenomenon as it is in a positive way (*ji ltar yongs su bcad pa ltar grub pa*).[1149]

In every system, from the Svātantrikas on down, all valid cognitions are nonerroneous (*ma 'khrul pa*) in regard to the phenomenon with respect to which it is a valid cognition. Here [in the Prāsaṅgika system], however, both the valid cognition within the continuum of an ordinary being and the valid cognition that analyzes the nominal within the continuum of an *āryan* who is affected with the latent potentialities of the error of dualistic appearance are erroneous consciousnesses with regard to the phenomenon with respect to which they are valid cognitions. Form appears as form to the eye consciousness, and it also appears to exist by virtue of its own characteristic. Still, [the eye consciousness] cognizes (*gzhal*) form to be form, but it does not cognize form to exist by virtue of its own characteristic. Even though [the eye consciousness] is a valid cognition in regard to (1) form, (2) the appearance of form, and (3) the appearance of form that exists by virtue of its own characteristic, it need not be a valid cognition in regard to form's existing by virtue [452]
of its own characteristic.

4.2.3.3.3.2. The Divisions

As regards the divisions, the *Prasannapadā's* explanation[1150] that is fourfold—(1) direct [perception] (*mgon*), (2) inference (*rjes*), (3) scriptural (*lung*) valid cognition, and (4) valid cognition by analogy (*nyer 'jal*)—is based on [comments in] the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* root text and commentary.[1151] *Scriptural valid cognition* is inductive inference (*yid ches rjes dpag*) that cognizes extremely obtuse [points] (*shin tu lkog gyur*).[1152] *Analogy* is a valid cognition that infers obtuse [points] (*lkog gyur*) in dependence on an example. Hence, [both scripture and analogy] are contained within [the category of] inference. Therefore, he is not denying [the usual] categorization of valid cognitions into [just the two subdivisions] of direct perception and inference.

As regards the valid cognition of direct perception, we have already refuted autocognitive direct perception (*rang rig mngon sum*). [The Prāsaṅgikas] also repudiate [the notion of] mental direct perception (*yid kyi mngon sum*)[1153] as it
is explained in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. This is because the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* says: [453]

> These two [types of] consciousness do not cognize the same object. One cognizes the aspect of the object in a direct and positive way. It arises first. The second is not a consciousness that acts directly. Under the influence of the sense consciousnesses it conceives [of the object] and is born. Hence, [due to this connection to sense perception] it is said to "cognize its object" [and not because it is actually a form of direct cognition].[1154]

Sense consciousness clearly cognizes objects such as form and so forth. The mental consciousness cognizes them under the influence of the sense con-

sciousnesses. It does not directly and clearly cognize them as do the sense consciousnesses. This is what it is saying. The mental consciousnesses that cognize their objects under the influence of the sense consciousnesses are memories (*dren pa*).

It is not, however, that they do not accept [some notion of] mental direct perception, for the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* says: "Nor is it something which is an experience, like feeling and so on. It does not engage objects like form and sound and so on via the sense organs."[1155] It is saying that kinds of experience like pleasant and painful feelings (*tshor ba*) that are in the entourage (*'khor*) of the mental consciousness are valid cognitions that perceive their own evident (*mngon gyur*) phenomena.

Feeling, the mental event (*sems 'byung*) that is within the entourage of the mental consciousness, is a valid cognition; and the three [types of feeling], pleasant, painful, and neutral, are cognized phenomena (*gzhal bya*). *The sūtras* give the definition of *feeling* to be "a special experience." They say that whatever is experienced is experienced as either pleasant, unpleasant, [or neutral]. Even in worldly parlance we say, "I am experiencing pleasure," or "I am experiencing pain." This indicates that what is experienced (*myong bya*) and that which experiences it (*myong byed*) appear as different [things] to the mind; and because this [difference between experienced and experiencer] is also proved both by scripture and reasoning, there is no similarity between [the present case] and the refutation of an independent (*yan gar ba*) subjective aspect that, when it faces inward, has the capacity of [giving rise to] the appearance of cognized entity (*rig bya*) and cognizing entity (*rig byed*) as different. Hence, we do not suffer from the absurd fault of having to accept autocognition.

Because in our own system it is impossible for a Buddhist not to accept yogic direct perception (*rnal 'byor mngon sum*), here [in the Prāsaṅgika system] direct perception is said to be of three kinds.[1156]

The *Prasannapadā says:*

> If in the world there existed anything like a characterized object (*mtshan gzhi*), a specific characteristic (*rang gi mtshan nyid*), or a generic characteristic (*spyi'i mtshan nyid*), everything would be an object perceived within direct perception. Hence, they would [all] be nonobtuse (*lkog tu ma gyur*). Therefore, together with the consciousness that possesses an object there would have to occur a di- [454]
> rect perception.[1157]

Within the context [of this passage Candrakīrti] is merely identifying a direct perceptual valid cognition from among the two divisions of direct perception and inference. He is not teaching that if something exists, then it must appear directly to the omniscient gnosis [of a Buddha]; nor is he teaching that whether something is a specific (*rang*) or a generic (*spyi*) [characteristic], it must be evident (*mngon gyur*), for in the section following that scriptural passage the

Prasannapadā says: "The consciousness that possesses as its object something obtuse and that arises from nonerror in regard to the proposition to be proven through reasoning is inference."[1158] Therefore, the meaning of the previous *Prasannapadā* passage is this. No matter what phenomenon the realists accept as either a specific or generic [object], any consciousness possessing dualistic appearance that takes that phenomenon as its direct object (*dngos yul*) must have the appearance of that object within it; and the object of any consciousness in which the appearance of the object arises in the consciousness is directly perceptible (*mngon sum pa*). At that time it is teaching that there is an explicit use of the word *direct perception* when applied to objects, and an allegorical sense of the word *direct perception* when applied to subjects, [that is, to the consciousnesses cognizing the objects]. Therefore, [Candrakīrti] accepts that if an object is "directly perceptible" (*mngon sum pa*), it must be evident (*mngon gyur*), and that what it means for something to be a direct perceptual valid cognition is that it be a consciousness not deceived in regard to its own evident object. Consciousnesses that possess dualistic appearances must be undeceived in regard to the appearance of the objects that appear to them. Therefore, it is necessary to accept that all consciousnesses are direct perceptual valid cognitions in regard to the appearance of the objects that appear to them. Thus, even though the two kinds of apprehension of self and the sense consciousness to which two moons appear and so forth are mistaken [455] consciousnesses, they are nonetheless direct perceptual valid cognitions in regard to the appearance of the two selves and in regard to the appearance of two moons, [respectively]. This is because they are consciousnesses that are undeceived in regard to their own directly perceptible objects that are based on those [appearances].

The sense consciousness to which two moons appear is a consciousness that is undeceived in regard to the two moons that appear to it, for, because it takes such an appearance as its direct object, the ascertaining consciousness (*nges shes*) that ascertains that appearance can be elicited (*'dren*) independently, without reliance on another valid cognition. Even though the sense consciousnesses to which the two selves appear and to which two moons appear are valid cognitions in regard to the appearances of the objects that appear to them, they need not be valid cognitions *in general*. This is because they are minds that are not valid cognitions in regard to their individual apprehended objects (*'dzin stangs kyi yul la tshad min*). Therefore, simply because something is a valid cognition in regard to the appearance of an object that appears to it is not enough to make it a valid cognition in general. Whether something is a valid cognition in general is determined by whether it is a valid cognition in regard to its apprehended object. For example, the Sautrāntikas believe that the fact that something is simply a mistaken consciousness in regard to its own appearing object (*snang yul*) is not enough to make it a mistaken consciousness. Instead, whether something is a mistaken

consciousness is determined by whether it is a mistaken consciousness in regard to its apprehended object. Therefore, we do not suffer from the fault of not being able to distinguish between [minds] that are valid cognitions and those that are not.

Now from this method of interpretation one might entertain [the following idea], namely, that given that all consciousnesses are valid cognitions in regard to their own individual appearances why, if something is a valid cognition in [456] regard to its own appearances, need it not be a valid cognition [in general]? In examining this, one might conclude this. "Mistaken nonconceptual consciousnesses, like the sense consciousness to which imaginary hair (*skra shad 'dzag pa)* appears, *are* valid cognitions; and this is because they are valid cognitions in regard to what appears to them. This is because the chief object of nonconceptual consciousnesses is the appearing object. In the case of the conceptual apprehension of sound as permanent, however, even though it is a valid cognition in regard to what appears to it, it need not be a valid cognition. This is because it is not a valid cognition in regard to its conceived object (*zhen yul*), and the chief object of conceptual consciousnesses is the conceived object."[1159]

However, one should not entertain this idea, for following that line of reasoning, nonconceptual mistaken consciousnesses could not be valid cognitions, as follows. Despite the fact that the chief objects of nonconceptual consciousnesses are their appearing objects, the mere appearance (*snang ba tsam*) is not the chief appearing object. The appearing object qua appearing basis (*snang gzhi*) of that appearance is the chief appearing object. For example, the mere appearance of blue is not the chief appearing object of the eye consciousness that apprehends blue. Instead, it is the blue qua basis of the appearance of that [consciousness] that is the chief appearing object of that [consciousness]. Therefore, even though [a mind] is a valid cognition in regard to an appearance, if it is not a valid cognition in regard to any object that is the basis of what appears to that [consciousness], it is not a valid cognition, for its chief appearing object in regard to which it is a valid cognition would be nonexistent. Thus, whether something is a mistaken consciousness depends on the chief appearing object that is the basis of appearance. Hence, there is a way to distinguish between the fact that the eye consciousness apprehending blue is not a mistaken consciousness and the fact that the sense consciousness to which falling hair appears is a mistaken consciousness. Were it not so, then all nonconceptual consciousnesses would either have to be mistaken or else there [457] could be no nonconceptual mistaken consciousnesses.

This being the case, some have thought that if it is necessary to accept that whether or not something is a mistaken consciousness depends on the chief appearing object, then it must also be necessary to accept that whether or not a nonconceptual consciousness is a valid cognition depends on the chief appearing object. This, however, is but a lack of subtlety in one's analysis; it is a conclusion born from incorrect examination. Be aware that nowhere in the

scriptures of the Lord [Tsong kha pa] is there to be found a single statement to the effect that nonconceptual mistaken consciousnesses are valid cognitions.

[Opinion:] It being the case that it is not possible to determine something to be a valid cognition simply because it is undeceived in regard to the phenomenon that is its apprehended object, it is necessary to [make the criterion] that it be *newly (gsar du)* undeceived.[1160]

[Reply:] This is incorrect, for (1) the fact that it is necessary for a valid cognition to be newly undeceived is something not established by a merely nominal valid cognition, and (2) neither [is it established] by a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate, for this does not find any valid cognitions whatsoever [within its purview]. The former, [that is, part (1) of the reason,] is true because the term *valid cognition* is applied to [a mind] that is undeceived in regard to the object perceived by an ordinary innate worldly mind that has not been affected by an adventitious cause of error (*glo bur gyi 'khrul rgyus*) and that engages [its object] without either analyzing or examining it. Applying the term [*valid cognition* to a mind] has nothing to do with its being *newly* undeceived. It is also so because all of the proofs that the logicians cite in favor of the necessity of inserting the expression *newly* as part of the definition of a valid cognition are cited from a special viewpoint, that being that it is posited as a valid cognition in regard to an object found on logical examination.

In every system from the Svātantrikas on down there is a belief that all inferential valid cognitions are erroneous in regard to their appearing object [458]
and that they are not erroneous in regard to their conceived object, but in this [Prāsaṅgika] system this cannot be accepted for the following reason. The impermanence of sound appears to exist by virtue of its own characteristic to the inferential valid cognition that understands the impermanence of sound. Now if the logical reason (*rtags*), that even though it appears in this way it does not exist in this way, does not prove that the inference is an erroneous consciousness in regard to the impermanence of sound, then it contradicts the fact that the logical reason that "even though blue appears to the eye consciousness to exist by virtue of its own characteristic, it does not exist [in that way]" can prove that the eye consciousness is erroneous in regard to blue.

Therefore, in this system, whether something is a mistaken consciousness is determined by whether there exists a valid cognition that directly contradicts the way in which [that consciousness] apprehends its object. Whether it is a mistaken consciousness is not determined by whether it is erroneous in regard to its conceived object or by whether there exists a valid cognition that contradicts the way things appear to it.

Those who claim that nonconceptual consciousnesses do not have a mode of apprehension (*'dzin stangs*) are speaking without having studied, for it seems that they have confused into a single entity a consciousness' mode of apprehension and its mode of conception (*zhen stangs*), [which in actuality are quite different things].[1161] A valid cognition's mode of apprehension refers to that

valid cognition's positive (*yongs su gcod pa*) mode of apprehension of its own perceived object. To accept, on the one hand, that attitudes to be abandoned, like the apprehension of the self, and its antidote, the wisdom that understands selflessness, are contradictory modes of apprehending the single object (*dmigs pa*) they are focused on and, on the other, to accept that direct perceptual valid cognitions have no mode of apprehension is a great internal contradiction.

Now let us discuss the meaning of real (*dngos*) direct percept (*mngon sum*)[1162] and that which is just labeled (*btags*) [*direct perception* without actually being so]. In general, we do not accept that if something is a direct perceptual valid cognition, then it contradicts its being a direct percept. It depends on the individual object, as follows. Blue is a real full-blown direct percept [459]
of the eye consciousness that apprehends blue. The eye consciousness apprehending blue [on the other hand] is labeled a direct percept based on the blue [without actually being a direct percept]. At the same time, it is a real full-blown direct perceptual valid cognition; but the eye consciousness apprehending the blue is the actual full-blown direct percept of, for example, the extrasensory perception that knows the mind of someone else; that is, it is directly seeing the eye consciousness [of someone else] as it apprehends blue. That extrasensory perception is labeled a *direct percept* based on such an eye consciousness, and [at the same time] it is an actual full-blown direct perceptual valid cognition. This is how one should understand the meaning [of these terms.]

Therefore, in this [Prāsaṅgika] system, the consciousness that remembers blue, that is elicited by the eye consciousness apprehending blue, in so far as it is an experience of the evident phenomenon blue that it takes as its apprehended object, as witnessed by experience, is an undeceived consciousness. Hence, it is accepted as being a direct perceptual valid cognition. Thus, being a subsequent consciousness (*bcad shes*) and being a valid cognition are not mutually exclusive; it is also not contradictory for something to be both a direct perceptual valid cognition and a conceptual thought that perceives the meaning of a word. In this vein, the *Prasannapadā* states:

> Moreover, since words qua direct percepts are what express nonobtuse meanings, meanings associated with the senses are direct percepts. In this regard, as they are associated with the senses, nonobtuse entities, like the pot and blue, are direct percepts. Because the consciousnesses that understand them, like clay and the fire that bakes it, are the result of direct percepts, [those consciousnesses] too should be called [460]
> *direct percepts.*[1163]

Even though both the *Prasannapadā* and *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* extensively teach a refutation of the claim that being nonconceptual (*rtog bral*) is part of the definition of a direct percept, as it would lengthen this exposition excessively, I will not go into it here.

According to this method of interpretation, then, valid cognitions are of two types: direct perceptual valid cognitions and inferential valid cognitions. The definition of the first is "a consciousness that, without depending on a logical reason, is undeceived as to the directly perceptible phenomenon that it takes as its apprehended object." The definition of the second is "a consciousness that, depending on a logical reason, is undeceived in regard to the obtuse phenomenon that it takes as its apprehended object."

Just because something is a valid cognition that understands a directly perceptible object does not mean that it is a valid cognition that understands that object *directly*, as is the case, for example, with the consciousness that remembers blue. Therefore, something's being a direct perceptual valid cognition does not imply that it directly understands its object. For were that not so, [that is, were it to necessarily understand its object directly,] then it would follow, absurdly, that there would be no difference between the way the object is perceived by the eye consciousness apprehending blue, and the way it is perceived by the consciousness that, arising after that [eye consciousness], remembers blue; and also because if that were accepted, it would follow, absurdly, that even blind people could see form directly.

The first, [that is, direct perceptual valid cognitions,] have three divisions.

(1) *Sensory* direct perceptual valid cognition is defined as "a consciousness that, directly arising from a physical organ as its dominant condition (*bdag rkyen*), is undeceived as regards the directly perceptible phenomenon that it takes as its apprehended object." An example is the eye consciousness.

(2) *Mental* direct perceptual valid cognition is defined as "a consciousness [461] that directly arises from the mental organ (*yid dbang*) as its own special dominant condition and that, without depending on *samādhi*, is undeceived in regard to the directly perceptible phenomenon that it takes as its apprehended object." An example is the consciousness that remembers blue and that arises after the eye consciousness apprehending blue.

(3) *Yogic* direct perception is defined as "a nonconceptual consciousness that directly arises from the *samādhi* which is the union of mental quiescence (*zhi gnas*) and insight (*lhag mthong*) as its own special dominant condition, and that is undeceived in that it directly perceives as its apprehended object either the aspects of the [four noble] truths or the subtle or gross forms of selflessness." In the system of the Svātantrikas, Cittamātrins, and Sautrāntikas, if something is a consciousness that directly understands the sixteen aspects of the [four noble] truths, such as impermanence and so on, then [that consciousness] must be an *āryan* gnosis.[1164] [For them,] the consciousness to which the world appears as bones, that arises from the *samādhi* meditating on ugliness, is not a valid cognition. They also believe that the gnosis to which the generic image (*don spyi*) of reality appears, within the path of preparation (*sbyor lam*), is not a direct perceptual valid cognition because it is

a conceptual thought that apprehends the meaning of words. Hence, they accept that there can be no yogic direct perception within the mental continua of sentient beings.

In this [Prāsaṅgika system], as we have explained, even before coming to a logical understanding of the ultimate subtle forms of the two forms of selflessness, there is such a thing as understanding, through reasoning and medi- [462]
tating on the sixteen aspects of the four truths such as impermanence and so on, the selflessness of the person qua mere repudiation of the person as an independent substantially existent thing, and emptiness qua the mere repudiation of subject and object as different entities. If one practices, fully taking into account all of the aspects of the practice that involve becoming accustomed to those [objects], one will come to a clear and direct perception of those objects. Gnoses of this sort are not *āryan* gnoses, but are nonetheless yogic direct perceptual valid cognitions. Hence, we believe that yogic direct perceptual valid cognitions *do* exist within the mental continua of sentient beings. This concludes the explanation of the exposition of valid cognitions.

[CONCLUSION]

4.2.3.4. *Having Set Forth Emptiness, How to Meditate on It*[1165]

The fortunate should understand this in dependence on the extensive exposition found in the *Stages of the Path* of our glorious holy spiritual master [Tsong kha pa].[1166] It seems as though there are many individuals who, without the slightest expertise in the correct and incorrect methods of practicing mental quiescence and insight as they are taught in the scriptures and commentaries and in previous spiritual masters' own treatises, and without having accustomed themselves in the least to the points of the essential instructions *(man ngag)* for deepening their experience into the bliss of the *samādhi* that turns [the mind] inwardly, have had their words, under the false name of "essential instructions into mental quiescence and insight," extensively compiled into expository treatises. Nonetheless, because those who have not studied even the mere terminology of the essential instructions for practice are not to be taken either as the objects of refutation or support by scholarly persons who are well-versed in the methods of accomplishing ordinary and special *samādhis*, I will not engage in an exposition [of their views].[1167] [463]

4.2.3.5. *The Exposition of the Result That Is the Culmination of Meditation*[1168]

Having, in an extensive way and by means of correct reasoning, understood, through the method explained earlier, the most subtle form of selflessness, without separating oneself from the portions of the practice that allow one to accustom oneself to the very view that has been understood, by practicing to perfect the Mahāyāna path, one comes to travel in stages the paths of faithful activity (*mos pa spyod pa'i lam*), [that is, the non-*āryan* paths of accumulation and preparation,] and the ten *bhūmis* of the *āryan*, the Diamondlike *Samādhi*, the gnosis of the tenth *bhūmi*, the "Limit of the Stream" (*rgyun mtha'*), which eliminates without a trace being left the latent potentialities of the error of dualistic appearances. In the second moment after [that] one actualizes the *dharmakāya (chos sku)*, which is a state of "equal taste" (*ro mnyam du gyur pa*), in that the reality of the mind possessing the two purities becomes irre-

versibly [intermixed] with reality (*de bzhin nyid*), like water when mixed with water. At that same time, the body of the being of the tenth *bhūmi*, called "Limit of the Stream," which is of the nature of mind, comes to be adorned with the marks and signs (*mtshan dpe*). In the second moment after that it becomes the *sāmbhogakāya* (*longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku*), its continuity not interrupted for even a single instant until the end of the universe, inseparable in nature from the gnosis of the *dharmakāya*. That is why it is said that: "By the cessation of the mind, the bodies are actualized."[1169]

According to the Mahāyāna of the *pāramitās*, one achieves enlightenment for the first time only in Akaniṣṭha,[1170] whereas the place where one acts out (*tshul ston pa*) becoming enlightened, at a later date, is the desire realm (*'dod khams*). Though there is much to analyze in regard to such topics as the iden- [464]
tification of Akaniṣṭha and the refutation of the form body's being material and so on, wishing to discuss it elsewhere, I will not write about it here.[1171] Instead, let me here give a brief exposition of the way the Buddha's gnosis understands objects.

[Opponent:][1172] Within the Buddha's own appearances (*rang snang la*) no phenomenon whatsoever is seen; therefore, there is no gnosis that is contained within the Buddha's own continuum.[1173] It is only for the purpose of others, his disciples, that he puts forth a notion of "gnosis." That is why the *Avatārabhāṣya* says: "I have explained the workings of the minds and mental events within the state of buddhahood to be mistaken."[1174]

[Reply:] This is a giant slander against the sources of refuge, for it would be necessary to accept that he would not know who is to be protected, by what means he should protect, and so forth. What is more, because it would follow that the ten powers (*stobs bcu*),[1175] the eighteen unshared attributes (*ma 'dres pa bco brgyad*),[1176] and so forth are not qualities within the mental continua of buddhas, then tell me exactly whose mental continuum they are qualities of? The *Avatārabhāṣya* also says: "Since he has actualized the sole essence, he has understood reality. That is why he is called the *Buddha*."[1177] And also: "You of wholesome knowledge understand all phenomena in a single instant."[1178] You are in direct contradiction to many such passages.

If there is no result, no omniscient gnosis, then all of the efforts made on the path for a period of three countless eons would be purposeless, and in the end it would be necessary to accept that there were no phenomena at all. [465]

It seems to be an instance of this system that is based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of the scriptures that explain that one should avoid understanding the ultimate truth from the viewpoint of dualistic appearances and that one should avoid perceiving any of the proliferations of dualistic appearances, and that [based on this misinterpretation] claims that the ultimate truth is not a phenomenon. I have already refuted this method [of interpreting scripture] above. As for the meaning of "reversing the mind and mental events," the *Prasannapadā* says: "The *Sūtra* says, 'What is the ultimate truth? If there

is no movement of the mind in regard to anything, what need to mention words.' It is inconceivable (*rnam par rtog pa med pa*) in such terms.''[1179] As it is stating that the lack of movement of the mind refers to nonconceptualization, it is meaningless to [cite this] as proof of there being no gnosis.

[Opponent:] Well then, in your own system what is this gnosis' method of understanding phenomena?

[Reply:] On the stages of the path, while one is still in training, the stains of the latent potentialities of the error of dualistic appearance that apprehends the two truths to be different things have not been eliminated. Hence, it is impossible for the ultimate and conventional truths to simultaneously appear to a single mind in a direct way (*mngon sum du*). Therefore, equipoise and aftermath states (*mnyam rjes*) occur sequentially, [as opposed to simultaneously]; and the equipoise and aftermath states are of different natures.

At the level of buddhahood every latent potentiality of the error of dualistic appearance has been eliminated. Hence, a single gnosis can directly understand all the phenomena included within the two truths simultaneously. The [466]
two gnoses, that which cognizes [things] as they are and that which cognizes things as they seem to be, are of the same nature, as are the two gnoses, that during equipoise and that during the aftermath period.

When, in this way, the Buddha's gnosis enters into emptiness, like water mixing with water, that gnosis directly and simultaneously understands conventional phenomena in such a way that they appear as dual, that is, as distant from the [consciousness] itself. Even though this dualistic appearance exists, however, it need not involve the error of dualistic appearance. Therefore, even though that gnosis is both a gnosis that understands [things] as they are and one that understands [things] as they seem to be, the gnosis understands reality as it is and does not understand it as it appears to be. It understands the conventional as it seems to be and does not understand it as it is.

That portion of it which is the understanding of reality as it is via the waning of dualistic appearances is equipoise and that portion of it which understands conventional phenomena as they appear to be via dualistic appearances is the aftermath state. The commentary to the *Uttaratantra* verse that goes:

> Because wisdom, gnosis, and liberation,
> As regards their clarity, radiance, and purity
> And also as regards the fact that they are not different,
> Are like light, rays, and the sphere of the sun.[1180]

says:

> Therefore, the nonconceptual supramundane wisdom that the Buddha possesses clears away the obscurations [that block] the reality of phenomena. Hence, it is similar to clear light. The gnosis of all phenomena, the aftermath state, becomes engaged in all aspects of every entity qua phenomenon. Hence, it is similar to a radiating net of lights.[1181] [467]

[The aftermath state spoken of] is not an aftermath state that arises after an equipoise, as happens during the paths of training. Instead, it is called an *aftermath state* because it is a state obtained due to the power of that equipoise. Also, as it has been stated:

> The gnosis of omniscience
> Is accepted as possessing the characteristic of being a direct perception.
> We do not accept that others are direct perception, even partially.

and also, in the *Satyadvayavṛtti*, "One instant of his knowledge pervades the entire sphere of phenomena."[1182] Thus, [the Buddha's gnosis] understands every phenomenon of the three times directly and simultaneously. When he directly perceives today's sprout, the gnosis that perceives today's sprout also directly perceives last year's sprout and next year's sprout. Nonetheless, it does not perceive the sprout of those two years *qualified as being today's*. If the gnosis is today's gnosis, the entity perceived by that [gnosis] need not exist today, just as is the case with the extrasensory perception that perceives past lives.

[Opponent:] If the Buddha's gnosis does not understand the Buddha's gnosis it contradicts [the claim] that he understands all phenomena. If it understands it indirectly (*shugs la*), it undermines the claim that the Buddha's wisdom, [being a form of direct perception,] does not have an indirect understanding [of anything]. [If it is not indirectly understood, but instead] directly appears (*dngos su snang*), then does he understand things [in this way] via dualistic appearance or in such a way that dualistic appearance has waned? In the first case, as it would itself appear to be different from itself, while in fact [468] not being so, it would follow, absurdly, that it was an erroneous consciousness. In the second case, as it would be a direct understanding of itself by itself in such a way that dualistic appearances had waned, you would have to accept that it was an autocognitive direct perception, [which you as Prāsaṅgikas reject].

[Reply:] It is not correct for the Buddha's gnosis to understand the Buddha's gnosis indirectly. What reason can you give for it being the case that even though the Buddha's gnosis is the object of the Buddha's gnosis, it is not appropriate for it to appear directly?

[Opponent:] If it appeared directly, then the Buddha's gnosis would become both cognizer and cognized; and if that were so, then the acting subject and the object acted upon would be identical.

[Reply:] The same would be true in every way of [the alternative you propose, namely,] indirect cognition, for otherwise it would follow, absurdly, that indirect cognition would not count as cogniton.

[Opponent:] If something directly cognizes itself, then it must appear to itself, and there occurs the absurd fault of something being like itself.

[Reply:] So show us what problem there is with advocating the opposite view, as we do, namely that if something directly cognizes itself, then it must cognize itself without appearing to itself.

[Opponent:] If one object is directly cognized without its aspect [appearing] (*rnam med du*), then all objects would have to be directly cognized without their aspects [appearing].

[Reply:] Then how would you reply if I said that it follows, absurdly, that if one object is directly understood in such a way that dualistic appearances had waned, then all objects must be directly understood in such a way that dualistic appearances have waned?

[Opponent:] If one object is ultimate, then all objects are ultimate.

[Reply:] Then how would you reply if I were to say that it follows, absurdly, that if one object is not different from itself, then all objects cannot be different from themselves? [469]

Now, does the Buddha's gnosis understand the Buddha's gnosis via dualistic appearances or in such a way that dualistic appearances have waned? In the first case, it follows, absurdly, that the Buddha's gnosis is different from the Buddha's gnosis because it appears to the Buddha's gnosis as dual, [that is, as different,] from the Buddha's wisdom, and that is a consciousness that is nonerroneous with respect to its appearing object. In the second case, it follows, absurdly, that the [gnosis] is an ultimate truth because it is directly understood by the Buddha's gnosis in such a way that dualistic appearances have waned.

When analyzed in this way, we [respond that] we do not accept the first [alternative], and to the pervasion of the second one, [that what is understood by the Buddha's gnosis in that way must be an ultimate truth,] one should give the following response. Simply because [Buddha's gnosis] is directly understood by the Buddha's gnosis in such a way that dualistic appearances have waned does not imply that it must be an ultimate truth, for if something is directly understood by the Buddha's gnosis in such a way that dualistic appearances have waned, because it would have to be identical to the Buddha's gnosis, the Buddha's wisdom would have to have its dualistic appearances wane with respect to it, and if something is identical to the Buddha's gnosis, it must be conventional.

Do not entertain the doubt that if one accepts that all of the phenomena that are positively indivisible but different only in a negative [or verbal] way (*ldog pa tha dad pa'i grub bde dbyer med kyi chos*) from the Buddha's gnosis directly appear *to* the Buddha's gnosis, then one must also accept that the Buddha's gnosis directly cognizes itself. [If that were so, then] the Buddha's gnosis that perceives things as they seem to be, absurdly, must directly understand [470] even the Buddha's gnosis because the Buddha's gnosis is a phenomenon different in a negative [or verbal] way from the Buddha's wisdom understanding things as they seem to be, while positively indivisible from the Buddha's wisdom understanding things as they seem to be. You accept the pervasion. If

there is no pervasion that *if* something is a phenomenon that is different from the Buddha's gnosis understanding things as they seem to be while positively indivisible from the gnosis understanding things as they seem to be, *then* it must be something that directly appears to and is understood by the Buddha's gnosis understanding things as they seem to be, then give up [your acceptance of] the pervasion that if something is a phenomenon that is different from the Buddha's gnosis while positively identical to the Buddha's wisdom, then it must directly appear to and be understood by the Buddha's gnosis. If you accept [the original premise, that the Buddha's gnosis understanding things as they seem to be directly understands the Buddha's gnosis], then [I ask this]: if something is directly understood by the Buddha's gnosis understanding things as they seem to be, then it must be directly understood by the Buddha's gnosis or need it not be so understood? If it need not, then for something to be an [object] directly found by the Buddha's gnosis understanding things as they seem to be it need not be something directly found by the Buddha's gnosis, so that it would be impossible to refute someone who accepts that the conventional is what is directly found by the Buddha's gnosis. If it must [be directly understood by the Buddha's gnosis], then it follows, absurdly, that the Buddha's gnosis directly appears to and is understood by the Buddha's gnosis understanding things as they seem to be because it is a phenomenon different from the Buddha's gnosis perceiving things as they seem to be while being positively indivisible from it. The pervasion is a true one. If you accept [the premise], then it follows, absurdly, that the Buddha's gnosis is directly understood by the Buddha's gnosis because it directly appears to and is understood [471]
by the Buddha's wisdom that understands things as they seem to be. You have accepted the three cycles!

Although there is more to be said, I will leave it at that.

This concludes the explanation of the exposition [of what occurs] at the time of the result, [buddhahood].

[Concluding Verses]

The supreme leader, the masterful incarnation of logical reasoning,
The merciful father has established for me
The wealth of the hood of the Lord of Nāgas, the eloquence
of Nāgārjuna,
Which acts to grant one all requisites and desires.

The bright rays of the logical methods of the glorious Candra,
Freeing one from the hundredfold clouds of mental proliferations
With the water that opens the Kumuda [flower], my own mind,
Are the sources of hope for the fortunate ones of today.

The correct view [of emptiness] is the ultimate jewel,
But expertise in this incomparable analysis,
Untainted by the polluting stain of misconceptions,
Is to be purchased by method and in no other way.

When one tastes the eloquent sayings of the spiritual master
That come from churning the ocean of scripture,
Seeing the pond of the poisoned waters of scholarly pride and
false exegesis
As stealing away a life of happiness, one banishes them to far
off places.

Seeing the tremendous spread of the mistaken scriptural exegesis
Of scholars who plant the impure seeds of evil views,
What scholar could not generate pity
On those beings who, though aspiring to the dharma, walk so far from it?

Because this system is apprehended only by those
Who are renowned in the highest [forms of] reasoning,
It is different from all others and extremely subtle.
Hence this system, like the Conqueror's own scriptures, is extremely
subtle.

Though I do not know how to arrange words in a literary fashion
And am devoid of the ability to prove things logically, [472]
Alas! I have engaged in the composition of these words
As if a king had imposed on me some penance as punishment.

Just as the majority of the doctrines advocated
By the Tibetan *gZhan stong*[1183] followers indicate their stupidity,
In the opposite way the majority of what the Mādhyamika method-
ology advocates
Is witness to the unerring path of logic [which they take].

This elucidation which clears away the darkness of the three worlds
That comes from the [sun] orb of the analysis of my own mind
Opens up the lotus of the correct view [of emptiness].
So rejoice, ye hosts of clear minded ones!

By this virtue may I, in all my lives,
Never abandon service to my spiritual master;
And by apprehending all of the doctrinal methods of the Conqueror,
May I come to resemble Ajita [Maitreya] and Mañjuśrī.

The good system of Nāgārjuna is held within the womb
Of this noble woman of wealth [Tibet],
Girdled with the four winding rivers.
May her activity make the world a more beautiful place.

[Colophon]

This *Treatise That Perfectly Elucidates Reality, The Profound Doctrine of Emptiness, Called "Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate"* was composed by the learned Venerable [mKhas grub] dGe legs dpal bzang who, with the cupped hands of faith, took up the holy stainless nectar of the eloquent words from the lips of the one whose nature is the knowledge and compassion of all the buddhas of the three times rolled into one, the crown jewel of the [sages of all the] 500 [year periods in the history of Buddhism], the dust of whose feet serves as the crown on the heads of all the lords of sages, the omniscient one, whose virtuous enlightened activity pervades every spot of this ocean clothed [earth], making him incomparable at the task of raising the banner of the Tathāgata's teachings all the way up to the peak of existence, the chief son of the Lord [473]
Mañjuśrī, the king of the doctrine, the great Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa. [He took it up with these cupped hands of faith] and tasting it with the tongue of analysis, he came to possess, in regard to the logical analysis of the stainless intent of all of the Tathāgata's scriptures, the self-confidence of the intelligence that cannot be overcome by opponents. Seeing that the scriptures composed by the Lord Master [Tsong kha pa] were very extensive and extremely subtle, making it difficult for those of inferior intellect to understand, and impossible for them to condense into a single line [of reasoning], with the thought of being of benefit to them and without in the least contradicting the intended meaning of the Lord Master, he condensed them into a single line of reasoning that was easy to comprehend.

This was written down by bLo gros chos skyong,[1184] [a scholar] well versed in all of the *tripiṭaka* and the *tantras* and who, being a one seater,[1185] abides by the stainless discipline of the Conqueror. It took place in the Southeast Nyang section of gTsang [province], a place that is a source of knowledge,[1186] in the great temple of the great college called dPal 'khor bde chen,[1187] a veritable park for expounding eloquent expressions.

May this [scribal work] as well cause the precious teachings to spread and expand in all directions and abide forever.

Appendix 1
The Verses to Rong ston

The following is a translation of the polemical verses that mKhas grub rje wrote to Rong ston pa on the occasion of their cancelled debate at dPal 'khor chos sde in 1428. They are to be found in *KYP*, folios 6a–7a. See the "Biography" for an account of the events leading up to the composition of these verses.

The superior power of the lineage of the supreme vehicle arises from the precious element of the dual accumulations.[1]
There is no obstacle to the space of phenomena when one is led there by the swift magical stallion of analysis.
This vast ocean-clothed earth of the scriptures is illuminated by the rays of the sun of reasoning.
How can a firefly travel next to the sun, this jewel of the sky, the likes of which has never before been seen?

Nonetheless, this "Śākya" born in Rong
Was of a mind to attack the teachings,
Having taken up the banner of the scriptures of gShen rab
And like a child boasting of being a scholar,
He calls us to debate with him
From quite a distance away,
Repeatedly shouting out the insults
Of an erratic ascetic.
But whenever I approached you,
You became discouraged, were filled with fear,
Embarrassment, and sadness, and seeing yourself abandoned,
You went looking for a refuge.
Face to face I say to you, filled as you are with the darkness,
Which is the desire to find fault
In the pure white brilliance of the glorious Candra,
That you shall be destroyed by the thunderbolt of my reasoning.
The rays of the maker of the day, the sun of my master's proper explanations,
Have been blocked by the growth of the tree of your jealousy,

For yours is a dense forest of evil explanations.
First he tells me to debate him
But then, seized with fear,
He blithers something like,
"I didn't stop them!"[2]
Over and again you take refuge in a vessel of lies
And lacking the clothing of shame or guilt,
Wearing the belt of your monastic discipline loosely,
You hide behind the blind
Of the evil words of your disciples, a pack of fools.
Finding a refuge in the words of your benefactor
Who has said that in this district
Conferences of scholars are not allowed,
You tell him what a great kindness he has done you.
Though many hooded *nāgas,* the scholars,
Have come together in this place as judges,
From their respective oceans, the great seats of learning,
Which possess the play of a string of the waves of scripture and
reasoning,
The word has come from him who is your protector
That, having returned to their respective abodes,
The oceans, which are the treasuries of water,
The *maṇḍala* of disputation will not take place.
Now remember your threats as [I have explained them here],
Threats that in reality have proven to be powerless,
And in the future do not spread in secrecy
Evil rumors about the proper explanations of sages.
Having advised and refuted you,
Realize that your efforts at speaking untruths
And your resultant blithering, the consequence of shame,
Proclaim to scholars that you are like a sheep or ass.

I live in the gorge of a snow mountain, the Tathāgata's teachings.
My mane heavy with the weight of a thousand scriptural traditions,
Possessing the power of the inexhaustible claws and fangs of reasoning,
I alone am the supreme sage, the lion, king of beasts.[3]

Appendix 2
The Eighteen Great Contradictions

From *sGra pa Shes rab rin chen pa'i rtsod lan lung rigs seng ge'i nga ro,* in *Miscellaneous Works of the First Panchen Lama* (from the rDzang la mkhar Ms. Collection) (Gemur, H. P.: Topden Tsering, 1979), pp. 373–462.

1. *"yul kun brdzun dang yul can bslu med 'gal"* (p. 407): To claim that all objects are false things contradicts the fact that there is such a thing as right knowledge of those objects.
2. *"yul der 'khrul dang de la tshad ma 'gal"* (p. 409): To claim that [a cognition] is erroneous in regard to its object contradicts its being a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).
3. *"rjes dpag yod dang bsgrub ngag med pa 'gal"* (p. 412): To claim that there is such a thing as inference contradicts the claim that syllogisms do not exist.
4. *"mthun snang med dang chos can tshad grub 'gal"* (p. 414): To claim that [the subject of a syllogism] does not appear in a common way [to the proponent and opponent] contradicts the claim that the subject is established by a valid cognition.
5. *"phyi don tshad grub rdul phran cha bcas 'gal"* (p. 417): That external objects are established by valid cognition contradicts the claim that elementary particles have parts.
6. *"rigs drug tshad ma rdos bcas tshad grub 'gal"* (p. 421): That each of the six classes of beings has [its own] valid cognition contradicts the fact that the gross [aggregates] are established by a valid cognition.
7. *"skra shad med dang klung rnag yod pa 'gal"* (p. 422): The claim that illusory hair does not exist contradicts the claim that rivers of pus exist.
8. *"rdzas grub med dang dngos po yod pa 'gal"* (p. 424): The claim that there is no substantial existence contradicts the claim that things exist.
9. *"gzhan skye med dang sa myug rdzas gzhan 'gal"* (p. 424): The claim that there is no arising from another contradicts the claim that the seed and the sprout are different substances.
10. *"bden brdzun yod dang / yang log med pa 'gal"* (p. 425): To claim that there are such things as truth and falsity contradicts claiming that there is no such thing as the correct and incorrect [conventionals].

11. *"yan lag la dpyad bum pa mi rnyad dang skad cig la dpyad zhig pa rnyed pa 'gal"* (p. 427): It is contradictory not to find a pot when its parts are analyzed, but *to find* destruction when a moment is analyzed.
12. *"rang rgyud smra bas rang bzhin smras pa dang / rang bzhin med blo de der grub pa 'gal"* (p. 430): It is contradictory to claim that those who advocate *svatantras* are essentialists while the mind that [cognizes] essencelessness exists in that way.
13. *"nyon mongs can min ma rig yod pa dang / shes par 'gyur pa'i shes sgrib med pa 'gal"* (p. 432): Your claim that there is such a thing as nonafflicted ignorance contradicts the claim that no knowledge obscurations are forms of consciousness.
14. *"gzhung gzhan nas bshad kun gzhi rang rig sogs / 'gog na de dag rang lugs mi 'dod dang / sde bdun nas gsungs tshad ma mi 'dod kyang / rang lugs tshad ma'i rnam gzhag shes pa 'gal"* (p. 432): The fact that the foundation consciousness, autocognition, and so forth as explained in other [non-Madhyamaka] texts are repudiated and not accepted in your own system contradicts the fact that your own system sets forth a general exposition of valid cognitions, albeit not the valid cognitions as taught in the seven treatises [of the Pramāṇikas].
15. *"mi rtog sogs rtogs rnal 'byor mngon sum dang / de'i sbyor lam rtogs par mi sleb 'gal"* (p. 439): The fact of that there exists the understanding of nonconceptual states and yogic direct perception [in non-Madhyamaka systems] contradicts the fact that [those who practice these states] cannot reach the point of attaining their own path of preparation.
16. *"gzhan sems shes pa yid mngon yin pa dang / bden bzhi shes pa rnal 'byor mngon sum 'gal"* (p. 439): The claim that the cognition of others' minds is a form of mental direct perception contradicts the claim that the cognition of the four [noble] truths is a form of yogic direct perception.
17. *"kun mkhyen ye shes chos kun 'jal pa dang / shes bya phyed la tshad ma min pa 'gal"* (p. 440): The claim that the gnosis of omniscience perceives all phenomena contradicts the claim that it is not a valid cognition in regard to one-half of phenomena.
18. *"rdzas yod bdag smra gnas ma bur nges dang / rnam shes bdag smra'i dbu sems yod pa 'gal"* (pp. 440–441): To claim that to advocate a self that substantially exists is something that the Vātsīputrīyas do contradicts claiming that [some] Mādhyamikas and the Cittamātrins believe that consciousness is the self.

Notes

Introduction

The Introduction has benefited from the comments of D. Seyfort Ruegg.

1. *Metaphysica,* trans. W. D. Ross, in the *Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 689.

2. José Ortega y Gasset, *What Is Philosophy?* trans. Mildred Adams (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1964), p. 67.

3. The verse continues:

Still, in this country of snow mountains
Most of those who seek water go after mirages instead.
Even though the source of happiness has been expounded in the scriptures
Of my supreme and incomparable master, those of little fortune
Fail to find this curative, which is the correct view.
Witnessing that the multitudes are following evil and mistaken paths,
That they are becoming confused when forced to distinguish the true path from the false,
My mind fills with pity for them.

Collected Works, vol. *ta,* folios 171a–b. All references to the *Collected Works of Tsong kha pa* and his two disciples are to the Lhasa Zhol edition, unless otherwise specified.

4. This is not to say that this insight was unique to the Buddha, being already a well-established principle of the religious movements at that time. For a discussion of some of the philosophical issues surrounding this question see K. Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1963), pp. 1–25; see also A. L. Basham, *The Origins and Development of Classical Hinduism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), Chapter 4, "Mystical and Ascetic Traditions."

5. I have discussed the theory of antidotes (skt. *pratipakṣa;* tib. *gnyen po*) in "Women and Illusion: Towards an Aesthetics in Buddhism," a paper delivered at the American Academy of Religion (1987), unpublished; see also *Abhidharmakośa (AK)* (I, 26), (V, 61), and (VII, 8); and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (*AS*), W. Rahula trans. in *Le Compendium de la super-doctrine* (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1980), p. 14: "De plus, la fonction des chose favorables *(kuśala dharma)* consiste à éliminer ce qui leur est hostile *(vipakṣa)* et la fonction des souillures majeures et mineures *(kleśopa-*

kleśa) consiste à faire obstruction à leurs opposés *(pratipakṣa).*" On *pratipakṣabhāvanā* see p. 116 of that work; also S. Anacker, "The Meditational Therapy of the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya,*" in M. Kiyota and E. W. Jones, eds., *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978), pp. 101–107. This is not to say that Buddhists everywhere and at all times have advocated an agonistic theory of mind (thoughts fighting other thoughts) implied by the antidote model for purification. There have been movements throughout Buddhist history that have stressed the innate purity of the mind, advocating, instead of the poison-antidote model, one in which this innate purity is tapped or made manifest in what we might call the *irenic,* as opposed to the *agonistic,* model of purification.

6. On the sources for this doctrine in the Pali scriptures see L. O. Gomez, "Proto-Madhyamaka in the Pāli Canon," *Philosophy East and West (PEW)*, 26 (1978); 137–165; see also Steven Collins, *Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravāda Buddhism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

7. An excellent overview of early Western scholarship on the subject of emptiness is to be found in J. W. de Jong, "Emptiness," *Journal of Indian Philosophy (JIP)* 2 (1977): 7–15.

8. Title of one of the first scholarly texts in English on the doctrine of emptiness, the work of T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974).

9. On this hermeneutical method see my forthcoming article in the Minoru Kiyota *festschrift,* "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of *Siddhānta* in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism," and my forthcoming article in a volume of critical essays on the Primordial Tradition, "A Link of Non-being: Buddhism and the Concept of an Hierarchical Ontology." See also my "The Concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures," *JIABS* 4, no. 1 (1981): 7–23; also H. V. Guenther, "The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism," *Journal of the American Oriental Society (JAOS)* 78 (1958): 19ff, anthologized in H. V. Guenther, *Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective* (Emeryville, N.Y.: Dharma Publishing, 1977).

10. See the *TTC's* second stanza of the "Concluding Verses." "Candra" refers of course to Candrakīrti, the author of the *Prasannapadā,* though perhaps not the first, certainly the most famous of the Indian "Prāsaṅgikas," a name that seems to have been applied to Candrakīrti's school only in Tibet.

11. On the concept of "purport" see D. S. Ruegg, "Purport, Implicate and Presupposition: Sanskrit *Abhiprāya* and Tibetan *dGongs pa/dGongs gzhi* as Hermeneutical Concepts," *JIP* 13 (1985): 309–325, in part a response to M. Broido's earlier article in *JIP* 12 (1984).

12. This is not to say that such a synthesis was not attempted prior to Tsong kha pa. This seems, for example, to have been the very tack taken by rNgog lo tsā ba; see L. W. J. van der Kuijp, *Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology (CTBE)* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983) Alt und Neu Indische Studien (no. 26), pp. 36–38. It was Tsong kha pa's particular synthesis, emphasizing as strongly as

it did the fact that the ultimate could be approached conceptually, however, that drew particular attention and criticism. See also L. W. J. van der Kuijp, "Studies in the Life and Thought of mKhas grub rje I: mKhas grub rje's Epistemological Oeuvre and his Philological Remarks on Dignaga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I," *(SK-I) Berliner Indologische Studien (BIS)* (1985) 75–105; see also P. Williams, "A Note on Some Aspects of Mi bskyod rdo rje's Critique of dGe lugs pa Madhyamaka," *JIP* 11 (1983): 125–145; and his "rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka Method," *JIP* 13 (1985): 205–225; as well as my "The Prāsaṅgikas' Views on Logic: Tibetan dGe lugs pa Exegesis Concerning the Question of Svātantras," *JIP* 15 (1988): 55–62.

13. On "sectarian" developments in Tibetan Buddhism see G. Tucci, *The Religions of Tibet,* trans. from the German and Italian by G. Samuel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); D. Snellgrove, *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism,* vol. 2 (Boston: Shambhala, 1987). One of the best available sources on the subject, written from a dGe lugs pa perspective, is Thu'u bkwan bLo bzang chos kyi snyi ma's *Grub mtha shel gyi me long* (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, n.d.), which has yet to be translated into English.

14. The *rTogs dka'i snang ba* (Toh. no. 5461), *Collected Works,* vol. *ka,* and the *rNam 'grel ṭik chen* (Toh. nos. 5505–5506), *Collected Works,* vols. *tha* and *da,* respectively. References are to the listings in the *Catalogue of the Tohoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism,* P. Kanakura et. al., eds. (Sendai, Japan: The Seminary of Indology of the Tohoku University, 1953). On mKhas grub rje's *pramāṇa* works, see van der Kuijp, "Studies in mKhas grub rje I," p. 78 passim.

15. Tsong kha pa left us no major work in the field of *pramāṇa* studies, and his great commentary on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra,* the *gSer phreng,* is considered by the later dGe lugs pa scholiasts to be too difficult and radical in its views. The oral tradition stresses that it is to be used cautiously, as Tsong kha pa wrote the work "in the rashness of his youth." In any case it differs, sometimes radically, from the views expressed by rGyal tshab rje in his *rNam bshad,* the full title of which is *Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel ba don gsal ba'i rnam bshad snying po'i rgyan* (Toh. no. 5433), *Collected Works,* vol. *kha.* The other work referred to is rGyal tshab rje's *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa* (Toh. no. 5450), *Collected Works,* vol. *cha.* On orders of commentary and textual layering in the scholastic tradition see my doctoral dissertation, *The Development of a Buddhist Philosophy of Language and Its Culmination in Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought (DBPL)* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1987), Chapter 2; I have also discussed the nature of the commentarial enterprise and some theoretical problems related to it in a paper delivered at the 1987 meeting of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, "Is the Rest Commentary? The Hermeneutics of Tibetan Monastic Exegesis," soon to be published as part of a book entitled *Buddhism and Language.*

16. *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal* (Toh. no. 5408), *Collected Works,* vol. *ma*; and *dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (Toh. no. 5401), *Collected Works,* vol. *ba.* His *Drang nges legs bshad snying po* (Toh. no. 5396), *Collected works,* vol. *pha,* might very well also be added to this list.

17. *sDe bdun yid kyi mun gsal* (Toh. no. 5501), *Collected Works*, vol. *tha*, his synthetic work on *pramāṇa*. Concerning this work, see *SK-I*, p. 78. The *rGyud sde spyi'i rnam* (Toh. no. 5489), *Collected Works*, vol. *nya*, has been edited and translated by F. Lessing and A. Wayman in *Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras* (The Hague: Mouton, 1959).

18. See note 16; translated by Robert A. F. Thurman in *Tsong kha pa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence EE* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). A Hindi translation of Tsong kha pa's work by Geshe Yeshe Thabkay is soon to appear (Sarnath: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, forthcoming).

19. *Byang chub lam gyi rim pa chen mo (LRCM)* (Toh. no. 5392), *Collected Works*, vol. *pa*; translated by Alex Wayman in *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (CMDR)* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). Portions are also translated in Elizabeth Napper's doctoral dissertation, *Dependent Arising and Emptiness (DAE)* (University of Virginia, 1985); Napper plans to complete a new translation of the entire *vipaśyanā* section in the near future.

20. This is set forth in what is perhaps Atīśa's most famous text, the *Bodhịpāthapradīpa*, trans. with the autocommentary by R. F. Sherbourne, S.J., *A Light to the Path and Commentary*, Wisdom of Tibet Series, vol. 5 (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); see also H. Eimer, *Rnam thar rgyas pa. Materialen zu einer Biographie des Atīśa (Dipaṃkaraśrījñāna)* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1979).

21. See note 16; the first five chapters of this work have been translated into English by Jeffrey Hopkins in *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980). The sixth chapter, the longest and most important of the work, is being translated by Jeffrey Hopkins and Anne Klein, but has not yet appeared in published form. One might also include as the fourth major work influencing the structure of the *TTC*, Tsong kha pa's *rTsa shes ṭīk chen*, which, though not as important as the *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* in terms of its influence on the *TTC*, is nonetheless influential.

22. Although the entire *TTC* is renowned in the Tibetan dGe lugs pa tradition for its extreme clarity of exposition, it seems that the Svātantrika section has enjoyed special popularity among scholars. Se ra rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1544), a disciple of the second Dalai bla ma and the author of the *yig chas* for the Se ra Byes College, for example, says in his *dBu ma'i spyi don* (Bylakuppe: Se ra blockprint edition, undated), folio 102a:

> You are the supreme one among scholars,
> Oh pandit who has been so often praised
> By the "Yama Dharma-king" and others
> And within the scriptures of the second Lord Victor [Tsong kha pa].
> You, oh mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang, have explained
> The system of the "Chief of the Svātantrikas" [Bhāvya].
> Based only upon [your interpretation] do I explain [their doctrine],
> Unsatisfied with [the analyses] of others who explain it without reference to you.

23. These are sometimes referred to as the "eight great difficult points" *(dka' gnas chen po brgyad)* of the Madhyamaka and there are several texts devoted exclusively to this subject in dGe lugs pa literature. There are no separate works on this subject by mKhas grub rje, but there does exist a work in eighteen folios by Tsong kha pa, to be found in his *Collected Works*, vol. *ba* (Toh. no. 5402), called the *dKa' gnad brgyad gyi zin bris rje'i gsung bzhin brjed byang;* more accurately, it is a work written as notes on a teaching of Tsong kha pa by rGyal tshab rje and identical, for all intents and purposes, to one found in the *ka* volume of the latter's *Collected Works* (Toh. no. 5426). There the text is called the *dBu ma'i rtsa ba dka' gnas chen po brgyad kyi brjed byang*. rGyal tshab rje is also the author of the *rTsa ba shes rab kyi dka' gnas chen po brgyad kyi bshad pa, Collected Works*, vol. *ja* (Toh. no. 5451). Each of these texts is in sixteen folios. According to the *brJed byang*, the eight points or subjects can be delineated as follows (folios 1–2a):

Related to the Basis *(gzhi)*

1. The Prāsaṅgikas do not accept the foundation consciousness even nominally.
2. They do not accept even nominally the existence of svalakṣaṇas.
3. They accept external objects.

Related to the Path, That is, the Methods for Understanding Reality

4. They do not accept the svātantra form of reasoning.
5. They do not accept autocognition.
6. The exposition of the two obscurations *(sgrib pa)*.
7. Why they accept that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena.

Related to the Result

8. How a buddha's wisdom of the conventional world functions, which involves the acceptance of four facts and the rejection of four others.

The *bShad pa* has an identical enumeration of the eight points. mKhas grub rje never explicitly identifies the eight points, though he covers, usually in greater detail, all of the eight points mentioned by rGyal tshab rje. Most of this discussion is to be found in section 4.2.3.3.1.2.2. of the *TTC*. Compare also to the "seven questions" of Mi pham rgya mtsho (1846–1912), discussed in F. K. Ehrhard, "Observations of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka in the rNying-ma-pa school," in *Tibetan Studies (Proceedings of the Fourth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies)*, ed. H. Uebach and J. L. Panglung (Munich: Kommission für Zentralasiatische Studien Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988), p. 140, n. 7.

24. *SNT*, folio 7b, states that although mKhas grub rje spread the knowledge of "both *sūtra* and *tantra* in general, in particular he spread throughout Tibet the vision of the protector Nāgārjuna, the special Prāsaṅgika system as interpreted by the Lord Tsong kha pa."

25. We find in the *rnam thar* (hagio-biographical) literature mention of more explicitly polemical works, the records of debates *(rtsod yig)* between the early dGe lugs pas and their opponents. *SNT* (folio 6b) mentions a "record" of the debates between

Bo dong and mKhas grub rje and (folio 11a) one of a debate between Rong ston pa and rGyal tshab rje, documents that must have been circulating in the fifteenth century, but that, for the most part, have either been incorporated into more systematic treatises or else lost to us completely. In any case, few (if any) of these works exist in what must have been their original "debate" format.

26. Though much of mKhas grub rje's work is incidentally polemical in nature, some texts are explicitly so. In the field of Madhyamaka, for example, the *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma, Collected Works*, vol. *ta*, folios 171a–195b, is explicitly a refutation of "evil views" concerning the practice of *vipaśyanā*, or insight (and, therefore, concerning emptiness). Whether this is the same text as the *lTa ba'i dogs gcod lta ngan mun gsal*, attributed to mKhas grub rje in the *KYP*, folio 9b, remains to be seen, as the latter does not seem to be part of the edition of the *Collected Works* presently available to us. The genre of polemical literature is generally known as *dgag lan* or *rtsod lan*, literally "critique-rebuttal." Later dGe lugs pa polemical literature focused on the Madhyamaka includes the first Paṇ chen bla ma's (bLo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan's) (1567–1662) *sGra pa Shes rab rin chen pa'i rtsod lan lung rigs pa'i seng ge'i nga ro*, in *Miscellaneous Works of the First Panchen Lama from the Zangla khar Manuscript Collection* (Gemur Monastery, Himachel Pradesh, India: Topden Tsering, 1979), his answer to the eighteen critical questions raised by sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405) against the views of Tsong kha pa on the subject of Madhyamaka (see Appendix 2); rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's (1469–1544) rebuttals of Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507) and Go rab 'jam pa bSod rnams senge (1429–1489), the *Zab mo stong pa nyid kyi lta ba la log rtog 'gog par byed pa'i bstan bcos lta ba ngan pa'i mun sel* (Delhi: Champa Choegyal, 1969) and his critique of the eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje's commentary on *prajñāpāramitā*, the *Don gsal 'grel chen*, in *gSung lan klu sgrub dgongs rgyan* (Delhi: Champa Choegyal, 1969) are perhaps more paradigmatic of works of this sort. The fifteenth century Sa skya scholars Go and Śāk, as they were known to dGe lugs pas, were also fond of polemics, many of their criticisms being directed against Tsong kha pa's interpretation of the Madhyamaka. Especially important in this regard is Go ram pa's *lTa ba'i shan 'byed theg mchog gnad gyi zla zer* (Sarnath: Sakya Student's Union, 1988) and his *dBu ma'i spyi don*, collected in the *Complete Works of the Masters of the Sa skya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism (Sa skya bKa' 'bum) (SK)* (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunkyo, 1968), vol. 12, pp. 348–451; as well as Śākya mchog ldan's *dBu ma'i byung tshul rnam par bshad pa'i gtam yid bzhin lhun po*, in his *Collected Works*, in *SK*, pp. 209–240; his *Shing rta'i srol chen gnyis las 'byung ba'i dbu ma chen po'i lugs gnyis rnam par dbye ba* and its autocommentary, in his *Collected Works*, *SK*, pp. 307–499. Polemical literature of this kind, moreover, extends to the present day with the controversies surrounding dGe 'dun chos phel's interpretations of the Madhyamaka. See also Williams's "A Note on Some Aspects of Mi bskyod rdo rje's critique of dGe lugs pa Madhyamaka."

27. Concerning his reputation as a debater, even in his early years, see *KYP*, folio 3b.

28. Some of the Madhyamaka views that contrast with those of the dGe lugs pas have been discussed by D. Seyfort Ruegg, "The Jo nang pas: A School of Buddhist

Ontologists According to the *Grub mtha' shel gyi me long*," *JAOS* 83 (1963): 73–91; also in his *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra* (Paris: École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1969); "The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuṣkoti and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism," *JIP* 5 (1977): 1–71; "On Thesis and Assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma," in the *Proceedings of the 1981 Csoma de Körös Symposium, Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy,(CTBRP)* ed. E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis fur Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1983); by P. Williams, "rMa Bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka Method," "A Note on Some Aspects of Mi bskyod rdo rje's critique of dGe lugs pa Madhyamaka," "Silence and Truth: Some Aspects of the Madhyamaka Philosophy in Tibet," *Tibet Journal*, nos. 1–2 (1982): 67–80, and "On Rang Rig," in *CTBRP*, vol. 2, pp. 321–332; by van der Kuijp, *CTBE*, especially pp. 35–48, 61–70; by J. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (*MOE*) (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983); and in *EE*, pp. 50, 56–63; M. Broido, "The Jonang-pas on Madhyamaka: A Sketch," *Tibet Journal* 14, no. 1 (1989): 86–90. mKhas grub rje also discusses many of the views he refutes more extensively in the *TTC* in his *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma, Collected Works*, vol. *ta*, in *Thor bu* (Toh. no. 5500), folios 171a–195b.

29. mKhas grub rje does mention by name rNgog lo tsā ba bLo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) and brTsegs dBang phyug seng ge, according to *CTBE* (p. 99, where he is called rTsags dBang phyug seng ge) a disciple of Phya pa's and a teacher of Sa skya Paṇḍita. On Phya pa and rTsegs ston see also S. Onada, "Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's Classifications of Thal 'gyur," *BIS* Band 2 (1986): 65–85. Others whose views concerning the doctrine of emptiness he may have very well found anathema, but whom he does not mention by name in the *TTC*, include Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292–1361), Rong ston Śākya rgyal mtshan (1367–1449), rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus (twelfth century, also a disciple of Phya pa, *CTBE*, p. 99), Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (twelfth century), sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405), and the Indian pandit Jayānanda. *After* mKhas grub rje many of the critiques of these earlier masters were expanded upon and systematized by later, oftentimes brilliant, scholars such as Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507), Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge (1429–1489), and the eighth Karma pa, Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554). *SNT*, folio 7b, mentions among his other opponents Ngor Kun bzang ba (1382–1456), who was Go ram pa's ordination abbot (*CTBE*, p. 120, see also *EGW*, p. 18f), Sa skya pa dGe bshes Kan ting gu śrī, and also (folio 9b) Karma dkon gzhon. That the main opponents of the early dGe lugs pas were Sa skya pas seems clear. See David Jackson, "Madhyamaka Studies Among the Early Sa-skya-pas," *Tibet Journal*, 10, no. 2 (1985): 20–34, and *The Entrance Gate for the Wise: Sa skya Paṇḍita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of Pramāṇa and Philosophical Discourse (EGW)* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1987), Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 17, 2.

30. For another discussion of this view, specifically for a discussion of how mKhas grub rje perceives it as arising from the repudiation of logical analysis *(rigs pas lta ba rtsal mi dgos pa)*, and as implying quietism, see Mkhas grub rje's *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma, Collected Works*, vol. *ta*, folios 177a–b. It is interesting that even in the dGe lugs pa sources we find the claim that this was a view adhered to by Tsong

kha pa himself in "the rashness of his youth." Thu'u kwan Chos kyi nyi ma, in *Grub mtha' shel gyi me long* (Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, n.d.), p. 296, recounts the following episode in which Tsong kha pa, during a vision of Mañjuśrī asks, "'Is my view that of the Prāsaṅgikas or that of the Svātantrikas?' (Mañjuśrī) replies, 'It is neither.'" And Thu'u kwan adds, "At that time the Lord had a slight affinity for the view that nothing was to be accepted, that nothing was to be grasped on to, or studied. Then, asking (Mañjuśrī) many questions and even debating with him extensively, the Lord Mañjuśrī spoke these words over and over to him, 'Do not overemphasize either the side of appearances or the side of emptiness and, in particular, consider the importance of appearances.' From that time on. . . . the Lord made great efforts to refute those who held as the supreme Madhyamaka view the tremendously nihilistic view that cast aspersions as to the possibility of cause and effect by claiming that the establishment of the nominal world through valid cognition is baseless, that it is engaged in only when confronting others, intertwining their errors into one's exposition, but that in our own system there is no basis for anything."

31. I have attempted to disentangle some of the different threads of doctrine attributed to those who hold such a position in my *DBPL* (pp. 7–18). The creation of a philosophical sacrificial lamb to which a variety of philosophical positions that were found anathema could be attributed is of course well known in the Tibetan context, the figure of the Chinese monk Hva Shang Mahāyāna being the most famous; D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-Nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective: On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet*, the Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion 13, (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1989), has argued that whether or not the positions ascribed to the Hva Shang are historically justified, they are nonetheless intelligible from other viewpoints that involve structural or "family resemblance" criteria. L. W. J. van der Kuijp (*CBTE*, p. 45) has also pointed out how some of Tsong kha pa's defenders mistakenly ascribe to his critics the view of Hva Shang.

32. In his *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma*, folio 193a, a polemical text focused on Madhyamaka theory and practice, he lists in his conclusion several of the views he has criticized throughout the text. These include "relaxing without feigning anything," "thinking about the consciousness present now," "noticing whatever conceptual thought happens to arise," "meditation on the ineffable object," "seeking who you are," and "looking for the mind."

33. Perhaps one of the best examples of the conflation we have spoken of repeatedly is to be found in kLong rdol bla ma Ngag dbang blo bzang's *Synonyms Related to Madhyamaka that Occur in the Mahāyāna Abhidharma Piṭaka, Theg chen gyi mngon pa'i sde snod las byung ba'i dbu ma'i skor gyi ming gi rnam grangs* (pp. 408–448) in the section "Identifying the Teachings of the Various Tibetan Lineages" *(Bod gangs can gyi sgrub rgyud kyi bstan pa 'dzin pa), The Collected Words of Longdol Lama*, Parts 1 and 2 (Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1973), where he states, "The views of Dwags po zla 'od gzhon nu, of those who hold to the lineage of Phag mo gru pa rDo rje rgyal po etc., of the Bri khung, sTag lung, 'Brug pa, and of the Karma skam gtsang of sTod lung mTshur phu, and most other Tibetan teachings on the

view, such as the Zhi byed of Pha dam pa and the rDzogs chen view, may differ as regards the preliminary practices of accumulating virtue and purifying sins, and, regarding the actual practice, may differ as to how the body should be positioned or in their teachings concerning bodily exercises and so forth. They are all similar, however, in regard to the way they apprehend the view (of emptiness), for the supreme sage and siddha dGe legs dpal bzang, the sole spiritual son of the Dharma king of the three worlds, the great Tsong kha pa, has said in his *Digest that Opens the Eyes of the Fortunate*: "Those fools who consider themselves to have reached the pinnacle of sagehood, but who in reality have only a passing familiarity with the doctrine, when it comes to meditating on the definitive meaning, consider any conceptual thought to be the apprehension of signs or the apprehension of true [existence]. Hence, they set their minds on nothing, that is, no object whatsoever, and they all agree that this is what it means to find the true nature of the mind." Those who are partisan to the Cittamātrin system first claim that all phenomena contained within *saṃsara* and *nirvāṇa* are of the nature of the mind, and then based on their perception of the clear and formless nature of the mind, for months and even years practice restricting themselves from entertaining even the tiniest conceptions. In this way, guarding against mental excitement and lethargy, some of these scholars obtain *śamatha* focused on the mind. Since that brings in its wake the experience of the bliss of psycho-physical suppleness, that bliss temporarily suppresses the gross afflictions. Even though extra sensory perception does not arise in those who practice this *śamatha* alone, their dreams at night and the extreme clarity that arises from their focusing on the mind does resemble extra sensory perception. This brings on a certain exhilaration, leading them to think that they have obtained the different stages of the *sūtra* path or the completion of the Anuttarayoga Tantra.

"But the great meditators of today, who are inexperienced at guarding against mental excitement and lethargy, even if they attain single pointed concentration on the nature of the mind, by meditating on silence and blankness as their object, they are in actuality accumulating a subtle form of mental lethargy. By accustoming themselves to this for long periods of time, the dispersion of the air *(rlung)* within their bodies gives them a certain type of lightness and ease in actions. It seems to them as though they are abiding like space in the midst of space, or as if, having pushed their minds into a state of nakedness, they are emerging from the skin of a snake. It appears to them as though they are making their home on the pinnacle of Mt. Meru and that they are no longer solid as before, but are now like a rainbow. This leads to extreme elation and to thinking that one has traversed a variety of stages and paths, causing these masters to claim that the teachings of the Mahāmudra which perceives the nature of the mind are the most important and profound instructions of the Buddha, that they are teachings which allow one to attain the state of buddhahood in this very life.

"In response to this the great lord Tsong kha pa and most of his followers have stated that the single pointed equipoise on the nature of the mind is only a slight mental avoidance of the self of the person or the self of phenomena and is only a slight break in the proliferation of conceptualization in regard to other things. Hence, they say that it does not eliminate in the least either the delusion or the self-grasping that has arisen innately from beginningless time in *saṃsara*, since it does not in the least negate the object that appears in grasping at true [existence]. For example, if one is frightened at

the possibility of a snake in a cave, one rids oneself of this fear by examining with a lamp whether or not there is a snake. How can one rid oneself of it simply by not focusing the mind on whether or not there is a snake? Therefore, analyzing things over and over again with valid reasoning, examining the minutiae of an erroneous object, the conventional, there arises an ascertainment consciousness. If one then meditates forcefully on that with *śamatha*, one will be able to fathom within one's own mind all of *saṃsara* and *nirvāṇa* and one will be in accordance with the view that possesses a mindset of confident ascertainment."

34. In contemporary scholarship this view has been expressed by N. Katz, "Praśaṅga and Reconstruction: Tibetan Hermeneutics and the Yāna Controversy" in *PEW* 34, no. 2 (1984): 5, when he says, "all interpretation is a form of subjectivism bordering on solipsism." It will become evident by reading the *TTC* that the dGe lugs pas such as mKhas grub rje will want to preserve the validity of some sorts of interpretation.

35. D. Seyfort Ruegg, "On Thesis and Assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma" in *CTBRP*, vol. 2, pp. 224–225, 234–236, himself seems to consider the Prāsaṅgika critique of the *svatantra* form of reasoning to be a critique of a formal trimodal *(trairupya, tshul gsum)* syllogistic reason. From a dGe lugs pa perspective this can be agreed to if one is willing to add the qualified "real" or "truly existent" to the kind of trimodal syllogistic reason being negated. Tsong kha pa and his followers, of course, accept trimodal syllogisms, something that they consider the *svatantra* to be. See also my "The Prāsaṅgikas' Views on Logic: Tibetan dGe lugs pa Exegesis on the Question of Svātantras," *JIP* 16 (1988): 217–224.

36. Ruegg, "On Thesis and Assertion," *CTBRP*, has described variants of this position in both the Indian and Tibetan traditions. Katz, "Prasaṅga and Deconstruction," p. 9, puts forth the idea that even in the Pāli literature the notion of holding to no position was present. He states that "agreement or disagreement is understood as mere opinion *(diṭṭi)* and opinionatedness" and that this "is precisely that which prevents one from true seeing *(darśana)*. By the time of the great Pāli commentaries, escape from opinion was itself made into a hermeneutical principle."

37. Interestingly, the parallel between these different philosophical strands seems to have been evident to Western philosophers as well. See Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in J. W. Meiland and M. Krausz, eds., *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral* (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982) pp. 67–68.

38. It was a tradition of the time for scholars to travel from one monastery to the next, to receive teachings from the elder spiritual masters resident at these centers of scriptural studies, and to subject their own views to the test by sitting for examinations-debates in the courtyards of these establishments. See "A Short Biography of mKhas grub rje," which follows. Of the works consulted in composition of the latter, the *gSang ba'i rnam thar* of Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, to be found in mKhas grub rje's *Collected Works*, vol. *a*, most gives one a feeling for the importance of monastic dialectical disputation *(rtsod pa)* in the life of mKhas grub rje. See also *EGW*, pp. 251–

299, 323–367; and David Jackson and Shunzo Onada, eds., *Rong ston on the Prajñāpāramitā Philosophy of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra: His Sub-commentary on Haribhadra's 'Sputārtha,'* Biblia Tibetica 2 (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshodo, 1988) p. iv, where he states that Rong ston pa also made a similar debating circuit *(grwa skor).*

39. Concerning mKhas grub rje's exegesis of the *pramāṇa* literature, van der Kuijp makes a similar point in his "Studies in mKhas grub rje I," pp. 77–78, when he states that the importance of his work "lies not only in the testimony to the rigor of his philosophical analyses, but also in its references to numerous other interpretations that had been proposed by his precursors and contemporaries. A careful examination of these should enable one to understand in broad outlines the twists and turns of the exegesis of the *PV* during the fourteenth century for which to date no texts have come to light. Regrettably, with only a few exceptions . . . these references are all anonymous and prefixed by the uninformative 'some say' or 'Tibetan commentators say,' etc."

40. These works include the *Grub mtha' kun shes* of sTag tshang lo tsā ba; the *Madhyamakāvatāra* commentary, *De kho na nyid gsal ba'i sgron me,* of Red mda' ba gZhon nu blo gros; Rong ston Śākya rgyal mtshan's commentary to the *Madhyamakāvatāra,* the *rNam bshad nges don rnam nges;* Go ram pa's *lTa ba'i shan 'byed* and his *dBu ma'i spyi don;* the *dBu ma'i byung tshul,* the *dBu ma chen po'i sgom rim,* and the *Shing rta'i srol byed chen gnyis las 'byung ba'i dbu ma chen po'i lugs gnyis rnam dbye,* with the autocommentary, all works of Śākya mchog ldan; the *Madhyamakāvatāra* commentary, *rNam bshad,* called *Dus gsum mkhyen pa'i zhal lung* of the eighth Karma pa, Mi bskyod rdo rje; the various polemical and *yig cha* texts of Se ra rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan; and a variety of early and late dGe lugs pa philosophical literature, including works by the first Paṇ chen bla ma, by 'Jams dbyangs bzhad pa, by lCang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, by dKon mchog' jigs med dbang po, and others.

41. *KYP,* folio 9b, reads *sTong bdun* (Seven Emptinesses or Seven Thousand), most likely an error as it is unsubstantiated by any other source. Still, this is probably the earliest reference (late fifteenth century) to anything resembling *sTong thun* (as a work of mKhas grub rje's) with which I am familiar. The word *stong* can have two meanings in Tibetan. It can refer to "emptiness" (as in *stong pa nyid*) or to "thousand" (as in *brgyad stong*). Both Elizabeth Napper *(DAE)* and Donald Lopez *(A Study of Svātantrika)* (*SOS*) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987), p. 253, translate the title of the work as the *"Thousand Doses."* In my initial studies of this text I opted for the reading *"A Dose of Emptiness,"* a title that because of its aesthetic flavor, I have given to this volume as a whole, realizing that it is not the most accurate translation of the title of the Tibetan text. My earlier reading of the words *stong thun* was influenced both by the oral commentary I received on the text, a commentary that glossed the title as *stong pa nyid kyi thun,* as well as by certain considerations of Tibetan grammar. It was my belief then that the translation of the title as "Thousand Doses" would have been more likely if the Tibetan had read *thun stong,* with the noun being modified by the adjective that it precedes. Since that time I have come across several other references to the term *stong thun,* references that have led me to believe, first of all, that this is a term with strong connections to the medical literature, not because it is itself a medical term but

because of its prevalence in the titles of texts of that genre. A glance through the Nepal Manuscript Preservation Project's catalogues of Tibetan works, for example, yields many medical works that contain in the title the words *stong thun*. In the medical literature it seems to have the meaning of "digest," that is, a condensation of larger works into simpler formats. Jeffrey Hopkins, following bsTan dar lha ram pa, translates *sTong thun*, "Distillation on Emptiness"; *Collected gSung 'bum of Bstan-dar-lha-ram of A-lag-sha*, vol. *kha* (New Delhi: Lama Guru Deva, 1971), p. 593. L. W. J. van der Kuijp, in his review of Donald S. Lopez, *A Study of Svatantrika*, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 52 (1989): 160, suggests as possible translations "general survey" or "synopsis." It must be emphasized that the term is not exclusively a medical term and that it was taken up in the philosophical literature from early times. The term *stong thun* does occur, for example, in the titles of other Madhyamaka works. Paul Williams has pointed out that there is a work by the same name attributed to rMa bya pa; see his "rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka Method," p. 207. In the *da* volume of the *Collected Works* of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa rdo rje (1648–1722), we find a work in sixty-nine folios called *Tshig gsal stong thun gyi tshad ma'i rnam bshad zab rgyas kun gsal tshad ma'i 'od rgya 'bar ba skal bzang snying gi mun sel*. On a work called *Tshad ma'i stong thun mkhas pa'i yid phrog* by Mu srad pa, see *SK-I*, p. 75. Also attributed to the translator 'Gos seems to be a work on tantra bearing the name *sTong thun chen mo*. The *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* of Krang dbyi sun et. al. (Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1985–86) gives a definition of the term *stong thun* (p. 1109): "a general overview accomplished by collecting many thousands of points into discreet portions" *(gnad don stong phrag du ma thun thun du bsdus pa ste spyi don)*. The medical dictionary of dBang 'dus, *Bod gangs can pa'i gso ba rig pa'i dpal dlan rgyud bzhi sogs kyi brda dang dka' gnad zhig bkrol ba sngon byon mkhas pa'i gsung rgyan gYu thog dgongs rgyan* (Mi rigs dpe skrung khang, 1982), p. 210, however, gives the most clear definition, citing as its source a commentary on the *Four Medical Tantras* by bKra 'bum pa, "the collection of many thousands of difficult points of a scriptural system into discreet, which is to say brief, portions" *(gzhung lugs kyi dka' gnad stong phrag du ma thun thun te dum dum du bsdus pa'i don)*. Hence, within the present context I opt for translating *sTong thun chen mo* by the expression "Great Digest."

42. Hence, to find the folio in the Zhol *gSungs 'bum* edition one need only take the *MTS* arabic numeral (interspersed in the translation at the appropriate points) and divide by two (in the case of odd numbers rounding up), so that the notation "p. 99" found in the translation, and referring to the arabic enumeration of the *MTS*, corresponds to folio 50a of the *gSungs 'bum*. In a similar fashion, "p. 100" refers to folio 50b.

43. The discrepancy here is because two folios (folio 97) bear the same Tibetan page number, so that the second folio 97 has come to be labeled 97-below *(go bdun 'og)*.

44. For an edition and translation of Tsong kha pa's text, see Gyaltsen Namdol and Ngawang Samten, *Pratītyasamutpāda stuti subhāṣita hṛdayam of Acārya Tsong kha pa* (Sarnath: Tibetan Institute for Higher Studies, 1982).

45. This has been a source of confusion in Western scholarship, leading some scholars to claim that the entire *TTC* is but Zhang zhung pa's notes on lectures by mKhas grub rje. There is neither internal-textual nor historical evidence for this claim.

Instead, it seems to be a view that has arisen due to a confusion as to the status of the appendices. See note 1184.

46. T. Wylie, "A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription," *HJAS*, 22 (1959): 261–67; D. Seyfort Ruegg has argued for the capitalization of radical letters *(ming gzhi)* in his review of D. Snellgrove's *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1989): 176–178, a practice I do not follow here.

A Short Biography of mKhas grub rje

1. I remain unclear as to the identity of the author of this latter work. He calls mKhas grub rje "our glorious holy master" *(bdag cag gi dpal ldan bla ma dam pa)* (p. 422) and also "my tutor" *(bdag gi yongs 'dzin)* (p. 493). This, of course, implies that the author must have been a direct disciple of mKhas grub rje, ruling out both Se ra rJe bstun chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1544) and the first Pan chen bla ma, bLo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1567–1662), both of whom were not born until after mKhas grub rje's death. The most likely candidate, therefore, seems to be mKhas grub rje's younger brother, Ba so Chos kyi rgyal mtshan. However, in the autobiography of rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (Se ra xylograph edition of a mongolian original of the Yid dga' chos 'dzin gling College, Delhi: 1975) folio 25b, rJe btsun pa states that he has composed a short biography of mKhas grub rje. This was also known to kLong rdol bla ma who states that there exists a biography of mKhas grub rje similar to that written by Kun dga' bde legs rin chen rgyal mtshan (*KYP*) and written by Se ra rJe bstun pa, this statement to be found in the former's *bKa' gdams pa dang dGe lugs bla ma rag rim gyi gsung 'bum mtshan tho ba*, in his *Collected Works*, ed. Lokesh Chandra, Śatapiṭaka Series, vol. 100, (Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1973), p. 1378.

2. *KYP*, folio 6b. With these words the author of the *TTC* describes himself to an opponent reputed to have run away from him in the debate mentioned below.

3. The first part of his name, mKhas grub, is actually more a title than a proper name. It is, at least in theory, to be applied to those who have excelled not only in scholarly achievement *(mkhas pa)*, but in inner spiritual realization *(grub pa)* as well. It seems, however, that there was another reason why mKhas grub rje was given this title. He was popularly believed to have been the incarnation of Dharmakīrti's disciple Devendrabuddhi, and as the latter is known in Tibetan as mKhas grub Lha dbang, the title *mKhas grub* seems to derive from this source.

4. It is ironic that *SNT*, a text that goes to extremes to make known mKhas grub rje's expertise as a polemicist, should admit that, from among Red mda' ba's seven chief disciples, rGyal tshab rje was "renowned as the most proficient in the art of debate" (folio 8a).

5. See *SNT*, folio 6b; *KYP*, folio 10a; *LRLN*, vol. 1, p. 877; and the *TTC's* colophon. In another famous incident Tsong kha pa is said to have given mKhas grub rje, as a

relic, one of his own teeth that had fallen out accidentally. At that time he described mKhas grub rje as being "like Mt. Meru among the Golden Mountains." The incident is described in detail in a work to be found in Tsong kha pa's *Collected Works*, vol. *ka*, called *mKhas grub rje la tshems gnang skor*, and is based on an account by mKhas grub rje's disciple, rJe bstun dam pa Sangs rgyas rin chen. The incident is mentioned in *A Short Biography and Letter of rJe Tsong kha pa (SB)* (Dharmasala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1975), p. 31, which is based on a biography of Tsong kha pa by mKhas grub rje called *rNam thar dad pa'i 'jugs ngog*, the first work of Tsong kha pa's *Collected Works*, vol. *ka*, folios 1–72. *SNT* discusses the relationship and status of Tsong kha pa's three main disciples, rGyal tshab rje, 'Dul ba 'dzin pa and mKhas grub rje (folio 5b); see note 35 and also kLong rdol bla ma's comments in "Introduction," note 33.

6. This is not to say that this was his only area of tantric expertise, for he also wrote extensively on the practice of other deities such as Cakrasaṃvara, Hevajra, and Yamāntaka. His commentary on the generation stage *(bskyed rim)* of the *Guhyasamāja Tantra*, the *bsKyed rim dngos grub rgya mtsho* (*Collected Works*, vol. *ja*) is considered a classic, as is his synthetic work on the four classes of Tantra, the *rGyud sde spyi rnam* (*Collected Works*, vol. *nya*).

7. In the field of Madhyamaka studies his most famous work by far is the *sTong thun chen mo*, to be found in his *Collected Works (gSungs bum)*, vol. *ka*, Toh. no. 5459.

8. His commentary to the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, the *rTogs dka'i snang ba* (*Collected Works*, vol. *ka*), again, though not relied on as heavily as rGyal tshab rje's *rNam bshad snying po'i rgyan* and Tsong kha pa's own *gSer phreng*, is nonetheless considered an extremely important work, sometimes presenting opinions contrary to those of his elder contemporary, rGyal tshab. This also seems to be the case in other areas where the two overlap exegetically (in *Pramāṇa*, for example). Though most of the disagreements are minor, mKhas grub rje does at times depart quite radically from the interpretations of the latter in many different fields.

9. Most of the *rnam thars* begin not with the accounts of this life, but with a list of his previous incarnations. According to *KYP* (folios 2a–2b, 3b) these include the Buddha's disciple, Subhūti, the disciple of Nāgārjuna—Vidyākokila, the king of Śāmbala—Mañjuśrīkīrti, Bhāvaviveka, Devendrabuddhi, Abhayākara, the translator 'Gos, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and the rNying ma siddha—gYung ston rdo rje dpal (his last incarnation before being born as mKhas grub rje). These lists are interesting in that they often give us hints as to how the personality (both religious and scholarly) of the figure in question was perceived. *KYP*, folio 8a, suggests that many of his previous incarnations may have been suggested to mKhas grub rje during visions he had of Tsong kha pa, in which the latter extolled his various qualities and indicated the reasons for them by relating them to his past lives.

10. *BS* (p. xxii) calls it *La* stod byang, and this is indeed the name under which this area of gTsang is known today.

11. *BS* (p. 12) has mDog gzhung, but the contemporary spelling seems to be sDod gzhung.

12. *KYP* (folio 2b) has bKra shis dpal ldan.

13. *KYP* (folio 2b) has Ru 'dren rgyal mo.

14. Of his family, van der Kuijjp states in his *SK*-IV, p. 29, states that it was "an old Tibetan family that could trace its origins to Xixia."

15. *LRLN*, p. 878.

16. See *KYP*, folio 3a.

17. On the relationship between Red mda' ba and Tsong kha pa, see *SB*, p. 12 passim; as well as *SK*-I, p. 75ff, especially p. 94, n. 1.

18. On this system of praxis, see van der Kuijp, *CTBE*, p. 97 and notes 276–278.

19. *KYP*, folio 3b, also mentions among his early teachers Lam 'bras pa Ye shes dpal ba, Byang sems Kun dga' rgyal mtshan, Buddha śrī, and 'Jam dbyangs rin chen po.

20. One of the monasteries of the Sa skya order founded by dPon chen Byang pa. See van der Kuijp, *CTBE*, pp. 117–119. *SNT*, folios 6b–8b, paints a fascinating picture of Ngam ring and Sa skya during this time, with factions that were both pro and contra Tsong kha pa and his innovations in interpretation. In one incident, for example, Chos rje gYag pa, one of the great scholars of the Sa skya tradition, who a few years earlier was said to have lost to mKhas grub rje in a debate (*SNT*, folio 6b), writes to Tsong kha pa asking for some clarifications on the subject of the doctrines of provisional and definitive meaning *(drang/nges)*. In response to this Tsong kha pa composes his famous *Legs bshad snying po* and sends a copy to Sa skya. Chos rje gYag pa is overwhelmed *(shin tu 'phrogs)* by the profundity of the work and decides to visit Tsong kha pa but, we are told, "is stopped from going by disciples whose minds were filled with attachment and hatred" (folio 8a).

21. One of the greatest of Tibetan exegetes, he was from the monastery of Jo mo nang. He is considered one of the teachers of Tsong kha pa, the master from whom he was supposed to have received the lineage of Kālacakra; see *EE*, pp. 69–70. See also *KYP*, folio 3a; van der Kuijp (*SK-IV*, p. 49, n. 10) gives his dates as 1375/6–1451.

22. The autocommentary on this work is to be found in Sa paṇ's *Collected Works*, vol. *da*, in *SK*, vol. 5, pp. 167–264. Concerning Sa skya paṇḍita (1182–1251), and this most interesting work, see Z. Horvath, "Structure and Content of the Chad-ma rigs-pa'i gter, an Epistemological Treatise of Saskya Paṇḍita," in *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies*, vol. 1, ed. L. Ligeti, (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1984), pp. 267–302; van der Kuijp, *CTBE*, Chapter 3, "Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga' rgyal-mtshan and the Tshad-ma rigs-pa'i gter"; *EGW*, p. 2 passim; L. J. W. van der Kuijp, "Ldong-Ston Shes-Rab-Dpal and a Version of the Tshad-Ma Rigs-pa'i-Gter in Thirteen Chapters," *BIS*, Band 2 (1986): 51–64; and also D. Jackson, "Commentaries on the Writings of Sa skya Paṇḍita: A Bibliographical Sketch," *Tibet Journal*, 7, no. 3 (1983): 8–12.

23. *SNT*, folio 6b, by far the most vivid and interesting account of the debate.

24. Ibid.

25. The account seems to exaggerate the situation. Because mKhas grub rje and Bo dong differed in age by only ten years, this would mean that the latter was a mere twenty-six years of age when the debate took place in the year 1401. The date of 1401 is confirmed by *TTKT*, p. 210, contra van der Kuijp's (*SK*-I, p. 48, n. 10) 1400.

26. *LRLN*, p. 880.

27. How much of this story is historically accurate is questionable. Portions of it certainly fit the very popular hagiographical scenario of "The Great Debate" typified by the Āryadeva-Aśvaghoṣa disputations in India. At the same time, mKhas grub rje was always renowned for his great skill in dialectics, so there is no reason to question the veracity of the overall account. See Introduction, note 25, concerning a document said to have preserved an account of the proceedings.

28. See also *KYP*, folio 3b. This puts the ordination date at 1405, agreeing with the *Re'u mig* of gSum pa mkhen po, and almost agreeing with the *gSan yig (Collected Works*, vol. *ka*, folio 3a.) which puts the date at 1406, but disagreeing with other sources that put the date at 1415. See Ruegg, "On Thesis and Assertion," p. 216, n. 29, for a discussion of the inconsistencies in the sources regarding these dates. The chronology in the appendix to the *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*, p. 3244, also puts the date at 1405.

29. *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*, p. 3244.

30. A retreat place above the present monastery of Se ra where Tsong kha pa is said, among other things, to have written his famous commentary to *MMK*, the *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*. See *SB*, p. 27.

31. The most interesting account of the dreams and visions had by mKhas grub rje on his way to and after his meeting with Tsong kha pa are to be found in *SNT*, folios 4b–5b.

32. A more detailed account of the meeting based on different sources is to be found in the extensive biography of Tsong kha pa by the Se ra sMad bla ma bLo bzang phrin las rnam rgyal, the *'Jam mgon chos kyi rgyal po chen Tsong kha pa chen po rnam thar thub bstan mdzas pa'i rgyan gcig ngo mtshar nor bu'i 'phreng ba* (Indian edition, 1967), pp. 281–284.

33. *LRLN*, p. 887. For a translation of a praise of Tsong kha pa written by mKhas grub rje see "Song of the Tricosmic Master" in R. A. F. Thurman, ed., *The Life and Teachings of Tsong kha pa* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1982).

34. This refers to the private life story, which includes the record of visions and spiritual attainments usually never spoken of in public. To be found in Tsong kha pa's *gSung bum*, vol. *ka* (Toh. no. 5261), the work is only sixteen pages in length but highly regarded in the dGe lugs pa tradition. See also his *Rin po che snye ma*, *Collected Works*, vol. *ta* (no. 29 of his *Thor bu*, Toh. no. 5500, folios 46b–62a); a work related to the former is the *rJe btsun bla ma bLo bzang grags pa'i dpal gyi gsang ba'i rnam thar gsol 'debs* by Byam dbyangs chos rje bKra shis dpal ldan (1379–1449),

preserved in Tsong kha pa's *Collected Works*, vol. *ka* (Toh. no. 5262), and translated in the *Life and Teachings of Tsong kha pa*, pp. 47–55.

35. In the traditional artistic representations of "Tsong kha pa, the father, and his two spiritual sons" *(Tsong kha pa yab sras gsum)* one usually finds a central Tsong kha pa holding a sword in one hand and a text floating on a lotus in the other (the symbols of Mañjuśrī) surrounded on the one side by an elderly congenial rGyal tsab rje and on the other by a scowling mKhas grub rje (in debate posture, rosary brandished at an imaginary opponent). At times, however, in place of mKhas grub rje one finds the figure of 'Dul 'dzin grags pa rgyal tshan. When represented in this way the implication is that mKhas grub rje, being the "inner sole spiritual son," is in a category all by himself as Tsong kha pa's closest disciple; this according to an oral tradition. The dGe lugs pas believe that it is a later incarnation of 'Dul 'dzin that, having died a violent death, transformed himself at the moment of death into the protector rDo rje shugs ldan, concerning which there has been very bitter intersectarian polemics in recent years.

36. van der Kuijp, *SK-I*, p. 78, states that lCang r(w)a "was built in 1413 by his [mKhas grub rje's] patron Rab-brtan kun-bzang-'phags (1389–1442), the ruler of Rgyal-rtse. It was in this year or shortly thereafter that mKhas-grub was invited from Ngam-ring to take charge of the religious affairs of this monastery."

37. See *BS*, p. 122; *KYP*, folio 5b.

38. These are preserved in his *Collected Works*, at the end of vol. *tha*, in a short text of four folios (Toh. no. 5504), although the place of composition is listed as the lHas byin gling gi gtsug lag khang. It may be that mKhas grub rje used mDangs can as a retreat from where he would travel to different centers in Western Tibet.

39. See *BS*, p. 122; *KYP*, folio 6b. Sometimes called dPal 'khor chos sde, this is one of the most interesting monasteries in all Tibet because of its eclectic character and administrative organization. Besides having several dGe lugs pa colleges, Nor bu dga' ldan pa, rGyang ro lha khang pa, Zhi gnas pa and Grang mo che ba, Las grub pa and gSer khang khong, and 'Og, it had colleges devoted to Kālacakra, one to the teachings of Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290–1364), and at least one (Gur pa) that belonged to the Sa skya sect. Given the eclectic character of the monastery, whether mKhas grub rje was the sole founder of it is questionable. Nothing concerning this question, for example, is to be found in *SNT*, one of the most extensive sources for mKhas grub rje's life. It may be, therefore, that mKhas grub rje may have had a direct role only in the founding of the dGe lugs pa colleges, something that is eluded to in *KYP*.

40. This is despite the fact that *BS* (pp. 122–123) implies that he composed this, and indeed most of his other major works, during the last few years of his life when he occupied the throne of dGa' ldan.

41. *KYP*, folios 6a–7a.

42. *SNT*, folios 10a–12a, as in the case of the Bo dong debate, the most extensive, vivid, and interesting (though also the most partisan) account.

43. My source here is the Se ra Byas gTsang pa dGe bshes Thabs mkhas, a member of this monastery before he left for Central Tibet to engage in higher studies, he resides at present in Se ra Byas Monastery in Bylakuppe, South India.

44. *BE* (p. 122) states that the reason for mKhas grub rje's departure had to do not with the debate, but with disagreements over the status of the dGe lugs pa colleges at dPal 'khor sde chen. Van der Kuijp, *SK-I*, p. 98, n. 18, states that mKhas grub rje's departure had to do with his sponsor's displeasure at some rather strong statements the former had made "regarding the tenets of some leading Sa skya scholars, especially Ngor-chen Kun-dga' gzang-po (1382–1456)."

45. It is interesting that according to the oral tradition mKhas grub rje at first refused the invitation. Eventually, under pressure, he is said to have agreed and the event was scheduled.

46. *KYP*, folio 6a. The oral tradition adds interesting details. During this series of events it seems as though mKhas grub rje became estranged from his sponsor, feeling as though the monarch had taken sides with his adversary, Rong ston pa. Finally, when mKhas grub rje, after leaving his throne on one occasion, had his seat cover *(gding ba)* removed from the throne and handed to him, he took this as a sign that his presence was no longer required and he left the monastery, never to return; this, according to the oral account, is despite the later pleas of Rab brtan kun bzang who, repentful of his having caused the departure of mKhas grub rje, beseeched him to return; see Appendices, note 3.

47. dGe bshes Thabs mkhas tells me that during his time at dPal 'khor sde chen this letter was open for public viewing. Its most unusual feature was that it was written in Chinese characters! He himself could not explain the phenomenon.

48. *KYP*, folios 6a–6b.

49. *SNT*, folios 7b, 9b.

50. *SNT*, folio 10b.

51. *SNT*, folio 11a; David Jackson, in his introduction to *Rong ston on the Prajñāpāramitā Philosophy*, where he gives a synopsis of the life of Rong ston, mentions no debate with mKhas grub rje, nor one between Rong ston and rGyal tshab rje, but he does (p. v) mention that, according to bZad pa bLo gros rgya mtsho, a debate occurred between Rong ston and Tsong kha pa in which the latter was defeated. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra: Études sur la Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme* (*TTG*) (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1969) vol. 70, pp. 202, 204, compares several of the positions of Tsong kha pa, rGyal tshab, mKhas grub, and Rong ston in the context of the *AA* commentarial literature.

52. Many different accounts of the debate are preserved in oral tradition, however. According to the account of rGyud smad mkhen zur dGe bshes bLo bzang bstan 'dzin of the gTsang pa Khang tshan of Se ra Byes, for instance, the debate *did* take place; and as Rong ston pa realized that he was losing, he fled in the direction of his home

town in Western Tibet where, in the Rong Byams chen Monastery, there stood a huge statue of Maitreya *(Byams pa)* several stories tall. Rong ston pa, who was acknowledged even by many of his opponents to be an incarnation of the Buddha Maitreya, is said to have sought refuge from the pursuing mKhas grub rje by melting into the statue to become one with it, not an uncommon theme in hagiographical literature. mKhas grub rje pursued Rong ston pa, and arrived in Rong. At this point the accounts diverge. According to one, mKhas grub rje is said to have approached the statue and uttered the *Dhīḥ* sound, the traditional invocation uttered at the beginning of a debate, in response to which the statue of Maitreya, with the presumably nervous Rong ston pa inside, began to sweat! According to another account mKhas grub rje prostrated to the statue, reciting at the same time the following verse, preserved orally in the dGe lugs pa tradition to this very day, a verse that is recited in all of the great dGe lugs pa monasteries *(gden sa)* before every recitation of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* of Maitreya. "The fire of your great love *(byams chen)* burns up the firewood of anger. The brilliance of your gnosis clears away the darkness of ignorance. I bow down to the one who resides in Tuṣita heaven, the regent of the doctrine, the protector of beings"; the Tibetan reads, *byams chen me yis zhe sdang bud shing bsreg / ye shes 'od kyis ma rig mun pa sel / chos kyi rgyal tshab 'gro ba'i mgon mdzad pa / dGa' ldan bzhugs pa de la phyag 'tshal lo.* The implication is that mKhas grub rje was prostrating himself not before the Rong ston pa–filled statue before him, but before the true Maitreya in Tuṣita.

53. An interesting supplement to this is his *Rang gi rtogs pa gtam du bsnyed pa, Collected Works,* vol. *ta* (*Thor bu,* Toh. no. 5500–25), folio 35b–37b.

54. See *SB*, pp. 34–35. Although mKhas grub rje seems to have been a visionary even during his early life, it seems that the most intensive period of visions came toward the end of his life when he took up the throne of dGa' ldan. These are described in great detail not only in *SNT*, folios 16a–37a, but also in the *KYP,* folios 7b passim.

55. *BS* (p. xxii) puts mKhas grub rje's ascension to the throne of dGa' ldan at 1431, a date confirmed by *TTKT,* p. 216. If this is correct, then all of the events from the meeting of rGyal tshab rje in gNas rnying to his enthronement took less than a year.

56. He is said to have completed his enormous commentary on the Kālacakra Tantra during this time, specifically in 1434, just four years before his death.

57. *SB* states that he was fifty-four. It recounts that he had a vision of Tsong kha pa and requested that he too may enter *parinirvāṇa* to be with him. Tsong kha pa agreed. He then had a vision of the six-armed Mahākāla who requested him to remain for the benefit of beings. mKhas grub rje, however, passed away and "went to the land of the ḍākinīs" (*SB*, p. 35).

The Translation

1. The reference here is to mKhas grub rje's *(KDJ)* own spiritual master, the great Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa.

2. For a more detailed discussion of the division of compassion into that "perceiving sentient beings," that "perceiving phenomena," and that "perceiving the objectless," see Tsong kha pa's comments in *BGR* (pp. 205–209), and also bLo bzang rta dbyangs, *One Hundred and Eight Verses in Praise of Great Compassion* translated by me in collaboration with Geshes Lobsang Tenzing and Lobsang Tsering, (Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing, 1985), pp. 4–5. See also Guy Newland, *Compassion: A Tibetan Analysis* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1984), pp. 125–143.

3. This refers to the repetition of mantras, and hence this third category clearly refers to the adepts of the *tantras.*

4. A work of Mātṛceṭa. Tohoku no. 1150; *P* no. 2041, bsTod tshogs *ka,* folio 214a. *P* varies from *TTC* and reads instead: "*gting mtha' med pa'i 'khor ba yi / rgya mtsho nang du rnam par gnas / 'dod chags la sogs mi bzad pa'i / chu srin gyis ni lus zos pas / de ring gang la skyabs su mchi / ji srid bdag la sems yod na / gang gi bstan la gnas pa dang / gang bstod gang la bsnyan bkur bgyi / gang zhig la ni nyes pa kun / gtan nas yod ye mi mda' zhing / gang la'ang rnam pa thams cad du / yon tan thams cad gnas gyur pa/.*" On Mātṛceṭa, see *LMS,* pp. 119–120.

5. For a summary of the bibliographical sources concerning Nāgārjuna, see Ruegg's *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (LMS)* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), pp. 5–8. An interesting and brief Tibetan biography is also to be found in Go ram pa's *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgongs pa zab mo dBu ma'i de kho na nyid spyi'i ngag gis ston pa nges don rab gsal,* known colloquially as the *dBu ma'i spyi don (BPD),* in *Sa skya bka 'bum,* vol. 12, pp. 349–350, folios 4b–5b.

6. For a similar discussion, see Rong ston pa's *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad nges don rnam nges,* in *Two Controversial Madhyamaka Treatises* (Bhutan) pp. 60–62; also *BPD,* pp. 350–351, folios 6a–7a. For bibliographical references to Tsong kha pa's discussion of the prophecies, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's (1648–1721) attempts at reconciling contradictions, and recent Western scholarship on the question, see E. S. Napper's *DAE,* p. 922; also see her translation of the *Annotations* (*mChan*) on pp. 356–362, which cites many of the works mentioned later and discusses in detail the dGe lugs pa attempts at reconciling them. Śākya mchog ldan makes the point, quite rightfully, that even before Nāgārjuna, the great siddha Saraha also expounded a form of the doctrine of emptiness. He calls this the *ma brtags pa'i sems kyi rdo rje brjod byar ston pa'i dbu ma.* He adds, interestingly, that this emphasis on the mind in Saraha's thought is the equivalent *(don gcig)* of Asaṅga's notion of a storehouse consciousness *(ālayavijñāna)* and of the idea of the *tathāgatagarbha.* He thus implies by this that Saraha's was a Madhyamaka different from Nāgārjuna's, a notion that would of course be anathema to the less historically minded dGe lugs pa exegetes. See his *dBu ma'i byung tshul,* in his collected works, *Sa skya bka' 'bum,* compiled by bSod nams rgya mtsho (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1968), vol. 4, pp. 217–218.

7. The *pramuditā bhūmi (rab tu dga' ba'i sa),* the first of the ten bodhisattva stages. The *Annotations* to the *Lam rim chen mo* (*DAE,* p. 358) explain that this implies that Nāgārjuna had himself realized emptiness directly.

8. *Saddharmalaṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Vaidya ed. (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1963) (X, 165–166), p. 118. *D* mDo sde *ca*, folio 165b. Nanjio Sanskrit ed. (Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923), p. 286. For the equivalents in the Chinese editions see D. T. Suzuki, *An Index to the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (Kyoto: Sanskrit Buddhist Texts Publishing House, 1934), p. 497.

9. Toh. no. 232, folio 185b. See P. Demieville's "Sur un passage du Mahāmegha-sūtra," *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême Orient* (1924): 227–228. Bu ston Rin chen grub, in his *History of Buddhism (Chos 'byung)* (Tibet: Bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, 1988), p. 149, questions whether this citation and the one from the *Mahābheri Sūtra* (see later) are in actuality prophecies concerning Nāgārjuna, as his full name does not appear explicitly in either source.

10. Toh. no. 542, folio 325b. For this and other references to Nāgārjuna in the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, see *LMS*, pp. 104, n, 120.

11. *P* no. 888, mDo sde *tshu* folio 105a. *P* varies slightly from *TTC* and reads in its entirety: *"de ltar de bzhin shegs pa des gzhon nu de la gang gi tshe 'jig rten gyi khams mi mjed 'dir mgon po shā kya thub pa zhes pa 'byung ba de'i tshe / rgyal po chen po khyod li tsa byi gzhon nu 'jig rten thams cad kyi mthong na dga' bzhes bya bar 'gyur te / de nas 'jig rten kyi khams der mgon po yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa'i 'og tu bstan pa nub pa'i dus kyi tshe / lo gryad bcu lon pa na dge slong blo bchang zhes bya bar gyur nas rang gi srog la yang mi blta bar byas te / mdo 'di 'dzin par 'gyur ro / de nas lo rgya lon pa'i 'og tu shi nas 'jig rten gyi khams bde ba can du skye par 'gyur ro /"*

12. The *Suvarṇaprābhāsa* does mention "a young Litsavi prince, Sarvalokapriya-darśana," but says nothing of his connection to Nāgārjuna; Nobel ed. (Leipzig, 1937), pp. 13–18, and the translation of R. E. Emmerick (London: Luzac and Co., 1970), pp. 6–8.

13. A commentary on the *Guhyasamāja Tantra* attributed to Candrakīrti, *P* no. 5340, rGyud 'grel *sa*, folio 232a. Ruegg (*LMS*, p. 105 n.) suggests that it might be the work of a tantric Candrakīrti distinct from the author of the Madhyamaka śāstric works. See also A. Wayman's *Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi-dass, 1977). The *TTC* passage varies from that found in *P*, which is (in portions) more extensive and comments on the *Laṅkāvatāra* passage quoted by mKhas grub rje earlier: *"rtog ge rnams kyi yul min pa / so sor rang rig ye shes ni / phyi ma'i dus su gyûr pa na / mgon po su zhig 'dzin 'gyur gsungs / bde shegs mya ngan 'das pa'i 'og / dus dag 'das nas 'byung ba ni / gang zhig bstan pa 'dzin 'gyur te / blo gros chen po khyod shes byos / lho phyogs bai da'i yul du ni / dge slong dpal ldan shes bya ba / de ming klu zhes bod pa ste / yod dang med pa'i phyogs 'jig pa / nga yi bstan pa 'jig rten 'dir / bla med theg chen rab bshad nas / Rab tu dga' ba'i sa bsgrubs te / de ba can du de 'gro'o / zhes pa'i rim pa 'dis na / de bzhin gshegs pa yongs su mya ngan las 'das kyang / ji srid 'jig rten du dam pa'i chos gnas pa de srid kyi bar du / rdo rje theg pa la rnal 'byor chen po'i rgyud kyi lung la brten nas / bskyed pa'i rim gyis rdzogs pa'i rim pa rtogs par bya ba / slob dpon chen po kLu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas brtsam te gter dang 'dra bar / slob dpon rnams brgyud pa'i rim gyis bla ma'i zhal nas / so sor rang*

rig pa rdo rje 'dzin pa chen po'i ting nge 'dzin 'jig rten du bstan nas / lha dang mi bde bas 'das shing / mu stegs dang nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyis bsam gtan dang snyoms par 'jug pa'i bde ba las 'das nas / bde ba can du gshegs te / yon tan gyi dbang phyug brgyad dang ldan pas bzhugs so /''

14. See G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Part II (Rome: IsMEO, 1958), pp. 209–210, 258. See also *Bhāvanākrama of Acārya Kamalaśīla*, restored, trans. and ed. Acarya Gyaltsen Namdol, Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica IX (Sarnath: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, 1985), pp. 41, 185. Also cited by Tsong kha pa in the *LRCM;* see *DAE*, pp. 237–238, 911. The *sūtra* passage cited is from the *Samādhirāja Sūtra* (IX, 36); see *DAE*, pp. 911–912 for the Sanskrit and full bibliographical references to this very important passage. The Udraka referred to, of course, is Udraka Rāmaputra, a contemporary of the Buddha. For legends in the Tibetan Buddhist literature regarding this figure, see *DAE*, pp. 913–916.

15. *Samādhirāja Sūtra* (IX, 37); see also *DAE*, pp. 916–917. This passage is also cited earlier in the first *Bhāvanākrama*, Namdol ed., pp. 23, 176. See also L. O. Gomez, "Primer Tratado de Cultivo Graduado," *Dialogos* 11, nos. 29–30 (1977): 190–191.

16. *P* no. 5311; *D* Toh. no. 3916, folio 48a; see Namdol ed., p. 93, 120 for text critical comments to this passage; see also *DAE*, p. 241 n.

17. *D* Toh. no. 16, Sher phyin *ka*, folio 27a. *Vajracchedika Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra Tathā Acārya Asaṅgakṛta Triṃśatikākārikāsaptati*, Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica 3 (Sarnath: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, 1978), p. 122.

18. *Āryaprajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā*, *P* no. 735; Sher phyin *tsi* folio 6b.

19. sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405), a contemporary of mKhas grub rje, makes the point in his *Grub mtha' kun shes* (dGa ldan phun tshog gling edition, undated Indian reprint), p. 151, that followers of the *tantra* can be of either the Madhyamaka or the Cittamātra philosophical perspective *(mdo sngags gnyis ka'ang grub mtha' smra ba po dbu sems sogs te)* and he cites several examples of tantric exponents of each of these schools. Later in the same text he states explicitly that there are *tantras* that teach the Cittamātra doctrine (p. 169): *"rnam par rig pa'i tshul ni mdo dang sngags las rgya cher gsungs."* For a different perspective on the question of the philosophical perspective of the *tantras*, see Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje's *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad* (Bhutan: undated blockprint), folios 9b–32b. He discusses the views of Tsong kha pa especially in folios 11a–b. Although mKhas grub rje would not deny the historical fact that both Mādyamikas and Cittamātrins have been proponents of the *tantras*, interpreting the "emptiness" expounded in the *tantras* according to their own views, what he is attempting to demonstrate in this section is that only the Madhyamaka perspective can serve as the ultimate *(mthar thug pa'i)* philosophical underpinning for tantric practice. Both Tsong kha pa and mKhas grub rje believe that it is possible to unite a Cittamātra understanding of emptiness to the great bliss *(bde chen)* that is the characteristic feature of tantric practice, and that it is possible to make limited progress in this way. At the same time they both maintain that only the conjunction of a Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness with the great bliss

can serve as the cause of complete buddhahood. See also mKhas grub rje's *rGyud sde phyi rnam*, Toh. no. 5489, *Collected Works*, vol. *nya*, which has been edited and translated by F. Lessing and A. Wayman (The Hague: Mouton, 1959), for further discussion on this point; Ruegg, *TTG*, p. 357, makes reference to mKhas grub rje's treatment of this subject in his Kālacakra commentary.

20. Refers to the six major philosophical works of Nāgārjuna, ennumerated by mKhas grub rje below as follows: (1) the *Mūlamadhyamakākarikās*, (2) the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikākārikās*, (3) the *Śūnyatāsaptati*, (4) the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, (5) the *Vaidalyasūtra* and (6) the *Ratnāvalī*. For Western scholarly treatment of the subject, see van der Kuijp's bibliographical note in "Ldong ston Shes rab dpal," p. 61, n. 3. The point being made here is that the emptiness taught in the *tantras* is no different from that taught in the *sūtras*, namely the emptiness of Nāgārjuna and his followers. mKhas grub rje is known to have criticized certain Sa skya scholars for their overly Cittamātrin interpretation of emptiness in a tantric context.

21. Śākya mchog ldan implies the existence of a Madhyamaka school based on the doctrine of emptiness as taught in the *Kālacakra* and in the *rDo rje gur*. This most likely refers to the "emptiness of what is other" interpretation of the Madhyamaka popular among the Jo nang pas. See his *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, p. 215.

22. kLong rdol bla ma, among others, makes it clear in his writings that this is the Tibetan name under which the *Śrī Pāramārthaseva* of Puṇḍarīka, Toh. no. 1348, rGyud *na*, folios 1–20a, was known. As it turns out, however, the passage is not to be found in that work, nor in one by a similar name, the *Vimalaprabhā* section entitled *Rang dang gzhan gyi lta ba rigs pas rnam par dpyad pa mdor bsdus*, *P* no. 2064, rGyud 'grel *ka*, folios 213a–227a. See also Ruegg's *TTG*, pp. 340, 357 and the following note.

23. The source is cited incorrectly by mKhas grub rje. Instead of being found in the *Pāramārthaseva* (see previous note) we find the verse in the work that follows it in the bsTan 'gyur, namely the *Śrīman Vimalaprabhātantrāvatāranavādahṛdayāloka*, Toh. no. 1349, rGyud *na*, folio 20b. Śākya mchog ldan treats this vese in his *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, p. 216–217; and also in his *Shing rta chen po srol gnyis kyi rnam par dbye ba bshad nas nges don gcig tu bsgrub pa'i bstan bcos kyi rgyas 'grel*, in *Two Controversial Madhyamaka Treatises* (Thimpu, Bhutan: n.d.), pp. 323, 349–350, where the word *rnam dpyad* (analysis) reads instead *rnam bcad* (negation). Hence, in this latter work Śākya mchog ldan takes the passage as criticizing a strictly negative approach to emptiness; that is, as criticizing emptiness as mere negation. In the former it is clear that he cites the verse in his treatment of certain proponents of Tibetan Madhyamaka who believed that the view of emptiness could be arrived at experientially or intuitively rather than through analysis. Be that as it may, it seems clear that this passage was utilized by the Jo nang pas and gZhan stong pas as a scriptural source for their more positive and experiential approach to reality.

24. That this is in fact a Jo nang pa view (see previous note) is also witnessed by the fact that Mi bskyod rdo rje attributes a very similar view to the Jo nang pa sect when he states: "*Jo nang pas / thal rang sogs ngo bo nyid med smra'i dbu ma de rang*

stong chu shing ltar snying po med cing rtag pa ma yin pas 'khor lo tha ma dang gsang sngags nas bshad pa'i dbu ma'i lta ba ma yin te / gzhan stong 'dus ma byas rtag pa rang 'byung rten 'brel las 'das pa'i don dam bden pa ma yin pa'i phyir," *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad,* folio 9a. Consider Śākya mchog ldan's remarks in his *Shing rta chen po'i srol gnyis kyi rnam par dbye ba bshad nas nges don gcig tu bsgrub pa'i bstan bcos kyi rgyas 'grel,* pp. 322–323: *"yang gzhan dag ngo bo nyid med par smra ba'i gzhung lugs su bshad pa'i stong pa nyid ni / phung po rnam bcad kyi stong pa nyid ces bya ba chu shing ltar snying po med pa de kho na yin gyi."* He then goes on to criticize this strictly negative conception of emptiness by showing that there are Madhyamaka texts that offer a positive conception of emptiness as "the emptiness experienced by the gnosis of yogis" *(rnal 'byor pa'i ye shes kyis nyams su myong bar bya ba'i stong nyid).*

25. An exhaustive search of this enormous work has failed to produce these lines.

26. *P* no. 2064, rGyud 'grel *ka,* folios 207b–262a, especially folio 220a passim.

27. Ibid., folio 136b.

28. Ibid., folio 136b.

29. Ibid., folio 219b.

30. Ibid., folio 224a.

31. Whereas the *Prajñāpāramitā,* that is, the vehicle of the perfections, explains it to be objectless *(dmigs med).* See, for example, the *Āryaprajñapāramitāsaṃcayagāthā,* folio 3a passim.

32. Ibid., folio 222b.

33. *P* no. 5330, dBu ma *ki,* folio 241b; see also the Catuḥśatakaṭīkā of Candrakīrti, *P* no. 5266, dBu ma *ya,* folio 103b passim. The following five citations are all taken from the *Sūtrasamuccaya.*

34. I have been unable to find any reference to this work in the *bKa' 'gyur,* though it is cited in the *Sūtrasamuccaya.*

35. Cited in *Sūtrasamuccaya, P* no. 5330, dBu ma *ki,* folio 241b, which differs somewhat from the *TTC: "'Jam dpal byang chub sems dpa' thabs la mkhas pa dang bral ba bskal pa brgya stong du pha rol du phyin pa drug la spyad pas gang gi chos kyi rnam grang 'di the tshom dang bcas pa nyan pa'i bsod rnams de bas ches bsod rnams mang du bskyed na / gang dag the tshomd med par nyan pa lta ci smos /."*

36. *Vajracchedikā,* p. 116. *Sūtrasamuccaya,* folios 241b–242a.

37. I have been unable to find reference to this work in the *bKa' 'gyur,* though it is cited in *Sūtrasamuccaya,* folio 242b. Bu ston, in his *Chos 'byung,* p. 226, states that this work, in four *bam pos,* has been lost. The passage is also cited by Tsong kha pa in *rTsa shes ṭīk chen* (Sarnath: dGe lugs pa Students' Welfare Committee, 1973), p. 11.

38. Sometimes translated as "heinous sin"; literally, a "sin without intermission," referring to actions so severely nonvirtuous that (at least according to the Ti-

betan tradition) they bring immediate rebirth in hell without the usual rebirth into the intermediate state *(bar do)*. See Mark Tatz, *Asaṅga's Chapter on Ethics with the Commentary of Tsong kha pa* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), p. 176.

39. There exists a chapter in the *Lalitavistara* by this name but the present citation is not from this source. Cited in *Sūtrasamuccaya*, folio 243a.

40. Toh. no. 216, mDo sde *tsha*, folio 267b; cited in *Sūtrasamuccaya*, folio 243b; also cited in *rTsa shes ṭīk chen*, Sarnath ed., p. 12.

41. Compare to *BPD*, p. 349, folio 3b, p. 354, folio 13aff.

42. See Introduction. This is an attack on a view prevalent among certain Tibetan Mādhyamika interpreters called *not existence, not nonexistent (yod min med min)*, which claimed that emptiness was a middle path between existence and nonexistence instead of being the path between inherent existence and nonexistence, the view of Tsong kha pa and his followers. Some members of this school apparently distinguished between nihilism *(med par lta ba)* and "the view that things do not exist" *(chos rnams yod par ma yin par lta ba)*, the latter being their own view. KDJ here says that there is no difference between these two views, implicitly equating the position of this school to nihilism. Consider, in this regard, Śākya mchog ldan's remarks in *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, p. 214: "*ngo bo nyid med par smra ba'i dbu ma'i lam ni / rang gi dbu ma'i lta ba ngos 'dzin gyi tshe na 'di lta bu zhes ngos 'dzin par mi nus / de'i tshe na mthar ma song ba'i shes bya mi srid pa'i phyir / dper na yod med dang yin ma yin dang ring thung la sogs pa 'jig rten pa dang / dngos smra bas phan tshun spangs te gnas par khas len pa de dag go /.*" For a more extensive discussion and critique of this view, see Se ra rJe bstun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, *Zab mo stong pa nyid kyi lta ba la log rtog 'gog par byed pa'i bstan bcos lta ba ngan pa'i mun sel* (Delhi: Champa Choegyal, 1969), his two volume critique of the Sa skya scholars Śākya mchog ldan and Go rab 'byams pa.

43. *MMK* (XXIV, 11). The unidentified lines are from *Ratnāvalī* (II, 19). See J. May, *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* (Paris: Adrien Maissoneuve, 1959), Collection Jean Przyluski, vol. 2, pp. 230–231, 434–435.

44. (II, 19); *P* mDo 'grel *ge*, folio 134b.

45. *Prasannapadā*, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin (Saint Petersburg: Bibliotheca Bouddhica [IV], 1913) (Pras), pp. 495–496; *D* ed., Pras-tib folios 163b–164b.

46. (XII, 12cd); *P* dBu ma *tsha*, folio 15a. See also, Karen Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge (AC)*, Indiske Studier 7 (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986), pp. 114–115.

47. A work of Candrakīrti; *P* no. 5246, dBu ma *ya*, folio 256a.

48. All references are to L. de la Vallée Poussin's edition, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti (MA)* (St. Petersburg; 1907–1912) (VI, 4–5ab), p. 78; see also C. W. Huntington, Jr. (with Geshe Namgyal Wangchen), *The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamika (EOE)* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), pp. 157, 226, n. 6, 7.

49. *MA* (VI, 5d–7a), pp. 78–79.

50. See Chr. Lindtner's *Nāgārjuniana* (Copenhagen: Academisk Forlag, 1982), pp. 88–89. Lindtner here mistranslates the first line by ignoring the particle *nas*, which clearly is meant to connote the fact that the belief in karma is a direct result of an understanding of emptiness, an important point for mKhas grub rje.

51. *P* no. 5336, dBu ma *ki*, folio 52b. See Tsong kha pa's remarks on this particular vow of the bodhisattva in Tatz, *Asaṅga's Chapter*, pp. 176–177.

52. *P* no. 5266, dBu ma *ya*, folios 212b–213a.

53. mKhas grub rje is paradigmatic of the dGe lugs pa exegetes in having great disdain for short and pithy teachings known as *man ngag*. The point that he makes here he will make again and again throughout the *TTC*, namely, that the way to a true understanding of Buddhism is not through mystical oral traditions, passed down in secret from master to disciple, but through the long and arduous study and analysis of scriptures. A later critique along these same lines is to be found in kLong rdol bla ma; see Introduction, note 33.

54. *LRCM*, folios 367b–369b.

55. One of the most important concepts in the work, mKhas grub rje, following Tsong kha pa's *Drang nges legs bshad snying po* (*LSN*), *Collected Works*, vol. *pha* (all references to the Lhasa Zhol edition unless otherwise specified), attempts to set forth in the *TTC* a hermeneutical theory, one that gives the Mahāyāna adept a key to the correct interpretation of the Mahāyāna *sūtras*. He does this by showing how three Mahāyāna schools, the Yogācāra, Svātantrika, and Prāsaṅgika, use the concepts of definitive and provisional meaning to interpret the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras*. Although we shall have the opportunity in what follows to witness for ourselves the complexity of this hermeneutic, for now suffice it to say that a *sūtra* (or *sūtra* passage) is of definitive meaning if it teaches the Buddha's ultimate and final purport. A *sūtra* is of provisional meaning if it must be interpreted; that is, if it cannot be taken literally. In recent years a great deal of literature has appeared on this topic. See R. A. F. Thurman, "Buddhist Hermeneutics," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* (*JAAR*) 46 (1978); J. I. Cabezón, "The Concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures," *JIABS* 4, no. 1 (1981); E. Lamotte, "Assessment of Textual Interpretation in Buddhism" (a translation of an article that first appeared in French in 1949), in D. O. Lopez, ed., *Buddhist Hermeneutics* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), pp. 11–28; and Lopez's own article in that volume, "On the Interpretation of the Mahāyāna Sūtras"; See also *EE*, p. 116ff; A. Wayman, *CMDR*, pp. 178–180; *DAE*, pp. 244–251.

56. Vasubhandu, throughout his *Vyākhyāyukti*, *P* no. 5562, Sems tsam *si*, folios 31b–156a; *D* Toh. no. 4061, Sems tsam *si*, folios 29a–134b, characterizes his *śrāvaka* opponents as hermeneutically naive because of their adherence to the position that the Buddha's word needs no interpretation. I am currently engaged in a project of critically editing and translating this text. See my "Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti* on the Authenticity of the Mahāyāna *Sūtras*," forthcoming in the Minoru Kiyota *festschrift* volume. See also the *Bhāṣya* on *Abhidharmakośa* (*AK*) (III, 28ab) for a debate between a Sautrāntika and a Vaibhāṣika on the nature of definitive and provisional *sūtras*.

57. See previous note. This subject is also treated in great detail in the fourth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*, *P* dBu ma *dza*, folio 160aff; in the literature associated with *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (*BCA*) (IX, 40–46), *P* no. 5272, dBu ma *la*, folios 36b–37a; especially interesting are the remarks of Prajñākaramati's *Pañjikā*, *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati*, ed. P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), pp. 202–208, *P* no. 5273, dBu ma *la*, folios 242bff; see also *BCA Vivṛttipañjikā*, *P* no. 5274, dBu ma *la*, folios 390aff, which comments on verses that seem to be unknown to Prajñākaramati.

58. See André Bareau's *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (Saigon: École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1955) for more on the history of the early splits within the Buddhist order. The best philosophical discussion of dGe lugs pa views concerning the Sautrāntika school and its relation to the Madhyamaka is Anne Klein's *Knowledge and Liberation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986). An interesting discussion is also to be found in the fourth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*; see previous note.

59. See *LSN*, folios 2b–41a; *EE*, pp. 191–252. According to the dGe lugs pas, the Yogācāra or Cittamātra ("mind-only") school is one of the two main philosophical schools *(siddhānta, grub mtha')* of the Mahāyāna. The chief human exponents of the school, such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, interpret essential *Mahāyāna* texts such as the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* to teach a brand of idealism that claims the nonexistence of external objects; see L. Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," in *German Scholars on India*, Contributions to Indian Studies, vol. 2, (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications, 1976) for a different perspective on this question. Hence, for the Yogācāra, emptiness refers to the lack of duality *(advaya, gnyis med)* between perceiving subject, that is, mind, and perceived object, and hence the name *mind-only*, for in the dissolution of subject and object the former (the mind) was given ontological supremacy. In this system everything is said to be of the same substance as the mind. What mKhas grub rje will argue here is that over and above this more ontological presentation of Yogācāra tenets is an alternative *linguistic* formulation of the Yogācāra doctrine of emptiness, based on Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, a fact that was overlooked by Tibetan exegetes until Tsong kha pa. It must be remembered that mKhas grub rje is here expounding upon a system (the Yogācāra or Cittamātra) he believes ultimately to be faulty, in so far as its views differ from the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, the highest viewpoint *(mthar thug pa'i lta ba)* according to dGe lugs pa exegetes. At times, however, his analysis is so sympathetic, it gives one the false sense that these are views he actually ascribes to, which is not to say that *everything* that he is covering is anathema to his own views. Still, the reader is advised not to be lulled into a false sense of security. Introductory overviews of the Yogācāra can be had by consulting A. K. Chatterjee, *The Yogācāra Idealism*, BHU Darsana Series no. 3 (Benares: Benares Hindu University, 1962); A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), pp. 423–462; P. Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989); and B. K. Matilal, "A Critique of Buddhist Idealism," in L. Cousins et. al., eds., *Buddhist Studies in Honor of I. B. Horner* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), pp. 139–169. More specialized studies include L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang* (Paris: Geuthner, 1928–29, 1948), 2 vols.; G. Tucci, *On Some Aspects of*

the Doctrines of Maitreya and Asaṅga (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1930); L. Schmithausen, "Zur Literaturgeschichte der alteren Yogācāra Schule," *Zeitschrifte der Deutscher Morgenlanischen Gesellschaft,* Supplementa 1 (Seventeenth Deutscher Orientalistentag) (1969); G. M. Nagao, "What Remains in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness," in M. Kiyota and E. W. Jones, eds., *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978), pp. 66–82; A. Verdu, *The Philosophy of Buddhism* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), pp. 18ff; S. Anecker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu,* Religions of Asia Series no. 4 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980); T. A. Kochmutton, *A Buddhist Theory of Experience* (Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass, 1982); D. R. Sarachchandra, "From Vasubandhu to Śāntarakṣita," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (*JIP*) 4 (1976): 69–107; H. V. Guenther, "Saṃvṛtti and Pāramārtha in Yogācāra According to Tibetan Sources," in *The Problem of the Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973); as well as the various translations of specific texts in the notes that follow. Japanese scholarship in the area of Yogācāra Studies is vast, see H. Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes* (*IB*) (Osdaka: KUFS Publications, 1980), pp. 256–263.

60. In his *Vyākhyāyukti* (*P* ed., folios 118aff) Vasubandhu portrays the Madhyamaka interpretation of the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* as hermeneutically problematic because of this school's insistence on taking these scriptures literally. What he then goes on to do is to show how these texts *should* be interpreted. Yogācāras such as Vasubandhu and Asaṅga use a three-step hermeneutic based on the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra.* The first step involves dividing all of the Buddha's word into "three turnings," the second involves the creation of a heirarchy to the turnings such that the third becomes the definitive one (and hence the Buddha's true purport); finally the last step involves going back to the second turning and explaining it (specifically, explaining why the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* claim that nothing exists) in terms of the doctrines of the final wheel (the three natures). See sTag tshang lo tsā ba, *Grub mtha' kun shes*, pp. 188–194, for a similar treatment; also Verdu, *Philosophy of Buddhism,* pp. 59–64; also G. Nagao, "The Buddhist World-View as Elucidated in the Three Nature Theory and Its Similes," *The Eastern Buddhist* (1983): 1–18.

61. *D* mDo sde *nga,* folio 24b. E. Lamotte, *Explication des Mystères (SS)* (Louvain: Maissoneuve, 1935), vol. 1, p. 85, vol. 2, p. 206. See also *EE,* p. 204.

62. The skt. of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* has been edited by U. Wogihara (Tokyo: 1930, 1936). The chapter mentioned here has been translated by J. D. Willis in *On Knowing Reality* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).

63. The reference is to Chapter 2, *SS,* vol. 1, pp. 24–47.

64. The most complete study of this concept in the Western scholarly literature is L. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy,* Parts I and II, Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series IVab (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1989); see also C. Macdermott, "Asaṅga's Defense of *Ālayavijñāna,*" *JIP,* 2 (1973): 167–174.

65. To say that it does so in condensed form is an understatement. *AS* hardly mentions the three natures theory. See *Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine (Philoso-*

phie) (Adhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga, trans. W. Rahula, 2nd ed. (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1980) Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, vol. 78, p. 177.

66. Of the five major works attributed to Maitreya by the Tibetan scholastic tradition *(Byams chos sde lnga)*, these three are considered Yogācāra works, the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and the *Uttaratantra* are considered Madhyamaka works. One of the most detailed dGe lugs pa defenses of this classification is to be found in Se ra rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *gSung lan kLu grub dgongs rgyan*, p. 19ff.

67. This corresponds quite well with Vasubandhu's characterization of the differences between *sūtras* of definitive meaning and those of ulterior purport *(dgongs pa can)* in his *Vyākhyāyukti*, folio 97b.

68. *Saṃdhinirmocana*, folio 17a. See also *SS*, vol. 4, p. 67, vol. 2, p. 193; and *EE*, p. 192.

69. Toh. no. 4038, Sems tsam *zi*, folio 16b; *C* Sems tsam *zi*, folio 17a. See also *EE*, p. 193.

70. Vasubandhu, *Triṃśikā*, v. 23. See S. Lévi, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, p. 14; EE*, p. 193; T. A. Kochumutton, *Buddhist Doctrine of Experience*, p. 157; and also *Sum cu pa tshig le'ur byas pa* in *sGron rtsa 'grel dang sems tsam gzhung sum bcu pa rtsa 'grel* (Varanasi: Kargyud Relief and Protection, 1982), p. 3.

71. The reference here is clearly to the Jo nang pas. Go ram pa, in *lTa ba'i shan 'byed* (Sarnath: Sakya Students' Union, 1988), pp. 3–9, gives an excellent brief overview of the Jo nang pa views on Madhyamaka. In regard to the present point he states, "When the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* state that everything from form up to omniscience is nonexistent, that is, when it teaches [everything] to be imputed, illusory, dreamlike and so on it is referring to the dependent, that is, conventional truths. It is not teaching that the real lacks ultimate truth and is false and so forth" (p. 5). See *EE*, p. 193.

72. This is a standard list of phenomena *('dres khang)* said to subsume all phenomena; that is, everything that exists.

73. The first of a long line of insults for which *KDJ* is renowned.

74. *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, folio 17a. See also *SS*, vol. 1, pp. 67–68, vol. 2, p. 194; and *EE*, p. 194.

75. Ibid., p. 17a. See also *SS*, vol. 1, p. 68, vol. 2, p. 194; and also *EE*, p. 195.

76. Ibid., p. 17a. See also *SS*, vol. 1, p. 68, vol. 2, p. 194; and *EE*, p. 196.

77. In this context perhaps better translated "lacking the nature of being ultimate," whereas the real ultimately is natureless because it is both the ultimate and a form of naturelessness, (that is, selflessness).

78. *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, p. 17a. See also *SS*, vol. 1, p. 68, vol. 2, p. 194; and also *EE*, p. 196.

79. See sTag tshang lo tsā ba's *Grub mtha' kun shes*, p. 153, who follows the same line as mKhas grub rje (and his master, Tsong kha pa) on this question to the point of even referring to the *Legs bshad snying po* at this point in his work.

80. Śākya mchog ldan, throughout *Shing rta chen po gnyis kyi rnam dbye . . . kyi rgyas 'grel* (see for example p. 472), takes the position that the doctrine that the real and the dependent truly exist is valid. He states, moreover, that this is a doctrine, not of the Cittamātra, but of the "Yogācāra Madhyamaka." mKhas grub rje, of course, makes no such distinction between Yogācāra and Cittamātra and in addition maintains that the Madhyamaka would repudiate the fact that *anything* truly exists.

81. Regarding this point see Se ra rJe btsun pa's critique of Go rab 'byams pa in *Zab mo . . . lta ba ngan pa'i mun sel*, p. 585: "*gzhan dbang bden med du 'dod pa ni / Byang sa sogs Thogs med kyi gzhung dang 'gal zhing /.*"

82. *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, folio 21a. See also *SS*, vol. 1, p. 77, vol. 2, pp. 200–201; and *EE*, p. 199.

83. U. Wogihara edition (Tokyo; 1931), pp. 45–46.

84. Ibid., p. 46; also N. Dutt edition, *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1966), p. 31.

85. Toh. no. 4038, Sems tsam *zi*, folio 42b.

86. From the *Viniścayasaṃgraha*, *C* Sems tsam *zi*, folio 43a; *D* Sems tsam *zi*, folio 42b.

87. (XI, 52), S. Lévi, *Asaṅga, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, exposé de la doctrine du Grand Vehicule selon le systeme Yogācāra* (Paris: Champion, 1907), p. 68; P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1970), p. 68; see also *EE*, pp. 224–225.

88. (I, 1); R. C. Pandeya, *Madhyāntavibhāga* (Delhi, 1971), pp. 9, 13. For a complete discussion (one that in some ways goes contra to mKhas grub rje's own commentary) and bibliographical references to sources that deal with this verse see Nagao, "What Remains," pp. 69ff. See also *EE*, p. 226.

89. The dependent entity, a table, say, is what is empty, and the imputed, specifically duality, is what it is empty *of*. Hence, a typical Yogācāra formulation of the doctrine of emptiness (for them nonduality) is to say that the dependent is devoid of the imputed.

90. *Madhyāntavibhāga*, Pandeya ed., p. 9. See also *EE*, p. 227.

91. Also a work of Sthiramati; *P* Sems tsam *ri*, folios 142a–143b. See also *EE*, p. 228.

92. *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (II, 1); see W. Rahula, *Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine* (Paris: École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1980), p. 65.

93. Ibid., pp. 136, 166, respectively. See also *EE*, p. 242, n. 81.

94. Wogihara ed., pp. 37–58.

95. This subject is treated more extensively in Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha;* see G. Tucci's edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts and his English translation in *JRAS* (1947): 53–75.

96. *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (II, 2); Rahula ed., pp. 141–142.

97. What is actually meant or intended when naturelessness or emptiness is taught in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras.* On this concept see D. S. Ruegg, "Purport, Implicate and Presupposition: Sanskrit *Abhiprāya* and Tibetan *dGongs pa / dGongs gzhi,*" *JIP* 13 (1985): 309–325.

98. See, for example, *D* mDo sde *ca,* folios 19b–20a.

99. This refers to those who have a definite *śrāvaka* vocation *(nyan thos rigs nges).* For more detailed discussion of this in the Yogācāra sources, see *TTG,* p. 73 passim.

100. Toh. no. 4038, Sems tsam *zi,* folio 114a. This seems to have as its source the *Saṃdhinirmocana.* See *TTG,* p. 74.

101. *Saṃdhinirmacana Sūtra,* folio 49a.

102. (XI, 54); Lévi, *Asaṅga,* p. 69; Vaidya, *Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 69.*

103. The hermeneutic here is similar to the one at work in the interpretation of the claims concerning nonarising. Here, however, the problem comes with the claims concerning one final vehicle *(ekayāna),* a notion anathema to (at least this branch of) the Yogācāra. The idea is to find ulterior motives for why the Buddha taught these doctrines if they were not meant to be taken literally.

104. Certain advocates of the "emptiness of what is other" tradition rely very heavily on the Cittamātra texts. See my comments on this subject in "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of *Siddhānta* in Tibetan Buddhism," forthcoming in the Minoru Kiyota *festschrift.*

105. *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra,* folio 22b.

106. Ibid., folio 17b.

107. Concerning the Madhyamaka critique of the Yogācāra, see K. Lipman, "The Cittamātra and Its Madhyamaka Critique: Some Phenomenological Reflections," *PEW* 32, no. 3 (1982): 295–308; and P. Fenner, "Candrakīrti's Refutation of Buddhist Idealism," *PEW* 33, no. 3 (1983): 251–261.

108. As portrayed by mKhas grub rje here and by Go ram pa in his *lTa ba'i shan 'byed,* pp. 3–8, 25–40, the advocates of this view claim that there are two versions of emptiness taught in the *sūtras,* a lesser one called the *emptiness of self* and a superior and more subtle one called the *emptiness of what is other.* The real ultimate truth is not the fact of a thing's being empty of own nature but the fact of the ultimate's emptiness of everything that is different from (other than) itself. This latter ultimate, they are

portrayed as claiming, truly exists, is stable, permanent, unchanging, and is further associated with the buddha-nature. An exhaustive study of this form of Madhyamaka interpretation is one of the great desiderata in the study of Tibetan Madhyamaka. Several short works on the subject do exist: D. Seyfort Ruegg, "The Jo nang pas: A School of Buddhist Ontology According to the *Grub mtha' shel gyi me long*," *JAOS* 83 (1963): 73–91; and M. Broido, "The Jo-nang-pas on Madhyamaka: a sketch," *Tibet Journal*, 14, no. 1 (1989): 86–90. Works that deal with the topic only indirectly include P. Williams, "A Note on Some Aspects of Mi bskyod rdo rje's Critique of dGe lugs pa Madhyamaka," *JIP* 11 (1983): 125–145; and my own article, "The Canonization of Philosophy." Exponents of the doctrine include Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan, Tāranātha, Śākya mchog ldan, the eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje, and a variety of figures from the *Ris med* (nonsectarian) movement in eastern Tibet.

109. This is the beginning of mKhas grub rje's critique of a view that must have been quite prevalent in Tibet. When Śākya mchog ldan, for example, describes in *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, p. 221, what it means to be "empty of own nature" *(rang gi no bos stong pa)*, he gives an interpretation that in part involves the *rang stong* doctrine being criticized here. He states there that a pillar is empty of two natures: the conventional nature of the pillar, which is the pillar itself *(ka ba ka bas stong pa)*, and the ultimate nature of the pillar, which cannot be found under analysis.

110. See *EE*, pp. 197–199, 225–226. The classical example is that of a magician arranging stones and pieces of wood together as the basis onto which he will cast a spell that will make it seem as if this basis is a real horse or elephant.

111. Lévi, *Asaṅga*, p. 59; Vaidya, *Madhyāntavibhaga*, p. 59. See also *EE*, p. 225.

112. The Madhyamaka theory of the illusion is treated later in great detail, see the Svātantrika section (4.2.3.1.3.2).

113. A work attributed to Āryadeva, *P* dBu ma *tsha*, folios 32a–32b; see *IB*, p. 245; also K. Mimaki, "Le Commentaire de Mi Pham sur le Jñānasārasamuccaya," in Hercus et al., *Indological and Buddhist Studies*, pp. 353–376.

114. See the explanation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* passage on pp. 43–44.

115. This is the linguistic formulation of the Yogācāra doctrine of emptiness, which will be dealt with in more detail later. Mkhas grub rje's point is that up to the time of Tsong kha pa this alternative (and more profound) exposition of the Yogācāra theory of emptiness was unknown in Tibet. See the next note.

116. Compare the first few paragraphs of this section with mKhas grub rje's remarks in *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma*, *Collected Works*, vol. *ta.*, folios 173a and 174a, where he characterizes Tsong kha pa's interpretation of the Cittamātra as superior *(khyad par du 'phags pa)* to those existing in Tibet at the time because of its compatability with the fourfold *siddhānta* schema of doctrinal classification. See also my "The Canonization of Philosophy." What follows is one of the most difficult sections of the *TTC*. Briefly, mKhas grub rje is trying to make four major points here:

1. Tsong kha pa was unique in pointing out a linguistic formulation of the Yogācāra doctrine of emptiness, based on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

2. The formulation states that there is no essential relationship between an object and its name, so that form, for example, does not exist as the linguistic referent of the word *form* (or as the basis of the thought *form*) by virtue of its own characteristic.
3. This linguistic formulation has several features in common with the Sautrāntika school of Buddhist philosophy. At face value it may seem to be saying nothing more than that the meaning of words is something unreal, a universal. mKhas grub rje maintains, however, that the Yogācāra theory is more subtle than this, implying as it does a more general theory of the relationship between language and reality.
4. This linguistic formulation of the doctrine is the equivalent (and mutual implicate) of the more popular formulation, namely, that of the nonduality of subject and object.

117. That is to say, the *Legs bshad snying po;* see Introduction, note 18.

118. I am using the noun *predicate* and the corresponding verb, *to predicate,* in what is perhaps a nonstandard way that includes simple naming. Hence to call form *form* is to predicate of it an essential predicate, that is, a name; to call it *impermanent* is to predicate of it a particular predicate ("particular" in the sense that it points out a distinctive quality, as opposed to pointing out an essential quality, of form). Everything of which one predicates "form" must be form, but not everything of which one predicates "impermanence" need be form.

119. The critique that follows speaks not only to those among mKhas grub rje's contemporaries who held such a view but to many a contemporary scholar who held to the fact that the idealistic (Cittamātra) theory of nonduality was a later innovation, unknown to Asaṅga.

120. The concept of *vijñapti* is one of the most difficult in Buddhist literature to understand because of the diversity in its use. Explanations of the term in Yogācāra contexts occur in a variety of sources, see n. 59; see also B. C. Hall, "The Meaning of *Vijñapti* in Vasubandhu's Concept of Mind," *JIABS* 9, no. 1 (1986): 7–23.

121. Chapter 2, section 3; E. Lamotte, *La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asaṇga (SGV)* (Louvain: Museon, 1938–39), vol. I, p. 25; vol. 2, p. 90.

122. *SGV,* vol. 1, p. 31; vol. 2, p. 105. The classic example being implied here is that of water. It is said that a man will see a fluid as water, a *preta* as pus and blood, and a god as nectar. This is seen as substantiating the idealistic claim that everything is of the same substance as the mind. This subject is treated in great detail in the Prāsaṅgika section. See the section entitled "Sense Perception Across World Spheres: The Case of Water." See also *MA,* pp. 164 passim; also *BGR,* folio 152a passim; the subject is also dealt with by Go ram pa, see *lTa ba'i shan 'byed,* pp. 61–65.

123. See Tucci, "Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha"; and also *EE,* p. 242, n. 81.

124. In kLong rdol bla ma Ngag dbang blo bzang's *rGyas 'bring bsdus gsum, Byam chos sde lnga, bKa' gdams gzhungs drug, bZhi rgya pa sogs kyi ming gi rnam*

grangs (Buxador edition, undated) (p. 4) he says: "The ten misconceptions are: (1) eternalism *(rtag lta),* (2) nihilistic view *(chad lta),* (3) reification *(sgro 'dogs),* (4) nihilism *(bskur 'debs),* (5) viewing unitarity as a true thing *(gcig tu bden par lta ba),* (6) viewing differentiation as a true thing *(tha dad du bden par lta ba),* (7) viewing specific [properties] as true and (8) viewing essential properties as true *(khyad par dang ngo bo la bden par lta ba),* (9) viewing names as true and (10) viewing meanings as true *(ming dang don la bden par lta ba).* Or again, the ten unstable conceptions [can be explained as] ten forms of misapprehending these ten things as true: names and meanings *(ming don),* the existence or nonexistence of the nature [of things] *(ngo bo yod med),* reification and nihilism *(sgro bskur),* unitary and differentiation *(gcig dang tha dad),* and essential and specific [properties] *(ngo bo dang khyad par).*"

125. See rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's comments in *Thar lam gsal byed* (Sarnath: dGe ldan spyi las khang, 1974), vol. 1, p. 79, on the meaning of the term *svalakṣaṇa (rang msthan)* in Dharmakīrti and the Madhyamaka, respectively. Here KDJ makes it clear that the own-characteristic within the expression "existing by virtue of its own characteristic" is the same *svalakṣaṇa* qua particular of Dharmakīrti's system by his contrasting it to universals *(sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyi mtshan)* of the latter. See also A. Klein, *Knowledge and Liberation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986), especially pp. 13–140, for more detail on the background of the issues being discussed here.

126. "Form's being" is an abstract fact and, therefore, by definition, it is something that exists only nominally.

127. Which is to say that form *is* form and that it *does* arise.

128. See the section entitled "The Proof of the Linguistic Interpretation of Emptiness" for a translation of the complete verse, considered to be the locus classicus for the proof of the linguistic interpretation of the theory of emptiness in the Yogācāra school. See also *SGV,* vol. 1, p. 36; vol. 2, p. 119; and sTag tshang lo tsā ba's *Grub mtha' kun shes,* for an explanation of this and related verses.

129. According to the epistemological theories of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the chief object of sense perception is a real particular *(svalakṣaṇa),* whereas the chief object of conceptual thought is a universal *(sāmānyalakṣaṇa),* a phenomenon that exists only nominally. mKhas grub rje is here making the point that even though sense perception does not *apprehend* nominal entities, such entities can nonetheless *appear* to it.

130. *SGV,* vol. 1, p. 24; vol. 2, p. 87.

131. *SGV,* vol. 1, p. 25; vol. 2, pp. 88–89.

132. *SGV,* vol. 1, p. 26; vol. 2, p. 92.

133. See the section entitled "On Latent Potentialities."

134. The reason for this being, of course, that in the Sautrāntika system all entities *(vastu* or *svalakṣaṇa)* exist by virtue of their own characteristic, their own particularity. For an alternative view on this point see sTag tshang lo tsā ba, *Grub mtha' kun shes,* p. 117: "*mDo sde pas dngos po la rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pas khyab par*

smra'o zhes Bod na mang po mgrin gcig tu smra ba ni / gzhung lugs rgya chen po la ma sbyang par ma zad''; see also his p. 125.

135. In other words, because sensory perception gives rise (or elicits) conceptualization, it is said to contain within it, in a latent form, that is, in the form of appearance, the seeds for that conceptualization, namely, the appearance of blue as the basis of statements like ''this is blue,'' ''blue is form,'' and so on.

136. *Cognizing (zhen pa)* also has the connotation of ''appearing to conceptual thought.'' Hence, the psychological process being described here is one in which form first appears to sense perception to be the basis of everything that can be predicated of it, in which this then appears to conceptual thought and in which linguistic-conceptual thought then makes the actual predication.

137. mKhas grub rje's usage of the term *zhen pa,* which I am translating ''cognition'' or ''to cognize,'' is such that it need not be inerrant, as in the present case.

138. *LSN* (all references to the Zhol ed.), folio 30b. See *EE,* p. 234 n. for a lengthy discussion of this passage.

139. This is an implicit critique of the quietists, who maintain that *all* forms of conceptual thought must be abandoned. mKhas grub rje, following the Indian gradualists like Kamalaśīla, claims that though all conceptual thoughts are erroneous, (that is, mistaken in terms of what appears to them,) they are not all mistaken, (that is, in regard to their principal object). Certain nonmistaken ones, moreover, can and do serve as the basis for systematic mental purification.

140. These refer, of course, to the three causal conditions that are said to give rise to a sensory consciousness: the immediately antecedant condition *(de ma thag rkyen),* that is, the previous moment of consciousness; the objective condition *(dmigs rkyen),* that is, the external object that will be experienced; and the dominant condition *(bdag rkyen),* that is, the appropriate sense organ.

141. *SGV,* vol. 1, p. 31; vol. 2, p. 107.

142. On the four kinds of conditions *(pratyaya),* see *AK* (II, 61c), passim. The problem here is simple: the objects that these particular latent potentialities are presumably ''causing'' are, for the most part, unreal, imaginary things (and therefore uncaused, permanent phenomena). mKhas grub rje sees himself as solving the problem by making the distinction between ''causing'' and ''conditioning.'' These latent potentialities ''condition'' these imaginary objects without causing them, for they have no causes.

143. See *LSN,* folios 31a–31b.

144. *SGV,* vol. 1, p. 36; vol. 2, p. 119, which has *nges* for *'dres* in the second line, and *'gal bar* for *'gal bas* in the fourth. I follow the *SGV* reading in the first case, and KDJ's in the second in my translation.

145. This is the classical definition *(mtshan nyid)* of a vase or pot. See Klein, *Knowledge and Liberation,* pp. 188–189. One of the most complete treatments of the

issue of definition is to be found in G. B. J. Dreyfus, "Some Considerations on Definition in Buddhism: An Essay on the Use of Definitions in the Indo-Tibetan Epistemological Tradition" (Master's Thesis, University of Virginia, 1987).

146. The fictitious opponent in all of these arguments is the realist who maintains that phenomena *are* inherently the referents of the terms that name them.

147. See *Mahāvyutpatti (MV)*, entry no. 3848.

148. Here the words *exist by virtue of being a svalakṣaṇa (rang mtshan gis grub pa)* and *exist by virtue of its own characteristic (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa)* are used interchangeably by mKhas grub rje, though whether this is appropriate is a point debated in the commentarial tradition.

149. On this concept, see section 4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.

150. In other words, sense consciousness involves duality because it is a perception in which subject and object appear to be different *(yul dang yul can tha dad du snang ba)*.

151. *LSN*, folio 32a. See also *EE*, p. 238 and n. 77.

152. The first verse of the *"Pratyakṣa"* chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikam (PV)*, ed. Swami D. Shastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968) Bauddha Bharati Series 3, pp. 98–99; see also Vinītadeva's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, ed. and trans. M. Gangopadhyaya, pp. 5–7, 86–92; Klein, *Knowledge and Liberation*, pp. 19, 47.

153. In other words, if the only valid exposition of the Vijñaptimātratā were that of nonduality, then all of the times the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* negate phenomena ("there is no form . . ."), it would have to be taken by the Vijñānavādins as referring to nonduality and nothing more. But in the case of something like noncompounded space, an overtly imaginary entity, there is never the doubt that it is anything but the result of human mental conceptualization, and hence never any doubt that it is an external object in the first place, making the repudiation by the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* of this fact alone an absurdity. Hence, claims mKhas grub rje, there must be another (more profound) interpretation, namely the linguistic one, that the Yogācāra take to be the ultimate meaning of the apparently nihilistic claims of the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.*

154. *LSN*, folio 34a.

155. This is evident from the fact that it is a consciousness and hence an impermanent or dependent entity.

156. This represents a logical break in the text, and what follows of the Yogācāra section seems to be a series of addenda more than a real continuation of what has preceded. It could very well have been added as an afterthought, especially because at other portions of the text stanzas of intermissions represent major transition points marked by numerical divisions. On the function of these types of verses see K. Mi-

maki, "Sur le role de l'antaraśloka ou du saṃgrahaśloka," *Indianisme et Bouddhisme, Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte* (Louvain-la-Neuve: 1980), pp. 233–244.

157. See *MOE*, pp. 426–427.

158. The three cycles *('khor gsum)* could here refer to the fact that object, subject, and action (gift, giver, and giving, for example) lack inherent existence.

159. This *sūtra* is known in the *bKa 'gyur* under the title *Āryatathāgatamahākaruṇānirdeśa*, Toh. no. 147, mDo sde *pa*. The passage cited here, however, seems to be missing (at least from *D*, the edition consulted), though there are several similar passages. See Bu ston, *Chos 'byung*, p. 221. For a more detailed discussion of this passage, see *MOE*, pp. 607–608 and note 560; see also *EE*, pp. 353–354 and note.

160. The reference is to the *Śatasāharikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*. Bu ston cites this same passage in *Chos 'byung*, p. 105.

161. Although an opponent's position, these works are considered sources for the Mādyamikas. The fact that their views are consistent with those of the *Saṃdhinirmocana* is in question here. For a more complete listing of canonical works on which the Mādhyamikas rely, see *MOE*, pp. 588–590.

162. Toh. no. 258, mDo sde *za*, folios 245b–259b.

163. *P* no. 768. See also *DAE*, p. 373.

164. Toh. no. 222, mDo sde *dza*, folios 84b–126b.

165. Toh. no. 213, mDo sde *tsa*, folios 126a–206b.

166. *P* no. 814; see note 159.

167. Toh. no. 120, mDo sde *tha*, folios 1b–151a.

168. See *MOE*, p. 609 and note 564.

169. This refers to the obstacles to omniscience *(shes sgrib)*.

170. This refers to actions done while under the influence of the obstacles to omniscience. On these concepts, see E. Lamotte, "Passions and Impregnations in Buddhism," in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner*, ed. L. Cousins et al. (Dodrecht: Reidel, 1974), pp. 91–104.

171. For more on this point and on this debate see Se ra rJe btsun pa, *gSung lan kLu grub dgongs rgyan*, pp. 8ff; also *TTG* Part II, pp. 177ff; *MOE*, pp. 392–397.

172. Toh. no. 100, mDo sde *ga*, folio 297b. See *DAE*, p. 373, who translates the passage, perhaps with some justification, as "that which is a definitive object is the ultimate"; see also *EE*, p. 255 and note.

173. See *LSN*, folios 41a–49a; *LRCM*, folios 367b–369b; and Red mda' ba, *dBu ma la 'jug pa rnam bshad*, pp. 205–207. Another of the Mādhyamikas' sources for this

doctrine must have been the *Áryatathāgatamahākaruṇānirdeśa*, Toh. no. 147, mDo sde *pa*, folio 181a, where it states: "*nges pa'i don gang yin pa de / don dam pa yang yin pa de / gang zag med pa'i don to /.*"

174. See *MOE*, pp. 425–426.

175. Toh. no. 175, mDo sde *ma*, folio 150a. For the Sanskrit, see Pras, p. 14, and *EE*, p. 253. See also *MOE*, p. 598 and note 537; and *DAE*, p. 246 and note 311.

176. *Samādhirāja* (VII, 5); Toh. no. 127, mDo sde *da*, folio 20b. See *Pras*, p. 44, and *EE*, p. 254; see also *MOE*, p. 600 and note 541, as well as *DAE*, p. 248 and note 314.

177. For a very lucid explanation of what is meant by a provisional *sūtra* see Napper's translation of the *Annotations* to *LRCM* in *DAE*, pp. 374–375.

178. Here, *the father* and *the mother* are said to refer to karma and the afflictions. These are the two chief impediments to liberation, obstacles that must be destroyed to halt the process of involuntary rebirth. The verse is found in the *Dhammapada*, ed. S. Sumangala Thera, *PTS* (London, 1914), v. 294, where it reads "*mātaraṃ pitaraṃ hantvā / rājāno dve ca khattiye / raṭṭham sānucaraṃ hantvā / anīgho yāti brāhamaṇo /.*" It is also found in *Nettipakaraṇa*, a postcanonical work (London: Luzac and Co., 1961), p. 165. dGe 'dun chos 'phel's translation of the verse reads "*ma dang pha ni bsad bya zhing / rgyal po rgyal rigs gnyis po dang / yul 'khor 'bangs bcas bsad byas na / nyes med bram ze nyid du 'gyur /.*" For an interesting gloss of a somewhat faulty translation of this verse from the Tibetan, see *Dhammapada* (Oakland, Calif.: Dharma Press, 1985), p. 149. See also *Udānavarga* (tib. *Tshoms*), Toh. no. 4099, mNgon pa *tu*, folio 31a.

179. Toh. no. 3887, dBu ma *sa*, folio 148b–149a. See also Donald Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika* (*SOS*) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987), p. 286; *EE*, p. 255; *DAE*, p. 376 and notes 459–460.

180. The Svātantrikas believe that a *sūtra* of definitive meaning must deal not only with emptiness as its principal subject matter (a criterion they share with the Prāsaṅgikas), but it must be able to be taken literally. Of course, the latter is never the case if it contradicts the evidence of a valid cognition. So principally, the fact that emptiness is the actual subject matter of a text becomes the common criterion (always necessary but not sufficient) for determining a scripture to be of definitive meaning in the Madhyamaka.

181. See *LRCM*, folios 369b–371a.

182. For a similar exposition in Tsong kha pa see the *rTsa shes ṭīk chen*, in *rJe rin po che'i gsung lta ba'i skor (Collected Madhyamaka Works)*, Dharamsala ed., pp. 463–468. For alternative classifications see Śākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, pp. 219–220; and Rong ston Śākya rgyal tshan, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad nges don rnam nges*, in *Two Controversial Madhyamaka Treatises* (Bhutan), pp. 6–7. Go ram pa, *BPD*, p. 351, folios 7a–b, also discusses different groupings of Nāgārjuna's works popular in Tibet. See also *DAE*, pp. 384–406; *MOE*, pp. 591–594; and *SOS*, pp. 55 passim.

183. *sByor ba rgya pa,* Toh. no. 4306.

184. *Shes rab brgya pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa,* Toh. nos. 4328 and 4501.

185. *mDo kun las bdus pa,* Toh. no. 3934. See also D. S. Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (LMS)* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), pp. 29, 84, 124.

186. As opposed to the *Sūtrasamuccaya* in which he demonstrates the *scriptural* foundations for the doctrine. Concerning the enumeration of the six treatises, see L. W. J. van der Kuijp, "Ldong-ston Shes-rab-dpal and a Version of the Tshad-ma rigs-pa'i-gter in Thirteen Chapters," *BIS*, Band 2 (1986): 61, n. 3; and J. W. de Jong, "Le Madhyamakaśāstrastuti de Candrikīrti," *Oriens Extremus* 9 (1962): 48, for a list of Nāgārjuna's texts studied by Candrakīrti.

187. *dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab,* Toh. no. 3824. Several complete translations exist. F. Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1967); K. K. Inada, *Nāgārjuna: A Translation of His Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1970); and D. J. Kalupahana, *Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986). See *LMS,* p. 1, n. passim; also *IB,* p. 236.

188. *Rigs pa drug cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa,* Toh. no. 3826. A translation into German based on the Chinese exists: P. Schaeffer, *Die 60 Satze des Negativismus* (Heidelberg, 1960). Critical edition and translation in Chr. Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana.* See *LMS,* pp. 8 passim.; also *IB,* p. 239.

189. *sTong pa snyid bdun cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa,* Toh. no. 3827. A complete translation and critical edition exists in D. R. Komito, *Nāgārjuna's "Seventy Stanzas"* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987); also in Chr. Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana.*

190. *rTsod pa bzlog pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa,* Toh. no. 3828. Although several translations exist, notably those of Yamaguchi, Tucci, and Streng, the most recent translation, based on the critical edition of the Sanskrit by Johnston and Kunst, is to be found in K. Bhattacharya, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: The Vigrahavyāvartanī* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978); see also B. K. Matilal, *The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978); *LMS,* pp. 8 passim; *IB,* pp. 238–239; and M. Siderits, "The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology, I," *JIP* 8 (1980): 307–355.

191. *Shib mo rnam par thag pa shes bya ba'i mdo,* Toh. no. 3826. Critically edited and translated by Y. Kajiyama in *Ashikaga Zemba Commemorative Volume,* pp. 129–155. See *LMS,* pp. 8 passim; also *IB,* p. 239.

192. *dBu ma rin po che'i 'phreng ba,* Toh. no. 4158. Translation of Sanskrit fragments by G. Tucci in "Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna," *JRAS* (1934): 307–325; (1936): 237–252, 423–435. See *IB,* pp. 241–242; also M. Hahn, *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī* (Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1982), vol. 1; N. Samten's forthcoming critical edition (Sarnath: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies); also, L. W. J. van der Kuijp,

"Notes on the Transmission of Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī in Tibet," *Tibet Journal* 10, no. 2 (1985): 3–19.

193. These sixteen categories or *padārthas* are listed in the first verse of the *Nyāya Sūtras;* see S. C. Vidyabhusana, ed. and trans., revised and edited by N. Sinha, *The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981; reprint of the 1930 ed.), pp. 1, 2.

194. *MMK* (I, 3); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa,* folio 1b.

195. This is the first verse of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī.* See K. Bhattacarya, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna,* p. 11.

196. *MMK* (VII, 34). *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa,* folio 7a.

197. *P* no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa,* folio 23a.

198. Ibid. folio 22a.

199. See E. Obermiller, "Nirvāṇa according to the Tibetan Tradition," *Indian Historical Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (1934): 211–257.

200. The achievement of higher rebirth based on the accumulation of virtuous action through the practice of morality and so forth is considered but a temporary goal in Buddhism. In contrast to this are the spiritual exercises of the individuals of middling and great scope, if we consider a *lam rim* classification schema, who strive toward the goals of permanent peace *(nirvāṇa)* and eventually buddhahood, here called the *definitive good.* A concise introduction to the *lam rim* literature, in many ways one of the foundational presuppositions of mKhas grub rje, is to be found in Geshe Rabten, *The Essential Nectar,* ed. and trans. M. Wilson (London: Wisdom Publications, 1984).

201. For an equivalent treatment from a slightly different perspective see Śākya mchog ldan's *dBu ma'i byung tshul,* pp. 219–221; Rong ston pa's *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad,* pp. 7–8; and Go ram pa's *BPD,* pp. 352–353, folios 10b–12a. See also A. Wayman, *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (CMDR)* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 181–183; *EE,* pp. 33 passim; and *LMS,* pp. 47 passim.

202. The dates of Āryadeva, who is a direct disciple of Nāgārjuna, are roughly those of his master, and as the latter are to a great extent a matter of speculation, the former are as well. See *LMS,* pp. 50–54. *IB* (p. 244) gives the dates as 170–270 C.E. See also E. Obermiller, trans., *Bu ston's History of Buddhism in India and Tibet,* Part II of *History of Buddhism (HOB),* Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus (Heidelberg: Otto Harrassowitz, 1932), pp. 130–131; *AC,* pp. 7–24; *EE,* pp. 36–39.

203. *bsTan bcos bshi rgya pa shes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa,* Toh. no. 3846. A translation from the Chinese exists in G. Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources,* Gaekwad Oriental Series no. 49 (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929); a critical edition of the Tibetan with Sanskrit fragments and translation is K. Lang, *AC.* See also *IB,* p. 244; *LMS,* pp. 50ff.

204. On this division into two schools, something which appears to be unknown in India, see *LMS*, pp. 58–59; see also P. Williams, "Introduction—Some Random Reflections," p. 1. For a bibliography of recent work on the Svātantrika school, see *SOS*, pp. 427–438.

205. See *LMS*, pp. 60–61. Nakamura gives his dates (*IB*, p. 284) as 470–540 C.E. See also *HOB*, p. 135; *EE*, p. 39.

206. *dBu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa buddha pālita*, Toh. no. 3842. Most of the work on the text has been done by Japanese scholars. See *IB*, p. 237. Chapter 18 of this work has been translated by Chr. Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 23 (1981): 187–217; see also William L. Ames, "Buddhapālita's Exposition of the Madhyamaka," *JIP* 14 (1986): 313–348.

207. See *LMS*, pp. 61–66. Nakamura (*IB*, p. 284) gives his dates as 490–570 C.E. and Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, p. 474, as c. 400 C.E. On the life of Bhāvaviveka, see S. Iida, *Reason and Emptiness* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980), pp. 5–26; see also Y. Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla," *WZKSO* 12–13 (1969): 191–201; also *EE*, pp. 39–40.

208. *Prajñāpradīpa*, *dBu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron me*, Toh. no. 3853. The first chapter was translated into German by Y. Kajiyama, *WZKSO* 7 (1963): 37–62; 8 (1964): 100–130; chapters 18, 24, and 25 were translated in M. D. Eckel, "A Question of Nihilism: Bhāvaviveka's Response to the Fundamental Problems of Mādhyamika Philosophy" (Cambridge, Mass.: Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, 1980); Eckel has also studied chapter 25 in "Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter XXV of the Prajñāpradīpa," *Miscellanea Buddhica*, ed. Chr. Lindtner (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1985), pp. 25–75.

209. As opposed to being a commentary on a specific previously extant work.

210. *dBu ma'i snying po tshig le'ur byas pa*, Toh. no. 3855. The second chapter is considered by V. V. Ghokale, *IIJ* 14, nos. 1–2 (1972): 40–42. The first sixteen Kārikās of the eighth chapter were edited by Ghokale, *IIJ* 2, no. 3 (1958): 165–180. Most of the text has been studied by Japanese scholars; see *IB*, p. 284. See also the following note.

211. *dBu ma snying po'i 'grel ba rtog ge 'bar ba*, Toh. no. 3856. For the Sanskrit of the *Hṛdaya*, the Tibetan of the *Tarkajvālā*, and an English translation of the entire third chapter, see Iida, *Reason and Emptiness*, pp. 52–242. For a study of Chapter 1, see V. V. Ghokale and S. S. Bahulkar, "Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā Tarkajvālā, Chapter 1," in *Miscellanea Buddhica*, pp. 76–108.

212. See *LMS*, pp. 68–71. See also M. D. Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction between the Two Truths* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987), pp. 1–34; and *SS*, pp. 21 passim, especially p. 446. Nakamura (*IB*, p. 283) gives the dates of Jñānagarbha as 700–760 C.E.

213. *bDen pa gnyis rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, Tohoku no. 3881. Edited and translated by Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary* (see previous note).

214. See *LMS*, pp. 88–93. There is considerable controversy over the dates of both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. On this see Nakamura's comments in *IB*, p. 281, n. 73.

215. *dBu ma rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa*, Toh. no. 3884. Kennard Lipman has undertaken a thorough study of this work in his doctoral dissertation (University of Saskatchewan, 1979), "A Study of Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*." See also I. Masamichi, "A Synopsis of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* of Śāntarakṣita," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, (1972); I. Masamichi, ed. and trans., *Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita with His Own Commentary or Vṛtti and with the Subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla* (Kyoto: Buneido, 1985); and D. Jackson's review of the latter in "A Recent Study of Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkara," *BIS*, Band 2 (1986): 13–22; also *IB*, pp. 282–283.

216. See *LMS*, pp. 93–99. Nakamura gives his dates as 700–750 C.E. (see note 38). L. Gomez, "Primer Tratado de Cultivo Graduado," (trans. of the first *Bhāvanākrama*), *Dialogos* 11 (1977): 223, n. 222, states that Kamalaśīla's position in that text leans more toward the *Prāsaṅgika* than toward the *Svātantrika*. See also Ruegg, *Buddha-Nature*, pp. 4 passim.

217. *dBu ma snang ba*, Toh. no. 3887; *LMS*, pp. 94–96.

218. *bsGom pa'i rim pa*, Toh. nos. 3915–3917. An edition of the first and third *Bhāvanākramas*, with available Sanskrit texts and partial translations is to be found in G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist*, Texts Parts II and III; the full Tibetan text was critically edited by S. Yoshimura, *Tibetan Buddhistology* (Kyoto: Research Society for the Eastern Sacred Books, 1953). L. O. Gomez has also translated into Spanish portions of the first and third *Bhāvanākramas*, in *Dialogos* 29, no. 3 (1977): 177–224, and 7, no. 23: 85–93; see also R. F. Olson and M. Ichishima, "The Third Process of Meditative Actualization by Kamalaśīla," *Taisho Daigaku Sogo Bukkyo Kenkyujo Nempo* (1979): 241–305. The most recent critical edition, with a complete Sanskrit restoration and Hindi translation, is to be found in Acarya G. Namdol, ed. and trans., *Bhāvanākrama* (Sarnath: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, 1985). For more background on the philosophical issues raised in these texts see P. Demieville, *Le Concile de Lhasa* (Paris; 1952); Y. Imaeda, "Documents tibetains de Touen-houang concernant le concile du Tibet," *Journal Asiatique* 263 (1975): 125–146; A. Wayman, "Doctrinal Disputes and the Debate of Bsam Yas," *Central Asiatic Journal* 221, no., 2 (1977): 139–144; and Ruegg, *Buddha-nature*. See also *IB*, p. 283.

219. See *LMS*, pp. 101–102; he was a direct disciple of Śāntarakṣita's (see *IB*, p. 283); also *HOB*, pp. 156–159.

220. A disciple of Haribhadra. See *LMS*, p. 102; also *HOB*, pp. 159–160.

221. See *LMS*, pp. 114–115; *IB*, p. 335; also *HOB*, p. 219.

222. According to oral commentary on this point, the extent of Haribhadra's similarity to Śāntarakṣita is questionable, for he is said to dispute the fact that the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* teaches emptiness and that it is of definitive meaning, both attributes of Yogācāra Svātantrika Mādhyamikas like Śāntarakṣita. See also *LMS*, p.

115, as well as sTag tshang lo tsā ba's comments on the way that different Tibetans mistakenly subdivide the Svātantrika school in *Grub mtha' kun shes*, pp. 212–213.

223. See *LMS*, pp. 71–82; also *HOB*, pp. 134–136; *EE*, pp. 40–41.

224. For a detailed summary of the controversy, one of the most important in the history of the Madhyamaka school, see *MOE*, pp. 441–530, and *LMS*, pp. 79–80; N. Katz, "An Appraisal of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Debates," *PEW* 25, no. 3 (July 1976): 253–267. See also *IB*, pp. 247–252, 284–287; also *EE*, pp. 91–111.

225. *dBu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel ba tshig gsal*, Toh. no. 3860. The standard Sanskrit edition, used throughout the present work, is that of L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Pras*. For other editions and (partial) translations (de Jong, May), see *IB*, pp. 237–238. The latest portion of the work to come out in English is M. Sprung, *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way* (Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979).

226. *Rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa*, Toh. no. 3864; a translation of which is forthcoming from Cristina A. Scherrer-Schaub.

227. *Byang chub sems dpa'i rnal 'byor spyod pa bshi rgya pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa*, Toh. no. 3865.

228. *dBu ma la 'jug pa* and *Rang 'grel (bShad pa)*. Toh. nos. 3861 and 3862. I have used throughout the present work the edition of the Tibetan by L. de la Vallee Poussin, *MA*. C. W. Huntington's *EOE* is, to my knowledge, the only complete English translation of the root text; see also L. de la Vallée Poussin's partial French translation (Paris), *Le Muséon*, vols. 8, 11, 12 (1907, 1910, 1911); see also *IB*, pp. 285–287; *LMS*, pp. 7 passim.

229. See *LMS*, pp. 82–86; *IB*, pp. 287–289. See also A. Pezzali, *Śāntideva: mystique bouddhiste des VIIe et VIIIe siècles* (Florence: Vallecchi Editore, 1968); and J. W. de Jong, "La Légende de Śāntideva," *IIJ* 16, no. 3 (1975): 161–182; *HOB*, 161–166.

230. *Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa*, Toh. no. 3871. For a complete bibliography of available translations in Western languages, see *IB*, pp. 287–288. A translation of the entire text from the Tibetan was done by S. Batchelor, *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979); it contains the *mchan* of Thogs med bzang po on the ninth chapter. See also *LMS*, pp. 82 passim.

231. Commentaries 2 through 5 are no longer extant, but see *IB*, p. 238, where Nakamura claims that fragments of Guṇamati and Devaśarma exist in Tibetan. See *EE*, p. 265 and footnote. Ruegg (*LMS*, p. 49) states that the works mentioned in this list are mentioned in the colophon to the *Akutobhayā*. This is most likely mKhas grub rje's scriptural source. See also *IB*, pp. 236–238.

232. See the discussion of *Akutobhayā* which follows; C. W. Huntington's doctoral dissertation, *The Akutobhayā and Early Indian Madhyamaka* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1986) discusses this text and its relationship to Chinese Madhyamaka sources.

233. Ruegg (*LMS*, p. 49) has pointed out that Atīśa has substituted a commentary by Guṇadatta for that of Devaśarma's, which he states is instead a commentary on the *Prajñāpradīpa* of Bhavya.

234. Preserved only in Chinese: *Ta-ch'eng-chung-kuan-shih-lun*, the first half of which is to be found in Taishō no. 1567, vol. 30; the latter half in the *Manji zōkyō*. See *IB*, p. 238.

235. *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā*, *P* no. 5259, dBu ma *wa*, folios 225a–226b. See *LMS*, p. 49, and *EE*, p. 265 n. If this is true, it contradicts Atīśa's belief that Devaśarma's was a commentary on the *Prajñāpradīpa*, implying the converse, that the *Prajñāpradīpa* was based on Devaśarma. An asterisked word signifies that it is a tentative reconstruction into Sanskrit based on the Tibetan.

236. Toh. no. 3829. German translation by M. Walleser, *Die Mittlere Lehre (Madhyamaka-śāstra) des Nāgārjuna: Nach der Tibetischen Version Übertragen* (1911). See *IB*, pp. 236–237.

237. Concerning this controversy see *LMS*, p. 48, especially note 120; also *IB*, pp. 236–237.

238. *P* no. 5229, folio 113a. Toh. no. 3846, dBu ma *tsha*, folio 98a. The verse from Āryadeva is from the Catuḥśataka (VII, 5); *AC*, pp. 70–71. The slightly variant reading of the verse to be found in *TTC* does not affect the meaning. See also *LMS*, p. 48, n. 120.

239. *MMK* (I, 1); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 1a.

240. *MMK* (I, 3ab); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 1b.

241. *MMK* (I, 3cd); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 1b.

242. *MMK* (I, 2); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 1b.

243. *MMK* (I, 5ab); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 1b.

244. See *LMS*, pp. 104–108.

245. I have taken this as referring to the lineage of Guhyasamāja, though one could take the *'dus pa* in its literal sense of "assembled". Nāgārjuna is held by the tradition to be the founder of the "Ārya" lineage of the Guhyasamāja, having composed a commentary on the root *tantra* and on the *pañcakrama*. Candrakīrti's *Pradīpoddyotana* (another important work of the Guhyasamāja lineage) has already been cited and discussed (p. 41). Western scholarship has opted for considering the tantric Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, Āryadeva, and so forth as different from the Mādhyamikas by the same name; see *LMS*, pp. 105–106.

246. The verse is obscure and the reference to Buddha could be referring to Buddhapālita who, in the lineage, lies between Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. More likely, however, the verse has been mistakenly quoted. See the next note.

247. The verse is quoted by Tsong kha pa in his *Lam rim chen mo*, folio 510b–511a, as follows: "*stong nyid gang gis rtogs she na / de bzhin gshegs pas lung bstan cing / chos nyid bden pa gzigs pa yi / kLu sgrub bslob ma Zla grags yin / de las brgyud pa'i man ngag gis / chos nyid bden par rtogs par 'gyur /.*" In this version the last line of the *TTC* citation has been replaced by another line so that the entire passage now reads as follows. " 'How does one come to understand reality?' One truly understands reality by means of the instructions of the lineage that descends from Candrakīrti, the disciple of Nāgārjuna, who has perceived the true reality and who has been prophesied by the Buddha." Śākya mchog ldan's *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, p. 233, has the same reading as the *Lam rim chen mo* version. The former adds this interesting aside: "Even though the works of Candra had not actually been translated when the Lord Atīśa came to Tibet, he composed several short explanatory treatises such as *The Elucidation of the Two Truths*, taught them to the virtuous friend sTon pa, and since the profound philosophy in the *lam rim* tradition of the three individuals (of small, intermediate, and great scope) was then taken to be Candrakīrti's system, in this way has it has passed down to this very day." For a similar view in another of Atīśa's texts, see R. Sherburne, *A Lamp for the Path and Commentary*, Wisdom of Tibet Series, vol. 5 (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 146, v. 26. See also Chr. Lindtner's "Atīśa's Introduction to the Two Truths and its Sources," *JIP* 9 (1981): 161–214.

248. Toh. no. 1785, rGyud *ha*, folio 1a (v. 1).

249. On Saraha and his relationship to Nāgārjuna, see *LMS*, pp. 54, 105, n. 333; and H. Guenther, trans., *The Royal Song of Saraha* (Berkeley and London: Shambhala, 1973).

250. These verses are not found in the *Pradīpoddyotana*, but they are to be found in Bhavyakīrti's commentary to the latter, the *Abhisaṃdhiprakāśikanāma*, Toh. no. 1793, rGyud *ki*, folio 2a. See *LMS*, p. 106, n. 339.

251. Toh. no. 1791, rGyud *'a*, folio 171a.

252. See *LMS*, p. 107 and n. 343. There is a yogi by this name who is roughly a contemporary of Nāropa and Maitripa and perhaps a teacher of Atīśa, placing him approximately in the tenth century. But 'Gos lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal, *Blue Annals* (*BA*), trans. G. Roerich (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976; reprint of the 1946 ed.), pp. 380, speaks of a Kṛṣṇācārya/cārin as belonging to the Cakrasamvara lineage, two generations before Tilopa, hence considerably earlier than the tenth century.

253. Also known as Nāḍapāda; see H. V. Guenther, *The Life and Teachings of Nāropa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); *LMS*, p. 116; and *BA*, pp. 180 passim.

254. Also known as Advayavajra; M. Tatz, "The Life of the Siddha-Philosopher Maitrigupta," *JAOS* 107, no. 4 (1987); see *LMS*, p. 107 and n. 342; *BA*, pp. 227 passim.

255. See earlier note 221. He was, of course, one of the leading figures in the Yogācāra Svātantrika Mādhyamika school. See *LMS*, pp. 103, 114–115; *BA*, pp. 32 passim.

256. See note 250.

257. See note 251.

258. See *BA*, p. 1051, which puts him three generations after Jetari, presumably the earlier one c. 800 (see *LMS*, p. 100, n. 312), and two before Mal gyo lo tsā ba (eleventh–twelfth century).

259. If it is the same as Lalitavajra, then an eminent figure in the Vajrabhairava cycle; see *BA*, pp. 204, 367 passim.

260. *De kho na nyid bcu pa*, *P* nos. 2358 and 3080. *CTBE*, *P* no. 3099.

261. See van der Kuijp's discussion in *CTBE*, p. 23 and especially n. 61; he was the abbot of sNar thang who flourished toward the end of the thirteenth century. None of his works seem to have survived, and what we know of him comes either from the critiques of his opponents or from historical sources. He is mentioned in Tāranātha's *Zab mo gzhan stong dbu ma'i brgyud 'debs* (*CTBE*, p. 41). His principal logical work seems to have been the *Tshad ma bstan bcos sde bdun rgyan gyi me tog*, though mKhas grub rje here seems to be referring to a separate commentary of his on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. See also *EGW*, p. 406, n. 106.

262. Of course, the extent of the harmony between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is a controversy that persists even today. See, for example, E. Franco, "Once Again on Dharmakīrti's Deviation from Dignāga on Pratyakśābhāsa," *JIP* 14 (1986): 79–97; see also R. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).

263. Both this and the next passage are to be found in a text attributed to sNyan grags bzang po, the *Sarvaguhyapradīpaṭīkā*, Toh. no. 1787, rGyud *ha*, folio 234a.

264. Though perhaps the view of Tibetans, this could very well have its origins with Ratnākaraśānti, whose *Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa* seems to have been written in part as a critique of Candrakīrti. See *LMS*, p. 122.

265. Toh. no. 1785, rGyud *ha*, folio 155a (Chapter 15).


266. The same point is made by Śākya mchog ldan in his *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, p. 220. The reference is to a passage in Candrakīrti's commentary to the *Catuḥśataka* (*P* no. 5266, folio 34b); see *LMS*, p. 51.

267. As mentioned earlier, this is an overstatement, for Ratnākaraśānti does just that in his *Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa*; see p. 80 and note 264.

268. The reference may be to some incident in which a monk, threatened with physical violence due to his philosophical position, reverted to lay life. Though perhaps a well-known anecdote at the time of mKhas rgub rje, the incident (if there was one) has undoubtedly been lost to history.

269. *DAE*, pp. 386–397. Go ram pa, *BPD*, p. 359, folios 24a–b, speaks of another division that is also mentioned in the *Phar phyin* literature, that between the *gZhung phyi mo'i dBu ma pa* and the *Grub mtha' phyog 'dzin gyi dBu ma pa*, although

he then goes on to discuss the various views concerning the partition of Mādhyamikas in Tibet in a more general way. An interesting *gzhan stong* classification of Mādhyamikas is to be found in Śākya mchog ldan, *Shing rta chen po gnyis kyi . . . rgyas 'grel*, p. 326: "*dbu ma pa ni gnyis te / rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa dang / ngo bo nyid med par smra ba'i dbu ma pa'o / dang po la rang stong du smra ba dang / gzhan stong du smra ba'o / ngo bo nyid med par smra ba de la'ang / gnyis te / thal 'gyur ba dang / rang rgyud pa'o / de la'ang gnyis te / gnas skabs mdo sde pa ltar khas len pa dang / sems tsam pa ltar khas len pa'o /.*" Schematically, this is as follows:



270. This is a view that sTag tshang lo tsā ba seems to advocate in *Grub mtha' kun shes*, p. 203: "*lugs de gnyis la rim bzhin du dbu ma rab tu mi gnas pa dang sgyu ma rigs grub kyi dbu ma pa zhes bod na grags pa ltar 'phags sogs bshad de /.*" He then goes on to discuss the sources for this distinction. The same division is given by Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (eleventh century) in *Dharma bha dras mdzad pa'i lta ba'i brjed byang*, in *Selected Writings (gSung thor bu) of Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po* (from the dPal spungs prints), 'Khor gdong gTer sprul 'Chi med rig 'dzin, ed. (Leh, 1974), p. 230: "*dBu ma'i lta ba mdor bsdu na / ma ya ste sgyu ma lta bur 'dod pa dang / a pra ti sti te rab tu mi gnas par 'dod pa'o /.*" See also *MOE*, pp. 534, 857–858; *DAE*, pp. 386–387 and Appendix I, pp. 566 passim. K. Mimaki, "The *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, and the Mādhyamika Classification in Tibetan *grub mtha'* Literature," in E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher, eds., *CTBRP*, vol. 2, p. 165, suggests that the *TTC* should be examined as the first possible source to combine Yogācāra and Sautrāntika Mādhyamikas as the two branches of the Svātantrika school, but, as we can see, this is never explicitly done. See also *LMS*, pp. 58–59, 87; and D. S. Ruegg, "Autour du *lTa ba'i khyad par* de Ye shes sde (version de Touen-houang, Pelliot Tibetain 814)," *Journal Asiatique* 269 (1981): 207–229. For further critique of this view in the works of mKhas grub rje, see his *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma*, folios 174b–175a.

271. This division was being employed in Tibet as late as 'Jams dbyangs blo gros gzhan phan mtha' yas, who in *Phyi nang gi grub mtha' mdor bsdus su bkod pa* (New Delhi: Sherab Gyaltsen Lama, 1983), divided all Mādhyamikas into the exponents of emptiness of self and emptiness of another. The first, he says are in turn divided into Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas, and the latter division, "*kun rdzob chos can sgyu ma lta bu dang / don dam chos dbying ngo bo nyid med kyi*" (folio 3a).

272. See Go ram pa's characterization of rNgog's position in *BPD*, p. 361, folio 28a.

273. sTag tshang lo tsā ba, *Grub mtha' kun shes*, pp. 205–206, states that rNgog's inability to see the validity of this distinction is due to his attraction to Svātantrika views: "*rNgog lo chen pos rang nyid rang rgyud kyi phyogs la shin tu dgyes pa'i . . . dbye ba sogs mi rigs te.*" See also *EE*, pp. 54–56; *DAE*, p. 389.

274. The point is a somewhat subtle one. Because every phenomenon is empty, it can be said to be the illusorylike composite of appearance (it appears) and emptiness. But because the appearance part is a conventional truth, it makes the conjunction of appearance and emptiness a conventional truth, even though the other half (the emptiness) is an ultimate truth. To make this point more evident, consider that "the illusorylike conjunction of appearance and emptiness" is not a nonaffirming negation, as it affirms "conjunction," "appearance," and so forth, all positive entities.

275. This term is extremely important in Tibetan Madhyamaka exegetical literature. Within this context, an *inferential cognition* refers, almost without exception, to the knowledge gained through logical reasoning that analyzes the ultimate *(don dam dpyod byed kyi rigs pa)*. This is born from the understanding of a logically valid syllogism of the type:

Subject: the sprout
Predicate: is truthless
Reason: because it arises interdependently

Here mKhas grub rje defines the direct object of the inferential cognition based on this syllogism to be the conjunction of subject and predicate. This must be qualified, however, for it would not be appropriate to say that the fact that "the sprout is truthless" is what is being referred to here as the conjunction. The former *is* a nonaffirming negation, whereas the conjunction, "the truthless sprout," for example, in which truthlessness is communicated in a secondary way as a characteristic of the main object being expressed, namely, the sprout, is an affirming negation.

276. See rJe bstun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *Khabs dang po'i spyi don* (Bylakuppe: Sera Je Monastery blockprint, undated), folio 99b.

277. In the discussion that follows, the word *terminology (tha snyad)* has a wider connotation than it ordinarily does in English, including not only words qua language, but propositions qua beliefs. Hence, it connotes also "philosophical positions" regarding the conventional. The discussion that follows assumes considerable knowledge of dGe lugs pa doxographical *(grub mtha')* literature. Here the reader is referred to Geshe L. Sopa and J. Hopkins' *The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Grove Press, 1976), pp. 48–145.

278. The resemblance between this position and that of many modern Western interpreters of the Madhyamaka is striking, the basic position being that Mādhyamikas have some sort of allergy to philosophical terminology and concepts, being ordinary language philosophers par excellence. This position is refuted by mKhas grub rje later. For a more expanded discussion of this very question see *DAE*, Chapter 6. This division into Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i Mādhyamikas has been discussed by Ruegg and Mimaki (see note 270). Interestingly, Rong zom, *Dharma bha dras*, pp. 225–227, also speaks of Sautrāntika and Yogācāra Mādhyamikas: "*de yang don dam pa'i lta ba mthun yang kun rdzob kyi bye brag gis / mdo sde dbu ma*

dang / rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma gnyis su byes so / de la mdo sde dbu ma ni kun rdzob nyan thos mdo sde pa dang mthun pa . . . / rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma ni / kun rdzob sems tsam dang mthun par smra bas." Consider also sTag tshang lo tsā ba's comment in the *sGrub mtha' kun shes*, p. 102: "*'o na dbu ma rang rgyud pa phal cher tha snyad sems tsam pa yin la*"; Go ram pa's characterization of rJe btsun grags pa rgyam tshan's position, in his *BPD*, p. 360, folios 26a–27a; and Śākya mchog ldan's discussion of a similar division, *Shing rta chen po srol gnyis kyi rnam dbye . . . kyi rgyas 'grel*, pp. 482–483.

279. *'khor gsum khas so*. This is a common expression in Tibetan polemical literature and debate. It is a statement implying that the opponent is without a means of escape from contradiction. For example, imagine an opponent who accepts that sound is permanent, that it is produced, and that all produced phenomena are impermanent. When the following reductio argument is posited against such an opponent:

Subject: sound
Predicate: is not a product
Reason: because it is permanent

the opponent is bound on three sides, unable to negate any of them without contradicting his or her own position. To say that the predicate does not follow from the reason *(ma khyab pa)* is to deny that all produced things are impermanent. To deny the relationship of the subject to the reason *(phyogs chos)* is to contradict the premise that sound is permanent, and to deny the proposition *(sgrub bya)* is to deny that sound is produced, leaving no escape free from contradiction. The present case is analogous. See S. Onada, "Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's Classification of *Thal 'gyur*," p. 67.

280. The acceptance of external objects being the most striking common feature between them.

281. See also the section entitled "The Meaning of 'According with The World' in the Prāsaṅgika System." Go ram pa's views on this subject, which clearly differ from those of mKhas grub rje, are to be found in *lTa ba'i shan 'byed*, pp. 121–122.

282. Compare to the position that kLong rdol bla ma attributes to the early sTag tshang lo tsā ba: "*phyug rdzi rgan po sogs grub mtha' la blo kha ma phyogs pas ma brtag ma dpyod pa'i snang ngor bden pa gnyis 'jog tshul gcig*," in his *Theg chen gyi mngon pa'i sde snod*, p. 436.

283. In other words, when ordinary beings are under the influence of ignorance, how could the Mādhyamika's notion of "according with worldly conventions" be referring to "according with ordinary beings"? It would be tantamount to claiming to be in accordance with ignorance, says mKhas grub rje.

284. *MA*, pp. 406–407.

285. See *LRCM*, folios 371a ff.

286. See *LRCM*, folios 374b–375a. See also mKhas grub rje's *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma*, folios 187b–188b for a similar discussion. The view expressed in this section is one that is born from the truly scholastic mind set of dGe lugs pa thought, one that

seeks a synthesis of logic (reasoning) and Madhyamaka thought. It seems to be a view shared by other Tibetan Mādhyamikas as well. For example, Śākya mchog ldan, in his *dBu ma'i byung tshul,* p. 215, attributes to Kamalaśīla the position that, to ensure that the view one is realizing is that of Nāgārjuna, it is necessary for the experience to be preceeded by a valid cognition *(tshad ma)* born from the logical reasoning of either of the two Madhyamaka schools. At the same time, it is clear that there were exponents of the Madhyamaka school in Tibet who maintained that emptiness did not have to be approached logically, which is to say through the systematic negation of a clearly defined object. Later in the same text (pp. 215–216) Śākya mchog ldan distinguishes two separate ways of ascertaining the meaning of the Madhyamaka, one he calls an "experiential Madhyamaka, based on nonconceptual meditation" *(rnam par ma brtags pa sgom pas nyams su myong bya'i dbu ma),* the other "a Madhyamaka that operates through the elimination of the reification that apprehends conceptual signs" *(rnam par brtags pa mtshan 'dzin gyi sgro 'dogs gcod pa'i dbu ma).* This has resonances to a similar distinction in the *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad Dus gsum mkhyen pa'i zhal lung* of the Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje, folios 34a–35a. In a sense, what mKhas grub rje is emphasizing here is that to ensure that one is experiencing emptiness as it was intended by Nāgārjuna (and, he would say, even by the Buddha himself,) one must operate through the avenue of logic, and this involves a process of negation. It involves the refutation of something. He claims that unless this object to be negated is first properly identified, it is impossible to ensure the purity and validity of the subsequent experience. For mKhas grub rje, then, there is no experiential Madhyamaka born from meditation alone. The first Paṇ chen bla ma, in *rTsod lan,* pp. 379–380, attributes the position that in "setting forth the reality of phenomena it is improper to refute an object of refutation or to add a qualifier such as *ultimately* in the process of refutation" to sTag tshang lo tsā ba, to whom he also attributes the view that qualifying the negation, as the dGe lugs pas do, is a Svātantrika position. See also *CMDR,* pp. 188 passim; *DAE,* pp. 447 passim; *MOE,* pp. 625 passim; and also J. Hopkins's *Emptiness Yoga* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987), pp. 123–155.

287. For the role of the mental image in the workings of conceptual thought, see *KL,* pp. 115–140.

288. Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (*BCA*), ed. V. Bhattacharya (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1960), p. 221.

289. See *LRCM,* folios 375a–375b.

290. See *LRCM,* folios 375b–376b.

291. The implicit reference here is to the *yod min med min* ("neither existence nor nonexistence") view. The dGe lugs pas, of course, maintain that things *do* exist and that the Madhyamaka critique of existence must be qualified as a critique of *true* existence. It is not clear whether there were any historical exponents of the exact view criticized here. We do find passages in the writings of Śākya mchog ldan, for example, to suggest that his was a more literal interpretation of the critique of existence offered by the Madhyamaka scriptures. Hence, he characterizes the Madhyamaka as "eliminating the extreme of existence through the lack of the experience of the existence, from

time primordial, of all phenomenal, both appearances and reality'' *(ji lta ba dang ji snyed pa'i shes bya mtha' dag gdod ma gnas yod ma myong bas na yod pa'i mtha sel), dBu ma'i byung tshul,* p. 213. Later in the same work he states that because the pot has neither a conventional nor an ultimate nature, (the meaning of lacking own nature according to him,) ''it does not exist, but it is not thereby accepted as being nonexistent'' (p. 221). We also know, for example, that the later dGe lugs pa exegete Se ra rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1544), in his critique of the Śākya mchog ldan and Go rab 'byams pa (1429–1489), does attribute such a view to them. See *Zab mo stong pa nyid kyi lta ba la log rtog 'gog par byed pa'i bstan bcos lta ba mun sel* (New Delhi: Champa Choegyal, 1969). Go ram pa, however, states very clearly in *lTa ba'i shan 'byed,* p. 121, that he is not an adherent of the *yod min med min* view: *''snga rabs pa 'ga' zhig gis tha snyad kyi rnam bzhag la'ang yod min med min khas len pa ni gzhung gi dgongs pa min te.''* For a view that concurs with Tsong kha pa's and that may very well have been the source of it, see Red mda' ba's *dBu ma la 'jug pa rnam bshad,* pp. 220–223. Only an in-depth study of the wide range of Madhyamaka views to be found during this and succeeding centuries, however, will be able to allow us to state definitively the extent to which the views criticized in the polemical literature were historical ones.

292. Compare this to the dGe lugs pa position, which is that only the object to be negated, true existence, is what is repudiated by the logic analyzing the ultimate. To say that the Madhyamaka reasoning repudiates all phenomena, in this view, is tantamount to nihilism. Though the dGe lugs pa position is also that no phenomenon can withstand logical examination, crumbling under the weight of an analysis that seeks to find its ultimate mode of being, this does not imply for them that the phenomenon itself has been repudiated, implying instead the more limited notion that it lacks *true* existence.

293. The passage is to be found in *Madhyamaka Śālistambhasūtra,* in *Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgraha,* ed. P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1961); and also in the *Ye shes snying po kun las bstus pa,* Toh. no. 3852, dBu ma *tsha,* folio 27b. The passage is also cited, without being identified, in the First Pan chen bla ma's *rTsod lan,* p. 381.

294. Śākya mchog ldan bases his entire *dBu ma'i byung tshul* around an interpretive scheme in which he shows how the different Buddhists philosophical schools all avoid the two extremes of existence and nonexistence. For his interpretation of the *catuṣkoṭi,* which occurs in the context of his explanation of the Madhyamaka, see pp. 213–214. For an extensive discussion of the four positions, see *MOE,* pp. 850–854, and D. S. Ruegg, ''The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Catuṣkoṭi* and the Problem of the Description of Reality of Mahāyāna Buddhism,'' *JIP* 5 (1977): 1–71.

295. See note 197.

296. *Ratnāvalī,* Toh. no. 4158, sPring yig *ge,* (I, 57).

297. *MMK* (XV, 10); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa,* folio 10b.

298. From the *'Od srungs kyi zhus pa'i le'u,* Toh. no. 87, dKon brtsegs *cha,* folio 131a. For a very similar passage in Nāgārjuna, see *MMK,* (XV, 7).

299. The *TTC* is unclear at this point, but it seems to imply that this passage follows the previous one. However, this last passage is to be found in the *Samādhirājasūtra* (IX, 27); Toh. no. 127, mDo sde *da,* folio 28a; *Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgraha,* ed. Vaidya, p. 48.

300. *MMK* (XIII, 7), *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa,* folio 10a. See later p. 102.

301. Consider Go ram pa's remark, *lTa ba'i shan 'byed,* p. 125: *"bden pa'i stong pa nyid gnas lugs su gzung du mi rung ste / dgag bya bden pa med pas de bkag pa'i bden stong nyid kyang ma grub pa'i phyir ro."*

302. According to Buddhist logic-epistemology, everything that exists must be epistemically validated by a valid cognition. This, in fact, is the definition of an existent thing, namely, that it be established by means of a valid cognition *(tshad mas grub pa).* Hence, to deny this is to deny the very foundations of Dharmakīrti's logical system. See the First Pan chen bla ma's *rTsod lan,* pp. 376 passim.

303. This is in contrast to a valid cognition, which understands the ultimate, like the gnosis of an *āryan.* Nominal valid cognitions understand and establish the existence of the world of nominal or conventional entities. That the dGe lugs pa enterprise of reconciling Dharmakīrti's epistemology with the Madhyamaka was one of their most controversial "innovations" is witnessed by the fact that their notion of "nominal valid cognition" was severely criticized by opponents the likes of sTag tshang lo tsā ba and Go ram pa.

304. The only thing that this state of equipoised meditation perceives is emptiness. No conventional phenomenon is either perceived within nor does it appear to this gnosis. For this reason it is called *a mind in which the appearance of duality has waned (gnyis snang nub pa'i blo).*

305. *P* no. 795, (IX, 23). See also *MA* (VI, 31). For a similar position attributed to the Mahāsaṃghikas by Vasubandhu, see *Vyākhyāyukti, P* no. 5562, Sems tsam *si,* folio 128a.

306. See, for example, *MMK* (I, 1–2) and (XII, 10).

307. *MA* (VI, 32), p. 122; *EOE,* p. 161.

308. *MA* (VI, 36), p. 122; *EOE,* p. 161.

309. Toh. no. 156, mDo sde *pha,* folios 206a–253b. See also *EE,* p. 278; *MOE,* pp. 161–162.

310. Of course, for the advocates of these views the nominal existence of something does not imply its existence, as for them both existence and nonexistence are objects to be negated. So, although willing to accept that things exist nominally, the person who holds these views is not willing to accept that they exist.

311. Because of its importance to the Tibetan scholastic tradition, numerous references are to be found concerning the "four reliances" in Tibetan philosophical literature. One of the more extensive expositions is to be found in lCang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje's *Grub mtha'* (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings, 1970), pp. 144, 162; see also

MOE, pp. 425, 597; *EE*, pp. 113–114. There are a variety of ways of enumerating the four. The *MV* enumeration, which mKhas grub rje follows, he wrongly attributes to the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa*, with a slight change in the order. Though the order differs from *MV*, the second through the fourth of this list correspond exactly to elements within the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa* version. The first, however, does not, and the disparity is an interesting one. Whereas *MV*, following an unspecified Indian source, states that doctrine *(dharma, chos)* is to be relied on, the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa* states that it is reality *(dharmatā, chos nyid)*. Thurman (p. 113, note) states that their enumeration in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of Asaṅga is the earliest source of the "four reliances." The *Akṣayamatinirdeśa*, however, predates Asaṅga, casting aspersions on Thurman's statement. In yet another interesting variation, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* enumerates them as follows: rely (1) on the meaning of what is spoken *(bhāṣitasyārtha)* and not on words *(vyañjana)*, (2) on reasoning *(yukti)* and not on the person *(pudgala)*, (3) on the definitive meaning and not on the provisional meaning, and (4) on the gnosis obtained by means of meditation *(bhāvanamayena adhigamajñāna)* and not on the mere ordinary consciousness based on hearing and thinking *(śrutacintāvijñānamātra)*; see *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ed. N. Dutt (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1966), pp. 175–176. The *Akṣayamatinirdeśa* passage, which, as mentioned, varies from that cited in *TTC*, reads, in its entirety: "*[154a]* What is more, Venerable Śāriputra, those four things on which bodhisattvas rely *(pratiśaraṇa, rton pa)* are also inexhaustible. What are the four? They are as follows: (1) to rely on the meaning (artha, don) and not to rely on the words *(vyañjana, tshigs 'bru)*, (2) to rely on gnosis *(jñāna, ye shes)* and not to rely on ordinary consciousness *(vijñāna, rnam par shes pa)*, (3) to rely on the scriptures of definitive meaning *(nītārtha, nges pa'i don)* and not on the scriptures of provisional meaning *(neyārtha, drang pa'i don)*, and (4) to rely on reality *(dharmatā, chos nyid)* and not to rely on the person *(puruṣa, gang zag)*" (from Chapter 9 of the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra*. *P* mDo na tshogs *bu*, folios 153b–156b. The commentary to this section is found in *P* mDo 'grel *ci*, folios 266b–267a).

312. Though somewhat obscure, the position here seems to be that all the conventional entities spoken of in the scriptures, though of definitive meaning, nonetheless exist, as they exist nominally or conventionally. On the other hand, the statement that the definitive meaning does not exist ultimately does not imply its nonexistence. Hence, claims this opponent, it would have been more fitting for the Buddha to have advised us to rely on the scriptures of provisional meaning, whose purport is more straightforward (statements of conventional existence indeed implying existence), rather than on the scriptures of definitive meaning, whose purport is more obtuse (statements of nonultimate existence not implying nonexistence).

313. Again, this proceeds as in the previous argument. The appearance of true existence is always said to be present within the consciousnesses of all sentient beings, except for its absence in the gnostic wisdom of an *āryan*. This being the case, all ordinary forms of consciousness are said to be mistaken, in that things appear to them in a way that they do not exist (appearing as if they were true and independent things when they are not). Yet mistaken forms of consciousness can still be valid cognitions and can therefore serve as sources validating the existence of phenomena. The gnosis of an *āryan*, however, perceives emptiness alone. Hence, the mere absence of something

within the purview of an *āryan's* gnostic wisdom is not a sufficient criterion for determining that thing to be nonexistent because by default, (that is, by virtue of the fact that it is perceiving emptiness and nothing else,) that thing is not present within that gnosis. With this as background the opponent then urges that, if mKhas grub rje's position was correct, it would be more appropriate for the Buddha to have urged reliance on ordinary consciousness, which can validate the existence of phenomena when they are in its purview, rather than on gnosis, which cannot validate the nonexistence of something when that is missing from its purview.

314. See *LRCM*, folios 376b–382a; *DAE*, pp. 462–487.

315. *P* no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 25a.

316. This refers to an understanding of the two truths.

317. That is to say, without an understanding of dependent arising, doubt as to the workings of causality in the moral sphere will be inevitable, impairing both one's desire and one's ability to engage in virtue and hence to accumulate the mass of merit. The same is true as regards the understanding of emptiness as a prerequisite for accumulating the mass of gnosis. Hence, only when dependent arising and emptiness are seen as mutual implicates can these two masses (and buddhahood) be attained. For an almost identical point in sTag tshang lo tsā ba, see *Grub mtha' kun shes*, pp. 214–215.

318. *MA* (6, 79); Toh. no. 3861, dBu ma *'a*, folio 208a.

319. This is the first verse of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī;* see also *SOS*, pp. 39–42 for similar verses of homage.

320. See *LRCM*, folios 382a–383b; *DAE*, pp. 508–517. An almost identical discussion is to be found in the First Pan chen bla ma's *rTsod lan*, pp. 378–379.

321. *MA* (VI, 115); Toh. no. 3861, dBu ma *'a*, folio 209b.

322. A correct "pervasion" (put simply, an if-then statement of the form "if reason, then predicate") would be of the form "if there is smoke there, is fire," whereas a contradictory pervasion would be of the form "if there is smoke, there is no fire," where the consequence is exactly the opposite of what it should be.

323. *MMK* (XXIV, 1); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 17b.

324. *MMK* (XXIV, 14); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 18a. See also *Pras*, p. 500.

325. In other words, instead of emptiness implying the impossibility of functionality, all functionality, causality, and moral retribution become possible by virtue of the fact that things are empty.

326. The term is an abridgement of two separate terms, into which all doctrines, those describing the afflictions to be avoided *(kun nas nyon mongs pa)* and those describing all positive purificatory practices *(rnam byang kyi phyogs)*, are subsumed.

327. Which is to say that, as this opponent believes that the Madhyamaka critique repudiates the existence of things, including functionality, from the outset, even without

the absurdity having to be urged on him, this opponent suffers from a fault that both realists and Mādhyamikas consider to be of utmost gravity.

328. *MMK* (XXIV, 14); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folios 18a. *Pras* p. 500. A discussion of this very important verse is to be found in R. Jackson, "For Whom Emptiness Prevails: An Analysis of the Religious Implications of *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 70," *Religious Studies* 21, no. 3 (1985): 407–414.

329. *Pras*, pp. 500–501; *Pras-tib*, p. 166a. The *TTC* omits a verse after the line "*yasmātpratītyasamutpādaṃ hi vayaṃ śūnyateti vyācakṣmahe,*" and again, after the line "*dharmadharmam tatphalaṃ sugatirdurgatilaukikaśca sarvasaṃvyavahāra yujyante,*" there are several lines missing in *TTC's* citation.

330. I have been unable to trace this passage. See *DAE*, p. 515.

331. *MA* (VI, 37–38ab), p. 123; *EOE*, pp. 162–163.

332. See *LRCM*, folio 391b ff; also *CMDR*, pp. 202 passim.

333. See section 4.2.3.1.3.4; *LCRM*, folios 391b–396a.

334. Compare to Śākya mchog ldan's statement in *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, p. 213: "[The Madhyamaka view] eliminates the extreme of nonexistence through the fact that neither reasoning nor the knowledge of *āryans* negate the existence of something that already exists" *(sngar yod pa zhig rigs pa'am 'phags pa'i shes mthong gis med par byas pa ma yin pas na med par mtha' sel)*; and to Go ram pa, *lTa ba'i shan 'byed*, p. 120, who expresses a similar position; see also the discussion of rNgog's position in the chapter "The Two Truths and Their Cognition."

335. Only valid auditory cognition can directly perceive sound, but because the other sense consciousnesses do not perceive it does not imply that they perceive it to be nonexistent.

336. The seven aspects of the analysis involve whether or not the chariot is its parts, the collection of its parts, its shape, and so forth. These will occur in more detail in the analysis of the self in a later section. They are described in detail in *MA;* see *EOE*, pp. 175, 176.

337. See *LRCM*, folios 411a–414b; also section 4.2.3.1.2.1, argument [2]. On the four positions or four alternatives *(catuṣkoṭi)*, see D. S. Ruegg's masterful study, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Catuṣkoṭi*"; also S. S. Chakrabarti, "The Madhyamika *Catuṣkoṭi* or Tetralemma," *JIP* 8 (1980): 303–306. Go ram pa's position on this point varies substantially from mKhas grub rje's in that the latter believes that none of the objects cognized as a result of each of the four negations is the true ultimate. He implies instead that the ultimate is cognized through a *gestalt* that arises after analyzing all four alternatives, through the transcendence of conceptual thought; see *lTa ba'i shan 'byed*, pp. 125ff.

338. KDJ is here simply stating the law of excluded middle, something repudiated by his opponent. See *DAE*, pp. 542 passim. I have discussed the Buddhist scholastic

commitment to the law of excluded middle in a forthcoming article, "A Link of Non-being: Buddhism and the Concept of an Hierarchical Ontology."

339. Literally "double negation," that is, the negation of a negation of x is tantamount to the affirmation of x. The repudiation of the law of excluded middle is a position that the First Pan chen bla ma attributes to the early sTag thang lo tsā ba, *rTsod lan*, p. 381. See also Go ram pa, *lTa ba'i shan 'byed*, pp. 52 ff; and also his *BPD*, p. 358, folio 22b.

340. *Direct contradiction (dngos 'gal)* refers to the relationship of any two things that divide reality into two parts in such a way that every phenomenon is in one of the two categories. *Bod rgya tshad ma rig pa'i tshig mdzod* (China: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987), p. 79, reads, as the definition of *dngos 'gal: " 'gal ba gang zhig / phan tshun dngos su mi mthun par gnas pa."* For example, permanence and impermanence are in direct contradiction because anything that exists must be either permanent or impermanent. In addition, it seems that each must be defined in terms of the negation of the other, like x and x^*, whereas "internal contradiction" *(nang 'gal),* though satisfying the first property, does not seem to require the very strict almost "contradictory by definition" status of things that are in direct contradiction. Hence, permanence and production are said to be internally contradictory, but not in direct contradiction.

341. See the citation from the *Ratnakūṭa Sūtra* earlier, p. 91.

342. Just as pots and pillars do not exhaust all the possible kinds of entities, according to the opponent, neither do existence and nonexistence. Hence, if it makes sense to conduct an investigation in terms of nonexhaustive categories in the latter case, it should not be unreasonable to subdivide entities into pots and pillars, which is absurd.

343. v. 26cd; Toh. no. 3828, dBu ma *tsa,* folio 27b. See also K. Bhattacarya et. al., *The Logical Method of Nāgārjuna*, pp. 20, 27.

344. Toh. no. 3828, dBu ma *tsa,* folio 127b. Bhattacarya, ibid., p. 27.

345. This is a reference to a famous line in the *Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya Sūtra,* commonly known in English as the *Heart Sūtra;* for more on the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist understanding of this line, see D. Lopez, *The Heart Sutra Explained: Indian and Tibetan Commentaries* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), pp. 49ff.

346. v. 28; *P* no. 735, Sher phyin *tsi,* folio 3b.

347. *MA* (VI, 165) p. 287; *EOE*, p. 177.

348. *MMK* (XIII, 7); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa,* folio 10a.

349. Toh. no. 4158, sPring yig *ge,* folio 10b, (II, 3).

350. Toh. no. 3846, dBu ma *tsha,* folio 17b; (XVI, 7); see also *AC*, pp. 144, 145.

351. I remain unconvinced that this is what mKhas grub rje means to say here. Alternatively, a textual emendation may be in order at this point to avert this rather

farfetched interpretation. To keep the example consistent with the doctrinal point being made, a negative might be added to make the passage read, "the lack of rabbits' horns does not exist because rabbits' horns do not exist."

352. Toh. no. 3865, dBu ma *ma*, folio 232b.

353. *MMK* (XIII, 8), *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 10b.

354. Toh no. 3842, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 220a, has *ngo bo nyid kyis yod pa ma yin no*, as opposed to the *yod pa yin no* of the *TTC*, completely changing the connotation of the passage, so that it instead reads something like: "It is to thoughts of the kind 'things do *not* exist by virtue of their own nature' that we apply the term *emptiness.*" But the *TTC* reading is confirmed a few lines further along in *BUD*. When it states that teaching emptiness has the "ability to counteract that misconception," obviously refering to the misconception that "things exist by virtue of their own nature" expressed in this first line.

355. The *D* edition is missing *stong pa nyid,* reading instead simply *dngos po rnams kyi ngo bo nyid du rab to bstan pa;* that is, "to say that things do not exist by virtue of their [own] nature is to teach the nature of things."

356. *P* dBu ma *tsa,* folio 248b.

357. As opposed to the fault lying in apprehending the lack of money to be money and the lack of true existence (emptiness) to be truly existent, as the analogy must obviously be interpreted.

358. Notice that the last three categories of which nonultimacy is predicated are vacuous, and hence claiming their nonultimacy is redundant. When something does not exist how can it *ultimately* exist? They are: something is nonexistent, something is both existent and nonexistent, and something is neither existent nor nonexistent. Hence, for mKhas grub rje, the refutation within the *catuṣkoṭi* is tantamount to the refutation of the ultimate or true existence of phenomena, of what exists (the first of the four positions), which makes one wonder about the need to refute the other three. See *MOE*, pp. 850–858.

359. See the *Ratnakūṭa* citation, p. 91.

360. The view being expressed here is exactly that criticized by Śākya mchog ldan in *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, p. 214, when he states: "*Bod phyi ma dag / tha snyad du yod pa'i phyir med mtha' sel la / bden par med pa'i phyir yod mtha' sel lo / zhes pa ni / lung dang ma mthun te.*" For an extensive discussion of the two extremes in the Madhyamaka, see Ratnākaraśānti, *Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya, P* no. 5331, dBu ma *a*, folios 336b passim.

361. See C. Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976), pp. 151–165.

362. See *AK* (I, 5–6); and the commentary *(bShad pa)* in *P* no. 5591, vol. *gu*, folio 29b.

363. What I translate "inherent existence" in the text could just as well (and perhaps in this case better) be translated "existence by virtue of its essence." To be consistent, however, I have kept the former, and here simply draw attention to the multifarious uses of the term *rang bzhin*.

364. *MMK* (XV, 11ab); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 10b; see also *BUD*, folio 226b; and *Pras*, p. 273.

365. This, of course, is a reference to the Cārvāka view; see Sharma, *Critical Survey*, pp. 40–48; E. Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, trans. V. M. Bedekar (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), pp. 215–226.

366. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1926), Chapter 3, p. 32, n. 1, treats the subject exhaustively and gives extensive bibliographical references. He lists the sects of early Buddhism that deny the existence of an intermediate state, among them the Theravāda. See also A. Wayman, "The Intermediate State Dispute in Buddhism," in L. Cousins et al., eds., *Buddhist Studies*, pp. 227–239.

367. See *AK* (III, 11); *bShad pa*, folio 135b.

368. *MMK* (XV, 11cd); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folios 10b–11a.

369. In the earlier example, it is something that inherently exists that mKhas grub rje claims cannot change or be destroyed in the second moment. In general, the Prāsaṅgikas uphold the doctrine of momentariness, though they claim that for a realist to do so is tantamount to nihilism. On the theory of momentariness, see K. Mimaki, *La réfutation Bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa) et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses (kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi)* (Paris: Publications de l'institut de civilisation Indienne, 1976) Serie in-8, fasc. 41.

370. *MMK* (XV, 11ab); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 10b.

371. *Pras*, p. 273; *Pras-tib*, folio 92b.

372. *MMK* (XXIV, 16); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 18a; *Pras*, p. 502; *Pras-tib*, folio 166b; see also J. May, *Candrakīrti*, p. 236, whose translation seems to miss the significance of the term *dngos rnams*.

373. Or of "inherent existence" *(rang bzhin gyis stong pa)*.

374. *Pras*, p. 329; *Pras-tib*, folio 109a.

375. Toh. no. 3865, *D* dBu ma *ya*, folio 220b. See V. Bhattacharya, ed., *The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva* (Calcutta, 1931), p. 226; *DAE*, p. 534.

376. Commentary to *CS* (XI, 25); ibid., folio 182b; Bhattacarya, ibid., pp. 134–135; *DAE*, pp. 537–538; *AC*, pp. 108–109.

377. For a more detailed discussion of this question, see Se ra rJe btsun pa, *dBu ma'i spyi don* (Bylakuppe, India: Se ra blockprint edition, undated), folio 127b.

378. Usually a "mistaken cognition" *(log shes)* is one that has as its main object an entity that does not exist. An "erroneous cognition" *('khrul shes)* is one that is mistaken, not in regard to its main object *('dzin stang gi yul)*, but in regard to the way in which that object appears *(snang)* to it. All inferential cognitions *(rjes dpag)*, for example, are nonerroneous in regard to their principal objects, but because those objects become confused with their generic images, they *appear* in a false way and are hence erroneous, though not mistaken. See *DBPL*, pp. 86–128; *KL*, pp. 26 passim, which translates *'khrul pa* by the word *mistaken* (as opposed to my *erroneous*).

379. So that it would appear as vividly to memory as it would to direct perception *(mngon sum)*. This is the connotation of the word *directly* here. The later tradition, in its attempt to fine tune the philosophical terminology that it employs, will claim that the measure of whether or not a consciousness directly perceives its object has nothing to do with whether that consciousness is a form of direct perception, but with whether the object appears *(snang)* to it when it apprehends it. Hence, even a conceptual consciousness can directly apprehend its objects. Nonetheless, in the present context it is clear that the words *direct apprehension (dngos su 'dzin pa)* are referring to the way the senses apprehend their objects, for otherwise no absurdity would ensue.

380. Commentary on *CS* (XI, 11); Toh. no. 3865, dBu ma *ya*, folio 175b; *AC*, pp. 104–105.

381. See earlier p. 100.

382. *Pras*, p. 368; *Pras-tib*, folio 117b.

383. *Pras*, p. 369, *Pras-tib*, folio 118a.

384. v. 88; see Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, pp. 210–211. Compare to *MMK* (XVII, 20), which states:

Emptiness is not nihilism and *saṃsāra* is not eternalism.
That karma is never destroyed is the doctrine taught by the Buddha.

385. On the Buddha's reticence to teach, see H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974; reprint of the 1898 ed.), pp. 21–23; also *Buddhacarita* (XIV, 96 ff); E. H. Johnston, ed., *Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978; reprint of the 1938 ed.).

386. *P* no. 5658, mDo 'grel *nge*, folio 134b (II, 18); see also *MMK* (XXIV, 12). D. Kalupahana, in *Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), p. 336, also discusses the canonical sources regarding the Buddha's hesitancy to begin preaching.

387. See Introduction, notes 32 and 33. For a similar treatment of the subject in which he actually cites mKhas grub rje, see kLong rdol bla ma, *dBu ma'i ming gi rnams grangs*, folio 431 ff.

388. Consciousness is formless, and so has neither color or shape. Hence, it should be no surprise that no consciousness should be found when it is searched for

among categories that are irrelevant to its nature. We have seen this argument before (see note 342). On the Tibetan Buddhist scholastics' notion of mind see Lati Rinpoche et al., *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980).

389. Namely, cognizing emptiness is tantamount to blanking out the mind. In *Lam ngan mun sel sgron me,* folios 176a–177a, mKhas grub rje is more explicit on the relationship of quietism to what he considers to be other misconceptions concerning the doctrine of emptiness, especially the relationship of quietism to the view that does not understand the fact that emptiness is an absolute, that is, nonaffirming, negation. He then goes on (folios 177b–178a) to list various types of quietism, using sleep as a metaphor for the view he is criticizing. This makes for a very interesting account of what may have been diverse views of meditation in Tibet at the time.

390. See earlier, p. 6; and also D. Seyfort Ruegg, "The Jo nang pas: A School of Buddhist Ontologists According to the *Grub mtha' shel gyi me long,*" *JAOS* 83 (1963); and his *TTG*, pp. 8–9, 434–435, 442.

391. According to Buddhist logic-epistemology it is possible to deduce a cause from its effect. The point that mKhas grub rje seems to be making here is that a faulty philosophical viewpoint (cause) can be deduced from a faulty system of praxis (effect). On this type of reasoning see, for example, *Nyāyabindu* (III, 16ff).

392. *MA* (VI, 113), p. 223; *EOE,* p. 171.

393. In other words, it is relatively easy to generate a blank mind, much easier than it is to realize emptiness.

394. We cannot discount the possibility that the critique presented here is a critique of the practices of the Great Perfection *(rDzogs chen).* On this system of meditation, see S. Karmay, *The Great Perfection (rDzogs Chen): A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching of Tibetan Buddhism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988).

395. This is a high-level meditative absorption in which one is said to lose all gross mental function. See *AK* (II, 42) and Paul Griffiths, *On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986).

396. The argument here is this. Because all beings, at some point or another in their infinite history, have been reborn in every conceivable state of cyclic existence, they must all have, at one point in the past, obtained this *samāpatti* and been reborn into the corresponding state. The fact that this alone has not freed them from cyclic existence, therefore, should indicate that this is not a state that leads to emancipation.

397. This might be characterized as incontrovertible knowledge, the culmination of extensive and profound analysis, as opposed to, say, belief, which is something that can arise spontaneously on merely hearing or seeing certain doctrinal passages.

398. Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika* (I, 51); V. S. Agrawal, ed., *Svārthanumāna Pariccheda* (Benares: Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series, Vol. 2, 1959), p. 18.

399. The fact of selflessness is something that can be established by either direct perception or inference. In the present case, the fact that things are empty is a fact that

can be established by inference, so that dependence on scriptural verification becomes unnecessary. Only in cases of "extremely hidden facts" *(shin tu lkog gyur kyi gnad),* such as wealth in a future life arising from charity performed in this one, is validation by means of scripture required, because this is something not amenable to direct means (that is, to direct perception or inference). See my "The Concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures," *JIABS* 4, no. 1 (1981): 7–23.

400. Chapter 13; Toh. no. 3865, dBu ma *ya,* folio 205b.

401. Ibid., folio 201b.

402. Not found anywhere in Chapter 20 of *BUD.*

403. See section 4.2.3.1.2.1.1, argument [3]; see also *CMDR,* pp. 221 passim. Concerning the Prāsaṅgika critique of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, see M. Siderits, "The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology, II," *JIP* 8 (1981): 121–160; Rong ston, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad,* pp. 120–121.

404. Rong ston pa, in *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad,* pp. 71–72, also makes it quite clear that Mādhyamikas *do* accept the functioning of valid cognition and that they *do* have theses.

405. Hence, there are two classes of valid cognitions: those that analyze or serve as sources of verification for conventional or nominal entities (such as arising), and those that analyze or serve as sources of verification for emptiness, the ultimate truth. There has been considerable controversy in Tibet concerning whether the ultimate is a knowable object; that is, an object cognized by a valid cognition. See, for example, Śākya mchog ldan's treatment of this in *Shing rta chen po'i . . . rgyas 'grel,* pp. 335–336; Go ram pa, *lTa ba'i shan 'byed,* pp. 14 passim.

406. This is the first line of the *Samādhirāja Sūtra* passage cited earlier (see section 4.2.3.1.2.1.1, argument [3]).

407. In other words, the quote, if taken literally, as the opponent would have it, seems to imply that the acceptance of the notion of valid cognition is tantamount to the claim that there is no need to rely on the *āryan* path. See the last two lines of the *Samādhirāja Sūtra* passage (see previous note).

408. *MA* (VI, 31a), p. 112; *EOE,* p. 161.

409. *MA* (VI, 31b), p. 112; *EOE,* p. 161.

410. This portion of the commentary precedes verse 30, and is not a direct commentary on the verse quoted earlier.

411. The verse [*MA* (VI, 30)] continues:

Since the world would perceive reality, then what necessity would there be
For the *āryan's* alternative [way of seeing]; what function would the *āryan* path perform?
It is incorrect to consider the [perceptions of the] foolish to be valid cognitions.

MA, pp. 111–112. This citation must be seen in context. The opponent claims that the repudiation of arising from what is other (expounded by the Mādhyamikas) is in opposition to worldly perceptions. Candrakīrti's reply seems to be that it is permissible for this claim to contradict worldly perception because this is a claim as to the ultimate nature of things, as to their emptiness. Worldly perceptions have no say in this sphere. If, however, one accepts that what the world sees is valid even in regard to ultimate reality, then the absurdity follows that the world should have perceived emptiness from beginningless time, making the *āryan* path obsolete. For a more extensive treatment of this, see Tsong kha pa's remarks on this portion of the *Avatārabhāṣya (dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, vol. *ma*, folios 113a passim).

412. Here is a portion of Tsong kha pa's remarks mentioned in the previous note: "Some believe that we are expounding opposition to the world when we refute the ultimate arising from another. If they accept that even what the world sees is a valid cognition in regard to reality, when reality is analyzed, then let us suppose it is so. If the perceptions of the world are valid cognitions in regard to reality, ordinary worldly beings would directly perceive reality . . . they would understand it. We would have to accept that, as *saṃsāra* is beginningless, they had abandoned ignorance. What then would be the need for the *āryan's* alternative when it comes to directly understanding reality? There would *be* no need. What would be the need to even seek out the path of the *āryan?* There would *be* no need. It is not correct to consider fools, that is, ordinary worldly beings, to be valid in regard to reality.

"Therefore, when it comes to analyzing reality, worldly perceptions are not valid cognitions in regard to reality in all respects; that is, in every way. The world cannot oppose one when it comes to reality. Both those who advocate that the verse, 'the world is not valid in every respect,' (p. 113b) teaches that this system [the Mādhyamika] does not at all accept [the notion of a] valid cognition, and that the system is therefore erroneous, and also those who advocate that [because they repudiate the notion of a valid cognition] they are free of error, are just making these claims [with no basis in scripture], having missed the point of what the Acārya himself believes. Hence, they are only demonstrating their own nature [as incompetents], for they interpret the teaching that the perceptions of the world are not in every respect valid cognitions in regard to reality to be a repudiation of valid cognitions in general. I will explain later how both the valid cognition and the phenomenon [which is verified by it] are, as is taught in the *Prasannapadā*, repudiated as things that exist *by virtue of their own nature* and how one must consider a valid cognition and a phenomenon as posited in dependence [on each other]."

413. *Pras*, p. 75; *Pras*-tib, folio 25b. This line is taken by mKhas grub rje as showing that the *Prasannapadā* upholds the notion of a valid cognition in general. It remains a conundrum why Candrakīrti chose to cite four types of valid cognitions (as the Naiyayikas do, for example), and not the standard two of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

414. Toh. no. 3865, dBu ma *ya*, folio i96b; commentary on verse 301 (Chapter 13).

415. Toh. no. 3865, dBu ma *ya*, folio 196b. For a discussion of this passage and its implication to the thought of Tsong kha pa, see *DAE*, p. 164 and n. 178.

416. Consider Rong ston pa's comment on this subject in *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad*, pp. 71–72: "*tshad ma yang rtog ge pas brtag pa ni 'jig rten gyi tha snyad las 'das te rang dgar snang ba la dgongs nas de dag bkag pa yin gyi / 'jig rten na grags pa ni bzhed pa yin te.*"

417. Hence, in mKhas grub rje's interpretation of the Madhyamaka, every consciousness (except for the gnosis of an *āryan* in equipoise) is erroneous (*'khrul pa)* in so far as the object being perceived appears as if it truly existed. Every valid cognition (except again for an *āryan's* direct perception of emptiness within equipoise), though erroneous, is nonetheless unmistaken *(mi slu ba)* because it does not confuse its main object for something different.

418. This passage is not to be found in the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* but is found, almost verbatim, in the *Prasannapadā*, Toh. no. 3860, dBu ma *'a*, folio 25b.

419. See *LRCM*, folios 408b–411a; also section 4.2.3.1.2.1.1, argument [4]; and Rong ston, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad*, pp. 121 passim.

420. The point being that they do not find the need to analyze it into four possibilities as they already accept one of the four, namely, arising from what is other, which is (in mKhas grub rje's interpretation) another way of saying true arising.

421. In other words, if something exists nominally, without being analyzed, it does not mean that under analysis it would be found to exist. All phenomena exist nominally but none can withstand an ultimate analysis.

422. *MA* (VI, 115), p. 228; *EOE*, p. 171.

423. *MA* (VI, 114), p. 226; *EOE*, p. 171.

424. *MA* (VI, 36), p. 122; *EOE*, p. 161.

425. *MA*, p. 122.

426. *MA* (VI, 111), pp. 221–222; *EOE*, p. 170.

427. v. 48; *P* no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 22b.

428. Toh. no. 3864, dBu ma *ya*, folio 26b. mKhas grub rje's citation is based on a different translation than that found in *D*, though the meaning is essentially the same.

429. See section 4.2.3.1.2.1.1, argument [3] for the full citation.

430. See *Prasannapadā*, Toh. no. 3860, dBu ma *'a*, folio 167a.

431. See section 4.2.3.1.2.1.1, argument [5].

432. The opponent's implicit argument here is this. If the former takes precedence, then this is going against the "fourth reliance," namely, to rely on gnosis and not on consciousness. If the latter takes precedence, then it presumably validates the opponent's claim that the Madhyamaka critique is a repudiation of all phenomena. See *DAE*, pp. 166ff.

433. *LRCM*, folios 414b–419b; also *CMDR*, pp. 253 passim.

434. See W. C. Ames, "The Notion of Svabhāva in the Thought of Candrakīrti," *JIP* 10 (1982): 161–177.

435. *MMK* (XV, 1–2), *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 10b. See Buddhapālita's remarks on this verse in Toh. no. 3842, folio 224a.

436. See sTag tshang lo tsā ba, *Grub mtha' kun shes*, pp. 55 ff.

437. The second argument presented here is a straightforward one. The emptiness of an essence possessing the three characteristics cannot be reality because its antithesis cannot be the object of innate ignorance, for innate ignorance is something that does not involve concepts as complicated as those involved in having to come to an understanding of the three qualities of this essence. Every sentient being, for example, has innate ignorance but many do not have the kind of developed linguistic-conceptual apparatus to think that something is "unchanging," "independent," and so forth.

438. *MMK* (XV, 2); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 10b.

439. Heat is not an essential property of water because it is a changing quality of water, but if something is the *essence* of *x*, then it must always exist within *x* in an unalterable way, as is the case with emptiness.

440. In other words, these two qualities spoken of here are predicates of reality, and since reality (and indeed every phenomenon) is interdependent, the "independence" spoken of here cannot be independence in contradistinction to interdependence.

441. In other words, the concepts of "over there" and "over here" are relative and mutually dependent, just as "long" and "short" are.

442. This is a reference to the *Prasannapadā's* comments on this verse, *Pras*, p. 263; *Pras-tib*, folio. 89a.

443. See the commentary on *MA* (VI, 180), pp. 305–306; and *EOE*, pp. 179–180.

444. *Pras*, p. 260; *Pras*-tib, folio 88a.

445. *MA*, pp. 307–308.

446. *LRCM*, folio 419b ff.

447. Commentary to v. 27; Toh. no. 3832, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 128a. mKhas grub rje omits several lines. See Bhattacharya, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna*, pp. 21, 27–28.

448. The notion that there are two forms of ignorance, one innate, nonlinguistic, and unlearned, the other philosophical, acquired, and related to conceptuality, was certainly an important one in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Tibet. Besides being mentioned, of course, in many of Tsong kha pa's works such as *Legs bshad snying po*, *Lam rim chen mo*, and *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, we also find that it is a pivotal notion in the writings of sTag tshang lo tsā ba, who in *Grub mtha' kun shes*, p. 52,

uses this idea as a hermeneutical strategy to set forth his theory of *siddhānta*. See also Śākya mchog ldan's *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, p. 212.

449. This is because the repudiation of the fact that matter is made up of such point particles is to the repudiation that matter truly exists what the overturning of philosophical misconception is to the overturning of the innate variety. In both cases the former is a part of achieving the latter, but in no way constitutes the latter.

450. One of the most detailed treatments of the material that is to follow is to be found in A. Engle, *The Buddhist Theory of Self According to Acārya Candrakīrti* (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1982).

451. Again, this has to do with the fact that the apprehension of a person as permanent, unitary, and independent requires relatively advanced conceptual-linguistic abilities, which animals lack. The innate misapprehension of the person, however, is prelinguistic (or perhaps only minimally so) and possessed by every sentient being who is still bound to *saṃsāra*. Therefore, the *arhant's* having rid himself of the former alone is insufficient to be considered a perfected understanding of the selflessness of the person.

452. The point being made throughout this argument is that simply because *x* implies *y* logically does not mean that psychologically or epistemologically doing away with the apprehension of *y* through analysis and meditation is going to eliminate the apprehension of *x*. mKhas grub rje is here relying on Dharmakīrti's epistemology and its subsequent exegesis; see my discussion of the dGe lugs pa theory on the workings of inference in *DBPL*, Chapter 3.

453. *MA* (VI,140–141), p. 264; *EOE*, p. 174.

454. *MA* (VI,125) p. 243; *EOE*, p. 172.

455. The implication here being that these too are merely philosophical undertakings that have no direct impact on the elimination of the innate misapprehension of arising.

456. The positions of the opponent here are not presented in the most lucid fashion, nonetheless it is basically a continuation of the critique of the view that understanding that there is no permanent, unitary, and independent self is to realize full-blown selflessness. The opponent here seems to be repudiating the distinction between innate and philosophical misapprehension, at least to the point of claiming that what it means to understand selflessness is to refute the general characteristics of the self as it is accepted by an opposing philosophical school, and hence that the nonexistence of a permanent, unitary, and independent self *is* the selflessness of the person because permanence, unitarity, and independence are qualities held by an opposing philosophical school to be the general characteristics of the self. mKhas grub rje's response, which follows, is this. He argues that, if what the opponent says is true, to understand full-blown nonarising, (that is, the fact that there is no true arising,) it would be sufficient to refute one general characteristic of arising, namely, arising as it is misapprehended by a philosophical school (here the Sāṃkhya's notion of arising from self). If this were so,

then the absurdity would follow that even realists, who refute the self-arising accepted by the Sāṃkhyas, realize nonarising. The point here is that if by refuting *one aspect* of the self of the person, that is, permanence, one can come to understand full-blown selflessness, then by refuting *one aspect* of inherent arising, that is, self-arising, one should be able to come to a true understanding of the selflessness of arising, which is absurd. Only refuting a very special kind of object—an object that is apprehended by the innate mind (and not an object that is the concern solely of philosophers)—qualifies the understanding born from the refutation of that object as an understanding of emptiness.

457. Here the idea is to set up a correspondence between (1) accepting the nonexistence of a permanent, unitary, and independent self as the full-blown selflessness of the person and (2) accepting the fact that there is no self-arising as full-blown truthlessness, as the reality, the emptiness, of arising. Presumably the opponent is loathe to accept the latter, and by showing that it is in every way similar to the former (which he does accept), mKhas grub rje leads him to the absurdity of the former view. The reasons that follow attempt to demonstrate the correspondence between these two positions.

458. In other words, these two viewpoints resemble each other in that they are both philosophical (and not innate) viewpoints: one being a reification of a phenomenon (arising); the other a reification of the person. Hence, the argument goes, if the repudiation of the latter, (that is, the repudiation of a permanent, unitary, and independent person,) is the full-blown understanding of the selflessness of the person, then the repudiation of the former (the repudiation of arising from self) should be the full-blown understanding of the selflessness of phenomena; that is, of truthlessness.

459. Which is to say that in neither case do these two viewpoints constitute the totality of what it means for arising and the person to be reified, even philosophically, so that both arising from self and being "permanent, unitary, and independent" are at most *subsets* of all of the logical outcomes of inherent existence, neither capturing the essence of what it means for something to exist inherently in its entirety.

460. This I find questionable, for if arising existed as it is grasped by innate ignorance, then it seems to me that it would have to be one of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*, though not necessarily the first, (that it arises from itself).

461. This, presumably, is the stance of the Vātsīputrīyas. mKhas grub rje's comments here are very revealing, for they imply that in his opinion this school does not accept the selflessness of the person because he cites them as an example of a philosophical viewpoint that, though disclaiming the permanence of the self and so forth, nonetheless accepts a self of the person. Whether the Vātsīputrīyas believe in selflessness, and hence whether they are Buddhists, was (and still is) a point of great controversy among Tibetan exegetes. See the section entitled "The Diamond-Granule Reasoning."

462. We must keep in mind that, according to the dGe lugs pa interpretation of arising via the four extremes (from self, from another, from both, and causelessly), the second, "arising from another," is not merely the arising of an effect from a cause that

is different from it, but the arising of an effect from a cause that is *inherently* different from it, which, of course, is an object to be refuted.

463. *MA* (VI, 32), p. 114; *EOE*, p. 161. An alternate interpretation might suggest that even in worldly terms there is no such thing as a cause different from its effect, but that, says mKhas grub rje, is blatantly false, as the world does consider causes to be different from their effects. In mKhas grub rje's view, as we have seen, "arising from another" implies more than just that a cause is different from its effect, instead referring to the fact that a cause gives rise to an effect that is *inherently* of a different nature from it. What is more, this, he says (see the following note) is a philosophical and not an innate form of misconception. He therefore interprets Candrakīrti's statement to mean that, because the misapprehension that things arise from another is a philosophical and not an innate attitude, it is something that ordinary worldly, (that is, nonphilosophical,) beings do not possess.

464. The point being made here is that the agent that opposes the innate misconception that things truly exist is the ascertainment of truthlessness. In the present case, it specifically says that the agent that opposes the innate misconception that *arising* truly exists is the ascertainment of the truthlessness of arising. Although realizing that things do not arise from themselves, others, and so on, a philosophical understanding, serves as a stepping stone to the full-blown ascertainment of the truthlessness of arising, it is not the counteractive force that opposes the misconception of true arising. This, however, must be seen in its proper perspective. It does not mean that the understanding of truthlessness immediately destroys in an irrevocable way all apprehension of true existence. rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, in *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings, 1974), pp. 87–88, states quite clearly that an inferential consciousness, like the ascertainment of truthlessness, cannot overcome even the manifest (much less the latent) form of the innate misconception. The most that it can do, for as long as its impact on one's mind does not degenerate, is to preclude the arising of the manifest (though not even the latent) form of *philosophical* misconception. Once repeated meditation on this inferential-conceptual understanding is brought to the level of direct yogic perception, the *innate* misconception is said to be overcome during the equipoise. In any case, we must, within this context, take this to be what mKhas grub rje means by the statement that the ascertainment of truthlessness opposes innate misconceptions, assuming of course that he concurs with rGyal tshab's analysis. Another question arises in regard to the status of the misapprehension that things arise from another. Here mKhas grub rje seems to be quite explicit in regarding it as a philosophical and not an innate attitude, the ascertainment whose negation cannot oppose the misconception of the true existence of arising. Much of the later dGe lugs pa exegesis, however, maintains that the understanding that there is no arising from another is an understanding of the emptiness of arising, something that certainly should oppose the misconception that arising truly exists. Hence, there seems to be disagreement within the tradition on this point.

465. This is reference to the inference based on the following syllogism:

Subject: sound
Predicate: is impermanent

Reason: because it is a product.

466. *LRCM*, folio 415b; in *CMDR*, p. 254, the passage is mistranslated.

467. Most likely a reference to the Jo nang pa doctrine. See Broido, "The Jo-nang-pas on Madhyamaka," p. 87; Go ram pa, *lTa ba'i shan 'byed*, pp. 3–8; kLong rdol bla ma, *dBu ma'i ming gi rnam grangs*, pp. 432–433; my "The Canonization of Philosophy"; and *TTG*, pp. 139 passim.

468. See *LSN*, folios 49a–63a. Other expositions of the Svātantrika system include Donald S. Lopez, Jr., *A Study of Svātantrika* (*SOS*) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987); S. Iida, *Reason and Emptiness: A Study of Logic and Mysticism* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980); M. D. Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka and the Early Mādhyamika Theory of Language," *PEW* 28 (1978): 323–337; his "A Question of Nihilism: Bhāvaviveka's Response to the Fundamental Problems of Mādhyamika Philosophy" (Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, 1980), and also his *Jñānagarbha on the Two Truths* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987). K. Mimaki discusses the Svātantrika in the context of the question of classifying the Madhyamaka into two schools in "The bLo gsal brub mtha' and the Madhyamaka Classification in Tibetan Grub mtha' Literature," in Steinkellner and H. Tauscher, *CTBRP*, pp. 161–167. For varying perspectives on this subject see various articles in *Tibet Journal* 14, no. 1 (Spring 1989). See also *LMS*, pp. 58 passim; and section 4.2.2.

469. See mKhas grub rje's remarks in *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma*, folios 174a passim; also Go ram pa, *lTa ba'i shan 'byed*, pp. 11–12, 70–76, 111.

470. According to rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, *BPD*, folios 94a–95a, the stones and sticks do not always have to appear as the horse or the elephant but the "basis of the conjuring," by definition, must; which is to say that the latter refers to the collection that, having had the spell cast on it, is ready to appear as a horse or elephant as soon as it is seen by a spectator. The basis of the illusion has within it the potential to immediately appear in this way, as opposed to the striped rope in the corner, for example, which in general cannot be said to always appear as a snake, depending not on some spell for attaining its deceptive power, but simply appearing as a snake in given situations and to certain people with certain predispositions. See also section 3.1.3.5.1.1.3.

471. The word *posited* (*'jog pa*) has the connotation of verification here. The mind that posits an entity is the valid cognition that acts as the source of verification for it. In almost every case this is simply the valid cognitión that perceives the object itself, though, as we shall see later, this is not invariably the case.

472. Keep in mind that the Svātatantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas differ in several respects, this being one. In the latter, the fact that all things are imputations or labels of the mind is sufficient to determine them as truthless, as not existing from their own side. This is not the case in the Svātantrika system, where things are seen to be both posited by the power of the mind and inherently existent.

473. As opposed to the Prāsaṅgikas' example of the rope, which, from its own side, has no power to appear as a snake and does so simply due to external conditions.

474. As mentioned earlier, though reality itself is the ultimate truth, the *existence* of reality is strictly a conventional truth. Hence, the gnosis of an *āryan*, which perceives *only* the ultimate truth, cannot perceive the former and cannot be the source of verification of the existence of reality.

475. In other words, if this gnosis has no conventional entities within its purview as far as appearances are concerned, there can be no question of it having any conceptions of the kind mentioned, appearances being much more difficult to abandon, as well as being the source of their corresponding conceptions.

476. See J. Hopkins, "A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School," *Tibet Journal* 14, no. 1 (1989): 10–43.

477. For a more extensive discussion of this passage, see Se ra rJe btsun pa, *dBu ma'i spyi don,* folios 92b–93a.

478. Toh. no. 3887, dBu ma *sa,* folio 228b. See also *EE,* p. 283.

479. Toh. no. 3887, dBu ma *sa,* folio 229b. See *EE,* p. 284.

480. On the meaning of this term see the following note; see also Rong ston pa, *dBu ma la 'jug pa rnam bshad,* p. 112.

481. According to oral commentary on this point, in the discussion that follows the "knowledge" (*rig shes*) being spoken of, which almost exclusively refers to the inferential knowledge of emptiness, here refers instead to the equipoised wisdom of an *āryan;* for otherwise, it would make no sense to say that conventional objects do not exist within the purview of that knowledge. To use the word *rig shes* in this way, however, is an anomaly. What is more, mKhas grub rje's associating it with the knowledge gained from study and contemplation might make this interpretation suspect. Nonetheless, it is even more absurd to suppose that no conventional phenomena appear to a conceptual understanding of emptiness, the alternative.

482. Which is to say that emptiness fits the first definition of *ultimate* because it exists within the purview of that knowledge.

483. Here we have emended the text to read *gnas lugs su* ma *grub pa* as opposed to the existing reading of *gnas lugs su grub pa,* as the only possible reading that makes sense.

484. Legs ldan shes rab, one of the greatest Tibetan translators. See van der Kuijp, *CTBE,* pp. 29–53, and especially pp. 35–48, where he discusses the relationship of Madhyamaka views to those concerning logic (epistemology). See also *LMS,* pp. 59n, 85n; *MOE,* pp. 406–411, 535.

485. See S. Onada, "Phya Pa Chos Kyi Seng Ge's Classification of *Thal 'Gyur,*" pp. 65–66; also van der Kuijp, *CTBE,* pp. 59 passim.

486. The basic error, says mKhas grub rje, is in confusing the two connotations of the word *ultimate* in the expression *ultimately existing* as explained. rNgog, he claims, confuses the analytical reasoning that examined reality with reasoning in general.

mKhas grub rje visualizes him reasoning as follows: even reality cannot withstand an ultimate analysis . . . hence, it cannot withstand reasoning in general . . . hence, it cannot be established by a valid cognition and hence reality, that is, the ultimate truth, does not exist. Phya pa, on the other hand, he perceives to reason as follows: reality, the absence of true existence, exists within the purview of the gnosis that understands reality . . . hence, it truly exists, and hence, the absence of true existence truly exists. Only further scrutiny of the views of these authors, to the extent that they are available, will bear out mKhas grub rje's claims, however.

487. See *CMDR*, pp. 227 passim; also *MOE*, pp. 574, 632. Go ram pa, *lTa ba shan 'byed*, pp. 20–22, discusses this view of the dGe lugs pas and then (pp. 109–116) goes on to refute much of what we shall find later. Go ram pa believes, for example, that "on the conventional level there is no difference between the Svātantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas" (p. 109), a view that is anathema to mKhas grub rje who maintains that the Svātantrikas accept "existence by virtue of own characteristic" on the conventional level, whereas the Prāsaṅgikas do not.

488. For a similar interpretation see Kamalaśīla's remarks in *Madhyamakāloka*, Toh. no. 3882, dBu ma *sa*, folios 134a–b.

489. Toh. no. 3853, dBu ma *tsha*, folio 242a; *C* dBu ma *tsha*, folio 243b. See also *SOS*, pp. 69–70, for a more detailed discussion of this passage and the following one from the commentary.

490. Toh. no. 3859, dBu ma *za*, folio 274a; *P* no. 5259, dBu ma *za*, folios 325a–b. *TTC* has *dngos po* for *ngo bo*, see previous note. The passage is not cited in Tsong kha pa's *Legs bshad snying po* but is cited in his *Lhag mthong chen mo*, in the collection *rJe'i Tsong kha pa'i gsung dbu ma'i lta ba'i skor* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1975), p. 64.

491. In other words, if composite things did not exist by virtue of their own characteristic, they would have to be labeled phenomena, but we know from certain scriptural passages (cited later) that Bhāvaviveka accepts that such things are substantially existent phenomena, hence the two categories would have shared members and not be mutually exclusive, which is absurd.

492. *P* no. 5256, dBu ma *sa*, folio 231b.

493. *MA* (VI, 36), p. 122; *EOE*, p. 161.

494. This could be a direct quote but is more likely a paraphrase, as mKhas grub rje is for the most part quite strict about identifying the text from which he quotes. Bhāvaviveka's theory of sense perception is in many ways similar to Dignāga's. See M. Hattori, *Dignāga on Perception* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); and R. P. Hayes, "Dignāga's Views on Reasoning (Svārthānumāna)," *JIP* 8 (1984): 219–227.

495. See lCang skya's comments on this point, as translated by Lopez in *SOS*, pp. 285–286.

496. This most likely refers to the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (*P* no. 5764) and its *Pañjikā* (*P* no. 5765), both of which are considered works of *pramāṇa* found in the section by that name in the Tibetan canon.

497. Here the word *reasoning* is meant to connote not only the type of logical argument, but the resulting philosophical position as well. Given mKhas grub rje's presuppositions, as it is a Cittamātrin tenet that the dependent and the real exist by virtue of their own characteristic, if this is something shared with the Svātantrikas, as his reading of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla implies, it means that the latter then also hold the view that things exist by virtue of their own characteristic.

498. Actually from the commentary, Toh no. 3883, dBu ma *sa*, folio 5b. See Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, pp. 75, 78–79.

499. This passage demonstrates mKhas grub rje's somewhat controversial position that the Svātantrikas do not accept that things are *mere* labels by name and conceptual thought, a position repudiated by certain later dGe lugs pa exegetes (who claim that both Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas accept things to be mere labels).

500. Toh. no. 3883, dBu ma *sa*, folio 10a. See Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 88.

501. On this concept in the Svātantrika school, see, for example, Y. Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsaṅgika School," in S. Mookerjee, ed., *Navanalanda-mahavihara Research Publication*, vol. 1 (Patna: Navanalandamahavihara, 1957), pp. 289–331.

502. There has been a textual emendation made here to conform to what it is that mKhas grub rje has explained in the preceding passage: "*dngos smra ba'i kun rdzob dBu ma pa'i don dam du 'dod*" has been changed to read "*dngos smra ba'i don dam dBu ma pa'i kun rdzob du 'dod.*"

503. Toh. no. 3881, dBu ma *sa*, folio 2a. See D. Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, pp. 78–79.

504. *TTC* has *dngos sun* incorrectly for *dngos su*.

505. Toh. no. 3883, dBu ma *sa*, folio 6b. See Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 79. *D* has *chu la sogs pa* for *TTC*'s incorrect *tshul sogs pa* and also the modifier *'jigs rten gyi* that *TTC* omits.

506. For example, the Prāsaṅgikas, who do maintain that all phenomena are only conceptual labels, make no such distinction, though it is never completely clear why *making* this distinction, as the Svātantrikas do, and specifically why positing the existence of this category of correct, nonerroneous conventional entities, dooms one to accepting that things exist by virtue of their own characteristic. The implication might be that if something is correct and nonerroneous, it must be a truth, and hence must exist by virtue of its own characteristic. The Prāsaṅgikas, on the other hand, claim that all phenomena are false.

507. See *LSN*, folios 51a, 62a–63a; rJe btsun pa's *BPD*, pp. 357–358, folios 20a–20b, where he states that the Madhyamaka that uses this type of logical strategy is a "Madhyamaka that refutes [only] a relatively rough object of refutation." See also T. Tillemans, "The Neither One nor Many Argument for *Śūnyatā* and Its Tibetan Interpretations" in Steinkellner and Tauscher, *CTBRP*, vol. 2, pp. 305–320; his "The Neither One nor Many Argument for *Śūnyatā* and Its Tibetan Interpretations: Background Information and Source Material," *Études de Lettres* (University of Lausanne), 3 (July–September 1982): 103–128; and his "Two Tibetan Texts on the 'Neither One nor Many' Argument for *Śūnyatā*," *JIP* 12 (1984): 357–388; and *SOS*, pp. 167–191. Mamoru Kobayashi has written several articles on the subject: "*Chūganmyō* ni okeru riichitaronshō ni tsuite," in *Tōhoku Indogakushūkyōgakkai Ronshū* 12 (December 1985): 100–102; "Kamalaśīla no riishitaronshō—*Chūganmyō* shiyaku (Jō)," *Tōhoku Indogakushūkyōgakkai Ronshū* 13 (December 1986): 60–72.

It is interesting that the exposition of the different forms of reasoning that follows should be included in the Svātantrika section. In other synthetic works of this sort (for example, in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's *sGrub mtha' chen mo;* see *MOE*, pp. 639–658) such a discussion is included in the Prāsaṅgika section. This reasoning of the one and the many is just one of a series of logical strategies employed by the Madhyamaka. Following the exposition of this form of reasoning, mKhas grub rje discusses three other types in the context of the Svātantrika section (see later), and one other (reasoning from dependent arising) in the Prāsaṅgika section. The eleventh century rNying ma scholar Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po also discussed what he calls "the four great syllogisms that establish the nonarising of phenomena" (*chos skye ba med pa'i gtan tshigs chen po bzhi*), which he lists as follows: "*dBu ma'i phur bzhi dang / gcig dang du bral ba dang / mu bzhi skye ba 'gog pa dang / rten 'brel lo,*" to be found in his *lTa ba dang grub mtha' sna tshogs pa brjed byang du bgyis pa*, in *Selected Writings (Gsung Thor Bu) of Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po* (Leh: 'Khor gdon Gter-sprul 'Chi-med-rig-'dzin, 1974), pp. 348 ff.

508. See F. W. Thomas and H. Ui, "The Hand Treatise, a Work of Āryadeva," *JRAS* (1918): 267–310; and also F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, "The Hastavālanāmaprakaraṇavṛtti," *Journal of Religious Studies* 8 (1980): 18–31. On the question of the authorship of the text, see *AC*, p. 15. See also *EE*, p. 286 and n. 20; there, the author traces this same citation to the *Catuḥśataka*, but does not give the reference in the text. I have been unable to find this line in any edition of the *Catuḥśataka* at my disposal.

509. This section assumes a familiarity with the trimodal (*trairūpya, tshul gsum*) criterion; that is, the three properties all valid syllogisms must have. For an in-depth treatment of this question, see B. K. Matilal and R. D. Evans, eds., *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986). See also note 885.

510. These are the chief, though not the only, criteria for the existence of forward (*rjes*) and reverse (*ldog*) pervasion, respectively. For example, in the syllogism:

Subject: the smoke-ridden mountain
Predicate: has fire
Reason: because it has smoke.

forward pervasion exists because, among other things, the reason (smoke) exists exclusively in things concordant with the predicate (fire); that is, exists exclusively in things like wood fire or kitchen fires, and nowhere else. If it existed, for example, in water then there would be a case of something having smoke that does not have fire. The pervasion would fail, and the syllogism would be invalid.

511. rJe btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, in *Khabs dang po'i spyi don* (folio 26b), has slightly different wording for this criterion. He calls it "a valid cognition which ascertains that that [subject = person, for example,] is devoid of being either [truly one or many]," whereas rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, in *Thar lam gsal byed,* calls it "a valid cognition which ascertains an exemplification (*mtshan gzhi*) of the reason," in other words, a valid cognition that ascertains something which *is* the reason. mKhas grub rje is saying that the first criterion is simply that the reason itself must be ascertained by a valid cognition. That the difference in wording reflects basic philosophical differences is evident. According to rJe btsun pa, the criterion seems to become synonymous with the ascertainment of the *presence of the reason within the subject* (*phyogs chos*), whereas according to rGyal tshab rje's interpretation, it is sufficient to ascertain a chair, for example (that is, *anything* that is neither a true unity or plurality). mKhas grub rje's position seems to follow a middle path between these two, requiring that more than a mere exemplification of the reason be ascertained, but not requiring the ascertainment of the full *phyogs chos.* For more discussion on the discrepancies of interpretation among the major dGe lugs pa exegetes on this point, see *SOS*, pp. 371–379. See also *Bod rgya tshad ma rigs pa'i tshig mdzod,* pp. 206–207.

512. As earlier, this criterion says that nothing can be both devoid of being a true unity or plurality *and* truly existent. According to rJe bstun pa (folio 26b) this is the most difficult of the three cirteria to ascertain. The wording of this criterion in the latter is almost identical to mKhas grub rje's here, but rGyal tshab rje has instead "the valid cognition which refutes (*'gog byed*) the reason's (*rtag*) [existing] in the object to be refuted (*dgag bya'i chos*)."

513. In other words, the mutually exclusive character of *true* existence and nonexistence is understood by analogy to the case of existence and nonexistence. mKhas grub rje seems to be implying that, strictly in an abstract way, having to do with the formal logical nature of the dichotomy, one comes to understand that they are mutually exclusive, regardless of the categories being dealt with. There is a reason for this, and it has to do with the fact that this reasoning is meant to prove truthlessness for the first time. If, in the process of understanding the reasoning, the person to whom the syllogism is posited would have to understand truthlessness to understand the mutually exclusive character of true existence and truthlessness, then this reasoning could not be considered one that for the first time established truthlessness, which it is. It seems, therefore, that mKhas grub rje gets around this by showing how, through analogy to a much more straightforward example, this relationship can be intuited without having to have fully ascertained truthlessness. *Intuitively* here has the connotation of an understanding that does not rely directly on logical reasoning, but comes about simply by turning one's mind toward the object; see also the section entitled [The Reasoning Used to Prove That One Phenomenon Is Empty Applies to All Phenomena, Including Emptiness].

514. The question is this: does not true existence itself represent a case of something that is the reason, the absence of being a true unity or plurality, and something discordant to the predicate, that is, something not "truthless"? If so, is not the second criterion for the existence of pervasion violated?

515. The point being made here is that such a common locus must *exist*, and "true existence" does not. What is more, because it is nonexistent, nothing can be predicated of it; that is, it cannot be said to be "the absence of. . . ."

516. See *Catuḥśataka* (IX, 6, 12–19), (XIII, 5) and (XIV, 14) as well as the *Ṭīkā*, *P* dBu ma *ya*, folios 167b, 171a–174a, 210a, and 244a. See also *AC*, pp. 89–93, 118–119; and *MOE*, pp. 39, 337–338, 346, 373, 432, and 587–588.

517. This is, of course, a critique of the Abhidharmika notion of partless moments and not of momentariness in general. See K. Mimaki, *La réfutation Bouddhique de la permanence;* and S. Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980; first published in 1935). See also *Catuḥśataka* (IX, 17) and *Ṭīkā*, *P* dBu ma *ya*, folios 186b–187a; *AC*, pp. 106–107.

518. See notes 140, 142.

519. Here *noncomposite* refers to permanent entities such as space, *nirvāṇa*, reality, and so forth. See *AK* (I, 5–6). See also *Catuḥśataka* (IX, 56); *Ṭīkā*, *P* dBu ma *ya*, folio 167a; *AC*, pp. 88–89, n. 5. With this mKhas grub rje completes his proof of the fact that nothing (whether composite entity—matter or consciousness—or noncomposite entity) can be partless.

520. In the Tibetan scholastic tradition *path* most often refers to a form of consciousness, so that it is permissible to say that "a path perceives."

521. The essence body of a buddha is one kind of phenomenal body or *dharmakāya*, the other being the gnostic body or *jñānakāya*. An essence body is said to possess two purities: (1) "the purity or freedom from true existence" is the aspect of the essence body that is the emptiness or reality of a buddha's mind; and (2) "the purity or freedom from all defilements," the cessation of all negative factors attained by a buddha. Only a buddha is said to be able to directly perceive another buddha's essence body. See D. Snellgrove, *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 36–37, 115–116, and 250–251. A detailed study of this subject is currently being undertaken in a doctoral dissertation by John Makransky; see also his "Controversy over *Dharmakāya* in the Prajñāpāramitā Commentaries of India and Tibet" (unpublished, March 1987); P. J. Griffiths, "Buddha and God: A Contrastive Study in Ideas about Maximal Greatness," *Journal of Religion* 69, no. 4 (1989): 502–529; *MOE*, pp. 117–123; Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, pp. 401 ff; *IB*, pp. 39 passim.

522. The *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, especially in Chapter 4, explains the properties of each of the ten stages or *bhūmis*. Because a bodhisattva of the first stage has not rid himself of the stains of the second, he cannot perceive the cessation of these stains; and because that cessation is reality, he cannot perceive the reality of the second stage, that is, the reality perceived by being on the second level, much less the reality of buddhahood.

523. This refers to the pot in the case of "emptiness or reality of the pot," for example.

524. *blo'i yul du byar rung ba,* "being able to be taken as an object of the mind," that is, being able to be known, is the definition of a phenomenon, of an existing thing, given in many of the Tibetan exegetical works. See, for example, Geshe L. Sopa and J. Hopkins, *The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1976), pp. 92–93; *Bod rgya tshad ma rig pa'i tshig mdzod,* p. 328.

525. For a similar discussion concerning the example of the magician's illusion see the section entitled "The Analysis of the Svātantrika's Object of Refutation Based on the Example of the Illusion."

526. See section I, "Citing the reason," at the beginning of this section.

527. mKhas grub rje is here making several profound points. First of all, he is making the nontrivial claim that the opponent to whom the syllogism is directed is a realist who has never understood truthlessness. He is also stating that realizing truthlessness in regard to the example (of the reflection) does not constitute realizing truthlessness in general. Finally, he is claiming that if the opponent *had* understood truthlessness already,, then the syllogism would be pointless, for understanding truthlessness in regard to one phenomenon allows one to intuit the truthlessness of any other phenomenon without having to go through the inferential process over again. It should be noted that this goes counter to Se ra rJe bstun pa's theory of the workings of the unity-plurality reasoning in specific and his views on the workings of the inferential understanding of emptiness in general. To go into the details of how this is so would require a more elaborate exposition than is appropriate here. It is a subject to which I plan to devote an article in the near future.

528. We have seen that what makes a mirage or reflection incorrect is that an ordinary being of the world can perceive that it does not exist as it appears. If, however, to ascertain that something does not exist as it appears, one must ascertain truthlessness, then no ordinary being of the world could understand that a mirage does not exist as it appears, and so the basis for making this distinction between correct and incorrect conventionalities would vanish.

529. In general, reasoning from nonperception (*ma dmigs pa'i rtags*), one of the three main types of reasoning, is said to be of two types: nonperception in which what is negated (*dgag bya'i chos su btags pa'i don*) could in principle appear (*snang rung ma dmigs pa'i rtags*), and nonperception in which what is negated, even in principle, could not appear (*mi snang ba ma dmigs pa'i rtags*) to the person to whom the syllogism is being posited. Consider an example of the former:

Subject: in the place where a pot is not perceived by a valid cognition
Predicate: there is no pot
Reason: because it is not perceived by a valid cognition.

What is being negated, the pot or its existence, in principle can appear—we see pots all the time. This is also a type of syllogism called "nonperception of the essence" (*rang bzhin ma dmgigs pa*) because the reason, nonperception by a valid cognition, is the essence of, the nature of, or we might say the defining characteristic of, nonexistence.

Now consider another example of this first kind of syllogism:

Subject: on the cliff devoid of trees
Predicate: there are no *Sha ba* trees
Reason: because there are no trees.

Here *tree* is a category that is wider than, that is, extends over, the smaller category of "*Sha ba* trees," and it should be noted that the oral tradition adds that *Sha ba* are low-lying bushlike trees that the opponent in this syllogism cannot perceive (because of his/her distance from the site, say). In addition to being a reason in which the object of negation in principle could appear to the opponent to whom the syllogism is posited, this type of reasoning is also a kind of syllogism called *nonperception of a more extensive category* (*khyab byed ma dmigs pa*).

The question then becomes whether the reasoning from the lack of being a unity or plurality is a form of reasoning from "the nonperception of the essence" or from "the nonperception of a more extensive category." Though mKhas grub rje claims it is the latter, based on the passage from the *Āloka*, rJe bstun pa seems to imply that the two are not mutually exclusive, and that it is both.

In addition, the syllogism based on the reason from "being devoid of being a unity or plurality" is said to be "reasoning that establishes only the term" (*tha snyad 'ba' zhig sgrub kyi rtags*). What this means is a point of some controversy. Some claim that the opponent to whom the reasoning is posited has understood the entire meaning (*don*) or essence (*rang bzhin*) of the predicate, but has never heard the subject called by that name (*ming*), that is, is unaware of the linguistic symbol (*rda*) or term (*tha snyad*) found within the predicate; in other words, that the opponent, in dependence on such a reason, has understood all that is implied within the meaning of "truthlessness" and now merely learns to predicate the term *truthless* of the subject.

Other scholars within the tradition maintain that this reasoning does not simply allow the opponent to *name* something as truthless, but that it is the vehicle through which the opponent comes to negate that the subject truly exists, hence bringing with it a deeper understanding than mere linguistic learning.

The classification of this form of reasoning brings up many very profound and important issues, which, unfortunately, can be dealt with here only in a cursory way.

It is normally the case that all forms of reasoning from nonperception that establish only the term are forms of reasoning from the nonperception of the essence (because the predicate and reason, related as defined-definition, are of the same nature). As mKhas grub rje makes it quite clear that the reasoning from the lack of being a unity or plurality is a form of reasoning from the nonperception of a more extensive category, however, his position is that not all forms of reasoning from nonperception that establish the term *are* forms of reasoning from the nonperception of the essence.

530. There was in Tibet a controversy concerning whether all reasoning that established only the term had to be reasoning from the nonperception of essence. *KDJ* makes it clear here that this form of reasoning is not both reasoning from the nonperception of essence *and* from the nonperception of an extending category, but only the latter, contra Se ra rJe bstun pa's opinion. See the previous note.

531. See *CMDR*, p. 276; *MOE*, pp. 54–57, 131–150, and 639–650.

532. Toh. no. 3887, dBu ma *sa*, folio 190a. See *SOS*, pp. 326–327; *EE*, pp. 277–281, 286–287, where the source in the canon is wrongly identified.

533. The text reads *bdag skye* ("arising from itself"), but this makes no sense in the present context. I therefore have emended it to read *gzhan skye* and translated it accordingly. See later section 3.3.1.2.1.A.

534. Compare to *Catuḥśataka* (IX, 9–11); *Ṭīkā*, dBu ma *ya*, folios 169b–171a; *AC*, pp. 90–91.

535. Compare to the arguments at the begining of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (v. 1–3). The theory is that what makes a_1 and a_2, both the results of cause A, arise sequentially (at times t_1 and t_2, respectively) is that A is changing, that it is different just before t_1 and t_2. If it were not, then there would be no reason why a_1 and a_2 should arise at t_1 and t_2, respectively, for their causes would be exactly the same at both times. Hence, a_2 could (and in fact would) arise at t_1 together with a_1, as would all of A's other effects. What is more, if a_1 were the effect of A at t_1, then even at t_2 and t_3, and so on a_1 would also have to arise because its cause would be exactly the same at those times as it was at t_1. Hence, if a_1 arises from A at t_1, it would also have to do so at t_2, t_3, and so on, otherwise, a_1 could not arise even once.

536. See section II.B.1.b. of the exposition of the section [The Reasoning of the One and the Many].

537. Toh. no. 3887, dBu ma *sa*, folio 196a.

538. Toh. no. 3887, dBu ma *sa*, folio 196a; *TTC* omits *skad cig* in the line: "*des na dus mtha'i mtshan nyid (skad cig) ma nyams par 'gyur ro.*"

539. This line does not exist, as mKhas grub rje claims, at the end of the previous passage from the *Āloka*.

540. That is to say, a valid cognition exists that repudiates the nonexistence of the reason (that it is other) in the discordant side (that it arises ultimately from another). This is because, claims the opponent, there is a valid cognition that ascertains that what is other (the reason) ultimately arises from what it is other than (the discordant side).

541. Existence does not prove impermanence because there are existent things that are not impermanent; for example, space and certain kinds of cessation.

542. Toh. no. 3887; dBu ma *sa*, folio 198a.

543. The Prāsaṅgikas are said to accept a more subtle object because they accept that arising from another can be taken as the object negated by the syllogism without seeing a need to qualify it with the word *ultimately*.

544. See *MOE*, pp. 61–63, 151–154, and 651–658.

545. Toh. no. 3881, dBu ma *sa*, folio 2a; See Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 80; *EE*, p. 287; and also *MOE*, p. 654.

546. See note 140.

547. It is clear how it is that this refutes one lone cause giving rise to one lone effect, but not how it refutes the second extreme, that a lone cause can give rise to many effects. This is left unexplained.

548. mKhas grub rje here is implying that the combination of the three *does* give rise to the threefold aspects of consciousness, but that it does not do so in an ultimate way; hence, he seems to be implying that the fourth alternative needs to be qualified by the word *ultimately*.

549. This is part of v. 49 of Atīśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa*, Toh. no. 3947, dBu ma *ki*.

550. So that it would be pointless to take this as the interpretation of the verse, as the verse is attempting to refute a strictly realist position, which this is not, it being one advocated by the Mādhyamikas as well.

551. See *LSN*, folios 63a–113b. As mentioned earlier, the distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika as the two branches of the Madhyamaka is one we find only in Tibet, and there only as one among several different ways of subdividing this school of tenets (*grub mtha'*). In the present context the term *Prāsaṅgika* refers to the tradition founded by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. General treatments of the Prāsaṅgika school from Tibetan dGe lugs pa perspectives are to be found in Geshe L. Sopa and J. Hopkins, *The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1990), pp. 301–320; *MOE*, pp. 36 passim; J. Hopkins, ed. and trans., *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider, 1980); J. Hopkins, *Emptiness Yoga: The Middle Way Consequence School* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1987). See also *EOE*, pp. 33–336.

552. See *LRCM*, folios 419b ff.

553. A translation of a portion of Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* that deals with this subject is to be found in C. W. Huntington, "A Non-referential View of Language and Conceptual Thought in the Work of Tsong kha pa," *PEW* 33, no. 4 (1983).

554. *Catuḥśataka* (VIII, 3); *P* no. 5246, dBu ma *tsha*, folio 10a. See also *AC*, pp. 78–79.

555. *P* no. 5266, dBu ma *ya*, folio 149a.

556. (I, 80); *P* no. 5658, mDo 'grel gTam yig *nge*, folio 132b.

557. (XI, 16), (XII, 7). Cited in *Pras* in the commentary on *MMK*, Chapter 4. See *CMDR*, p. 371.

558. Toh. no. 13, Sher phyin *ka*, folio 3a.

559. It is, of course, principally the Jo nang pas who maintain that the ultimate, qua positive luminous entity, truly exists. See, for example, Dol bu pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan, *Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho* (Delhi: Dodrup Sangye Lama, n.d.), pp. 4 passim. mKhas grub rje, however, makes a distinction between truly existing and being the truth, between ultimately existing and being the ultimate truth. Emptiness, that is, reality, is the latter in each case but never the former. Indeed in the dGe lugs pa ontol-

ogy nothing truly or ultimately exists. On other polemics concerning this point, viz. between sTag tshang and 'Jam dyangs bzhad pa, see *MOE*, pp. 171–173. mKhas grub rje, in *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma*, folio 174b, discusses such positions as *don dam bden pa bden grub du 'dod pa* with a view to refuting them, as he does here. Consider also a similar view to the one being criticized here, namely that the "nondual wisdom that cognizes emptiness" truly exists, in Śākya mchog ldan, *Shing rta chen po'i srol gnyis . . . kyi rgyas 'grel*, pp. 430 ff.

560. See the section entitled [The Reasoning of the One and the Many].

561. The point of this argument is to show that one cannot maintain that conventional phenomena are truthless while claiming that reality, the ultimate quality of conventional phenomena, truly exists. As is clear, this follows from their relationship as basis and dependent.

562. *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 1a.

563. *MA* (VI, 19), p. 95.

564. The several arguments that follow are very difficult to render into English because they play off of a fundamental ambiguity in the Tibetan language concerning the nature of adverbial constructions. This last passage might also be translated "perceives reality to be ultimate." See n. 571.

565. Again, this same phrase might just as well be rendered "that reality is perceived as an ultimate."

566. See *MOE*, pp. 381–397, 616–623; *TTG*, pp. 146 passim; see also note 521.

567. In other words, if the reality of sentient beings' minds are their nature bodies, and if this reality is contained within the continua of sentient beings, how could the opponent repudiate that sentient beings have nature bodies, and are thus fully enlightened buddhas?

568. The nature body is not only something that belongs to the buddha, but in fact it is the buddha.

569. kLong drol bla ma gives a list of eighteen. *MA* (VI, 179–218) and its ancillary literature are the locus classicus for the list of sixteen. See also *MOE*, pp. 201–205. A similar list is also found in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Piṇḍārtha* of Dignāga. For bibliographical references to the different lists of the different emptinesses, see *EOE*, p. 215, n. 57.

570. This refers to permanent phenomena like noncomposite space, cessation and so forth. See *AK* and *Bhāṣya*, especially on verse (II, 55).

571. The argument here, and throughout this section, is at times extremely difficult to put into English because it is based on an ambiguity of Tibetan syntax, in which statements like "*x* is an ultimate" and "*x* ultimately exists" are expressed in the same way as *x don dam par grub* or *don dam par x grub*. See n. 564.

572. See earlier, pp. 160–161; see also *CMDR*, pp. 365 passim.

573. *Catuḥśataka* (VIII, 16); Toh. no. 3846, dBu ma *tsha*, folio 9b; an extremely important verse in dGe lugs pa exegetical literature. For the Sanskrit and for references to its citation in other works, see *AC*, p. 83, n. 16. This and the following two passages are cited in *Pras*, as the last stanzas of Chapter 4. See J. May, *Candrakīrti*, p. 95. This section from *Pras* is clearly the source for mKhas grub rje's present discussion.

574. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see May, ibid., p. 95.

575 See note 557.

576. There is an alternate version of this line that has *dngos gcig* for *bden nyid*, making the alternate reading, "He who sees the reality of one thing." This passage is also found cited in *Pras*. See n. 573.

577. Cited also in *Prasannapadā*, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri (Benares: Bauddha Bharati, 1989), p. 195; Toh. no. 3860, dBu ma *'a*, folio 147a.

578. *MMK* (VII, 32).

579. Following the epistemology and ontology of Dharmakīrti, mKhas grub rje is here maintaining the traditional parallel between composite-impermanent-particular-real-efficacious things on the one hand and noncomposite-permanent-universals-unreal phenomena on the other. See, for example, M. Hattori, *Dignāga on Perception, Being the* Pratyakṣapariccheda *of Dignāga's* Pramāṇasamuccaya (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 14, 80, n. 14; also the literature surrounding *PV, Pratyakṣa* Chapter, v. 1 passim. Emptiness, because it falls into the latter, is considered a nonfunctioning, permanent fact; which is not to say that the *cognition* of emptiness (wisdom—which *is* a functioning real particular) cannot help human beings to achieve desired goals.

580. See Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*, especially section 5.2.5 ff.

581. See the section entitled [The Meaning of "According with the World" in the Prāsaṅgika System].

582. Within the present context this most likely refers to minds that still have conceptions, unlike the buddhas, whose omniscient minds are said to perceive all phenomena *directly*, without the intervention of images (*don spyi*).

583. For example, when they are hungry, they eat without analyzing what "hunger" is.

584. See section 4.2.3.1.2.1.2.1. This is the central theme of *DAE;* see also *MOE*, pp. 38 passim.

585. The problem is a simple one. If the Buddha does not think conceptually (because his omniscient mind perceives all phenomena directly, as our senses, for example, perceive their objects) then, if phenomena are things that, to exist, require being

labeled by conceptual thought, (this being the only kind of existence they possess), how can phenomena originally posited by the Buddha be said to exist before they form part of the conceptual thought patterns of worldly beings? This is the paradox that mKhas grub rje is attempting to address here. What he means by the Buddha's having created these linguistic symbols "in dependence upon the conceptual thought of the disciples" remains vague but gives us the impression that even religious-philosophical terminology (whose aim after all is the pragmatic one of eliminating suffering) has its ultimate origins in the source of suffering, namely, in the conceptual minds of worldly sentient beings, and is an enlightened adaptation of already existing terms to fulfill soteriological goals. According to this theory, then, the Buddha did not teach any new concepts (terms). He simply employed old concepts in new syntactical structures.

586. Cited in *Pras.* For a complete discussion of this passage, see May, *Candrakīrti*, pp. 156–157. My translation here varies slightly from May's.

587. Cited in *Prasannapadā*, ed. Shastri, p. 60; Toh. no. 3860, dBu ma *'a*, folio 48b.

588. *Samādhirājasūtra* (XXXVIII, 24); Vaidya, ed., p. 267; Toh. no. 127, mDo sde *da*, folio 147a. The last line is actually from another verse: *Samādhirājasūtra* (XXXVIII, 32); Vaidya, ed., p. 238; Toh. no. 127, mDo sde *da*, folio 147b;

589. Cited in *Prasannapadā*, ed. Shastri, p. 148; Toh. no. 3860, dBu ma *'a*, folio 113a.

590. Cited in *Pras*, See May, *Candrakīrti*, p. 204, for complete references concerning this passage.

591. Toh. no. 60, dKon rtsegs *nga*, folio 43a.

592. From *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, Toh. no. 8, Sher phyin *ka*, folios 74b–75a.

593. See previous note.

594. *P* no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 24a.

595. (I, 99–100); *P* no. 5658, gTam yig *nge*, folio 133b. The Sanskrit to this passage is found cited in *Prasannapadā*, ed. P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), p. 179, as in *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka*.

596. (II, 14); Toh. no. 4158, sPring yig *ge*, folio 111a. Also cited in Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* (Sarnath: Gelukpa Students' Welfare Committee, 1984), p. 140.

597. As they do not exist, they are refuted by means of demonstrating a contradiction when assumed or hypothesized to exist.

598. *Catuḥśataka* (XIV, 23cd); *P* no. 5346, dBu ma *tsha*, folio 17b. See also *AC*, pp. 134–135.

599. *P* no. 5266, dBu ma *ya*, folios 250b–251a.

600. See *LRCM*, folios 433a–447a. See also Jeffrey Hopkins, "A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School," *Tibet Journal* 14, no. 1, (1989): 10–43. Paul Williams, in his introduction to this volume, "Introduction—Some Random Reflections on the Study of Tibetan Madhyamaka," comments (p. 4) that "it is interesting in reading Hopkins' paper to see just how slim is the Indian evidence for the distinction as drawn by dGe lugs pa scholars between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka. A corollary of this is the scope for creative development, and for rival interpretations and therefore genuine debate within Tibetan thought."

601. A position held historically by Go ram pa. In *BPD*, p. 361, folio 28a, he states very clearly: "*thal 'gyur ba dang / rang rgyud pa gnyis te / don dam gyi 'dod tshul la ni khyad par med do.*"

602. This is reminiscent of an argument that occurs at the beginning of *LSN* in which a similar position is ascribed to the "Great Chinese Commentary" on the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*. See *EE*, p. 192 and n. 3.

603. *Satyadvaya* (v. 20). See Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, pp. 88–89, 174.

604. Whereas the realists at least are consistent in maintaining a strictly realist position throughout.

605. The gist of this rather involved argument seems to be that simply because a consciousness is nonerroneous in one respect (in perceiving the whiteness of the moon or in the sense that a pillar appearing to it can function as the pillar that it appears to be) does not imply that it is nonerroneous in every respect (for example, it may be erroneous, in the former case, in having two moons appear to it instead of one, and in the latter case in having that pillar appear as if it existed from its own side). How this is a response to the opponent's argument, or indeed that such an argument even needs a response, is baffling to me.

606. The former is not true because in the Sautrāntika system such a difference is a mere conceptual imputation that has no status as a real entity. See the "Sautrāntika" chapter of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po's *Grub mtha' rin chen phreng ba*, translated in Geshe Sopa and Hopkins, *The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*; and also Anne Klein, *Knowledge and Liberation* (*KL*) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986), pp. 33–67.

607. This is a statement of the *apoha* theory of the Pramāṇika school. See Leonard Zwilling, "Dharmakīrti on Apoha" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1976); Masaaki Hattori, "*Apoha* and *Pratibhā*," *Sanskrit and Indian Studies* (Boston: Reidel, 1979); Dhirendra Sharma, *The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic* (Paris: Mouton, 1969); and Klein, *KL*, pp. 141–182.

608. *PV* (I, 40). See R. Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti* (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960), p. 24; see also *KL*, p. 46. In the case of a table, for example, a concordant entity would be another table, whereas a discordant entity would be, say, space. In the Sautrāntika system, every entity is said to

be specific unto itself because it is the opposite of or different from every other entity, both those concordant and discordant to it.

609. This shows quite clearly that for mKhas grub rje "existing by virtue of own characteristic" (*rang gi msthan nyid kyis grub pa*) and "being a *svalakṣaṇa*" (*rang gi mtshan nyid yin pa*), in the Sautrāntika system, are equivalent statements. This is a disputed point in the tradition.

610. This is commented on by Klein, *KL*, pp. 139–140.

611. *PV* (I, 112c); Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*, p. 58.

612. *PV* (I, 76); Gnoli, ibid., p. 44.

613. *MA* (VI, 36), p. 122; *EOE*, p. 161.

614. *MA*, pp. 122–123.

615. *MA* (VI, 170), p. 292; *EOE*, p. 178.

616. *MA*, p. 292.

617. *MA* (VI, 61), p. 154; *EOE*, p. 164, which corrects la Vallée Poussin's text and translation of this verse.

618. The argument baffles me, for all that mKhas grub rje has managed to prove by citing these passages from Candrakīrti is that he does not accept existence by virtue of own characteristic, something the opponent seems willing to grant. It entails nothing of the Svātantrika position, which is where the real disagreement seems to be. In other words, it does not in any way prove that the Svātantrikas *do* accept this kind of existence.

619. Although the entire argument confounds me, I find this third option especially baffling. It would seem to me that what the opponent is trying to urge here is that there is no scriptural basis on which to make a distinction between "existence by virtue of own characteristic" and "true existence," and hence that this is no basis on which to distinguish the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas.

620. *MA* (VI, 34), p. 117; *EOE*, p. 161, where the last line has been mistranslated.

621. *MA*, p. 117.

622. This is the syllogism that will be spoken of in what follows.

623. That is, no subject in the syllogism.

624. *MA* (VI, 35), p. 120; *EOE*, p. 161.

625. *MA*, p. 119.

626. This is an extremely significant point in Tsong kha pa's and mKhas grub rje's interpretation of the Madhyamaka. Elsewhere, specifically in the rebuttal of the one who does not go far enough in his refutation, see section 4.2.3.1.2.2. both authors

criticize the viewpoint that the Madhyamaka is involved in a critique of essences. Both are also quite willing to accept that nominally a thing's definition (*mtshan nyid*) is its essence or nature, and both repeatedly use terminology such as "of the same nature" (*rang bzhin gcig*).

627. See note 461.

628. The Sautrāntikas, for example, consider them essenceless because such entities are not considered to be potentially efficacious. See *PV* (III, 3); also *KL*, pp. 35, 222, n. 3; also Y. Kajiyama, "Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv Für Indiche Philosophie* (1973); also *MOE*, pp. 113 passim, especially Appendix 4.

629. Hence, contradicting the first verse of *MMK*, "*yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃśivam.*"

630. See section 4.2.3.1.3.4.

631. *MMK* (XXIV, 18).

632. Compare to kLong rdol bla ma's characterization of a related position that he attributes to the early sTag tshang lo tsā ba, in *dBu ma'i ming gi rnam grangs*, p. 436.

633. *P no. 5224, dBu ma tsa*, folio 10b.

634. Toh. no. 3864, dBu ma *ya*, folio 8a.

635. Ibid., folio 7b.

636. The opponent accepts the "cycle" that if something is posited by the mind, then it must be created.

637. The former refers to the classical "twelve links" formulation as it applies to the cyclic process of rebirth of sentient beings. The latter refers simply to the interdependent nature of causality in general. See *MOE*, pp. 275–283; also *DAE*, especially pp. 223–235 and 287–298; and D. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1975).

638. The text reads "*don de ma yin bzhin du don de yin par rtog pas btags pas rtog btags su brjod pa ma yin la.*" This passage is obscure and may very well be a corruption in the text. All corrections that seem plausible, however, seem to be equally as obscure.

639. *MMK* (XXIV, 33d). *Svabhāva kriyate na hi*. Kalupahana, *Causality*, p. 350, mistranslates "For, self nature does not perform." See section 4.2.3.1.2.1.2.2.3.

640. *MA*, pp. 261–262.

641. Here mKhas grub rje (and the dGe lugs pas in general) follow the Abhidharmika notion that speech, being the physical sound of the words, is itself a real entity (*dngos po*). See *AK* (I, 10b); *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, trans. la Vallée

Poussin, p. 17; also, P. Jaini, "The Vaibhāṣika Theory of Words and Meaning," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (1959): 95–107.

642. The point here seems to be that non true existence does not imply false existence any more than not being nonerroneous implies being erroneous. Emptiness, for example, does not truly exist but it is also not a false thing: it is the truth. It is worth clarifying this point in general, as it is an important one in dGe lugs pa exegesis. Only emptiness is considered to be nonerroneous (*mi slu ba*) because its mode of appearance corresponds to its mode of existence, at least when it is perceived by the direct gnosis of an *āryan*. All other phenomena are considered erroneous (*slu ba*), for, although they do not inherently exist, they appear to do so. There are times, however, when conventional phenomena, like cause and effect, are called unerring (*mi slu*). This does not mean that they are nonerroneous, but that they are unfailing; that is, that a cause, for example, will always produce its effect unerringly, without fail. In general, *false* (*rdzun pa*) is a synonym for *erroneous*. Hence, all conventional phenomena are said to be false (or falsities), whereas emptiness is said to be true (or the truth) and nonerroneous. Though it is true (*bden pa yin pa*), it does not truly exist (*bden par ma grub pa*). This last claim is slightly more problematic in Tibetan than in English, for the Tibetan expression *bden par grub pa* can plausibly express two things: (1) truly existing, where the *bden par* (truly) is taken as an adverb modifying the verb *grub pa* (to exist), or (2) "being the truth," more literally, "existing as the truth," for the construction *x y* (*in locative*) *verb to exist* is often used to signify that *x* is *y*, as in, for example, *sgra mi rtag par grub pa* ("sound is impermanent"). To avoid this ambiguity, the convention here (in philosophical circles) is to let the expression *bden par grub pa* take on only the first of these two significances and express something's being the truth by another expression (such as *bden par yin pa*). A confusion between these two possible meanings of the expression *bden par ma grub pa*, claims mKhas grub rje, brings the opponent to claim that because emptiness is not truly existent, it is not the truth.

643. *Madhyamakāloka*, *D* dBu ma *sa*, folio 210b, attributes this, with a slightly different reading, to the *Śrīmālādevi Sūtra*. The passage is also cited in Buddhapālita's commentary, Toh. no. 3842, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 217b; in *Pras*, pp. 41, 237; and, according to the latter, in the commentary to *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (IX, 2).

644. *MMK* (XIII, 1); *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 9a. Kalupahana's (p. 217) translation of the title of this chapter (the Saṃskāra chapter) as "Examination of Action and Agent" is misleading, as is his interpretation and critique of the Tibetan translation.

645. See *Pras*, pp. 237–238.

646. The latter is a common and indisputable property of such an equipoise, a corollary of its being a mind in which the appearance of duality has waned (*gnyis snang nub pa'i blo*).

647. This refers to the object that actually exists, but is misperceived by ignorance and reified into a truly existent entity. In other words, it is the conventionally existent self, as opposed to the false self that is constructed with this former entity, the conventionally existent self, as its perceived object. On the distinctions made in dGe lugs pa

exegesis between the different kinds of objects (*dngos yul, gzung yul, 'jug yul, snang yul*, and so on), see *KL*, pp. 38 passim. See also *MOE*, pp. 177–178, 678–679.

648. This begins the section on the selflessness of the person. See *MMK*, Chapter 18; *Pras*, pp. 340–381; *CS*, Chapter 10 (*AC*, pp. 95–103); and *MA* (VI, 120 ff). For a detailed treatment of this subject in Tsong kha pa, see *CMDR*, pp. 336–371; *EE*, pp. 141 ff; and in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, *MOE*, pp. 677–697. For a brief exposition of the nature of the self in the different Buddhist philosophical schools as systematized by a later Tibetan exegete, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po (1728–1790), see Sopa and Hopkins, *The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 111–321; also *MOE*, pp. 175–193; A. Engle, "The Buddhist Theory of Self According to Acārya Candrakīrti" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1982); J. Duerlinger, "Candrakīrti's Denial of the Self," *PEW* 34, no. 3 (1984).

649. *MA*, pp. 261–262.

650. See *Pudgalaviniścaya*, an appendix to T. Stcherbatsky, *The Soul Theory of the Buddhists* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986; reprint); *AK*, Chapter 9; trans. L. de la Vallée Poussin, vols. 5–6, pp. 227–302. The *Vyākhyā* explains the opponents being refuted therein to be "the Vātsīputrīyas; that is, the Ārya Saṃmitīyas" (la Vallée Poussin, p. 227). The view that mKhas grub rje ascribes to the Saṃmitīyas here does not, however, seem to correspond to that in *AK*. See also the Vātsīputrīya chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, trans. G. Jha, Gaekwad Oriental Series (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929–37); and also A. Bareau, *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petite Véhicule* (Saigon: Bulletin de L'École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1955).

651. This *sūtra* is also quoted in *Bhāṣya* to *AK* (V, 7) and in the ninth chapter of *AK*; la Vallée Poussin (Chapter 5, p. 17; Chapter 9, p. 253) identifies the origin of the citation as *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (III, 46); see also *mDzod rang 'grel* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*) (Dharmasala: Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1967), p. 287; the two citations (the latter and *TTC*'s) vary insignificantly. The passage as cited in *AK*, however, is quoted not by the Vātsīputrīya (who is portrayed as accepting that the self is neither the same as nor different from the aggregates, but an ineffable substance) but by Vasubandhu in support of his own position (that no such ineffable self exists). See previous note. This same citation is paraphrased in *MA* (VI, 126cd).

652. Many similar passages are to be found in the *Udānavarga* (XXIII, 10 ff), but nothing exactly like the present one.

653. *Udānavarga* (*Tshoms*) (XXXI, 1).

654. See *AKB*, Chapter 9; P. Pradhan ed., op. cit., pp. 470–471. *P* no. 5591, mNgon pa *ngu*, folio 102b.

655. See, for example, *AKB*, trans. la Vallée Poussin, Chapter 3, p. 57 [commentary on (III,18)]; also Chapter 9, pp. 258–259.

656. See *AKB*, Chapter 9; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*, ed. Pradhan, pp. 470–471. *P* no. 5591, mNgon pa *ngu*, folio 102b. Neither this nor the previous passage seem to correspond exactly to *TTC*.

657. See *AKB*, Chapter 9; Pradhan ed., ibid., pp. 470–471; ***P* no. 5591, mNgon** pa *ngu*, folio 102b.

658. This refers to the Sautrāntikas who base themselves on the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

659. For an extensive discussion of Bhāvaviveka's position regarding the self according to later dGe lugs pa exegetes and their defense of the views expressed here and in Tsong kha pa, see *MOE*, pp. 897–903, and n. 791.

660. Toh. no. 3856, dBu ma *dza*, folio 80b; *C* dBu ma *dza*, folio 80b. See also *EE*, pp. 301–303; *MOE*, pp. 898–900.

661. The reasoning is similar: arising's being a labeled entity does not imply that all composite entities are labeled, even though arising itself is such an entity.

662. Whether all these realists *actually* accept that the self is a substantial entity is questionable. In any case, mKhas grub rje's stance is that it is a view they are forced into through reasoning, and the point here is that if that mind apprehends the self to be such an entity, and it indeed *is*, then they have accepted the absurdity that the innate misapprehension of the self is not a mistaken mind.

663. Cited in *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā*, folio 155b; and also in Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, ed. Sarnath, p. 369.

664. Cited by Bhāvaviveka in *Tarkajvālā*, *P* no. 5256, dBu ma *sa*, folio 36. Also cited in the *Bhāṣya* to *MA* (VI, 135); see also *MA* (VI, 166–167); *MOE*, pp. 694, 698; *EE*, p. 303 and n. 47; and *CMDR*, p. 337; Wayman (*CMDR*, p. 473, n. 328) speculates on the possible source. See also *Milindapañha*, trans. T. W. Rhys Davids, in *The Questions of King Milinda* (New York: Dover Books, 1963; reprint of the 1890 ed.), pp. 43–45.

665. See *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra: A Mahāyāna Text*, trans. D. T. Suzuki (Boulder, Colo.: Prajna Press, 1978; reprint), p. 122. See also *CMDR*, pp. 349, 474, n. 344; and also *MMK* (XXVII, 3) and its commentaries.

666. Of course, there is no such thing as tortoise skin.

667. This is one of the famous "undeclared views" (*avyākṛtavastu*). See my discussion of this subject in *DBPL*, pp. 129–156.

668. See D. S. Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Catuṣkoti* and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism," *JIP* 5 (1977): 1–71.

669. *MA* (VI, 127–130), pp. 245–252; *EOE*, pp. 172–173.

670. The argument, to put it mildly, is a bit circular, oftentimes assuming presuppositions the imaginary opponent would never agree to.

671. See note 651.

672. The innate view of the self of the person is a general misapprehension of the self based on anyone's aggregates. The view in regard to the perishable group of ag-

gregates (*'jigs tshogs la lta ba*) refers specifically to the misapprehensions of the self based upon one's own aggregates alone. See *MA* (VI, 120), p. 179 passim.

673. In other words, all of these logical attacks are against the self as perceived by this innate misapprehension of the self. Were this not an erroneous mind, such contradictions would not only be meaningless but impossible.

674. The direct object, that is, the object that actually appears to this innate apprehension of the self, of course, is nonexistent. The perceived object is the entity actually being perceived and mistaken for this false self, and it exists.

675. On these meditative states see Paul J. Griffiths, *On Being Mindless* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986).

676. *"ci yang med pa'i skye mched,"* the third *samāpatti* or formless absorption. See previous note.

677. When he goes into single pointed concentration on emptiness, for example.

678. This is usually said to refer to the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha's* direct understanding of the selflessness of the person.

679. *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti Spuṭārtha,* ed. R. Tripathi, Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica 2 (Sarnath: CIHTS, 1988), p. 7 (tib. ed.); p. 5 (skt. ed.).

680. Toh. no. 3887, dBu ma *sa,* folio 227a.

681. See W. Rahula, trans., *Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine (Philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1980), p. 65.

682. *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, v. 272cd–274ab, *Pramāṇavārttika of Acārya Dharmakīrti,* ed. S. Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968), pp. 91–92.

683. This seems to contradict what is said at the end of section 4.2.3.1.2.1.2.2.3., namely that to negate the existence of the object of the *philosophical* apprehensions of a self is not to negate the existence of the object of the *innate* apprehension of the self. One is almost tempted here to propose a radical emendation so that the text reads, "if one negates the existence of such a permanent, unitary, and independent [self] one *does not* also negate the existence of a person who is a self-sufficient, substantial [entity]."

684. There are four aspects, that is, characteristics, associated with each of the four noble truths. Hence, the truth of suffering has associated with it the aspects of impermanence, suffering, selflessness and emptiness, and so forth. For a detailed discussion of this subject, see *MOE,* pp. 292–296.

685. *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, v. 255cd; *Pramāṇavārttika of Acārya Dharmakīrti,* ed. Shastri, p. 86. See also J. Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (*CTB*) (London: Rider, 1980), p. 153.

686. See Rong zom chos kyi bzang po, *lTa ba dang grub mtha' sna tshogs pa brjed byang*, pp. 335–339, and especially pp. 365–374, for a treatment of this subject from a substantially different perspective.

687. This very subject is treated at length in the fourth chapter of Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*. See my "Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti* on the Authenticity of the Mahāyāna *Sūtras*," forthcoming from SUNY Press in an anthology of essays on traditional hermeneutics in South Asia, ed. J. Timm.

688. This refers to the path of accumulation (*tshog lam*).

689. This could alternatively be translated "within one lifetime." It is clear from other contexts, however, that one meditative session is being referred to, as the bodhisattva, according to the *śrāvaka* schools, proceeds through all of these stages in one final sitting under the bodhi tree. The word *rten*, however, ofttimes does connote a bodily existence, that is, a lifetime.

690. *AK* (VI, 24); see also trans. la Vallée Poussin, Chapter 6, p. 177.

691. There are different ways of enumerating these, for example:

1. the transfer from Tuṣita
2. the conception
3. the birth
4. the mastery of conventional arts and sciences
5. the great renunciation
6. the six years of ascetic practices
7. the journey to Vajrāsana (Bodhgaya)
8. sitting under the bodhi tree
9. the overcoming of the Māras
10. the enlightenment
11. the turning of the wheel of the doctrine
12. the *nirvāṇa* (passing away)

For more on this, see Mi bskyod rdo rje, *rGyud bla ma'i rnam 'grel* (Sikkim: Rumtek Monastery Press, undated blockprint), folio 174a; also rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, *rGyud bla Dar ṭīk*, in the *Collected Works* (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1982), pp. 677–678; *The Twelve Deeds of the Buddha (Lalitavistara)*, translated from the Mongolian by N. Pope, Asiatische Forschungen 23 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1967) and *The Voice of the Buddha: The Beauty of Compassion*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: Dharma Publications, 1983).

692. This is in contradistinction to the Mahāyāna claim that all twelve actions were the play acting of an already enlightened being. See rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, *sPyi don* to the first chapter of *AA* (Bylakuppe: Sera Monastery, blockprint edition, undated), folio 9a ff.

693. See the section entitled [Innate and Philosophical Misconceptions].

694. *MA* (VI, 131), p. 253.

695. See *CMDR*, pp. 336 ff; see also my remarks concerning the "eight great difficult points" (*dka' gnas chen po brgyad*), in the *Introduction*, note 23.

696. *MA* (VI, 179) p. 301.

697. *P* no. 5262, dBu ma *ya*, vol. 98, folio 103. See also *MOE*, p. 637; *CMDR*, pp. 271–272.

698. Toh. no. 3842, dBu ma *tsa*, folios 198a; commentary to *MMK*, (VII, 34); see also *EE*, p. 299. For a disagreement between Bhāvaviveka and Buddhapālita concerning this passage, see *SOS*, p. 106.

699. See section 4.2.3.1.3.5.1.1.1 for a discussion of the notion of a "perceived object."

700. For a discussion of this passage, see p. 285 and n. 905.

701. The six elements are earth, air, fire, water, space, and consciousness. *Touch* refers to the meeting of sense object and sense organ in the production of sense consciousness—the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness. The *eighteen functions* most likely refer to the eighteen *dhātus* (*khams*); that is, the six objects, six organs, and six types of consciousness.

702. That is to say, those that belong to oneself, as opposed to someone else's eyes, ears, and so on.

703. In other words, they *are* mine.

704. For example, to contemplate one's eyes without thinking of them as "mine" and to conceive of them as truly existent is not the apprehension of mineness; but to specifically think of them as "mine" and to think that this mine exists from its own side, that is, truly exists, *is* the apprehension of mineness.

705. Other scholars, notably rJe bstun pa, would go even further and declare that not only need this not be the apprehension of mineness, but that it *cannot* be. He states, in a very famous passage in *dBu ma'i spyi don*, that to apprehend "mine" as truly existent is the apprehension of the self of the person because the word *mine* actually or directly expresses "I," but that to apprehend "my eyes," "my ears," and so on as truly existent is not the apprehension of mine because the words *my eyes* and so on actually or directly express *exemplifications* of mine (and not mineness itself). This discussion could serve as a springboard for a discussion of the nature of predication and adjectival modification in the Madhyamaka, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this work.

706. This section is one of the longest and most detailed of the entire *TTC*. Despite the complexity of the section, especially of the exegetical material that sets forth the "correct" interpretation of certain scriptural passages, such as the one found in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, the point being made is a very simple one. *Śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* attain arhantship. Of this there is no doubt. To accomplish this they must forever rid themselves of the afflictions. The only method to accomplish this, in turn,

is through the direct perception of reality; that is, through the direct understanding of emptiness. Hence, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*, despite their impoverished attainments in the area of "method" (*upaya*), *do* cognize not only the selflessness of the person, but also the selflessness of phenomena; that is, full-blown emptiness. In short, the difference between *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*, on the one hand, and bodhisattvas, on the other, lies not in the realization of emptiness. Both groups accomplish this. It lies, instead, in the degree of their compassion and altruism and in the *extensiveness* of their understanding of emptiness, bodhisattvas having an understanding of reality that is more in-depth, by virtue of the fact that they have mastered many forms of reasoning that establish emptiness, a feat that the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* cannot claim for themselves. Similar treatments of this subject are to be found in Tsong kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo* (see *CMDR*, pp. 383–385); *dGongs pa rab gsal* (see *CTB*, pp. 150–181); and *LSN*, folios 73b–77b (see *EE*, pp. 299–305). See also *MOE*, pp. 296–304; *SOS*, pp. 104–107; and Guy Newland, *Compassion: A Tibetan Analysis* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1984), p. 156, n. 15. For discussion of this subject in non-dGe lugs pa works the reader is referred to the detailed treatment in the Karma pa's *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad*, folios 46b–56b; as well as the *rNam bshad* of Rong ston pa, pp. 24–31. Tsong kha pa's position, that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas do* understand the selflessness of phenomena, is criticized by Mi bskyod rdo rje in *dBu ma gzhan stong smra ba'i srol* (undated blockprint), folio 17b.

707. Toh. no. 44, Phal chen *kha*, folio 234a. See also M. Honda and J. Rahder, trans., "Annotated Translation of the Daśabhūmika-sūtra," in *Studies in South, East and Central Asia*, Śatapiṭaka Series 74 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1968), pp. 115–276.

708. (Dharamsala: Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs, 1968), p. 17.

709. Ibid., p. 17.

710. This refers to those non-Buddhists who, by the power of meditation, have managed to temporarily suppress their afflictions. The bodhisattva of the first level, by his or her direct perception of emptiness, already has uprooted many of those afflictions and thus surpasses these non-Buddhist yogis by virtue of this accomplishment.

711. See *CTB*, p. 151. This is a point of some controversy in the tradition. Some sources seem to imply that the selflessness of the person is realized first and that of phenomena (of the aggregates, for example) later. This passage, however, seems to imply just the opposite. Some scholars, most notable among them being Pan chen bSod rnams grags pa, claim that this refers only to the order in which they are understood by direct perception (*myong thob kyis*) and not to the way they are understood by inferential, that is, conceptual, thought.

712. v. 35–37. *P* no. 5658, gTam yig *nge*, folio 132b. See also *CTB*, p. 165.

713. Here mKhas grub rje's explanation seems to be almost identical to that found in Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*. This passage is quite controversial and involves the issues of (1) whether the selflessness of the person or that of phenomena is cognized first and (2) whether a person's cognition of the selflessness of

x entails his or her cognition of the emptiness of any other pheñomena at will. See *CTB*, pp. 151, 160, 166.

714. *P* no. 5658, gTam yig *nge*, folio 145b. See *CTB*, p. 168.

715. See *CTB*, p. 168.

716. *Ratnāvalī* (IV, 86); see also *CTB*, p. 169.

717. *MA*, p. 22. Quoted is *MMK* (XV, 7), see *Pras*, p. 269, and also see rJe bstun pa, *Khab dang po'i spyi don*, folios 99b passim. As for the Indian commentaries on this verse in Tibetan translation see *Buddhapālita* (folio 225b), *Akutobhayā* (folio 61a), and *Prasannapadā* (folio 91a); references are to Peking editions of these texts. See also *EE*, p. 300.

718. See *CTB*, p. 172.

719. Toh, no. 3853, *D* dBu ma *tsha*, folio 113b. Here, however, he cites this stance as if it were the opinion of another: "*khung des ni nyan thos la gang zag gi bdag med pa'i sgra'i don bye brag tu rtogs par bya ba yin pa'i phyir chos bdag med pa nyid bstan par mi nus so / nus par gyur na ni theg pa gzhan yongs su bzung ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ro zhes zer ro.*"

720. *P* no. 5658, gTam yig *nge*, folio 147a.

721.Toh. no. 1120, bsTod tshogs *ka*, v. 65. See also L. de la Vallée Poussin, "Les quatre odes de Nāgārjuna," *Le Museon* (1913); and Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*.

722. The *peak junction* refers to the series of stages extending from the Mahāyāna path of preparation through the paths of seeing and meditation. It is a series of paths belonging exclusively to bodhisattvas.

723. The stream enterer who experiences the four fruits, those of stream enterer, once returner, no-returner, and *arhant*, in that very life.

724. This is the view ascribed to Rong ston pa by Se ra rJe bstun pa; see the *yang dag mtha'* section of his *Khabs dang po'i spyi don*.

725. This section assumes a great deal of knowledge of the "path system" of the Mahāyāna (as systematized primarily in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*). Lucid literature on this topic in Western languages is scarce. See E. Conze, *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, Serie Orientale Roma 6 (Rome: IsMEO, 1954); E. Obermiller, "The Doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā as Exposed in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra of Maitreya," *Acta Orientalia* 11 (1932): 1–133; Rahula, trans., *Le Compendium de la Super-doctrine*.

726. This by virtue of considering them merely conventional truths. See my *DBPL*, Appendix 1; *KL*, pp. 25–88.

727. Here it is the opponent's belief that if the seventh *bhūmi* bodhisattva surpasses the *śrāvaka arhant* "by virtue of his wisdom," he must do so in every respect. To this, mKhas grub rje responds by saying that if that were true, then at the *first*

bhūmi to not surpass by virtue of his wisdom must mean that in *no* respect can the first *bhūmi* bodhisattva's wisdom surpass that of the *śrāvaka*, but in at least one respect (his ability to eliminate the obscurations to omniscience connected with the path of seeing) his wisdom *does* surpass that of the *śrāvaka arhant* at the first *bhūmi*.

728. Oral commentary maintains that this refers to the apprehension of true existence (*bden 'dzin*).

729. The point being that if the opponent's criterion for "surpassing" is that a wisdom must be able to eliminate the subconscious afflicted obscurations, then, even from the first level the bodhisattva's wisdom, which, by the opponent's own admission, is not bound by the apprehension of true existence and hence capable of later acting as the agent that eliminates these subconscious afflicted obscurations, would surpass the *śrāvaka arhant's* wisdom. Hence, this cannot be the proper criterion.

730. The "knowledge of the basis" is one of the three knowledges (*mkhyen gsum*) described in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*. Specifically it is the one that leads *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* to their desired goal of liberation, namely the wisdom that directly understands the selflessness of the person.

731. According to oral commentary this refers to the latent potentialities for the apprehension of true existence (*bden 'dzin gyi bag chags*).

732. (I, 37); Toh. no. 4024, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 56b. E. H. Johnston, ed., *The Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* (Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950), p. 34. See also J. Takasaki, *A Study of the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra)* (*SR*), Serie Orientale Roma 33 (Rome: IsMEO, 1966), p. 218.

733. Toh. no. 4025, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 92b.

734. More specifically, it is the result of meditation on the four noble truths and the eightfold path that is being spoken of. See Rahula, *Le Compendium*, p. 124.

735. Toh. no. 3786, Sher phyin *ka*, folio 6a; (II, 29); see also R. Tripathi, ed., *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛttispuṭārtha* (Sarnath: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, 1977), p. 35; and E. Conze, *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, Serie Orientale Roma 6 (Rome: IsMEO, 1954), p. 42.

736. The *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* of Haribhadra, ed. G. Tucci, Gaekwad Oriental Series no. 26; a later edition with the text of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* by Unrai Wogihara (Tokyo: Toyo Bunkyo, 1932–35).

737. See M. Tatz, "Candragomin and the Bodhisattva Vow" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1978), a translation of the *Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃśaka*. See also his *Asaṅga's Chapter of Ethics with the Commentary of Tsong kha pa* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), pp. 177 passim.

738. *MA* (VII, 1), p. 261. In the autocommentary it states: "To enter into equipoise on cessation means to enter into equipoise on the "perfect end" (*yang dag pa'i mtha'*), [that is, emptiness]. Hence, we call reality *cessation* because in the [equipoise

on reality] all proliferations cease. In the seventh *bhūmi*, called *Gone Afar*, the bodhisattva, in one instant, enters into and in one instant [emerges from] the cessation obtained in the sixth *bhūmi*." The views of Tsong kha pa and mKhas grub rje on this point correspond to and most likely are derived from those of Red mda' ba gZhon nu blo gros; see the latter's *rNam bshad* on this verse, pp. 310–312. The entire question, as presented in this verse, is based on the quote from the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* cited in *MA*, p. 261.

739. See *CTB*, pp. 154–160.

740. Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ed. V. Bhattacharya, (*BCA*), Bibliotecha Indica (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1960) (IX, 41ab), p. 195. For a translation of Thogs med bzang po's comments on this and subsequent verses in English, see S. Batchelor, trans., *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979), pp. 142 ff.

741. See *MOE* pp. 292–6.

742. *BCA* (IX, 41cd), p. 195.

743. That of a *śrāvaka*, *pratyekabuddha*, or buddha. See E. Conze, trans., *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, Series Orientale Roma 6 (Rome: IsMEO, 1954), pp. 4 passim.

744. This most likely refers to Prajñākaramati's *Pañjikā;* see P. L. Vaidya, ed., Buddhist Sanskrit Texts no. 12 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), pp. 203 ff.

745. *BCA* (IX, 45), p. 196.

746. "*nyon mongs spangs pas grol na des / de ma thag tu der 'gyur ro*," *BCA* (IX, 46ab), p. 197. I have translated the passage to fit KDJ's gloss, which follows. Here he follows Tsong kha pa (*BGR*) almost verbatim. Both of them clearly cite this passage because it might be, (and most likely was, historically) interpreted to support the position that Śāntideva was of the opinion that meditation on the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths leads to emancipation qua extinction of the afflictions (though not to buddhahood), a position both of them battle throughout this section and that they of course find anathema.

747. *BCA* (IX, 46cd), p. 197.

748. *BCA* (IX, 47ab), p. 197.

749. *BCA* (IX, 47cd–48ab), p. 197.

750. The craving that the Mādhyamikas and Abhidharmists hold in common is what is called *afflicted craving*. It is the craving explained in the *Abhidharma* as one of the afflictions. The nonafflicted craving referred to here is the apprehension of true existence, which the Mādhyamikas accept as an affliction and the Abhidharmists do not (because they perceive the apprehension of true existence as being unmistaken). When the Mādhyamikas call it *nonafflicted*, however, it is not because the apprehension of true existence is not an affliction but because it is not an affliction according to the common standards they share with the Abhidharmists. This is the point being made here.

751. *BCA* (IX, 99).

752. *P* no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 24b.

753. *BCA* (IX, 48cd–49), p. 197.

754. See *Introduction* p. 8.

755. Both of these scholars are mentioned by Tsong kha pa in *BGR* as well. See previous note.

756. According to the Pramāṇikas the existence of a cause can be inferred from the existence of its effect but not vice versa. This is the principle operative in "valid reasoning (from the existence of an) effect" (*'bras rtags yang dag*). For a brief summary of this type of reasoning see M. Gangopadhyaya, ed. and trans., *Vinitadeva's Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, pp. 20, 134.

757. What follows, in this and the subsequent section, is one of mKhas grub rje's most extensive treatments of the doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha*, or buddha-nature. Much of the material discussed in this section is discussed in great detail in D. S. Ruegg's masterful study, *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra: Études sur la Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme* (*TTG*) (Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1969); on p. 397 he actually cites a portion of the *TTC* on which is based Gung thang's (1762–1823) account (which he translates). See also his "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktasena on the Gotra Theory of the Prajñāpāramitā," *WZKSO* 11–12 (1968), Mélanges E. Frauwallner, pp. 303–317; and *Le traité sur le Tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston* (Paris: Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1973), vol. 88. See also E. Obermiller, "The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra of Maitreya," *Acta Orientalia* 11 (1932): 1–133, 334–354.

758. *AA* (I, 39); see E. Obermiller and T. Stcherbatsky, *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-prajñāpāramitā-upadeśa-śāstra, The Work of the Bodhisattva Maitreya* (Leningrad: Bibliotheca Buddhica 23, 1929); and Conze, *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, p. 18. See also *TTG*, pp. 78, 118, 129–132, 156, 170, 238, 397; where much of the commentarial literature (both Tibetan and Sanskrit) on this verse is discussed.

759. This is from the *Āryapañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśātrābhisamayālaṃkāravṛttih of Ārya Vimuktasena*, Toh. no. 3738, mDo 'grel *ka*, folio 59b. The Sanskrit of the first chapter has been edited by Corrado Pensa, *The Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti of Ārya-Vimuktasena* (Rome: IsMEO, 1967), see pp. 76–77. See *TTG*, p. 131; and for a translation of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's comments on this issue, see *TTG*, p. 170.

760. Toh. no. 3787, Sher phyin *ka*, folio 59a. See the *Vṛtti of Ārya Vimuktasena*, ibid., pp. 76–77; and *TTG*, p. 131 and n. 2, where it is pointed out that Haribhadra follows this line of thought extremely closely in his exposition.

761. *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka*, ed. U. Wogihara (Tokyo, 1932–35), p. 77. See *TTG*, p. 131 and n. 2.

762. Commentary to v. 40; Toh. no. 3791, Sher phyin *cha*, folio 48a.

763. See the *Vṛtti of Ārya Vimuktasena*, p. 77. The scriptural line in question, "*asaṃskṛtaprabhāvita hy āryapudgalaḥ*," is to be found both in the *Aṣṭa* (Chapter 2) and in the *Vajracchedikā* (section 7); see references to this and rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's comments translated in *TTG*, p. 170. See also *TTG*, p. 350.

764. This is a sarcastic remark. *Āryans* have the *dharmadhātu* by virtue of the fact that they exist and nonexistent phenomena do not contain anything.

765. See note 749, *Vajracchedikā*, p. 111.

766. *AA* (VIII, 2). Toh. no. 3786, Sher phyin *ka*, folio 5a. On the misconception concerning object-subject, see also *AA* (V, 5–7) and *TTG* pp. 132–133. On the *pratyekabuddha's* elimination of this form of misconception, see *TTG*, pp. 156, 238–239, 397–398; see also *MOE*, pp. 106–108, 378–379. See also Rong zom chos kyi bzang po, *lTa ba dang grub mtha' sna tshogs pa brjed byang.du bgyis pa*, pp. 369–374.

767. This has the format of a "stanza of intermission" but it is not actually identified as such. Because the view expressed in the verse is a position mKhas grub rje seems to be criticizing, it is also possible that it is a quote from some existing work of the time. In any case, the meaning of the verse is unclear.

768. This same point presumably is made by Nāgārjuna in *MMK* (XV, 7) when he states that this same doctrine was taught in the *Kātyāyanavāda Sūtra*.

769. It is not clear what "the two sets of two" refers to. It could refer to the fact that śrāvakas do and do not understand the selflessness of phenomena and that *pratyekabuddhas* do and do not understand it, or it could refer to the two explanations in *AA* and the two in the Hīnayāna *sūtrapiṭaka*.

770. In other words, the latter also caters to two audiences, Sautrāntika and Yogācāras, the former of whom accept the existence of external objects and the latter of whom do not.

771. Presumably this is because in their system *all śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* understand the selflessness of phenomena. And yet mKhas grub rje says in his comments later that Ārya Vimuktisena and Haribhadra accept that these two methods of interpretation (one that considers all *śrāvakas* and *pretyekabuddhas* to have realized the selflessness of phemomena and the other that considers only some of them to have done so) exist in regard to the *AA*. The only way to reconcile these two statements then is to say that, though they recognize these two methods of interpretation in principle, they opt for the former as opposed to the latter.

772. Tsong kha pa, *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal, Collected Works*, vol. *ma*, Zhol ed., folio 40b; (Sarnath: Gelukpa Students Welfare Committee, 1984), p. 73. See also *TTG*, p. 397 and n. 1.

773. See above p. 220.

774. As with the previous section, much of the material here is covered in great detail in *TTG*. The *Commentary* referred to, of course, is the *Vyākhyā* that is here attributed to Asaṅga. The root text and commentary have been edited by E. H. Johnston (Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950); the most complete work on these texts in English is J. Takasaki, *A Study of the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, Serie Orientale Roma 33 (Rome: IsMEO, 1966).

775. *Ratnagotravibhāga* (*RGV*) (I, 153cd), E. H. Johnston, ed., *The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* (Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950), p. 74; Toh. no. 4024, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 61b. See also (I, 2), (I, 32–33), (I, 133), and *TTG*, pp. 269–272, 275, 317, 378, and especially pp. 300–301 and Chapter 6.

776. *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* (*RGVV*), commentary on *RGV* (I, 153); Toh. no. 4025, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 112b. Ruegg identifies the scriptural citation as being from the *Śrīmāladevi Sūtra*.

777. *RGV* (I, 153ab); Johnston, *Ratnagotravibhāga*, p. 74; Toh. no. 4024, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 61b. See also *TTG*, pp. 298–299.

778. *RGV* (I, 33), Johnston, ibid., p. 27; Toh. no. 4024, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 56a. See also *TTG*, pp. 269–270, 346, 364.

779. *RGVV* commenting on *RGV* (I, 32); Toh. no. 4025, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 89b.

780. Toh. no. 4025, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 89b.

781. *RGVV* commenting on *RGV* (I, 33); Toh. no. 4025, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 90a.

782. Toh. no. 4025, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 80b.

783. Toh. no. 4025, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 81a.

784. Toh. no. 4025, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 80b.

785. The five works attributed to Maitreya (at least in the Tibetan tradition): (1) the *Uttaratantra*, (2) the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, (3) the *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, (4) the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, and (5) the *Madhyāntavibhāga*. In the dGe lugs pa tradition the first two works are considered Mādhyamika texts, the last three, works of the Yogācāra. This is not a position that goes unchallenged, however, as is evidenced by rJe btsun pa's defense of this position in *dGag lan kLu grub dgongs rgyan*. See also *TTG*, pp. 50–55.

786. See *MOE*, pp. 292–296; the sixteen aspects are also dealt with extensively in *AK* (VII, 13a) and its commentaries.

787. *PV*, "*Pratyakṣa*" chapter, v. 285; Toh. no. 4210, Tshad ma *ce*, folio 129a; S. Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., p. 186.

788. Of the three forms of suffering, (1) the suffering of suffering (*sdug bsngal kyi sdug bsngal*), (2) the suffering of change (*'gyur ba'i sdug bsngal*), and (3) the

suffering of the pervasive composite (*khyab pa 'du byed kyi sdug bsngal*), the aggregates themselves are said to be the exemplification of the third category, which is said to be the most fundamental form of suffering in that it is to be found in every sentient being in every realm of existence. See *AKB*'s commentary on *AK* (VII, 33), as well as the extensive corpus of *lam rim* literature on this point.

789. Toh. no. 4049, Sems tsam *ri*, folio 90b. See also *Le Compendium*, trans. Rahula, p. 99, where it is noted that the Sanskrit differs in this passage from the Tibetan.

790. This passage is somewhat misleading. It makes it seem as though the Cittamātrins accept that the selflessness of the person, which is the *śrāvakas*' principal object of meditation, is a dependent entity. This is not the case, for they consider it to belong to the category of the real. Of course, *the real* and *emptiness* are synonyms for the Prāsaṅgikas but not for the Cittamātrins. For the Cittamātrins, the former is a more extensive category than the latter.

791. Much of the material in this section is based on Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, but whereas the latter falls short of actually citing the lengthy passages from the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*, mKhas grub rje does quote them here. See *CTB*, pp. 160 ff.

792. Toh. no. 224, mDo sde *dza*, folio 165b. Cited in part in *Pras*, p. 46, *Pras-tib*, folio 14b, though the full citation occurs in *Pras*, p. 463, *Pras*-tib, folio 152b. See also *CTB*, p. 161; and my "Women and Illusion: Towards an Aesthetics in Buddhism" (unpublished paper, delivered at the 1987 meeting of the American Academy of Religion).

793. Most likely referring here to the four *viparyāsas;* namely, apprehending the impure to be pure, what is of the nature of suffering to be of the nature of happiness, what is selfless to possess a self, and what is empty to be not empty.

794. The *sūtra* is mentioned in *Pras*, pp. 295–296, and cited in *Pras*, p. 516. The latter is undoubtedly the source from which mKhas grub rje takes this passage. See also *CTB*, pp. 162–163.

795. See previous note.

796. *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, ed. and trans. Joshi, p. 113.

797. Ibid., p. 113.

798. Toh. no. 9, vol. 1, folio 44b.

799. Toh. no. 9, vol. 1, folio 45a.

800. v. 32; Toh no. 13, Sher phyin sna tshogs *ka*, folio 3b; also E. Conze, trans., *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines* (San Francisco: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973), p. 13.

801. *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, ed. P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), p. 3; Toh. no. 12, Sher phyin *ka*, folio 3b. See also Conze, *Perfection of Wisdom*, p. 84. The line is cited and discussed in Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti*

Spuṭārtha, see R. Tripathi, ed. (Sarnath: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, 1977), skt. p. 5, tib. p. 7.

802. Toh. no. 1118, bsTod tshogs *ka,* v. 1. See also D. S. Ruegg's treatment of this work in the *Études Tibetaines Dediées a la Memoire de Marcelle Lalou* (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1971).

803. vv. 70b–72; see also Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana,* pp. 206–207. See further *CTB,* pp. 168–169, where a portion of the same passage is cited in a similar context.

804. *P* no. 5658, gTam yig *nge,* folio 147a. *Ratnāvalī* v. 386, cited in *CTB,* p. 169. See also my "Vasubandhu's Vyākhyāyukti on the Authenticity of the Mahāyāna Sūtras," in Timm, ed., *Traditional Hermeneutics in South Asia,* where this verse and its commentaries are discussed.

805. Cited in Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* on the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā;* this is also cited (without being identified) by Tsong kha pa in *BGR;* see *CTB,* p. 170.

806. *P* no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa,* folio 23a.

807. This particular passage seems to be missing in the portion quoted earlier.

808. Again, these are portions not present in the citation that mKhas grub rje quotes.

809. vv. 10–11ab; Toh. no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa,* folio 23a. see Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana,* pp. 104–105.

810. Toh. no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa,* folios 23b–24a.

811. The point being that simply because other schools consider such a direct realization to be the path of seeing and so forth does not mean that it actually is.

812. See *LRCM,* folios 489a–492b. A very useful general treatment of this subject with reference to the Mahāyāna *sūtra* literature is to be found in N. Dutt, *Mahāyāna Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978; revised edition). For a general exposition of the two types of obstructions and how they are purged in the different stages of the path, see *MOE,* pp. 104–109. Hopkins (*MOE,* p. 300) also gives a chart comparing the nature of the two forms of obscuration in the different philosophical schools. This is also treated in detail (with reference to a great deal of Tibetan exegetical material) in *TTG* (see pp. 74 passim). See also *EE,* pp. 221, n. 1, 311–312; *SS,* Chapter 3, especially pp. 116–118; P. W. Griffiths, "Buddha and God: A Contrastive Study in Ideas about Maximal Greatness," *Journal of Religion* 69, no. 4 (1989): 506 passim; and Gomez, "Primer Tratado," pp. 188, 217, n. 125.

813. *MA,* p. 107.

814. *MA,* p. 107.

815. *P* no. 5265, dBu ma *ya,* folios 251b–252a; commentary on *CS* (XIV, 25); see *AC,* pp. 134–135; also *CMDR,* pp. 264, 394; and *MOE,* pp. 30, 556.

816. *P* no. 5246, dBu ma *tsha,* folio 8a; *CS* (VI, 10); *AC,* pp. 66–67.

817. *P* no. 5265, dBu ma *ya*, folio 124b; see previous note.

818. Toh. no. 3842, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 225b; See Lindtner, *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, p. 195; also *CMDR*, pp. 264, 394; *MOE*, pp. 30, 556.

819. Toh. no. 3842, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 241b.

820. *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 13a; *MMK* (XVIII, 5).

821. *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 13a; *MMK* (XVIII, 7).

822. v. 51; *P* no. 5225, dBuma *tsa*, folio 24b; see Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, pp. 116–117.

823. *MA*, p. 393.

824. *Dauṣṭhulya—arhants*, because of previous potentialities that exist within their continua, without being influenced by the afflictions or ignorance, at times will engage in offensive behavior. It is said to be like a reflex action because it does not involve any act of volition, but happens spontaneously in response to a situation, due merely to previous habit. Normally the demeanor of *arhants* is very dignified, but due to these subtle propensities, some may at times exhibit these strange kinds of behavior, walking in strange ways, or even insulting another. See *AKB* on *AK* (III, 29cd); *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, trans. Rahula, pp. 9, 128, n. 2; *Triṃśika*, trans. Levi in *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 27; *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, ed. Levi (VI, 2), (VI, 9), (XI, 11), (XI, 49), (XIV, 20), (XIX, 51), and (XXI, 31). See also, E. Lamotte, "Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism," in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner*, ed. L. Cousins et al. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974), pp. 91–104.

825. See *TTG*, Appendix 2, "Sur les notions de *bīja*, d'*aśraya*, de *vāsanā* et de *dhātu*," pp. 472–495.

826. These latter two divisions being the actual divisions of the obscurations to omniscience.

827. The first seven *bhūmis;* the last three are called the three pure *bhūmis* (*dag pa'i sa gsum*). See *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, trans. M. Honda (New Delhi: Satapitaka Series, 1967), pp. 115–276; E. Lamotte's translation of the *Ta chih tu lun*, *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra) avec une nouvelle introduction* (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste de l'Université de Louvain, 1970–76); K. Venkata Ramanan, *Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā-Śāstra* (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1966); H. Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979); for a bibliography of additional secondary literature, see *IB*, p. 152, n. 23.

828. For a treatment of this subject from a *rNying ma* scholastic perspective, see Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, *lTa ba dang grub mtha' sna tshogs pa brjed byang du bgyis pa*, pp. 375 ff.

829. *MA*, pp. 107–108.

830. Compare to Rong ston's statement in *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad*, p. 57: "*sa drug pa la ni mnyam par bzhag pa'i ye shes kyi 'od zer gyi dra bas rjes thob kyi gnas skabs na yang dngos po la mngon par zhen pa dang / stong pa nyid la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags ma lus pa rnam par bsal bas 'gog pa thob zhes brjod do.*"

831. See *MOE*, p. 105.

832. Much of this discussion has been influenced by the Pramāṇika treatment of reification and its counteractive antidote in valid cognitions; see *DBPL*, pp. 122–125 for a more extensive discussion of this point in the Pramāṇika context.

833. See *LRCM*, folios 447a–462b.

834. For a fascinating treatment of this subject by Rong ston pa, who in fact holds views and uses arguments very similar to those of mKhas grub rje here, see the former's *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad*, pp. 71–73. Especially interesting is his discussion of the different ways in which Mādhyamikas accept things, which he classifies as being threefold: "*dgos pa'i dbang gi gzhan ngor khas blangs pa dang / rang gzhan mthun pa'i khas len pa dang / rang kho nas khas len pa'o.*" See also Go ram pa's *lTa ba'i shan 'byed*, pp. 94ff; and his section, *Thal 'gyur ba khas len thams cad dang bral ba ni 'gog pa*, *BPD*, p. 360, folio 25aff. Also, P. Williams, "rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka Method," and my "The Prāsaṅgikas on Logic: Tibetan dGe lugs pa Exegesis on the Question of Svatantras," *JIP* 15 (1988): 217–224.

835. The First Pan chen bla ma, *rTsod lan*, pp. 381–382, ascribes this position to sTag tshang lo tsā ba, and he criticizes it very much as mKhas grub rje does here.

836. *P* no. 5228, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 32a, v. 24–25; see also Bhattacharya trans., pp. 23–24, skt. pp. 26–27.

837. v. 50, *P* no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 24b; see also Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, pp. 114–115.

838. *P* no. 5246, dBu ma *tsha*, folio 20a; *CS* (XVI, 25); *AC*, pp. 150–151. Also cited in *Pras*, p. 16. See *CMDR*, pp. 289, 300–301; and *MOE*, p. 585.

839. According to Tsong kha pa and mKhas grub rje, a *svatantra* form of reasoning is a syllogism in which the *trairūpya* (*tshul gsum*) conditions truly exist. I discuss this question in more detail in "The Prāsaṅgikas on Logic: Tibetan dGe lugs pa exegesis on the Question of Svatantras."

840. *Pras*, p. 16; *Pras*-tib, folio 6a.

841. *Pras*, p. 23; *Pras*-tib, folios 7b–8a.

842. *MA* (VI, 173), p. 294; *EOE*, p. 178.

843. *MA* (VI, 81), p. 179; *EOE*, p. 167.

844. *P* no. 5228, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 33b, v. 63; Bhattacharya trans., p. 41, skt. p. 47.

845. I have dealt with the question of whether the Prāsaṅgikas have a viewpoint of their own in my *DBPL* (Introduction and Chapter 4); see also E. Napper, *DAE*, pp. 174–192; Ruegg, "On Thesis and Assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma."

846. In other words, it is a category error.

847. This expression, *gzhan ngo tsam*, which I translate at times "for the sake of others" and at times "when confronting others" has the sense that only when interacting with others are such positions accepted, and not because they are actually a part of a Prāsaṅgika system of beliefs.

848. In other words, the claim to no claims are self-defeating, like the liar's paradox.

849. The underlying assumption being that apart from the scriptures that belong to the different school there are no other, (that is, generic,) scriptures because apart from these Buddhist schools there are no other Buddhist schools. I discuss this issue in my "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of *Siddhānta* in Tibetan Buddhism."

850. Which is to say that the claim as to the ineffability of *x* does not make one immune from fault in regard to *x*. If it did, then the Vātsīputrīya claim concerning the relationship between the self and aggregates would be immune from fault, which of course is anathema to a Prāsaṅgika.

851. *P* no. 5228, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 32a, v. 28; see Bhattacharya trans., p. 21, skt. p. 28. The emphasis in each of the following citations is my own.

852. *P* no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 24a; see *MOE*, p. 472; *CMDR*, p. 195.

853. v. 4; Toh. no. 1120, bsTod tshogs *ka*, folio 68b; see also L. de la Vallée Poussin, "Les Quatres Odes de Nāgārjuna," *Le Muséon* (1913); and *CMDR*, p. 307.

854. *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 18a; *MMK* (XXIV, 18); on this very important verse see H. Nakamura, "The Middle Way and the Emptiness View," *Journal of Buddhist Philosophy* 1 (1984): 81–111; also Kalupahana, *Nāgārjuna*, pp. 339–341.

855. *Pras*, p. 54; *Pras*-tib folio 18b.

856. *Pras*, p. 67; *Pras*-tib, folio 23a.

857. *MA*, pp. 279–280.

858. *MA*, p. 277.

859. *MA*, pp. 305–306.

860. *Pras*, p. 13; *Pras*-tib, folio 5a.

861. *MA* (VI, 8a), p. 82.

862. *MA*, p. 82.

863. *MA* (Epilogue, 2a), p. 406; *EOE*, p. 196.

864. *MA*, p. 406.

865. v. 1; *P* no. 5228, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 32a; see also Bhattacharya trans., p. 5, skt. p. 10.

866. This is the second verse of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* passage cited earlier.

867. *CS* (XIV, 21a); *P* no. 5246, dBu ma *tsha*, folio 246a; see also *AC*, pp. 132–133.

868. *P* no. 5266, dBu ma *tsha*, folio 249a; see also D. S. Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Catuṣkoṭi* and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism," *JIP* 5 (1977): 1–71.

869. v. 23; *P* no. 5228, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 32a; see also Bhattacharya trans., p. 18, skt. p. 24.

870. *MA*, pp. 294–295.

871. *Nyan thos chen po gnyis kyi dris lan gyi mdo*, which seems to be a reference to a passage of the *Pañcaviṃśati* cited in Candrakīrti's autocommentary to *MA;* see also *EOE*, pp. 263–264.

872. Commentary to *MA* (VI, 170cd), p. 292.

873. *MA* (VI, 115), p. 228; *EOE*, p. 171.

874. *MA* (VI, 104ab), p. 216.

875. *MA* (VI, 165), pp. 287–288.

876. *MA* (VI, 174), p. 296; *EOE*, pp. 178–179.

877. *MA*, pp. 296–297.

878. Jayānanda, the twelfth century author of the *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* and the *Tarkamudgarakārikā*, is refuted on several points of interpretation in Tsong kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo* (see *CMDR*, p. 284), *Legs bshad snying po*, and in other Madhyamaka texts of the dGe lugs pa tradition; see also *MOE*, pp. 868–871; N. Roerich, trans., *The Blue Annals* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976), p. 272; *EE*, pp. 58, 105–106, 324, n. 106, 326, n. 112, 346.

879. *MA*, p. 295.

880. (I, 28); *P* no. 5658, gTam yig *nge*, folio 130b.

881. (I, 29); *P* no. 5658, gTam yig *nge*, folio 130b.

882. (II, 11); *P* no. 5658, gTam yig *nge*, folio 134a.

883. Tibetan version (Dharamsala: Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs, 1968), p. 18.

884. See D. Lopez, Jr., *The Heart Sutra Explained*, especially Chapters 5 and 6.

885. According to the dGe lugs pa interpretations of the theories of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, a syllogism must fulfill three modes or criteria for it to be valid. These involve the understanding on the part of both the proponent of the syllogism and the opponent to whom it is presented that (1) there is a relationship between the subject and the reason (*phyogs chos*), (2) that there is a forward pervasion (*rjes khyab*), that if reason, then predicate, and (3) that there is a reverse pervasion (*ldog khyab*), which is the contrapositive, that if not predicate, then not reason. For example, in the following syllogism:

Subject: sound
Predicate: is impermanent
Reason: because it is produced

the first mode involves the understanding that sound is produced, the second that if something is produced, then it must be impermanent, and the third that if something is not impermanent, then it cannot be produced. See note 509.

886. Of course, according to the interpretation of Tsong kha pa and mKhas grub rje, it *does* take more than mere acceptance of the trimodal criterion for a syllogism to be accepted as being a *svatantra*. It requires that the trimodal criterion be considered to exist inherently. This allows for the general acceptance of the principles of Buddhist logic while at the same time allowing for the rejection of *svatantra* syllogistic reasoning.

887. *Pras*, p. 16; *Pras*-tib, folio 4b; see *MOE*, p. 475.

888. *Pras*, p. 25; *Pras*-tib, folio 7a; see *MOE*, p. 500.

889. In other words, subjects that can be perceived by the senses. On the division of entities into evident (*mngon gyur*), concealed (*lkog gyur*), and extremely concealed (*shin tu lkog gyur*), see my *DBPL*, Chapter 2, and also my "Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures," pp. 7–23.

890. See *KL*, pp. 89–114.

891. *MMK* (III, 2), *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 4a has *rang gi brtag nyid* for *TTC*'s *rang gi bdag nyid*, which is obviously an error on the part of the former. This is confirmed in *Budhhapālita*'s citation of the same verse that coincides with *TTC*. This verse is also reminiscent of the discussion in *VV* (XXXI–LI), see Bhattacharya trans., pp. 25–34, skt. pp. 26–33; and in *Śūnyatāsaptati* (47–57), Komito trans., pp. 159–169. See also Kalupahana, *Nāgārjuna*, pp. 132–134.

892. *Pras*, p. 34; *Pras*-tib, folio 11a.

893. *P* no. 5242, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 197b. The citation is from *CS* (XIII, 16); see *AC*, pp. 122–123; *CMDR*, p. 332.

894. *MMK* (III, 3ab). *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 3b; Kalupahana's comparison of the eye's seeing itself to the Cartesian cogito (*Nāgārjuna*, p. 134) is questionable.

895. See *LSN*, folios 83b–91a; also *MOE*, pp. 499–530; and *CMDR*, pp. 309–335.

896. See my *DBPL*, Chapter 3; also *KL*, pp. 126–130.

897. *Vyaṅgya;* Poussin identifies the position as "thèse du Mīmāṃsaka," citing *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* (II.2.28, 30) as his source.

898. *Pras*, pp. 28–29; *Pras*-tib, folios 9a–9b. Poussin gives the references in such works as the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* to the non-Buddhist positions expressed.

899. *Pras*, p. 29; *Pras*-tib, folios 9b–10a.

900. The distinction between mistaken (*phyin ci log*) and erroneous (*'khrul pa'i*) consciousness, though important in dGe lugs pa exegesis in general, tends to be lost throughout much of this discussion, especially in what follows.

901. *Pras*, p. 30; *Pras*-tib, folio 10a.

902. *Pras*, p. 30; *Pras*-tib, folio 10a. The syllogism being referred to here is as follows:

Subject: the eye and so on
Predicate: do not truly arise
Reason: because they exist.

903. *Pras*, p. 31; *Pras*-tib, folios 10a–10b.

904. See section 4.2.3.1.3.5.1. and its subsections; *LSN*, folios 103b–104a; *LRCM*, folios 462b–483a; and mKhas grub rje, *Lam ngan mun sel*, folios 179b–181a; also *CS*, Chapter 10; *AC*, pp. 94–103; *MMK*, Chapter 18; *Pras*, pp. 340–381; A. Engle, "The Buddhist Theory of Self According to Acārya Candrakīrti" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1982); J. Wilson, *Chandrakirti's Sevenfold Reasoning* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1980); *CMDR*, pp. 336–371; *MOE*, pp. 44–66, 175–192, 296–315; *EE*, pp. 298–306.

905. *MA* (VI, 151), p. 271; compare to *MMK* (XVIII, 1).

906. *MA* (VI, 157), p. 275; *EOE*, p. 176.

907. *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 12b; *MMK* (XVIII, 1).

908. *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 12b; *MMK* (XVIII, 1cd): "*skandhebhyo 'nyo yadi bhaved bhaved askandhalakṣaṇaḥ*"—tib. "*gal te phung po rnams las gzhan / phung po'i mtshan nyid med par 'gyur.*" Kalupahana translates: "If it were to be different from the aggregates, it would have the characteristics of nonaggregates." The Tibetan, however, interprets the negative (*a*) prefix as applying to the entire compound (*skandhalakṣaṇaḥ*).

909. Implicit here is the presupposition that shape and anything having shape must be material. In other words, shape is both matter and a property of matter. This derives from the Abhidharmikas; see *AKB* on *AK* (IV, 2–5).

910. *P* no 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 12b; *MMK* (XVIII, 2ab).

911. See *LRCM*, folios 483a–489a; *LSN*, folios 104–108a. mKhas grub rje, in *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma*, folios 181b–187a has an interesting discussion of the self of phenomena based on what he considers to be faulty views on the nature of mind. See also Red mda' ba's *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad*, pp. 207–220.

912. This of course is the subject of *MMK*, Chapter 1. The *Prasannapadā* commentary on this chapter has been translated by Stcherbatsky in *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1927). For an even more extensive exposition of this form of reasoning, see mKhas grub rje's *dBu ma rta ba'i 'grel pa Tshig gsal gyi mtha' bzhi skye ba'i 'gog pa'i stong thun*, an appendix to the *sTong thun chen mo*, Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 1 (Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin, 1972), pp. 473–506. See also *CMDR*, pp. 372–376; *MOE*, pp. 131–150, 637–658;

913. See *MOE*, pp. 321–327. See the *Sāṃkhya Aphorisms of Kapila*, trans. and ed. J. R. Ballantyne, v. 38, pp. 41 passim; elementary treatments of the Sāṃkhya theory of *satkāryavāda* are to be found in S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 257–258, and in E. Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, trans. V. M. Bedekar (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), pp. 303–307.

914. According to the dGe lugs pa interpretation of *MMK* (I, 1), "arising from another" does not refer to a cause arising from an effect that is different from it, but to a cause arising from an effect that is *inherently* different from it.

915. On the Jain theory of *anekāntavāda*, see Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 175–176.

916. See *MOE*, pp. 327–333; *CMDR*, p. 375; Dasgupta, ibid., p. 345.

917. Candrakīrti's defense of Buddhapālita's interpretation of the refutation of arising from self is discussed at length in *MOE*, pp. 469–498. This begins an extensive discussion of the polemics concerning the interpretation of the Buddhapālita-Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti debates on the nature of proper logical strategies in the Madhyamaka. Although this is also discussed in the *Lam rim chen mo*, the present discussion is based principally on that in the *Legs bshad snying po;* see *EE*, pp. 321–344.

918. *Pras*, p. 14; *Pras*-tib, folio 5b.

919. For an exposition of Bhāvaviveka's interpretation of Buddhapālita's reductio (including translations of Bhavya's *Prajñāpradīpa* and Avalokitavrata's commentary) and the polemic surrounding it, see *MOE*, pp. 455–468.

920. For example, in the reductio—it follows absurdly, that sound is not a product because it is permanent—to determine what the proponent, the Buddhist, believes one must reverse both the proposition (yielding "sound is a product") and the reason (yielding "it is impermanent"). Hence, the proponent (the Buddhist) believes that sound is a product and that it is impermanent. This is what is being referred to in general. Its application to the present case concerning the refutation of arising from self will be discussed later.

921. *Pras*, p. 14; *Pras*-tib, folio 5b.

922. This is a reference to *PV* (I, 213); see Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*, pp. 107–108.

923. *MA*, p. 89.

924. *MA* (VI, 14), p. 89; *EOE*, pp. 158–159.

925. *MA*, p. 90.

926. *prasaṅgavakyatvāt*. See *Pras*, pp. 15, 14, n. 5, for the variant in Bhāvaviveka.

927. Tsong kha pa, *dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, in *Collected Works*, vol. *ba*, folio 31b; also (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), p. 53.

928. Ibid.

929. Ibid.

930. Ibid.

931. Ibid.

932. *P* no. 5259, vol. 96, folios 190b–191a. This passage is translated in *MOE*, pp. 462–466.

933. The point here being that if affirming arising from another, as Bhavya accuses Buddhapālita of doing, is tantamount to affirming *ultimate* arising from another, as this opponent suggests Bhavya is accusing Buddhapālita of doing, then the opponent is refuting Bhavya himself because he too affirms arising from another, but not ultimate arising from another.

934. This is said in response to Bhavya's assertion that this first stanza teaches a syllogism of the form:

Subject: all things
Predicate: never ultimately arise
Reason: because they do not arise from self, other, both, or neither.

According to the Prāsaṅgikas, this first stanza teaches just the four positions and not a syllogism. This is why Tsong kha pa makes the point that the adjectives and adverbs do not form the separate predicate of a syllogism, but are to be construed as applying to each of the four positions as part of position statements.

935. Tsong kha pa, *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, folio 31b; Sarnath ed., p. 53.

936. See p. 291.

937. Tsong kha pa, *Rigs pa'i rgya mstho*, folio 32b; Sarnath ed., p. 55.

938. *Pras*, p. 24; *Pras*-tib, folio 8a.

939. See above p. 290.

940. See *LSN*, folios 73a–81b. For sTag tshag lo tsā ba's discussion of this topic, see his *Grub mtha' kun shes*, pp. 225–228; for Rong ston pa's, see his *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad*, p. 121; and for Go ram pa's, see *BPD*, p. 411, folios 127b ff. See also *CMDR*, pp. 373–379.

941. *bcos ma* can have two meanings here. It can mean "created," as in "produced" or "made," or it can mean "feigned," as in "false" or "unreal". Both translations make sense here. Of course, in the Madhyamaka, whatever is dependent on other entities cannot exist inherently and therefore is empty and illusorylike, hence "false."

942. *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 14b; *MMK* (20, 20cd).

943. *MA* (VI, 14), p. 89; *EOE*, pp. 158–159.

944. mKhas grub rje accepts that cause and effect *are* different. Thus, if this implied that they must be cotemporal, the fault would apply even to his own position.

945. Reasons in which the presence of an effect (smoke) is used to infer the existence of a cause (fire); and in which the presence of one coessential property (production) is used to infer another (impermanence). The theory is explained in detail in *PV*; see also Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣa*, trans. Y. Kajiyama, in *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy*, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, no. 10 (Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1966), pp. 72–77.

946. Take for example the following reductio:

Subject: darkness
Predicate: arises from fire
Reason: because it is different.

If, as the opponent claims, it is the mere difference of two things that is being used as the reason to show absurdities in the theory of causality, then it should work to disprove that cause and effect are different, that is, in the case of reductios where the things being spoken of are causally related, and not, as in this reductio, where they are not. Yet it is *this very kind* of reductio that Candrakīrti urges. This means that the opponent is wrong in thinking that it is the mere difference of the two things that is being posited as the reason. Instead, says mKhas grub rje, a *truly existent* difference is posited by Candrakīrti as his reason. This argument is extremely powerful.

947. *Pras*, p. 54; *Pras*-tib, folio 18b. See also section 4.2.3.2.1.

948. *MA* (VI, 36), p. 122.

949. That cause and effect are different things is something that mKhas grub rje claims even Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti would accept, but as they refute arising from another, the latter cannot be as simple as merely the position that a cause gives rise to an effect different from it. Hence, says mKhas grub rje, it is a cause giving rise to an effect that is *an inherently different object from it* that is the meaning of "arising from another," and it is *this* that is being refuted.

950. The Prāsaṅgikas of course refute *svasaṃvedanā* in such works as *BCA* (IX, 15–24); see later section 4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.

951. The implication here seems to be that, according to mKhas grub rje, the Prāsaṅgikas accept cognition of something that is of the nature of the cognition itself but do not accept autocognition. Likewise, they accept the arising of an effect that is different from its cause but do not accept arising from another. In other words, "arising from another" and "autocognition" are technical terms whose meanings cannot be inferred from their etymologies.

952. *MA* (VI, 99), p. 206; *EOE*, p. 169.

953. *P* no. 5246, dBu ma *tsha*, folio 14a; *CS* (XI, 15cd); *AC*, pp. 106–107.

954. *MA* (VI, 115), p. 228; *EOE*, p. 171.

955. Put simply, this is the fact that "all things (subject) arise interdependently (reason)."

956. This involves the fact that "if something arises interdependently (reason), then it cannot exist by virtue of its own characteristic (predicate)."

957. According to the dGe lugs pas, the Prāsaṅgikas held a series of special tenets that were uncommon to what other Buddhist philosophical schools believed. These were systematized in a list of the "eight great difficult points," (*dka' gnas chen po brgyad*); see Introduction, note 23. Although what follows is not exactly an exposition of these eight points, there is much overlap with what eventually came to be systematized into the list of eight.

958. Although Tsong kha pa does not treat this in *LSN*, he does give an extensive explanation of the Prāsaṅgika views on time in *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (Varanasi: dGe lugs pa Student Welfare Committee, 1973), pp. 187–191, 343. On the nature of time in Buddhism, see P. M. Williams, "Buddhadeva and Temporality," *JIP* 4 (1977): 279–294; also his "On the Abhidharma Ontology," *JIP* 9 (1981): 227–257, especially p. 229; L. de la Vallée Poussin, "Documents d'Abhidharma—La Controverse du Temps," *Mélanges chinoises et bouddhiques* 5 (1937); Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣa*, pp. 142–143; *AC*, pp. 102–109, which translates *CS*, Chapter 11, "A Meditation on the Critique of Time"; for a similar discussion in St. Augustine, see *Confessions* (XI, 14.17–30.40), translation in R. J. Deferrari et al., *Fathers of the Church*, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1953), pp. 343–365.

959. Most of the positions that follow are based on the lengthy discussion that follows from the Sautrāntika objection to *AK* (V, 24cd), a discussion that takes place in the context of *AK* (V, 25–27); la Vallée Poussin, trans., *L' Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, pp. 49–66.

960. Author of the *Abhidharmāmṛta;* see Shanti Bhiksu Shastri, The *Abhidharmāmṛtra of Ghoṣaka*, Vishvabharati Studies, no. 17 (Santiniketan: Vishvabharati, 1953); *Vishva-Bharati Annals* 5 (1953): 1–151. See also E. Frauwallner's article in *WZKSO* 7 (1983): 20–36; also *IB*, pp. 110, 175.

961. An *Ārya Vasumitrasaṅgītiśāstra* has been preserved in Chinese and translated into Japanese. See also *IB*, pp. 107, 108 note, 111, 125.

962. See *IB*, p. 107; and M. Shizutani, "On Buddhadeva in the *Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra*," *Bukkyo Shigaku* 2, no. 4 (1952): 31–39.

963. La Vallée Poussin, in his translation of the fifth chapter of *AK* (p. 54, n. 2) translates *Vibhāṣa* (77, 1): "Les Sarvāstivādins ont quatres grands maitres qui etablissent differemment la difference des trois epoques . . . 1. Vasumitra qui dit qu'elles different par l'etat (*avasthā*); 2. Buddhadeva qui dit qu'elles different par le point de vue (*apekṣā*); 3. le partisan de la difference quant au *bhāva*, qui dit: le *dharma*, changeant d'epoque, differe par le *bhāva*, non pas par la nature . . . ; le *dharma*, passant du futur dans le present, quoiqu'il abandonne le *bhāva* futur et acquiere le *bhāva* present, cependant ni ne perd ni acquiert sa nature . . . ; 4. le partisan de la difference quant au *lakṣaṇa*."

964. *AKB*, commenting on *AK* (V, 27d), puts it in a more simple way, "what arises is the future, what ceases is the present."

965. *P* no. 5266, dBu ma *ya*, folio 193a; Chapter 11 of *CS* is dedicated to a critique of the notion of time in other philosophical schools (both Buddhist and non-Buddhist).

966. Hence, because it is a nonentity, space could not (for such an opponent) ever exist in the present, and if this were the case, there could be no referent for a past or future space.

967. Which is to say that there are plenty of phenomena that are neither the passing away of the pot nor the pot. A *mutually exclusive* pair must divide all phenomena into two categories such that, if something is not in one, it must be in the other. For example, pot and nonpot are two such categories. It is because they are mutually exclusive that double negation brings us back to the affirmative; that is, that a non-nonpot is a pot.

968. mKhas grub rje here is saying that being "arisen and not yet ceased" is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being "the present," and he takes as his example the nonarising of the sprout, a future entity, According to him, this is arisen and not yet ceased, as it is a produced entity, but it is not a present entity, as the mode of its appearing to the mind depends on a phenomenon that has not yet arrived at the sprout's own time.

969. This presumably means that if the disputation is held in winter, when no sprouts are growing, it does not mean that "present sprouts" do not exist because they exist at their own time; but to my mind, mKhas grub rje has not resolved the problem, for at that time are not those sprouts that will exist in the summer future entities and *not* present ones?

970. Presumably because effects, being later, they must be future, which means that they must be nonarising, whereas effects, by definition, arise.

971. Here the word *entity* (*dngos po*) is used in the technical sense of "an efficacious entity," which is impermanent, caused, and has the ability to produce effects. The rationale for maintaining this is clearly explained in the previous section. It has to do with explaining the workings of karma in a system (the Prāsaṅgika) in which a foundation consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) is not accepted. Tsong kha pa does not deal with this topic in *LSN* and instead refers the reader to his exposition of this in his *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (commentary to Chapter 7 of *MMK*, Sarnath ed., pp. 187–191); see *EE*, p. 316, n. 92, 93.

972. Indeed, much of the material that is to follow is based on the discussion in *Pras*, pp. 174–176 [in the commentary following *MMK* (VII, 32)].

973. Toh. no. 44, Phal chen *kha*, folio 221b. This of course is part of the famous formula from the teaching of the twelvefold dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*), describing the last two members of the chain. See E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien: Des Origines a l'Ère Śaka*, Bibliotheque du Muséon, vol. 43 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1958), p. 38 ff.

974. Toh. no. 44, Phan chen *kha*, folio 221b; paraphrased in *Pras*, p. 174. See la Vallée Poussin's extensive note on this passage, *Pras*, pp. 174–175, n. 4.

975. *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 19a; *MMK* (XXV, 13).

976. v. 20ab, *P* no. 5225, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 23b; Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, pp. 108–109.

977. *Pras*, p. 173; *P* edition (29–2–6) differs from the passage quoted in *TTC*, but agrees with *Pras*. It reads *rgyu med pa nyid* instead of *rgyu med;* more significantly, the *khapuspavad* is missing in *TTC*. I have followed *Pras* in the translation.

978. *Periodic* (skt. *kadācit-ka*) here means that it exists at some periods and not at others.

979. Toh. no. 3862, dBu ma *ya*, folio 15b.

980. Which is to say that in the Madhyamaka system everything that is a conventional entity, like cause and effect, exists only nominally. This is what it means for something to be a conventional truth. For a Mādhyamika there is no difference between a seed giving rise to a sprout and the exhaustion of a lamp giving rise to darkness, whereas other schools have reservations concerning the involvement of past and future entities in causal processes because of their philosophical commitment to certain positions concerning the nature of the entities involved, positions that ultimately bring them beyond the worldly usage of words. Hence, for a Mādhyamika, the lack of fuel in a lamp giving rise to the exhaustion of the lamp and to subsequent darkness is just as real as seeds giving rise to sprouts. They both are conventional truths, and as such both are posited merely nominally; that is, in accordance with worldly usage.

981. The main point of this section is to show that the Mādhyamikas can still posit a theory of cause and effect (especially in the sphere of moral retribution), without needing to posit the existence of a foundation consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). Con-

cerning the foundation consciousness, see also note 64. Tsong kha pa is the author of a separate treatise dealing with the theory of the foundation consciousness, *Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' ba'i gnas rgya cher 'grel pa legs par bshad pa'i rgya mtsho, in gSungs 'bum* (*Collected Works*), vol. *tsha*, folios 1–57 (Toh. no. 5414), which has been commented upon by dKon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me, among others. Śākya mchog ldan treats the question of the foundation consciousness throughout *Shing rta chen po srol gnyis kyi rnam dbye bshad nas nges don gcig tu bsgrub pa'i bstan bcos kyi rgyas 'grel*, p. 345ff. The main Prāsaṅgika critique of the *ālaya* is to be found in *MA* (VI, 39 ff) (see the following section in *TTC*). For a Svātantrika critique of the foundation consciousness see Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy," pp. 68–69, 75; see also *MOE*, pp. 383–388; *EE*, pp. 312–321. L. de la Vallée Poussin discusses the *ālaya* in *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 13 (1934–1935): 145–168; see also E. Frauwallner, "Amalavijñānam und Ālayavijñānam," *Beitrage zur indischen Philologie und Altertumskunde* (Festschrift W. Schubring) (Hamburg: Cram, de Gruyter, 1951), pp. 148–159; for a bibliography of Japanese scholarship on the topic, see *IB*, p. 255; it is also discussed extensively in connection with the *tathāgatagarbha* theory in *TTG*, pp. 35 passim; see also B. K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), pp. 333 ff.

982. This is a point that is made in extenso in *DAE;* see also *MMK* (XVII, 11–20).

983. On the concept of "efficacy" (*arthakriyā*), see M. Nagatomi, "Arthakriyā," *Adyar Library Bulletin* 31–32 (Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume) (1967–68): 52–72.

984. *Avipraṇāśa*. See *MA* (VI, 39). This doctrine is also mentioned in *Sūtrālaṃkāra* (XX–XXI, 10); it is critiqued in *Pras*, commenting on *MMK* (XVII, 12–14). Though Nāgārjuna uses the term frequently in this section of *MMK*, he is not referring to the metaphysical entity of the Vaibhāṣikas. See also Vasubandhu, *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, trans. E. Lamotte, English trans. Leo M. Pruden, (Berkeley, Calif.: Asian Humanities Press, 1988), pp. 24 ff; and especially *Abhidharmakośa*, Chapter 9, on which much of the material here is based (la Vallée Poussin, trans., Chapter 9, p. 295, n. 4, is especially interesting).

985. On the theory of "attainment" (skt. *prāpti) see AK* (II, 36–40). La Vallée Poussin, trans., ibid., pp. 179–195.

986. See *AK*, Chapter 9; la Vallée Poussin, trans., ibid., pp. 287–300.

987. *MA* (VI, 39), p. 125.

988. The point here seems to be that, if the qualifier *ultimately* must be applied to Candrkīrti's refutation of the foundation consciousness, then it must also be applied to his acceptance of the possibility of karma and its effects.

989. v. 3; Toh. no. 4055, Sems tsam *shi*, folio la; see also the edition of R. Tripathi and S. Dorje, *Triṃśikā* (Leh: Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1984), p. 1 of skt. The latter, which differs from the *TTC* and *D* versions reads: "*de ni len pa dag dang gnas / rnam par rig pa ma rig pa / rtag tu reg dang yid byed dang / rig dang 'du shes sems par ldan.*" See also S. Levi, ed., *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Deux traités de*

Vasubandhu. Viṃśatika accompagné d'une explication en prose et Triṃśika avec le commentaire de Sthiramati, Bibliotheque de l'École des Hautes Études, no. 245 (Paris: Bibliotheque Ancienne Honore Champion, 1925).

990. See *EE*, p. 316.

991. See Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, pp. 180–218.

992. *MA* (VI, 43), p. 132; *EOE*, p. 162.

993. *MA*, p. 132.

994. Toh. no. 110, mDo sde *cha*, folio 37b.

995. *MA*, p. 131.

996. Of course in the Prāsaṅgika system, any statement that does not teach emptiness directly is considered to be of provisional meaning, and this would include statements concerning the existence of the personality and so forth apart from any qualifications like *ultimately* or *truly existing*.

997. See section 4.2.3.3.1.2.1.A.

998. In other words, you would claim, as *we* are doing here, that there is no scriptural basis for such a belief.

999. *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra;* Vaidya, ed., p. 68.

1000. *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* (32–34); Toh. no. 1800, dBu ma *ngi*, folio 39b.

1001. *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*, *P* no. 2665, vol. 61, folio 286; see also Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, pp. 194–195.

1002. This differs somewhat from the exposition given in *MOE* (p. 387) of the nature of the "intended basis" that is held to be the Buddha's actual intention in teaching the doctrine of the foundation consciousness, of the entity that transmigrates, and so on.

1003. This is referring to the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* in 100,000 lines, in 25,000 lines and in 8,000 lines, respectively. See rJe bstun chos kyi rgyal msthan's *Khabs dang po'i phyi don*, folios 13a ff for a discussion of this point.

1004. This again hearkens back to a previous discussion (see section 4.2.3.1.3.5.2.3.2.1) concerning the position of the *AA* on the question of *tathāgatagarbha*. mKhas grub rje here and in that discussion clearly holds the view that *AA* is a Prāsaṅgika and not a Svātantrika work, a view that does not go unchallenged in later exegetical literature.

1005. *SGV*, vol. 1, p. 4; vol. 2, p. 12.

1006. It is a pan dGe lugs pa view that Asaṅga was himself a Prāsaṅgika, and that he wrote Cittamātra works simply for the benefit of those who could not accept the more advanced Madhyamaka teachings. The fact that he is considered an *āryan* implies

that he must be considered to have understood the "correct" (*lege* Prāsaṅgika) interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness.

1007. See Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique," pp. 61–70; *EE*, pp. 312–321; *MOE*, pp. 367–381.

1008. *MA* (VI, 92a), p. 192; *EOE*, p. 168.

1009. *MA* (VI, 55), p. 146; *EOE*, p. 163.

1010. *MA* (VI, 53), p. 155; *EOE*, p. 163. The former has *byung* for *TTC*'s *gyur*. The commentarial passage quoted precedes the verse.

1011. *MA*, p. 155, which adds *gnas pa* that is missing in the *TTC* citation.

1012. *MA*, p. 156, identical except for the genitive added in *TTC* in *sngon po la sogs pa'i*. The *Bhāṣya* continues: "in regard to the appearance of that as blue and so on, in regard to that which is the appearance itself, the world conceives [of things] as being of the nature of external objects . . . therefore, there do not exist objects external to consciousness."

1013. The argument is a bit convoluted but not difficult to understand. If there were no external objects, then their existence would have to be repudiated or rejected by a valid cognition. There are only two types of valid cognitions; those that analyze the nominal or conventional and those that analyze the ultimate. From one viewpoint, the nonexistence of external objects, if it were true, would be a basic or ultimate fact of their nature, bringing the repudiation of the existence of external objects into the sole purview of valid cognitions that analyze the ultimate; but as mentioned in the text, when examined by a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate, even consciousness fails to hold up, much less external objects. So the fact that external objects cannot withstand the test of this latter kind of valid cognition is indicative not of the fact that there are no external objects, but only of the fact that they do not ultimately exist. Hence, because their existence cannot be repudiated by a valid cognition that analyzes the nominal and because nothing is established by a valid cognition that analyzes the ultimate, external objects cannot be rejected by any valid cognition and hence must be accepted as existing nominally.

1014. One of the syllogisms used by the Cittamātrins to disprove the existence of external objects is as follows:

Subject: form and the valid cognition that apprehends it
Predicate: are not different substances
Reason: because of the simultaneity of the referent (form) and its perception (the valid cognition).

Which is to say that the object (form) and its apprehension (the valid cognition) must be related in some way. They cannot be related causally (*de byung gi 'brel ba*), says the argument, because they occur simultaneously. Hence, they must be related in terms of being of one substance or of one nature (*bdag gcig 'brel*). Whether or not the argument works is a different question, here the point being made is that the Cittamātrins use such reasoning into the ultimate nature of phenomena to establish the nonexistence of external objects.

1015. The *Viṃśatikā* of Vasubandhu, Toh. no. 4056, Sems tsam *shi*, v. 12. I have discussed the position of different Buddhist schools in regard to material particles in my "Quarks and Paramāṇu," an unpublished paper delivered at the meeting of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (Oxford, 1982); see also *KL*, pp. 34 passim; and *SOS*, p. 63.

1016. See *EE*, pp. 345 ff. For an extensive treatment of this question in a non-dGe lugs pa source see Red mda' ba gZhon nu blo gros, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad* (Sarnath: Sakya Students' Union, 1983), pp. 198 ff.

1017. *P* no. 761.31, vol. 25, folio 263; P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, no. 7 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967), p. 32. Cited in *SGV*, vol. 1, p. 26; vol. 2, p. 93; see Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique," p. 61; also *MOE*, p. 378, and for references to where this is cited in Candrakīrti and Tsong kha pa, see *MOE*, p. 875, n. 574.

1018. *AK* (III, 1).

1019. The *Abhidharmakośa* (IV, 1), also *AKB* (IV, 3c) and (IV, 119–120) explains the former to be the actions of the mind that motivate the latter, which in turn are actions of the body and speech.

1020. Toh. no. 107, mDo sde *ca*, folio 86b, 124a, v. 133; see also Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique," p. 64, for a similar *sūtra* passage and a similar interpretation of the word *only* (*mātra*) by Bhāvaviveka.

1021. The same passage is cited in Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, Sarnath ed., p. 317.

1022. Toh. no. 107, mDo sde *ca*, folios 116a and 246b. Quoted also in *MA*, p. 194. There we find a Cittamātrin opponent bringing up this passage as proof of the fact that the mind-only doctrine was the Buddha's own purport, and in response, we find Candrakīrti commenting on the meaning of this citation.

"[Opponent:] Here, the *body* refers to the sense spheres, such as the eye and so on; *possessions* refer to objects such as form and so on; *abode* refers to the external world. Apart from the mind, nothing exists externally, and hence it is only mere consciousness that arises in such appearances as the body, possessions, and abode, and [because it appears in this way,] the nature of objects such as the body and so on manifest as if they were external things separate from consciousness. For this reason [the Buddha said], 'all three realms are mind only.' "

"[Reply:] This *sūtra* is also of ulterior purport (*dgongs pa can*), and so I explain:

> Some *sūtras* teach that external objects are not appearing,
> But that it is the mind appearing as the variety [of things].

But their intention (*dgongs pa*) is this:

> But they too are of provisional meaning, [aimed at] reverting
> [The notion] of form within those who are extremely attached to form" (VI, 94) (p. 194).

He then goes on to explain how the teachings of mind only succeed in dispelling the attachment of such individuals.

1023. *MA* (VI, 95), p. 195, has *'di ni ston pa'i* for *TTC*'s *'di ni ston pas,* and admittedly the latter makes more sense grammatically. See also *EOE,* p. 168.

1024. Toh. no. 107, mDo sde *ca,* folio 203b; it seems as though mKhas grub rje was using a different translation of this verse; cited also in *MA*, p. 196. See also Tsong kha pa's remarks concerning this verse in *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal,* Sarnath ed., p. 324.

1025. *MA* (VI, 95cd), p. 195; *EOE,* p. 168.

1026. Tsong kha pa, in *LSN,* indicates that this scriptural passage in fact does prove the provisional nature of several Cittamātrin doctrines, as does Candrakīrti in *MA,* p. 196. See *EE,* pp. 345–347.

1027. *LSN* gives only four, but see *EE,* p. 345, n. 1, for the comments of bLo bzang phun tshogs, who in fact gives the five mentioned later.

1028. Mi bskyod rdo rje, in *dBu ma'i gzhan stong smra ba'i srol,* folio 18b, criticizes those who would claim the merely provisional status of this teaching.

1029. Again, according to Tsong kha pa in *LSN,* this citation from the *Laṅkāvatāra* is proof of the provisional nature not only of (1), but of (3), and possibly of other Cittamātrin tenets as well.

1030. Toh. no. 107, mDo sde *ca,* folio 86a; P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1959), pp. 33–34; see *EE,* pp. 347–348.

1031. *MA,* p. 196.

1032. This is a reference to the *gzhan stong* position as expounded in such works as the *Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho* of rDol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (Gangtok: Dodrup Sangye Lama, 1976). mKhas grub rje's concurrence with Red mda' ba on this question is clear; see the latter's *rNam bshad,* pp. 200–204.

1033. Toh. no. 110, mDo sde *cha,* folio 55b.

1034. *MA,* p. 131.

1035. These three criteria are what classify a scripture as of ulterior purport and provisional meaning, namely, that (1) it has a basis of intention (*dgongs gzhi*), (2) there is a purpose (*dgos pa*) in its having been taught, and (3) there ensues a logical fallacy if it is taken literally (*dngos la gnod byed*). I discuss these three criteria in more detail in "The Concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures."

1036. See note 1005.

1037. Toh. no. 107, mDo sde *ca,* folio 85b; Vaidya, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra,* p. 33; see *EE,* p. 351.

1038. *MA,* p. 198.

1039. Toh. no. 107, mDo sde *ca*, folio 85b; Vaidya, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, p. 33.

1040. See *EE*, pp. 354–355.

1041. *MA*, chapter on the "Resultant Stage," v. 36; *EOE*, p. 194.

1042. If the idealist thesis of the Cittamātra were true, it should be provable by a logical syllogism. If there existed such a syllogism, there must exist as part of it a valid example. The idea here seems to be that, unlike the proof of the existence of past and future lives, the proof of idealism must proceed through a syllogism in which a direct example is demonstrated. It is generally said that in the former proof there is no direct example, but only an indirect example related to the syllogism that establishes the continuity of consciousness after death, for were the person to whom the syllogism is posited able to cognize a direct example pertaining to past and future lives, such a person would not need to have the syllogism posited to him or her. This is not the case here, however. If such a valid example existed, it would have to be direct and evident, and as the classical examples posited by the Cittamātrins fail, so too does any syllogism that is supposed to prove idealism.

1043. See *KL*, pp. 58–59, 155–156.

1044. See *MA*, pp. 164 passim; also Go ram pa, *lTa ba'i shan 'byed*, pp. 123 ff.

1045. The *lam rim* literature in general offers us a synthetic study of the nature and suffering of the realm of *pretas*, one of the six realms of Buddhist cosmology; See Tsong kha pa's exposition in the *Lam rim chen mo*, in *Collected Works*, vol. *pha*, Toh. no. 5392. See also Geshe Rabten, *The Essential Nectar: Meditations on the Buddhist Path*, ed. and trans. Martin Wilson (London: Wisdom Publications, 1984), pp. 91–92, 101–102.

1046. *SGV*, vol. 1, p. 31; vol. 2, p. 105.

1047. Toh. no. 4051, Sems tsam *ri*, folio 225a.

1048. *brlan shing gsher ba*, the common Tibetan scholastic definition of water (*chu'i mtshan nyid*). *See AK* (I, 12–13); la Vallée Poussin trans., vol. 1, p. 22 and n. 3.

1049. The Nigranthas (*gcer bu pa*) are a sect of Jainism; in Buddhist literature the term is often used to refer to all Jains. They advocated the doctrine of *bhedābheda*, a kind of relativism that repudiated the notion of absolute or complete truth, and advocated instead that both a proposition and its negation were true in part. Why these opponents are accused of Jainlike relativism here is obvious. See note 915.

1050. Nāgārjuna's *Suhṛllekha*, Toh. no. 4182, sPrin yig *nge*, folio 45a.

1051. From the "Pratyakṣa" chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. v. 413; Toh. no. 4210, Tshad ma *ce*, folio 134a; Shastri, *Pramāṇavārttika of Acārya Dharmakīrti*, p. 220.

1052. The various editions agree on the reading *gdon lnga*, it may make more sense, however, to correct this to read *don lnga;* that is, "the five objects" of the five sense consciousnesses.

1053. From the "Pramāṇasiddhi" chapter of *PV*, v. 150, Tshad ma *ce*, folio 134a; Shastri, ed., p. 55.

1054. See the second argument in section 4.2.3.3.1.2.2.2.2.2.

1055. It is the commonly accepted characteristic of a material thing that it take up space, impeding or obstructing the presence of another object that attempts to occupy the same space. Space, on the other hand is the lack of obstruction. See *AK* (I, 5d); la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, vol. 1, p. 8 and n. 3.

1056. Which is to say that he is refuting an opponent who does not exist, that he is putting the cart of refutation before the horse of an opponent, or to put it even more colloquially, that he is setting up a straw man.

1057. Toh. no. 4065, Sems tsam *shi*, folio 177a.

1058. *Viṃśatika*, v. 4; Toh. no. 4056, Sems tsam *shi*, folio 3a; see also Tripathi and Dorje, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 22.

1059. Commentary on v. 8; Toh. no. 4057, Sems tsam *shi*, folio 6a; see also Tripathi and Dorje, ibid., pp. 30–31.

1060. v. 95; Toh. no. 4182, sPring yig *nge*, folio 45a; see Geshe L. Tarchin and A. Engle, *Nāgārjuna's Letter* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979), pp. 116–117.

1061. Here the distinction being made is this. The eye of consciousness of a *preta* simply does not see the river, but it does not see the river to be nonexistent. That is a function of the conceptual thought that follows the eye consciousness. For that reason the *preta*'s eye consciousness is said not to be mistaken, whereas the subsequent conceptual thought that thinks there to be a river is mistaken (*log pa*) and in error as to its apprehended object (*'dzin stang kyi yul la 'khrul pa*).

1062. *MA* (VI, 71), p. 164; *EOE*, p. 165.

1063. This passage is somewhat difficult to understand. It would seem that mKhas grub rje is implying that the eye consciousness of the patient with eye disease who sees falling hair actually has as its object an external physical entity. The tradition however interprets this to mean that the *appearance* of the falling hair is being referred to. As in the case of the object of a dream consciousness, this appearance is considered to be external form.

1064. See *MA*, p. 164.

1065. *BCA* (V, 7–8ab), p. 54: "*śastrāṇi kena narake ghaṭitāni prayatnataḥ / taptāyaḥkuṭṭimaṃ kena kuto jātāśca tāḥ striyaḥ / pāpacittasamudbhūtaṃ tattatsarvaṃ jagau muniḥ*." I have, however, opted for translating instead of *striyaḥ* (tib. *mo*), that is, "women", "fire" (tib. *me*), if only to follow the reading in *TTC*. The Tibetan in *BCA* has *yin par* for *samudbhutam*, but *TTC*'s *byung bar* is more appropriate.

1066. According to dGe lugs pa *siddhānta* literature, *svasaṃvedanā*, or autocognition, is something asserted by Sautrāntikas, Cittamātrins, and Yogācāra-Svātantrika Mādhyamikas. Specifically, it is seen in these schools as a way to explain the workings of memory. How can we, they argue, remember having had a cognition of the color blue if when we first saw the blue that very same consciousness was not perceiving itself? The Prāsaṅgikas, as will become obvious, repudiate the need for autocognition to explain the workings of memory. See *MA*, pp. 166 ff for a complimentary discussion of this topic; also *LSN*, folios 77b–81b; see also *KL*, pp. 110–113; *SOS*, pp. 195–196, 310–312 (for a discussion of Bhāvaviveka's critique based on the *Madhyamakahṛdaya*); see Bhāvaviveka, *Madhyamakahṛdaya* (V, 20–22) and *Tarkajvālā*, *P* no. 5356, vol. 96, folio 93; the implicit reference in *MMK* (VII, 8–12) may be to *svasaṃvedanā*, see *Pras*, p. 151 and n. 4; also J. May, *Cinq Chapitres*, p. 113, n. 284, who gives references to sources that discuss the origin of the doctrine; *EE*, pp. 317–321; *MOE*, pp. 350–351, 373–374; Dignāga, *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, trans. M. Hattori, pp. 28–30; *PV* (*Pratyakṣapariccheda*) (II, 423–502), Shastri, *Pramāṇavārttika of Acārya Dharmakīrti*; *CS* (XIII, 16–17); *AC*, pp. 122–123; *CMDR*, p. 332; *Śūnyatāsaptati*, v. 52–57, ed. and trans. D. Komito, pp. 162–169; and Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣa*, trans. Y. Kajiyama, pp. 47–53, for an extensive rebuttal of the critiques of the theory, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist.

1067. Toh. no. 3856, dBu ma *dza*, folio 205a.

1068. Dualistic appearances occur when a consciousness apprehends an object that seems or appears external to itself. In the case of autocognition, even at the level of appearances, no external object is involved because it is but one aspect of the consciousness apprehending another.

1069. *PV*, Shastri, ed., p. 224 (II, 428d); rGyal tshab rje's remarks on this verse in *Thar lam gsal byed* (Sarnath: Gelukpa Students Welfare Committee, 1974), p. 196, are as follows.

"[Opponent:] Even though there is no autocognition, this does not imply that there is nothing to experience [the consciousness which is later remembered], for it is experienced by another consciousness occurring afterward.

"[Reply:] How can a later mind possessing the aspect of the entity of that earlier mind experience the earlier mind? It is impossible, for at the time of the later one the earlier consciousness has ceased. It would imply, absurdly, the end of all of the experience of object *and* consciousness, for not only would it fail in [apprehending] the earlier consciousness, but it would not experience its own nature either. It would follow, absurdly, that the later consciousness which is purportedly what experiences [the earlier one], appears as being directed outwardly because it is a consciousness that possesses the appearance of a *svalakṣaṇa* of a different substance from itself as its apprehended object (*gzung don*). It is not correct to accept this because the mind in its subjective aspect, which is what apprehends the mind, is always directed only internally toward its own nature."

1070. *PV*, Shastri, ed., p. 198 (II, 330); compare to *PV*, Shastri, ed., p. 229 (II, 446cd); rGyal tshab rje's remarks in *Thar lam gsal byed*, Sarnath ed., p. 158, are as follows.

"[Opponent:] If object and subject are not different things, then why is it that they appear [as if they were] to everyone, from sages to children, in a way that cannot be disavowed?

"[Reply:] Even though ultimately the aspects of the cognized [entity] and the cognizing [agent] are not different things, just as that which is apprehended by the consciousness to which hair [falsely] appears, [so that the imaginary hair] appears as if it were of a different substance from the consciousness, there is no contradiction in its appearing in this way, that is, erroneously."

1071. *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti; P* dBu ma *sa,* folio 4b (commentary of kārika 6c); see Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary,* pp. 72–73, 157. The *rang rig 'gog pa na* of the *TTC* is missing in the *bsTan 'gyur* versions. This leads me to suggest an emendation to the text of the *TTC* so that this expression, "when refuting autocognition," is read outside of the quote. My translation (and interpretation) here varies from Eckel's.

1072. The pervasion in the Cittamātrin's syllogism involves the assertion, "if memory of a consciousness exists, then so must the reflexive experience of that consciousness by autocognition." The reply by mKhas grub rje is that such a pervasion is erroneous—it does not hold invariably—for there are instances of remembering an object or a thought of an object when no reflexive experience occurred at the time of the thought.

1073. According to oral commentary, apparently there is a notion in Tibet that certain kinds of glass, those having powers to magnify for example, are born from fire, whereas others, having a cooling effect on the eyes, are born from the crystallization of water into ice and eventually into rock crystal. But this process is said to be very rare, and not every fire nor every body of water gives rise to such glass. Cf. *MA,* p. 169.

1074. *MMK* (VII, 12).

1075. Whereas the previous subsection was the refutation of the reasoning used by the Cittamātrins to prove autocognition, this subsection, not restricting itself to a mere rebuttal of their position, gives independent arguments and expounds other logical fallacies involved in maintaining the position that there is such a thing as autocognition.

1076. Which is to say that if cognition is possible without an object different from the cognition itself, then object and consciousness (or perceived object and valid cognition) would not be mutually dependent entities defined in terms of each other, which of course they are.

1077. Granted that the subjective aspect (the cognizing subject) is supposed to have as its subject the objective aspect (the cognized object), but the Cittamātrins go on to maintain that that objective aspect is *of the same nature* as the subjective aspect and that it is a case of autocognition, thereby once again blurring the distinctions between subject and object. See *Thar lam gsal byed,* p. 158.

1078. *MA* (VI, 76cd), p. 172. *TTC* has *min par* for *MA's min pas,* and *myong bar* for *MA's 'dzin par.* Though I have opted for the latter's reading, the meaning is essentially unchanged from what it would be in the former.

1079. The subject of autocognition is intimately connected to that of memory. Concerning the latter in Buddhism, see the discussion in the *Pudgalaviniścaya* section of *AK* (IX), la Vallée Poussin, trans., pp. 273 passim; also J. Gyatso, "Mantra as Memory, but Memory of What?" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion, 1987); Griffiths, *On Being Mindless*, pp. 52, 100; *EE*, pp. 317–320.

1080. *MA*, p. 169. *TTC* has *byas pa yin na ni* for *yin te*.

1081. *MA*, pp. 169–170.

1082. This indicates that the syllogism is such that any predicate will do; that is, the predicate is unimportant in what is to follow.

1083. *BCA* (IX, 24ab), p. 191.

1084. *BCA* (IX, 24cd), p. 191.

1085. *MA* (VI, 72cd), p. 166. *BCA*'s reading of *gang gis*, as opposed to *TTC*'s *gang gi*, is preferable here.

1086. *Pras*, p. 73; *Pras*-tib, folio 25a. *TTC* has been emended to read *rjes su byed pa* (versus *rjes su phyed pa*), in accordance with the latter.

1087. This of course is reminiscent of the famous line in the *Pratyakṣa* Chapter of the *PV* (*mānaṃ dvividhaṃ viṣayadvaividhyāt*) that connects the twofold nature of valid cognitions (direct perception and inference) to the twofold nature of objects (particulars and universals). See *PV*, Shastri ed., p. 98.

1088. See section 4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1.2.2.

1089. Usually the term *rig shes* refers to an inferential understanding of emptiness, the ultimate truth. In the present context, however, it is clear that mKhas grub rje is using it in a much wider sense to refer to any understanding of emptiness, and here specifically to the direct understanding of emptiness in the equipoise of an *āryan*.

1090. *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, in *Collected Works*, vol. *ba*, folio 27a; Sarnath ed., p. 46.

1091. This statement seems to indicate that the person whose view is being expounded accepts that when autocognition directly understands the subjective aspect, that is, the consciousness, it does so without this appearing to it. Otherwise, the position that is so severely criticized in these last lines would seem to be quite consistent.

1092. *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, in *Collected Works*, vol. *ma*, folios 161b–162a; Sarnath ed., p. 294.

1093. *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, in *Collected Works*, vol. *ba*, folio 27a; Sarnath ed., p. 45.

1094. *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, *Collected Works*, vol. *ma*, folio 161b; Sarnath ed., p. 293.

1095. *dGongs pa rab gsal*, in *Collected Works*, vol. *ma*, folio 162a; Sarnath ed., p. 294.

1096. As we shall see later, according to dGe lugs pa exegesis, this is one of the uncommon tenets of the Prāsaṅgika school, namely, that every consciousness, whether mistaken or not, is a valid cognition, that is, correct, in regard to what *appears* to it. Which is to say that, though it may be mistaken in regard to the object it is perceiving, it is nonetheless valid in regard to the appearance itself. In other words, that things are actually appearing to it in this false way is indisputable. That things exist as they appear to it is not.

1097. According to the Madhyamaka theory of "two truths," every phenomenon—object, consciousness, fact, in short, whatever exists—can be subsumed into one of these two categories; the ultimate, which is emptiness or reality, and the conventional, which quite literally is everything else. On the two truths in Buddhism, see *AK* (VI, 4–5), (VII, 2); *KL*, pp. 34–37; a collection of articles edited by M. Sprung, *The Problem of the Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973) contains some useful material; Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, is an annotated translation of a Svātantrika text on the subject; for a bibliography of Japanese work on the subject, see *IB* p. 249, n. 24; G. M. Nagao, "An Interpretation of the Term 'Saṃvṛtti' (Convention) in Buddhism," *Silver Jubillee Volume of the Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyo*, pp. 550–561; C. Lindtner, "Atīśa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and Its Sources," *JIP* 9 (1981): 161–214; F. Streng, "The Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths," *JIP* 1 (1971): 262–271; E. Conze, "The Ontology of the Prajñāpāramitā," *PEW* 3 (1953): 117–129; J. W. de Jong, "The Problem of the Absolute in the Madhyamaka School," *JIP* 2 (1972): 1–6; C. W. Huntington, "The System of Two Truths in the Prasannapadā and the Madhyamakāvatāra: A Study in Madhyamaka Soteriology," *JIP* 11 (1983): 77–106; Sopa and Hopkins, *The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*, is, in part, a summary of the dGe lugs pa view on this subject from a *siddhānta* perspective; along the same lines as this last work is a short text by nineteenth century dGe lugs scholar, Ngag dbang dpal ldan, on the stances of the different Buddhist philosophical schools concerning the two truths, *Grub mtha' bzhi'i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo'i glu dbyangs* (New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972); see also *MOE*, pp. 346–350 (on the Sautrāntika position), p. 390 (Cittamātra), pp. 405–422 (Madhyamaka); *SOS*, pp. 192–217, 325–338 (Svātantrika Madhyamaka). For a similar treatment in a Tibetan source contemporary to the *TTC*, see Rong ston pa's *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad*, pp. 113–120; and Go ram pa's *BPD*, p. 361, folios 28b ff.

1098. This section discusses *what* is being divided into the two truths. For the position of Thang sags pa on this question, see *MOE*, p. 411. That there must have been varying views of what formed the basis for setting forth the two truths is witnessed by kLong rdol bla ma's claim that sTag tshang lo tsā ba alone had three different methods on which he based his division, ones, incidentally, that are completely different from the ones delineated by mKhas grub rje as opponents' positions. See kLong rdol bla ma's *dBu ma'i ming gi rnam grangs*, p. 436.

1099. Toh. no. 60, dKon brtsegs *nga*, folio 62b; cited in *MOE*, p. 405; *SOS*, p. 193.

1100. rNgog bLo ldan shes rab (1059–1109). Concerning this controversy, see *MOE*, pp. 406–407.

1101. For a detailed discussion of this controversy, see M. Sweet, "*Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9:2 as a Focus for Tibetan Interpretations of the Two Truths," *JIABS* 2, no. 2 (1979). See also mKhas grub rje, *Lam ngan mun gsal sgron ma*, folio 174b; the first Paṇ chen bla ma, in *rTsod lan*, folios 376–378, criticizes sTag tshang lo tsā ba for holding a similar view.

1102. *BCA* (IX, 2), p. 185.

1103. In other words, that the premise does not at all follow from the reason or proof.

1104. To be found in *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, Chapter 14, Toh. no. 3940, dBu ma *khi*, folio 142b.

1105. Toh. no. 3887, dBu ma *sa*, folio 191a; cited in *SOS*, p. 194, where the exposition is based on Ngag dbang dpal ldan's text.

1106. Toh. no. 3887, dBu ma *sa*, folio 191b.

1107. Toh no. 60, dKon brtsegs *nga*, folio 61b; cited in *MOE*, p. 412; also cited in *MA*, p. 70.

1108. *MA*, p. 70.

1109. *MA*, p. 70.

1110. This is a point disputed in the tradition. rJe bstun pa, for example, holds that it is a belief that is uncommon to the Prāsaṅgikas. The claim of those who assert the latter is substantiated by the fact that Svātantrikas assert that not all *śrāvaka arhants* realize emptiness, whereas they do realize cessation. If *śrāvaka arhants* are then aware of cessation, how could they be unaware of reality, if for them cessation *is* reality? This is one counterargument to the several proofs now offered by mKhas grub rje.

1111. Though both are states of meditative equipoise on emptiness, during the former the obstacles (*mthong spang*) are not abandoned, they are not uprooted. The latter is called a *liberative path* because, due to the force of equipoise on reality that occurs during the former, the obstacles are overcome, representing one in a series of cessations that take place along the path to buddhahood.

1112. The two purities that the nature body are said to possess are (1) the purity of adventitious defilements (*lu bur kyi dri mas dag pa*) and (2) the essential purity (*rang bzhin rnam dag*), which refers to the emptiness of essence or the lack of inherent existence of the Buddha's mind. The point here is that, on the one hand, the nature body is identified as being the state of cessation of a buddha and, on the other, as the "reality" that possesses these two purities. Hence, it would be contradictory for the Svātantrikas not to accept cessation to be reality, the ultimate truth.

1113. See, for example, Haribhadra's comments in *'Grel ba don gsal* (Sarnath: Gelukpa Students Welfare Committee, 1980), pp. 126–127. On the sixteen (or actually eighteen) emptinesses, see also the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāpiṇḍārtha*, attributed to Dignaga, ed. and trans. G. Tucci, *JRAS* (1947): 53–75.

1114. *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, in *Collected Works*, vol. *ma*, folio 62b.

1115. *Pras*, p. 494; *Pras*-tib, folio 163b.

1116. v. 35; Toh. no. 3825, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 21b.

1117. Toh. no. 3864, dBu ma *ya*, folio 7b.

1118. Of course, because nothing "really exists," the second connotation of the word *truth* refers to the object to be refuted (*dgag bya*), something that cannot exist.

1119. *P* no. 5224, dBu ma *tsa*, folio 9b; *MMK* (XIII, 1); see *Pras*, pp. 42, 237, and *Pras*-tib, folios 13b and 81a. See also note 644; and the First Paṇ chen bla ma's *rTsod lan*, p. 387.

1120. *Pras*, p. 238; *Pras*-tib, folio 81a. The word *ekam* in *Pras* is missing in the Tibetan version.

1121. In Sanskrit the words *lake born* (*saroruha*) were an epithet of, and therefore used to refer *only* to, the lotus.

1122. The reference here is to an elephant, which is metaphorically called the *limbed one* (*lag ldan*, skt. *hastin*) because of its trunk. Now although a man fulfills the etymological criteria for being "a limbed one," in that he has limbs, this is not enough to make him a referent of the term. Only elephants are "limbed ones."

1123. *MA* (VI, 28a), p. 107.

1124. *MA*, p. 107.

1125. *MA*, p. 107.

1126. *MA* (VI, 23), p. 102.

1127. Causal and essential relations are the only two types of relations possible between phenomena. On this, see Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣa*, trans. Kajiyama, Chapter 2; also *DBPL*, pp. 91–94.

1128. Although having the same referent, they have different names, different designations, being the opposites of different entities qua names. See L. Zwilling, "Dharmakīrti on Apoha" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1976); and *MOE*, p. 413, n. 310.

1129. *P* no. 2665, vol. 61, folio 286; Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, pp. 204–205.

1130. On this position, see *MOE*, p. 415, n. 315.

1131. *PV Svārthānumāna Pariccheda*, v. 167, Gnoli ed., p. 85.

1132. This, of course, is a noncomposite entity, and therefore lacking the qualities of arising and cessation; that is, it is permanent.

1133. See *MOE*, pp. 204–205.

1134. v. 9a–b; Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 161 (also p. 76 for his translation). *TTC* takes the first line of the commentary following the verse, "*don dam yin par kho bo cag 'dod do*," and adds it to the first two lines as if it were 9c.

1135. Toh. no. 3887, dBu ma *sa*, folio 149a; cited in the *lCang skya Grub mtha'*, Lopez trans., in *SOS*, p. 326. Compare to *Satyadvaya*, v. 11, which is most likely the *Āloka's* source here.

1136. See *LSN*, folios 91b–97b.

1137. *Satyadvaya*, v. 12; Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 163, see also p. 79 for his translation, which differs slightly from my own in that he does not translate the particle *yang*, most likely considering it as an insertion for the sake of meter.

1138. *MA* (VI, 25), p. 104.

1139. For example, based on worldly consciousness one can say that there is such a thing as true or inherent existence, and the Prāsaṅgikas would accept that within the purview of worldly consciousness inherent existence exists because it appears, though they do not accept inherent existence in their own system.

1140. This statement is somewhat surprising. According to both Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Mādhyamikas, the eye consciousness, whether mistaken or nonmistaken, being a consciousness, cannot be understood not to exist as it appears by any ordinary being or mind, but only by a mind that understands emptiness. Here, however, the idea seems to be that, as it is an erroneous mind, confusing the reflection and the actual face, it is its mode of appearance that can be understood, even by ordinary beings, not to exist as it appears. This is what seems to be implied here by saying that the eye consciousness involved in perceiving a reflection in a mirror can be understood by worldly beings not to exist as it appears.

1141. *MA*, p. 190.

1142. *MA*, p. 174. Several textual emendations have been made in the *TTC* citation to make it conform to *MA*, which in this case seems consistently more accurate.

1143. *MA* (VI, 36), pp. 122–123.

1144. *MA* (VI, 127d), p. 245.

1145. *MA*, p. 113. The point here seems to be that it is inappropriate to take the term *stuff* (skt. *dravya*) in its technical sense of "substance" when it is being used in a nontechnical, worldly sense. The hypothetical opponent, however, misses the point of the passage and takes this as an indication of the fact that the Prāsaṅgikas accept the concept of substance nominally or conventionally.

1146. See *EE*, Chapter 6, pp. 345–363; *CMDR*, pp. 227–229; *MOE*, pp. 391–392, 601–602; also Red mda' ba's *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad*, folios 206–210.

1147. *MA*, pp. 201–202. I have followed *MA* where it differs from *TTC* except for the instance in which *TTC*'s *ma reg par* seems to make more sense than *MA*'s *ma rig par*. *MA*'s *sang rgyas shes brjod do*, as attested to by *TTC*, obviously is incorrect, to be read instead as *zhes*.

1148. For a similar discussion in sTag tshang lo tsā ba, see *Grub mtha' kun shes*, pp. 223–225.

1149. In that the object, if a pot, for example, is determined to be a pot as opposed to a pillar.

1150. See *Pras*, pp. 41, 53, 109, 289, 443, 518.

1151. See Rong ston pa's remarks concerning this subject in *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad*, pp. 69–71. See also the opponents remarks in kārika VI, and Nāgārjuna's remarks in his commentary to kārika LI; Bhattacharya, ed., pp. 14, 40 (trans., pp. 9, 34).

1152. For a full discussion of this, see *DBPL*, Chapter 2, which is a revised version of my "The Concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scriptures," *JIABS* 4, no. 1 (1981): 7–23.

1153. See M. Nagatomi, "*Manasa-Pratyakṣa:* A Conundrum in the Buddhist *Pramāṇa* System," in *Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honor of Daniel H. H. Ingalls*, ed. M. Nagatomi et al. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), pp. 243–260; also H. V. Guenther and L. Kawamura, *Mind in Buddhist Psychology* (Emeryville, Calif.: Dharma, 1975); H. V. Guenther, "Towards an Experience of being through Psychological Purification," in *Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective* (Emeryville, Calif.: Dharma, 1977), p. 245 and n. 11; Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣa*, trans. Kajiyama, pp. 45–46.

1154. *Ṭīkā* on *CS* (XI, 18); *P* no. 5266, dBu ma *ya*, folio 203a, has *don* for *TTC*'s mistaken *de na*, and *gnyis pas* for *TTC*'s *gnyis pa*. A somewhat more extensive discussion of *vijñāna* occurs in (XIII, 12–18). See *AC*, pp. 108–109.

1155. Toh. no. 3865, dBu ma *ya*, folio 171b.

1156. Namely, sense consciousness (*dbang shes*), mental consciousness (*yid shes*), and yogic direct perception (*rnal 'byor mngon sum*). Compare to Dignāga's theory; see Hattori, *Dignāga on Perception*, pp. 27 passim; also Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣa*, trans. Kajiyama, pp. 44–56.

1157. *Pras*, p. 75; *Pras*-tib, folio 25b.

1158. *Pras*, p. 75; *Pras*-tib, folio 25b.

1159. See *KL*, pp. 123–130.

1160. In the *pramāṇa* literature, a valid cognition usually is defined as "a cognition that is newly undeceived" (*gsar du mi slu ba'i rig pa*). Kajiyama, for example,

cites the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin concerning the characteristics of a valid cognition, which includes this property of being "new": "*pramāṇaṃ samyagjñānam* apurva*gocaram iti lakṣaṇam*," (*Language of Logic*, p. 23 and n. 4), a view shared by Mokṣākaragupta. The opinion presented here, therefore, is consonant with that of the Pramāṇikas.

1161. For a discussion of this and related problems, see *DBPL*, Chapter 3.

1162. Here I have tried to use a generic term that could apply both to a consciousness and to its object, while emphasizing the latter, because the object is the real full-blown *mngon sum*, and the valid cognition that perceives it only *labeled mngon sum*, without actually being so.

1163. *Pras*, p. 71; *Pras-tib*, folio 24b.

1164. See *Tarkabhāṣa*, trans. Kajiyama, in *Language of Logic*, pp. 53–56.

1165. Much more extensive explanations of the meditative practices only touched on here are to be found in a genre of literature that becomes especially popular after this time, a genre known as *lta khrid*, literally, "teachings on the view." See also mKhas grub rje, *Lam ngan mun sel sgron ma* (Introduction, note 26), and his third appendix to the *TTC*.

1166. *LRCM*, folios 492b ff; see also *CMDR*, pp. 390–426.

1167. Compare this, that is, the critique of the notion that the essence of the practice is to be found in "secret instructions" apart from the formal study of the great scriptural classics, with that of the Fifth Dalai bLa ma in his *'Jam dpal zhal lung*: "There is no method for establishing any form of happiness, from that of higher rebirth on up through that of the definitive good [buddhahood], that is not taught, either directly or indirectly, in the stainless words of the Buddha. Still, because [these teachings] are profound and subtle, it is difficult for the mind to penetrate them. It is the great treatises which comment on their purport that clearly elucidate them. Hence, there is not the slightest essential instruction (*man ngag*) on the practice that is not explained in the scriptures and their commentaries," (Bylakuppe, India: Sera Byes Monastery, undated blockprint), folio 7b; translation in my, "The Revelations of Mañjuśrī," (unpublished manuscript), p. 17.

1168. Much of this section deals with the theory of the three bodies of buddhas (skt. *trikāya*). The most complete and recent work on this subject is J. Makransky's doctoral dissertation, (University of Wisconsin, 1990). See also the bibliography in la Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, as well as his "The Three Bodies of the Buddha," *JRAS* (1906): 943–977; also, Akanuma Chizen, "The Triple Body of the Buddha," *Eastern Buddhist* 2 (1922): 1–29. *IB*, p. 260, n. 43 gives references concerning the *saṃbhoga* and *nirmāṇakāyas*; and Bu ston's *History of Buddhism*, trans. E. Obermiller, trans., part I, pp. 128–138, gives references to most of the Indian works dealing with the *trikāya* theory. See also Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, pp. 101–103, 187–190, for the comments of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* on this subject.

1169. From the "Qualities of the Fruits and Stages" chapter of *MA* (XI, 17); see *EOE*, p. 191, which varies from my translation.

1170. The canonical source for this doctrine seems to be the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, Nanjio ed., p. 269: "*Akaniṣṭhe bhavane divye sarva pāpa vivarjita tatra budhyanti sambuddhā nirmita tv iha budhyate.*" See also mKhas grub rje, *rGyud sde phyi rnam*, ed. and trans. Lessing and Wayman, *Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), which compares different notions concerning the final stages in the process of attaining enlightenment; also *Pras*, p. 448.

1171. These topics he discusses, for example, in his commentary to *AA*, the *rTogs dka'i snang ba*. If this is indeed the text to which he refers, it would indicate that the latter was composed after the *TTC*.

1172. Compare sTag tshang lo tsā ba's claim that the fundamental error in the dGe lugs pa interpretation of Candrakīrti (the one leading to the eighteen famous "contradictions" that he accuses the dGe lugs pas of, see Appendix 2) lies in their belief that "the valid cognition that analyzes conventional truths is to be found in the Buddha's conventional gnosis," as cited and subsequently criticized by the First Paṇ chen bLa ma, *rTsod lan*, p. 376.

1173. According to the First Paṇ chen bla ma's *rTsod lan*, pp. 376, 384 passim, sTag tshang lo tsā ba held a somewhat qualified version of this position, namely, that the Buddha cognizes no *conventional* truths. In fact, if the former's characterization of the latter's views are accurate, it would seem that the latter's chief complaint against Tsong kha pa and his followers would center on the fact that Tsong kha pa and mKhas grub rje conceive of the Buddha's gnosis as containing valid cognitions of the nominal-conventional world. See previous note.

1174. Commentary on (VI, 28); this passage is also discussed in Tsong kha pa's *rTsa shes ṭīk chen*, Sarnath ed., p. 414.

1175. These are discussed extensively in the "Qualities of the Fruits and Stages" chapter of *MA*; see *EOE*, pp. 192–194.

1176. For a discussion and listing of these in English, see *MOE*, pp. 208–211.

1177. I have been unable to find this passage in the *MA Bhāṣya*. It is discussed also in *rTsa shes ṭīk chen*, Sarnath ed., p. 415.

1178. *MA* (XI, 2), p. 356; *EOE*, p. 190.

1179. *Pras*, p. 374; *Pras*-tib, folio 120a. See also *MA* (VI, 29).

1180. *Uttaratantra* (I, 93); see also *Uttaratantra* (I, 153); and *TTG*, pp. 355–356.

1181. Toh. no. 4025, Sems tsam *phi*, folio 105b.

1182. Toh no. 3882, dBu ma *sa*, folio 14b. See Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, pp. 102, 188.

1183. Again, see D. S. Ruegg's translation of the Jo nang pa chapter of Thu'u kvan bLo bzang chos kyi nyi ma's *Grub mtha' shel gyi me long* in *JAOS* 83 (1963); also *TTG*, pp. 8 passim.

1184. D. S. Ruegg (*TTG*, p. 22) wrongly identifies the scribe as Zhang zhung pa Chos dbang grags pa, undoubtedly confusing the preface to the following treatise that *was* "mise par écrit par Zhang zhung pa" with the ending lines of the colophon to the *TTC*. In his "On Thesis and Assertion . . ." he states, "the *sKal bzang mig 'byed* was written down by Zhang zhung pa Chos dbang grags pa (1404–1469), a disciple of mKhas grub rje who, according to the colophon of the text, faithfully recorded his master's teaching without making either unwarranted additions or subtractions" (p. 216). The editors of the *Catalogue of the Tohoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism*, p. 141, also state of the *TTC* that it was "written by Shang zhung pa Chos dbang grags pa'i dpal as a summary of the lecture . . . by dGe legs dpal bzang po." See Introduction.

1185. This refers to those who, in accordance with *Vinaya*, practice the special discipline of taking all of their food for the day in one sitting. bLo gros chos skyong (1389–1463/4) was born in gYag sde, in gTsang, and was the fifth holder of the dGa' ldan throne; see *BS*, p. 124; *TTKT* for the alternative date for his death as 1470; see also *KYP*, folio 18b.

1186. Meaning that many scholars came from this area of Tibet.

1187. See the "Biography of mKhas grub rje" concerning this monastery; see also van der Kuijp, p. 315, n. 361.

Appendices

1. The two principal causes of buddhahood, the accumulation of merit and wisdom.

2. "*de dag bdag gis ma bkag ces*," *KYP*, folio 6b. The expression is somewhat puzzling, but what it implies is that Rong ston pa at least claimed that it was not he who had put a stop to the debate. Of course mKhas grub rje claims that this is just a pretense on Rong ston pa's part, as it was he who put up their mutual benefactor to cancelling the proceedings.

3. It is said in *KYP*, folios 6b–7a, that immediately after putting this up on the main door of the monastery, mKhas grub rje recited two verses on his own spiritual accomplishments and left for mDangs can Mountain. The king, bribing some of his attendants to entice him to return to dPal 'khor sde chen, finally gave up hope of his ever returning when, as a response to his efforts, mKhas grub rje sent him the following verse:

> What wise person would not laugh at the thought that the king of beasts
> Who has taken up his abode in the snow mountains,
> Endowed with inexhaustible fangs and powerful claws,
> Can be chained up like a watchdog and nourished with filthy water?

Glossary

A

abode .... *gnas*

absurd fact .... *thal chos*

absurdity .... *thal ba*

accordance with [its] object, correct .... *don mthun*

accordance with the worldly .... *'jig rten pa dang bstun pa*

accumulation, assembly, conjunction, grouping .... *tshogs*

accurate .... *'thad ldan*

act out .... *tshul ston pa*

active [altruistic] mind .... *'jug sems*

active opposite .... *'gal zla mi mthun phyogs*

actual, direct, real .... *dngos*

adventitious .... *glu (glo) bur*

advocate of [a particular] philosophical view or tenet, philosopher .... *grub mtha' smra ba*

advocate of the existence of objects .... *don smra ba*

affirmative misunderstandings .... *'jug pa gzung rtogs*

affirming negation .... *ma yin dgag*

afflicted consciousness .... *nyon yid*

afflicted obscuration .... *nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa*

afflicted phenomenon .... *kun nas nyon mongs kyi chos*

affliction .... *(kun nas) nyon mongs*

aggregate .... *phung po*

analogue .... *mtshung ldan*

analogy, comparison .... *nyer 'jal dpyad pa*

annihilate, negate .... *sun 'byin pa*

annihilation .... *rgyun chad pa*

antidote .... *gnyen po*

appear .... *snang ba, zhen pa, rnam pa(r) shar ba*

appearance of duality .... *gnyis snang*

appearing object .... *snang yul*

apprehended object, direct object, main or referent object .... *'dzin stangs gyi yul*

apprehension of a self .... *bdag 'dzin*

apprehension of signs .... *mtshan 'dzin*

apprehension of true existence .... *bden 'dzin*

āryan .... *'phags pa*

āryan still in training .... *'phags pa slob pa*

as they seem to be .... *ji snyed pa*

ascertain .... *nges pa*

ascertaining consciousness .... *nges shes*

aspect .... *rnam pa*

aspirational [altruistic] mind .... *smon sems*

at will, intuitively, simply by focusing [on the object] .... *blo kha phyogs pa tsam*

atom, elementary particle .... *rdul phra rab, rdul phren*

attainment .... *thob pa*

autocognition .... *rang rig*

B

basis, referent .... *gzhi, rten*

basis for a perception .... *dmigs rten*

basis of the conjuring .... *sprul gzhi*

basis of emptiness .... *stong gzhi*

basis of labeling .... *btags (gdags) gzhi*

basis of vikalpic conceptions .... *rnam rtog gi zhen pa'i gzhi*

basis or referent on which linguistic terms are predicated .... *ming gi tha snyad 'dogs pa'i gzhi*

being [human] .... *skyes bu*

belief .... *mos pa*

belief, philosophical position, thesis .... *dam bca'*

bio-hagiographical work .... *rnam thar*

bodily exercise .... *'khrul 'khor*

brief topic .... *mdor bstan*

buddha-nature, *tathāgatagarbha* .... *bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po*

C

category, set .... *rang ldog*

causal condition .... *rgyu rkyen*

causal relationship .... *de byung du 'brel ba*

causally natureless .... *skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa*

cause .... *rgyu, skyed byed*
certainty .... *nges pa*
characteristic, definition .... *mtshan nyid*
characteristically natureless .... *mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa*
classification, lineage, kind .... *rigs*
cognition, cognitive act .... *rig shes*
cognitive basis .... *zhen gzhi*
cognize, appear .... *zhen pa*
cognized entity or object .... *rig bya, zhen yul*
cognized or perceived phenomenon, existent thing .... *gzhal bya*
cognizer, cognizing subject .... *rig byed*
common locus .... *gzhi mthun*
comparison, analogy .... *nyer 'jal*
compatibly .... *mthun snang du*
completion stage .... *rdzog rim*
composite body .... *'du byed kyi sku*
composite, produced .... *'du byed*
compounded .... *'du byas*
concealed entity, obtuse point .... *lkog gyur*
conceived object .... *zhen yul*
conceptual imputation or label .... *rtog btags*
conceptual thought, conceptual consciousness .... *rtog pa*
conceptualization .... *yongs su rtog pa, mngon par zhen pa*
conceptualize .... *mngon par zhen pa, rtog pa*
concomitant relation .... *khyab 'brel*
concordant .... *rigs mthun, mthun pa*

concordant example .... *mthun dpe*

concordant latent potentialities .... *rigs mthun pa'i bag chags*

concordant side .... *mthun phyogs*

concordant ultimate .... *mthun pa'i don dam*

condition .... *rkyen*

conjunction, assembly or accumulation, grouping .... *tshogs*

consciousness .... *shes pa, rnam shes*

contact .... *reg pa*

contemplate .... *bsam pa*

continuity .... *rgyun*

contradict, contradiction .... *'gal ba*

contradictory pervasion .... *'gal khyab*

conventional .... *kun rdzob*

conventional truth .... *kun rdzob bden pa*

correct, real .... *yang dag pa*

correct, according with its object .... *don mthun*

correct conventional truth .... *yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa*

correctly [really] existent .... *yang dag par yod pa*

critique, polemic, rebuttal .... *dgag lan*

crude, gross, rough .... *rag pa*

D

debating circuit .... *grwa skor*

decide .... *mtha' dpyad pa*

defilement, stain .... *dri ma*

definite lineage or kind .... *rigs nges pa*

definite *śrāvaka* type .... *nyan thos rigs nges*

definition, characteristic .... *mtshan nyid*

definitive good [buddahood] .... *nges legs*

definitive meaning .... *nges don*

deny the existence of, slander .... *skur ba 'debs pa*

depend .... *rag las pa*

dependent .... *brten pa*

dependent arising .... *rten cing 'brel 'byung*

dependent entity .... *gzhan dbang*

desire realm .... *'dod khams*

devoid of being a unity or a plurality .... *gcig dang du bral*

dharma element .... *chos kyi skye mched*

different nature .... *ngo bo tha dad*

direct, actual, real .... *dngos*

direct contradiction .... *dngos 'gal*

direct object .... *dngos kyi gzhal bya*

direct object, apprehended object, main or referent object .... *'dzin stangs kyi yul*

direct perception .... *mngon sum*

directly, really .... *dngos su*

directly perceptible .... *mngon sum pa*

disappear .... *snang ba ldog pa*

disciplined mind .... *spong sems*

discordant side .... *mi mthun phyogs*

discrimination .... *'du shes*

disparaging the doctrine .... *chos kyi phongs pa*

disputation .... *rtsod pa*

dominant condition .... *bdag rkyen*

doubt .... *the tshom*

downfall .... *pham pa*

E

effect .... *'bras bu, bskyed bya*

effective action (lit. taking up what is desired and avoiding what is not) .... *glang dor*

efficacious .... *'bras bu dang bcas pa, don byed (nus) pa*

ego grasping .... *bdag tu 'dzin pa*

egotistic views .... *bdag lta*

eight great difficult points .... *dka' gnas chen po brgyad*

eighteen shared attributes .... *ma 'dres pa bco brgyad*

elaborations, proliferation .... *spros pa*

element .... *khams*

elementary particle, atom .... *rdul phra rab*

elementary point particle .... *rdul phren phyogs kyi cha med*

emancipation, liberation .... *(rnam par) thar pa*

emptiness .... *stong pa nyid*

emptiness of emptiness .... *stong pa nyid stong pa nyid*

emptiness of what is other .... *gzhan stong*

empty	*stong pa*
empty of self	*rang stong*
enduring	*ther gzugs*
enlightenment	*byang chub*
entity, thing	*dngos po*
equal taste	*ro mnyam*
equipoised	*snyom par zhugs pa*
erroneous	*bslu ba, 'khrul pa*
essence, nature	*rang bzhin, ngo bo*
essence or nature body	*ngo bo nyid sku*
essenceless	*rang bzhin med pa, ngo bo nyid med pa*
essential instruction	*man ngag*
essential predicate	*ngo bo du kun btags*
establish, exist	*grub pa*
eternalism	*rtag lta*
etymology	*sgra bshad*
evident	*mngon gyur*
example	*dpe*
exemplification	*mtshan gzhi*
exist	*grub pa, yod pa*
exist by virtue of an essence, inherently exist	*rang bzhin gyis yod pa*
exist by virtue of being a *svalakṣaṇa*	*rang mtshan gis grub pa*
exist by virtue of its own characteristic	*rang gis mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*
exist by virtue of its own real nature	*dngos po'i dbang gis grub pa*

exist by virtue of its own reality .... *dngos po'i gnas tshod kyis grub pa*

exist from its own side .... *rang ngos nas grub pa*

exist in its own right.. *sdod lugs su yod pa*

exist objectively .... *yul kyi sdod lugs su grub pa*

exist under its own power....................................... *rang dbang du grub pa*

existent thing, cognized phenomenon .... *gzhal bya, gzhi grub, yod pa*

existential state .... *srid pa*

exist as substances or substantially .... *rdzas su grub pa*

exist from the object's own side .... *don stengs na grub*

experience .... *myong ba*

expressed, meaning .... *brjod bya*

extent, measure .... *tshad*

external object .... *phyi don*

extrasensory perception .... *mngon shes*

extreme of nihilism... *med pa'i mtha'*

extremely obtuse or hidden [point]............................ *shin tu lkog gyur (kyi gnad)*

eye consciousness .... *mig (gi rnam par) shes (pa)*

eye disease... *rab rib*

F

fact that [can be proven by] direct means .... *dngos stob kyi yul*

faith .... *dad pa*

false .... *rdzun pa*

false, feigned .... *bcos ma*

fault .... *skyon*

feeling .... *tshor ba*

fiction, invention, reification .... *sgro 'dgos / brtags*

find .... *rnyed pa*

finite .... *thug pa yod pa*

firmness of mind .... *yid brtan*

five aggregates [that are taken up] .... *(nyer len gyi) phung po lnga*

flexible .... *ldem pa*

forebear, patience .... *bzod pa*

form .... *gzugs*

forward pervasion .... *rjes khyab*

foundation [consciousness] .... *kun gzhi (rnam par shes pa)*

four [extreme] positions .... *phyogs bzhi*

four means for accumulating [disciples] .... *sdu ba'i dngos po bzhi*

four searches .... *tshol ba bzhi*

four understandings .... *yongs su shes pa bzhi*

freedom from mental proliferation .... *spros bral*

functionality .... *bya byed*

G

general, universal .... *spyi*

generation stage .... *bskyed rim*

generic image .... *don spyi*

generic linguistic image .... *sgra spyi*

generic or universal characteristic .... *spyi'i mtshan nyid*

gnosis .... *ye shes*

grasp at or apprehend a self .... *bdag 'dzin*

great bliss .... *bde chen*

great love .... *byams chen*

great objectless compassion .... *dmigs pa med pa'i thugs rje chen po*

gross, crude, rough .... *rag pa*

ground of nescient latent potentialities .... *ma rig bag chags kyi sa*

grouping, accumulation, assembly, conjunction .... *tshogs*

H

heartfelt .... *zhe bas*

heat [stage of the path] .... *drod*

heights, higher state of existence .... *mtho ris*

heterodox .... *mu steg*

higher rebirth .... *mngon mtho*

highest, ultimate .... *dam pa*

hypothetical .... *mthar gzung*

I

I .... *nga, bdag*

illusion .... *sgyu ma*

[illusion of] falling hair .... *skra shad 'dzag pa*

imaginary, imputed entity .... *kun brtags*

immediately antecedent condition .... *de ma thag rkyen*

imply .... *'phen*

imprint .... *lag rjes*

impure dependent entity .... *ma dag gzhan dbang*

imputation, label .... *btags pa*

in the purview [of] .... *ngor*

inconceivable .... *rnam par rtog pa med pa*

incorrect misconception .... *yang dag ma yin kun rtog*

indefinite .... *ma nges pa*

indefinite in lineage .... *ma nges pa'i rigs can*

independent .... *ltos med, rang dbang can, yan gar ba*

indirectly .... *shugs la*

individual autocognitive gnosis .... *so so rang gi rig pa'i ye shes*

individual members [of a category] .... *gzhi ldog*

induction .... *ldog pa gcig pa'i dpung 'phul ba*

inductive inference .... *yid ches rjes dpag*

ineffable, inexpressible .... *brjod du med pa*

inexhaustible .... *chud mi za*

inference .... *rjes dpag*

inference based on what is renowned to or understood by others (*iro*) .... *gzhan la grags kyi rjes dpag*

inference renowned or understood in one's own system .... *rang la grags pa'i rjes dpag*

inferential cognition [of emptiness] .... *rigs shes rjes dpag*

inherent purity .... *rang bzhin rnam dag*

inherently abiding lineage .... *rang bzhin du gnas pa'i rigs*

inherently exist, exist by virtue of an essence .... *rang bzhin gyis yod pa*

initiation .... *dbang*

innate .... *lhan skyes*

insight .... *lhag mthong*

instruction .... *gdams pa*

intellectual, learned, philosophical .... *kun brtags*

intended basis, ultimate intention .... *dgongs gzhi*

intention, purport .... *dgongs pa*

intention to express .... *brjod 'dod*

intermediate state .... *bar srid*

internal contradiction .... *nang 'gal*

internal [sense] organ .... *nang gi skye mched*

intuitively, at will, simply by focusing on it [the object] .... *blo ka phyogs pa tsam*

invention, fiction, reification .... *sgro 'dogs/brtags*

involved in circular reasoning .... *rtogs pa phan tshun brten*

K

karma and its effects, moral causality .... *las 'bras*

kind .... *rigs*

knowable phenomenon .... *shes bya*

knowledge of the basis .... *gzhi shes*

L

label .... *btags / 'dogs pa*

labeled in dependence upon [other things] .... *brtan nas btags pa*

labeled phenomenon .... *btags yod/chos*

larger category .... *khyab byed*

latent karmic potentiality .... *las kyi bag chags*

latent potentiality .... *bag chags*

latent potentiality for the apprehension of true existence .... *bden 'dzin gyi bag chags*

latent potentiality of ignorance .... *ma rig bag chags*

latent potentiality of the kinds of existence .... *srid pa'i yan lag gyi bag chags*

latent potentiality that perceives the self .... *bdag tu lta ba'i bag chags*

law of excluded middle .... *dgag pa gnyis*

learned, philosophical, intellectual............................ *kun brtags*

liberation, emancipation .... *(rnam par) thar pa*

liberative path .... *rnam grol lam*

limit of the stream .... *rgyun mtha'*

limited or ordinary (being) .... *tshur mthong*

lineage, classification, kind .... *rigs*

linguistic latent potentiality .... *mngon par brjod pa'i bag chags*

linguistic referent .... *gdags gzhi*

linguistic symbol .... *rda*

logic .... *rtog ge*

logical object of refutation .... *rtags kyi dgag bya, rigs pa'i dgag bya*

logical reasoning, syllogism .... *gtan tshig*

logical reasoning analyzing the ultimate .... *don dam dpyod byed kyi rigs pa*

logical reasoning or argument .... *rigs pa*

logician .... *rtog ge pa*

M

Madhyamaka .... *dbu ma*

main or referent object, apprehended or direct object ...... *'dzin stang gi yul*

manifest (v.) .... *sprul pa*

manifest .... *mngon gyur*

Manifestationist .... *mngon par gsal bar bya ba*

mantra .... *sngags*

mark .... *mtshan ma*

marks and signs [of a buddha] .... *mtshan dpe*

material [cause] .... *nyer len*

materialist .... *tshu rol mdzes pa pa*

meaning, object .... *don*

measure, extent .... *tshad*

meditation .... *sgom pa*

meditational deity .... *yi dam*

memory .... *dren pa*

mental .... *sems pa*

mental consciousness .... *yid shes*

mental direct perception .... *yid kyi mgnon sum*

mental factor .... *sems byung*

mental object .... *dmigs pa, dpyod yul*

mental organ .... *yid dbang*

mental quiescence .... *zhi gnas*

mentated .... *bsam pa*

mere general self .... *phyir nga tsam*

mere name or merely nominal .... *ming tsam*

mere *vijnapti, vijñaptimātra* .... *rnam par rig pa tsam*

merely nominally labeled .... *ming du btags pa tsam*

merit .... *bsod nams*

method .... *thabs*

mind, thought .... *sems*

mineness .... *nga yi (bdag gir) ba*

misbehavior (subtle) .... *kun tu spyod pa*

misconception .... *rnam par rtog pa*

misconceptualization of the object .... *gzung rtog*

misconceptualization of the subject .... *'dzin rtog*

misguidedness .... *thabs ma yin pa la zhugs pa*

misperception of the collection of perishable [aggregates] .... *'jig tshogs la lta ba*

misperception of the self .... *bdag lta*

mistaken .... *phyin ci log, log pa*

mistaken conception .... *log rtog*

mistaken consciousness .... *log shes*

misunderstanding of the object .... *gzung don rtog pa*

misunderstanding of the subject .... *'dzin don rtog pa*

mode of appearance... *snang tshul*

mode of apprehension .... *'dzin stangs*

mode of conception .... *zhen stangs*

momentary... *skad cig ma*

moral causality, karma and its effects .... *las 'bras*

moral discipline.. *tshul khrims*

mutually exclusive directly contradicting [things]........... *phan tshun spangs pa'i dngos 'gal*

N

Naiyāyika .... *rtog ge pa*

nature, essence.. *rang bzhin, ngo bo*

nature [essence] body... *ngo bo nyid sku*

natureless .... *ngo bo nyid med pa*

necessity, purpose .... *dgos pa*

negate, annihilate.. *sun 'byin pa, rnam par bcad pa, khegs pa*

negative reflex action.. *gnas ngan len*

nescience... *gti mug*

nihilism... *skur 'debs*

nihilist .... *med pa pa*

nihilistic kind of emptiness.................................... *chad stong*

nihilistic view .... *med par lta ba, chad lta*

nominal... *tha snyad pa*

nominal valid cognition .... *tha snyad pa'i tshad ma*

nominally .... *tha snyad du*

nonaffirming negation .... *med dgag*

nonafflicted [form of] ignorance .... *nyons mongs can ma yin pa'i ma rig pa*

noncomposite .... *'du ma byed*

nonconceptual .... *rtog bral*

nonconceptual consciousness .... *rtog med shes pa*

nonconceptual gnosis .... *mi rtogs pa'i ye shes*

nondiscrimination .... *'du shes med pa*

nonentity .... *dngos por med pa, dngos med*

nonerroneous real .... *phyin ci ma log pa'i yong grub*

nonestablished .... *ma sgrub pa*

nonexistent .... *med pa, gzhi ma grub pa*

nurtured .... *gso par byed*

O

object .... *yul*

object, meaning .... *don*

object appearing to conceptual thought .... *rtog pa'i snang yul*

object to be negated or refuted .... *dgag bya*

objective aspect .... *gzung rnam*

objective condition .... *dmigs rkyen*

obscuration .... *sgrib pa*

obscuration to omniscience .... *shes bya'i sgrib pa*

obstacles [removed during the path of] seeing .... *mthong spang*

obtuse points, concealed entity .... *lkog gyur*

omniaspected matter .... *rnam pa thams cad pa'i gzugs*

one who does not go far enough [in the refutation that leads to emptiness] .... *khyab cung ba*

one who overextends himself or herself [in the refutation that leads to emptiness] .... *khyab che ba*

opponent .... *phyir rgol*

oppose, opposition .... *ldog pa*

opposite .... *bzlog phyogs*

oral transmission .... *lung*

ordinary .... *rang dga' ba*

ordinary being .... *so skye*

ordinary or limited [being] .... *tshur mthong*

our own, that is, the Buddhist system .... *rang sde*

own characteristic, *svalakṣaṇa*, particular .... *rang msthan*

own nature .... *rang gi ngo bo (nyid)*

own reality .... *rang gi gnas tshod*

P

part .... *yang lag, cha, cha shas*

particular, *svalakṣaṇa*, own characteristic .... *rang msthan*

path, vehicle .... *theg pa, lam*

path of faithful activity .... *mos pa spyod pa'i lam*

path of insight or seeing .... *mthong lam*

path of knowledge that cognizes the path of the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddhas* .... *nyan rang gi lam shes pa'i lam shes*

path of preparation .... *sbyor lam*

patience, forebearance .... *bzod pa*

peace .... *zhi ba*

peak junction [stage of the path] .... *rtse sbyor*

perceive .... *dmigs pa*

perceived object .... *dmigs yul, gzhal bya*

perfect end .... *yang dag mtha'*

perfect object, emptiness, reality .... *yang dag pa'i don*

perfection of wisdom .... *phar phyin*

periodic .... *res 'ga' ba*

permanent .... *rtag pa*

permanent and stable .... *rtag brtan*

permanent entity .... *rtags dngos*

permanent substance .... *rtag rdzas*

permutation .... *'dres khang*

person .... *gang zag*

personal self-knowledge .... *so so'i rang rig pa*

pervaded category .... *khyab bya*

pervading category .... *khyab byed*

pervasion .... *khyab pa*

phenomenal body [of a buddha], *dharmakāya* .... *chos sku*

phenomenon .... *shes bya, gzhi grub, chos*

philosopher, advocate of a philosophical view .... *grub mtha' smra ba*

philosophical, learned, intellectual .... *kun brtags*

philosophical position, belief, thesis .... *dam bca'*

philosophical school or tenet .... *grub mtha'*

physical .... *gzugs can*

polemics, critique, rebuttal .... *dgag lam*

portion concordant to emancipation .... *thar pa cha mthun*

posit .... *'jog pa*

posited by names and signs .... *ming dang rda'i bzhags pa tsam*

positive .... *yong su gcod pa*

positive purificatory practice .... *rnam byang ki phyogs*

possessing a quality, subject .... *chos can*

possessing an object .... *dmigs bcas*

possessing an ulterior purport .... *dgongs pa can*

possessing aspects .... *rnam bcas*

power .... *stobs*

practice .... *sgrub pa, sbyor pa*

Prāsaṅgika .... *Thal 'gyur pa*

precondition .... *byed las*

predicate (v.) .... *'dogs pa*

predicate .... *(bsgrub bya'i) chos*

predicated, predication, to predicate .... *btags pa, sbyar ba*

preliminary visualizations .... *sngon 'gro'i dmigs pa*

proclivity for activity .... *spyod pa'i phra rgyas*

produced, composite .... *'du byed*

product .... *byas pa*

product or composite thing that is neither [mind or matter] .... *ldan min 'du byed*

profound meaning or object, emptiness .... *zab don*

proliferation, elaboration .... *spros pa*

proponent .... *snga rgol*

proposition [subject + predicate] .... *(b)sgrub bya*

provisional meaning .... *drang don*

pure, purity .... *(rnam par) dag pa*

pure attainments subsequent [to equipoise] .... *rjes thob dag pa*

pure dependent entity .... *dag pa gzhan dbang*

pure *karma* .... *zag pa med pa'i las*

purport, intention .... *dgongs pa*

purpose, necessity .... *dgos pa*

Q

qualifying predicate .... *khyad par kun brtags*

quality .... *chos*

R

radiant in nature .... *gsal ba'i rang bzhin*

real .... *yongs grub, yang dag pa*

real, direct, actual .... *dngos*

real or correct conventional entity .... *yang dag kun rdzog*

real ultimate .... *don dam dngos*

realist .... *dngos smra ba*

reality .... *chos nyid, gnas tshod/tshul, rnal ma, de kho na nyid, de bzhin nyid, gnas lugs, sdod lugs*

realization .... *mngon rtogs, grub pa*

really, directly .... *dngos su*

really exist .... *yang dag par grub pa*

really existent .... *gnas tshul la grub pa*

really existent in its own right .... *rang gi sdod lugs su grub pa*

reason .... *rtags*

[reasoning from the] nonperception of a more extensive category .... *khyab byed ma dmigs pa*

reasoning from the nonperception of essence .... *rang bzhin ma dmigs pa'i rtags*

reasoning of the diamond granule .... *rdo rje gzegs ma'i gtan tshigs*

[reasoning that] establishes only the term .... *tha snyad 'ba' zhig sgrub*

reasoning that refutes the arising of the existent and nonexistent .... *yod med skye dgag gi rigs pa*

reasoning that refutes arising via the four extremes .... *mu bzhi skye 'gog gi rigs pa*

rebuttal, polemics, critique .... *dgag lan*

receptacle consciousness .... *len pa'i rnam par shes pa*

recognition .... *'du shes*

referent, basis .... *gzhi, don, 'jug gzhi*

referent object .... *btags don*

reflexive experience .... *rang myong*

reification, fiction, invention .... *sgro 'dogs (brtags)*

related in such a way that they have the same nature ..... *bdag gcig 'brel*

relationship between subject and reason .... *phyogs chos*

relying [on other things] .... *ltos bcas*

repudiate .... *khegs pa*

reverse pervasion .... *ldog khyab*

right view [that is, the view of emptiness] .... *yang dag pa'i lta ba*

rough, crude, gross .... *rag pa*

S

samādhi .... *ting nge 'dzin*

saṃbhogakāya, enjoyment body .... *longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku*

scripture or scriptural citation .... *lung*

search for essential and specific predication .... *ngo bo nyid du 'dogs pa dang khyad par du 'dogs pa tshol ba*

search for the thing .... *dngos po tshol ba*

secondary mental event .... *sems byung*

seed .... *sa bon*

seed of concordant latent potentialities .... *rigs mthun pa'i bag chags kyi sa bon*

self .... *bdag*

self of phenomena	*chos kyi bdag*
self of the person	*gang zag gi bdag*
self-grasping	*bdag 'dzin*
selflessness	*bdag med*
self-power	*rang dbang*
self-reflecting	*rang snang ba*
self-sufficient	*rang skya thub pa'i*
self-sufficient substantially existent [person]	*gang zag rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod*
sense object	*skyed mched*
sense organ	*dbang po*
sensory consciousness	*dbang shes*
separation between apprehended object and apprehending subject	*gzung 'dzin rgyangs chad*
sequentially	*rim can du*
series	*thebs*
servant	*khol po*
set, category	*rang ldog*
sevenfold analysis	*dpyad pa rnam pa bdun*
sign, symbol	*rda*
simply by focusing [on the object], at will, intuitively	*blo kha phyogs pa tsam*
six external spheres	*khams drug*
sixteen *padārtha* of the Naiyāyikas	*rtog ge tshig don bcu drug*
skill in means	*thabs mkhas*
slander, deny the existence of	*skur ba 'debs pa*
smaller category	*khyab bya*

soteriological object of refutation .... *lam gyi dgag bya*

soteriologically valid doctrine.................................. *kun byang gi chos*

special, superior .... *khyad par du 'phags pa*

specific .... *khyad par*

specific predication .... *khyad par du kun brtags pa*

sphere... *skyed mched*

sphere of activity .... *spyod yul*

sphere of nothingness [the third *samāpatti* or formless absorption] .... *ci yang med pa'i skye mched*

spiritual master .... *bla ma*

śrāvaka .... *nyan thos*

śrāvaka type .... *nyan thos rigs can*

stable .... *brtan po*

stage of great joy [tenth of the ten *bhūmis*]................. *rab tu dga' ba'i sa*

Stages of the Path .... *Lam rim*

stain, defilement.. *dri ma*

standard .... *ltos sa*

subconscious... *bag la nyal*

subject.. *yul can, rig byed*

subject matter .... *brjod bya*

subject of the inquiry .... *shes 'dod chos can*

subject [possessing a quality] .... *phyogs, chos can*

subjective aspect.. *'dzin rnam*

subsequent attainment .... *rjes thob*

subsequent consciousness .... *bcad shes*

substance.. *rdzas*

substantially existent... *rdzas yod, rdzas su grub pa*

substratum .... *gzhis*

subtle .... *phra ba, yang ba*

suffering.. *sdug bsngal*

suffering of change .... *'gyur ba'i sdug bsngal*

suffering of the pervasive composite .... *khyab pa 'du byed kyi sdug bsngal*

superior, special .... *khyad par du 'phags pa*

superior state [of cyclic existence]........................ *mtho ris*

superior thought .... *lhag bsam*

supramundane .... *'jig rten las 'das pa'i*

supramundane path.. *'das lam*

supreme emanation body .... *mchog gyi sprul sku*

svalakṣaṇa, [own characteristic, particular]................ *rang mtshan*

svatantra .... *rang rgyud (kyi rtags)*

Svāntantrika .... *Rang rgyud pa*

syllogism, logical reasoning.. *gtan tshigs*

syllogistic reasoning based on dependent arising .... *rten 'brel kyi gtan tshigs*

symbol, sign.. *rda*

synonymous .... *don gcig*

T

tathāgatagarbha, buddha-nature................................ *bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po*

teaching .... *khrid*

ten powers .... *stobs bcu*

ten unstable misconceptions.. *rnam gyeng gi rnam rtog bcu*

terminology .... *tha snyad*

thesis, belief, philosophical position .... *dam bca'*

thing, entity .... *dngos po*

those that can be counted as .... *rnam grangs pa'i*

those who have a definite *śrāvaka* vocation .... *nyan thos rigs nges*

thought .... *blo, sems*

three conditions [causal, immediate, and dominant] .... *rkyen gsum*

three cycles .... *'khor gsum*

three existences .... *srid pa gsum*

three knowledges .... *mkhyen gsum*

three natures .... *ngo bo nyid gsum*

total knowledge .... *tham cad shes pa*

trained in terminology .... *rda la byang ba*

trimodal [criterion] .... *tshul gsum*

true arising .... *bden skye*

truly existent .... *bden par grub pa/yod pa*

truth .... *bden pa*

truth of cessation .... *'gog bden*

truthlessness .... *bden par med pa*

tutelary deity .... *yi dam*

two truths .... *bden bnyis*

U

ultimate, highest object .... *don dam pa*

ultimate analysis .... *don dam dpyod pa*

ultimate emptiness .... *don dam par stong pa nyid*

ultimate intention, intended basis .... *dgongs gzhi*

ultimate purport .... *dgongs pa mthar thug pa*

ultimate reality .... *mthar thug pa'i gnas*

ultimate truth .... *don dam bden pa*

ultimate view .... *mthar thug pa'i lta ba*

ultimately existent .... *don dam par yod pa*

ultimately natureless .... *don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa*

ultimately [smallest] moment .... *dus mtha'i skad cig ma*

unchanging real .... *'gyur med yongs grub*

undeclared view .... *lung ma bstan gyi lta ba*

under its own power .... *tshugs thub tu*

undermine .... *gcod*

understand .... *rtogs pa*

unitary .... *gcig*

universal .... *spyi*

universal or general characteristic .... *spyi 'i mtshan nyid*

unknowable .... *shes par bya ba ma yin pa*

unobstructed path .... *bar chad med lam*

unreal thing, unreality .... *dngos med*

unsatisfied .... *ma tshim par*

utilitarian phenomenon .... *go chod kyi chos*

utilizing worldly conventions .... *'jig rten grags sde spyod pa*

utterly nonexistent imaginary entities .... *yongs su chad pa'i kun brtags*

utterly unbelievable .... *rnam par shes par bya ba ma yin pa*

V

valid cognition .... *tshad ma*

valid reasoning from the effect to the cause .... *'bras rtags yang dag*

vehicle, path .... *theg pa*

view .... *lta ba*

view in regard to the perishable [aggregates] .... *'jig lta*

view that nothing is to be thought of .... *ci yang yid la mi byed pa'i lta ba*

view that things are neither existent nor nonexistent .... *yod min med min gyi lta ba*

view that [things] do not exist .... *yod pa ma yin par lta ba*

vijñaptimātra, mere *vijñapti* .... *rnam par rig pa tsam*

W

what depends [on a basis] .... *brten pa*

what gives rise to something, cause .... *bskyed byed*

what has arisen, effect .... *bskyed bya*

what is experienced .... *myong bya*

what labels .... *'dogs byed*

what possesses an attribute or quality, subject .... *chos can*

wisdom .... *shes rab*

without aspects .... *rnam med*

withstand analysis by reasoning .... *rigs pas dpyad bzod*

word .... *bka', sgra*

world .... *'jig rten*

worldly gnosis .... *'jig rten pa'i ye shes*

worldly nominal valid cognition .... *'jig rten pa'i tha snyad pa'i tshad ma*

worldly parlance or terminology .... *'jig rten gyi tha snyad*

wrong or false view... *lta ba ngan pa*

[wrong] view of the self .... *bdag lta*

Y

yogic direct perception .... *rnal 'byor mngon sum*

Abbreviations

AA	*Abhisamayālaṃkāra*
AC	Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka*
AK	*Abhidharmakośa,* see, for example, Pradhan ed.
AKB	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*
AS	*Abhidharmasamuccaya*
BA	Roerich, *Blue Annals*
BCA	*Bodhicaryāvatāra,* see for example, Bhattacharya ed.
BGR	Tsong kha pa, *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*
BIS	*Berliner Indologische Studien*
BPD	*dBu ma'i spyi don*
BS	sDe srid, *Baiḍūr ser po*
BUD	Buddhapālita's commentary on *MMK*
C	Cone ed. of Tibetan canon
CMDR	Wayman, *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*
CS	*Catuḥśataka*
CTB	Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*
CTBE	van der Kuijp, *Contributions to Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology*
CTBRP	Steinkellner and Tauscher, *Contributions of Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy*
D	sDe dge ed. of Tibetan canon
DAE	Napper, *Dependent Arising and Emptiness*
DBPL	Cabezón, *The Development of a Buddhist Philosophy of Language*
EE	Thurman, *Essence of True Eloquence*

EGW	Jackson, *The Entrance Gate for the Wise*
EOE	Huntington, *The Emptiness of Emptiness*
HOB	Obermiller, *History of Buddhism*
IB	Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism*
IIJ	*Indo-Iranian Journal*
iro	inference based on what is renowned to, or understood by, others
IsMEO	Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente
JAAR	*Journal of the American Academy of Religion*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JIABS	*Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*
JIP	*Journal of Indian Philosophy*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
KDJ	mKhas grub rje
KL	Klein, *Knowledge and Liberation*
KYP	gNas rnying, *rNam thar mkhas pa'i yid 'phrog*
LMS	Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School*
LRCM	Tsong kha pa, *Lam rim chen mo*
LRLN	Tshe mchog gling, *Lam rim bla ma rgyud pa'i rnam thar*
LSN	Tsong kha pa, *Drang nges legs bshad snying po*
MA	la Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti*
MMK	*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, see, for example, Inada ed.
MOE	Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*
MTS	*Madhyamaka Text Series* edition of *TTC*
MV	*Mahāvyutpatti*, Sasaki ed.
n.d.	no date
NT	dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, *rNam thar* (of KDJ)
P	Peking ed. of Tibetan Canon
PEW	*Philosophy East and West*

PPS	*Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra(s)*
Pras	*Prasannapadā,* see, for example, la Vallée Poussin ed.
Pras-tib	*Prasannapadā,* sDe dge Tibetan trans.
PTS	Pali Text Society
PV	*Pramāṇavārttika,* see, for example, Shastri ed.
RGV	*Ratnagotravibhāga,* see, for example, Johnston ed.
RGVV	*Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā*
SB	Thurman, *A Short Biography and Letter of rJe Tsong kha pa*
SGV	Lamotte, *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga*
SK	bSod rnams rgya mtsho, ed., *Sa skya bka' 'bum*
SK-I	van der Kuijp, "Studies in mKhas grub rje I"
SK-IV	van der Kuijp, "Studies in mKhas grub rje IV"
SNT	rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, *gSang ba'i rnam thar*
SOS	Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika*
SR	Takasaki, *A Study of the Ratnagotravibhāga*
SS	Lamotte, *Explication des Mystères, Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*
TTC	mKhas grub rje, *sTong thun chen mo*
TTG	Ruegg, *La Théorie du Tathagatagarbha et du Gotra*
TTKT	Tshe tan zhabs grung, *bsTan rtsis kun las btus pa*
VV	*Vigrahavyāvartanī,* see, for example, Bhattacharya ed.
WZKSO	*Wienen Zeitschrift für kunde Süd-und Ostasiens*

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An Annotated Translation of the *sTong thun chen mo* of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang

JOSÉ IGNACIO CABEZÓN

This book is an annotated translation of one of the great Tibetan classics of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought, mKhas grub rje's *sTong thun chen mo*. The text is a detailed critical exposition of the theory and practice of emptiness as expounded in the three major schools of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy: The Yogācāra, Svātantrika, and Prāsaṅgika. Used as a supplement to the scholastic debating manuals in some of the greatest monasteries of Tibet, the *sTong thun chen mo* is a veritable encyclopedia of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophical, dealing with such topics as hermeneutics, the theory of non-duality, the linguistic interpretation of emptiness, the typology of ignorance, logic, the nature of time, and the perception of matter across world spheres. This book is an indispensable source for understanding the Tibetan dGe lugs pa school's synthesis of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) and Epistemological (Pramāṇika) traditions of Indian Buddhism. In addition, it is an unprecedented source for the philosophical polemics of fifteenth century Tibet.

"It is encyclopedic and covers the most important ideas in the whole fabric of Indian Mahāyāna-Tibetan Buddhism. It brings to sharp relief the many debates, controversies, and variant interpretations of the key issues. Some of the elucidations are only found in these Tibetan sources and thus increases the value of this work."

— Kenneth Inada, State University of New York at Buffalo

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